Hernandez vs. National Power Corporation

The prohibition in Presidential Decree No. 1818 against court injunctions involving government infrastructure projects does not apply where the controversy involves questions of law, such as alleged violation of the constitutional right to health and failure to conduct prior consultation, and the requisites for preliminary injunction under probability of rights violation are shown.

Petitioners are numerous residents and homeowners of Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, joined by Barangay Dasmariñas and Judge Francisco B. Ibay as nominal party. Respondent National Power Corporation is a government-owned public utility undertaking power transmission projects. Presidential Decree No. 1818, as implemented by Supreme Court circulars, generally deprives courts of jurisdiction to enjoin infrastructure projects and public utilities operated by the government.

Sometime in 1996, the National Power Corporation began construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers, 53.4 meters high, to support overhead high tension cables for its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project. The line traverses Sergio Osmeña, Sr. Highway, the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road where petitioners reside.

Alarmed by the towering structures, petitioners researched possible adverse health effects and obtained published articles and studies linking exposure to electromagnetic fields to illnesses ranging from cancer to leukemia. They raised their concerns with NAPOCOR, which held a series of meetings with them. Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, in a Privilege Speech dated 10 May 1999, denounced the manner in which NAPOCOR allegedly ignored safety and consultation requirements, while petitioners also brought the matter to Representative Arnulfo Fuentebella, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy.

In a letter dated 10 August 1999 to Congressman Fuentebella, NAPOCOR President Federico Puno outlined four options discussed with Dasmariñas and Forbes residents: (a) transfer of the line to Lawton Avenue at P111.84 million; (b) maintenance of 12 meters distance along the village at P77.60 million; (c) construction of an underground line at P482.00 million; and (d) rerouting along C-5 and South Luzon Expressway at P1,018.83 million. By letter dated 8 November 1999, President Puno stated NAPOCOR was still working toward a win-win solution. Negotiations nevertheless reached an impasse, with petitioners seeking relocation to Fort Bonifacio, particularly Lawton Avenue, and NAPOCOR insisting on a 12-meter easement widening.

Thereafter, on 9 March 2000, petitioners sued for damages and sought relocation of the lines, invoking hazardous electromagnetic radiation. The trial record included petitioners' studies on electromagnetic fields, NAPOCOR's brochure on its Quezon Power Project indicating a 20-meter easement on each side, President Puno's correspondence, Congressman Escudero's speech, and evidence of negotiations and meetings. The trial court credited this showing as indicating that health concerns were far from imaginary and that consultation and safety compliance remained genuinely in dispute.

• Extreme Urgency and Irreparable Injury: Petitioner argued that temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions were designed for matters of extreme urgency where there is probability of grave injustice and irreparable injury, as when health and safety hang in the balance.
• Requisites for Preliminary Injunction: Petitioner maintained that the rule merely requires that unless restrained, the act complained of will probably work injustice to the applicant or probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment ineffectual.
• Inapplicability of Presidential Decree No. 1818: Petitioner maintained that Presidential Decree No. 1818 could not be construed to apply to cases of extreme urgency involving the constitutional right to health under Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution and the prior-consultation requirement under the Local Government Code.

• Lack of Jurisdiction Under Presidential Decree No. 1818: Respondent countered that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818 deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or preliminary injunction involving an infrastructure project or government-operated public utility, warranting dismissal.
• Prohibition Reiterated by Court Circulars: Respondent argued that the proscription was clearly mandated and reiterated by Supreme Court Circulars No. 2-91 and No. 13-93, leaving no room for the trial court's orders.
• Safety and Economic Justification: Respondent countered with studies yielding contrary results on electromagnetic-radiation risks and with presumed economic benefits of the transmission project, disputing the need to restrain energization and operation.

• Applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1818: Whether the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin construction and operation of the 29 steel towers and high-voltage lines, notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818.
• Grounds for Preliminary Injunction: Whether the act complained of probably violates petitioners' rights and tends to render judgment ineffectual so as to justify a writ of preliminary injunction under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

• Applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1818: No, the prohibition does not bar relief. The ban covers only injunctions against administrative acts involving facts or technical discretion, not controversies presenting questions of law on constitutional and statutory compliance.
• Grounds for Preliminary Injunction: Yes. Probability, not certainty, of rights violation suffices for a provisional writ, and the record showed adequate basis to conclude the project probably imperils health and safety pending full trial.

• Applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1818: The prohibition was construed as limited to restraining administrative acts in controversies involving facts or exercise of discretion in technical cases, following the line from Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr. to Zamora vs. Caballero and G & S Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. Because petitioners invoked violation of the constitutionally protected right to health and NAPOCOR's alleged failure to conduct prior consultation with the affected community under the Local Government Code, veritable questions of law were presented that invested the trial court with jurisdiction. Such questions were deemed clearly outside the technical-discretion dimension and thus divested of the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818, which was not intended as a blanket disregard of fundamental rights to health, safety, and well-being.
• Grounds for Preliminary Injunction: Under Section 3, Rule 58, a preliminary injunction may issue when the act complained of is probably in violation of the applicant's rights and tends to render judgment ineffectual, with probability as distinct from the certainty required for a permanent injunction. Applied to the record, petitioners' studies linking electromagnetic fields to cancer and leukemia, NAPOCOR's own brochure indicating a larger 20-meter easement on each side for its Quezon Power Project as against the 12-meter easement proposed, President Puno's letters acknowledging negotiations for relocation options, Congressman Escudero's censure of cavalier disregard of safety and consultation, and the series of meetings were considered ample indicia that health concerns were not imaginary. Judicial notice of the project's proximity to earthquake faults including the Marikina fault and exposure to typhoons and tornadoes, plus apparent lack of exhaustive feasibility study and shortcutting of community consultation, engendered sufficient doubt to preserve the status quo pending determination of safety, consultation, and damages issues.

• Limited scope of Presidential Decree No. 1818 — Although the decree appears to encompass all cases involving infrastructure, natural-resource, and public-utility projects, the prohibition extends only to injunctions against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or exercise of discretion in technical cases; on issues clearly outside that dimension and involving questions of law, courts retain power to restrain administrative acts. Applied here, alleged violations of the right to health and of prior-consultation requirements were questions of law permitting a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
• Preliminary injunction as preservative remedy; probability standard — A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage before judgment to refrain from particular acts in order to protect substantive rights pending final judgment, upon showing that the act complained of would probably work injustice, is probably in violation of the applicant's rights, or tends to render judgment ineffectual. Certainty is not required at the provisional stage, unlike a final and permanent injunction. Applied here, conflicting studies still left causation within the realm of scientific probability, sufficient with corroborating documents and negotiations to justify preserving the status quo.
• Judicial discretion and caution in injunctions — Injunction is the strong arm of equity calling for circumspection, extended in cases of great or continuing injury, extreme urgency, clear rights, or willful invasion, and judges must observe utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness under the circulars. The circulars against indiscriminate injunctions were construed as not imposing an unbridled absolute prohibition. Applied here, enjoining possible shielding of wrongdoing on safety and consultation pending trial was deemed a proper exercise of discretion rather than an erosion thereof.

• "Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases." — States the controlling limitation on the statutory ban and frames why questions of law fall outside it.
• "On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts." — Supplies the canonical exception relied upon to sustain jurisdiction despite an infrastructure project.
• "A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts." — Defines the provisional, preservative character of the remedy invoked to maintain the status quo pending trial.
• "Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law." — Reiterates from Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. that general welfare may not override legal requirements such as health protection and consultation.

• Zamora vs. Caballero, G.R. No. 147767, 14 January 2004, 419 SCRA 384 — Followed as authority for the limited scope of Presidential Decree No. 1818, distinguishing factual or technical-discretion matters from questions of law where courts may enjoin.
• Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr., G.R. No. 86695, 3 September 1992, 213 SCRA 516 — Followed as the source formulation of the exception that courts are not prevented from restraining administrative acts involving questions of law.
• Garcia vs. Burgos, 353 Phil. 740 (1998) — Cited for the general purpose of Presidential Decree No. 1818 to avoid disrupting essential government projects and economic development, but distinguished because the present controversy raised constitutional and legal issues.
• G & S Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 7 (2002) — Cited in support of the same limitation on the injunction ban.
• Phil. Ports Authority vs. Cipres Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc., G.R. No. 145742, 14 July 2005, 463 SCRA 358 — Followed for the definition of preliminary injunction as a preservative remedy against claimed emergency that would otherwise render litigation useless.
• Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 385 Phil. 586 (2000) — Followed to uphold an injunction against a government act pursued through legal shortcuts, emphasizing that general welfare must not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law.

• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1818 — Provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to issue restraining orders or injunctions involving infrastructure projects or government-operated public utilities; construed as inapplicable where questions of law on health rights and consultation are involved.
• Article II, Section 15, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people; invoked as the constitutional right probably imperiled by electromagnetic exposure and as basis for questioning the project.
• Section 27, Local Government Code — Provides that no project or program shall be implemented unless prior consultations with affected communities and prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned are observed; invoked as the statutory consultation requirement allegedly violated.
• Section 3, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Provides grounds for preliminary injunction, including probable violation of the applicant's rights and tendency to render judgment ineffectual; applied to sustain the writ on a showing of probability rather than certainty.
• Sections 3-5, Republic Act No. 8975 — Noted as the amendatory law prohibiting lower courts, except the Supreme Court, from enjoining national government projects, save in matters of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue where grave injustice and irreparable injury will otherwise arise; cited to contextualize the continuing prohibition regime.

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (Chairperson), Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.