Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals

Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; it must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality making the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and the root cause must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision.

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married on January 1, 1981 at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite. Three children were born to the union. Petitioner, five years older than private respondent, had been his college teacher at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas, Cavite before they became sweethearts. The petition sought annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, which declares void a marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. The case required the Court to determine the boundaries between psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity and the enumerated grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the same Code.

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas, Cavite, where petitioner, five years his senior, was teaching zoology and botany and private respondent was a college freshman enrolled in her class for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979, after petitioner was no longer private respondent's teacher, and were married on January 1, 1981 at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite. Three children were born to the union: Maie on May 3, 1982, Lyra on May 22, 1985, and Marian on June 15, 1989.

After the marriage, private respondent continued his studies for two more years, his tuition paid by his parents while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came principally from petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University, augmented by her sale of Tupperware products and a buy-and-sell business in coffee, rice, and polvoron. From 1983 to 1986, as private respondent could not find stable employment, it was agreed that he would help petitioner by delivering orders to customers, but the business suffered because of his spendthrift habits and involvement with other women. Private respondent frequently engaged in smoking and drinking sprees with friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters from a certain Realita Villena, a married student whose husband worked in Saudi Arabia, written to private respondent. When confronted, he admitted the extra-marital affair. Petitioner pleaded with Villena to end the relationship, and private respondent promised to do so but did not; instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child, though petitioner later accepted him back in the hope of saving the marriage.

Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent obtained employment at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986, but he availed of the early retirement plan and was employed only until March 31, 1991. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, which he spent entirely on himself within four months. During his employment at Reynolds, his smoking, drinking, gambling, and womanizing worsened. Petitioner discovered that he carried on relationships with several women: a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for some time; and Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989. When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her, causing cerebral concussion that required confinement at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmariñas, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990. According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986, contracted gonorrhea, and infected petitioner; both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987. Petitioner also testified that on one occasion during a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child, then barely a year old, and that he was never affectionate toward any of their children.

On July 17, 1979, prior to the marriage, petitioner had entered into a contract to sell with F & C Realty Corporation for a parcel of land at Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite, placing a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of P51,067.10 inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 was issued. On August 1, 1992, petitioner sent a handwritten letter to private respondent expressing frustration over the futility of her efforts to save the marriage, allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney and divide the proceeds, and stating her intention to file a petition for annulment. Private respondent never replied; by this time he had already abandoned the family, and in October 1992 petitioner learned he had left for the Middle East, his whereabouts thereafter unknown.

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, alleging that private respondent was irresponsible, immature, and unprepared for the duties of married life. She prayed for custody of the three children, monthly support of P9,000.00, and adjudication of the Dasmariñas property and the jeep as her exclusive property. On October 8, 1992, the trial court directed the assistant provincial prosecutor to investigate possible collusion; only petitioner appeared on November 5, 1992, and the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended the case for trial. Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher, corroborated petitioner's account, testifying that she had observed private respondent to be fun-loving and unemployed even before the marriage, that he became a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different women, that he had beaten petitioner, and that he was not close to his children and had abandoned the family. On April 10, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the circumstances pleaded constituted grounds for legal separation under Article 55, not psychological incapacity under Article 36, and that the gonorrhea infection, occurring five years after the marriage, could not serve as a ground for annulment under Articles 45 and 46, which require the fraud to exist at the time of the celebration. The Court of Appeals affirmed on January 30, 1996, citing Santos vs. Court of Appeals and holding that petitioner failed to prove psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage celebration.

• Existence of Incapacity at Time of Marriage: Petitioner contended that the fact that the acts of incapacity became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage should not bar annulment, arguing that Article 36 expressly provides that the incapacity "shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
• Psychological Incapacity Established: Petitioner maintained that private respondent's habitual drunkenness, sexual infidelity, gambling, physical abuse, contraction and transmission of gonorrhea, and abandonment demonstrated a psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations, and that his condition was incurable, causing the disintegration of the union and defeating the objectives of marriage.
• Custody and Support: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of permanent custody of the children to her and in denying the prayer for monthly support of P3,000.00 per child.
• Exclusive Property: Petitioner contended that the real property acquired during the marriage should be declared her exclusive property.

• Psychological Incapacity — Time of Celebration: Whether private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage as required by Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Psychological Incapacity — Nature of Acts: Whether habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, and abandonment constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Ancillary Issues: Whether the Court should rule on the issues of custody, support, and exclusive ownership of property.

• Psychological Incapacity — Time of Celebration: No. Petitioner failed to establish that private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect at the time of the marriage that deprived him of the ability to assume essential marital duties; the acts complained of occurred after the marriage, and no expert testimony was presented to prove the incapacity existed at its inception.
• Psychological Incapacity — Nature of Acts: No. Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36; they must be shown to be manifestations of a disordered personality making the spouse completely unable to discharge essential marital obligations, with the root cause medically or clinically identified and proven by experts.
• Ancillary Issues: Not reached. The Court declined to pass upon the issues of custody, support, and property ownership, holding that these matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children.

• Psychological Incapacity — Time of Celebration: Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if it becomes manifest only after solemnization. The Court of Appeals found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that petitioner presented no evidence showing that private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect at the time of the marriage. Petitioner herself described private respondent at the time of marriage as being on the "borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky," which she ascribed to his youth and good looks, not to a psychological disorder. The acts complained of — drunkenness, infidelity, gambling, abandonment — all occurred after the marriage. No expert testimony was presented to establish that any incapacity existed at the inception. The findings of the Court of Appeals on this point were entitled to great weight and even finality, and could be overturned only if shown to be whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary, which was not demonstrated.

• Psychological Incapacity — Nature of Acts: Relying on Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "psychological incapacity" refers to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants, confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The Court further relied on Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, which established that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be psychological, not physical, although its manifestations may be physical. Petitioner's evidence consisted of self-serving declarations and lay testimony; no psychiatrist or clinical psychologist was presented to identify the root cause of the alleged incapacity or to explain its incapacitating nature. The trial court correctly observed that the circumstances pleaded — repeated physical violence, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, and abandonment — are enumerated as grounds for legal separation under Article 55, and if Article 36 had intended to include them as constitutive of psychological incapacity, they would not have been separately enumerated. While these circumstances may, depending on degree and severity, serve as indicia of psychological incapacity, petitioner failed to show that they were manifestations of a disordered personality rendering private respondent completely unable to discharge essential marital obligations, rather than merely the product of youth and vanity. The constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as its foundation required that any doubt be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

• Ancillary Issues: Because the Court found no psychological incapacity and affirmed the lower courts' rulings, it deemed it unnecessary to pass upon petitioner's contentions regarding custody, support, and property ownership, noting that these matters could be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code — Psychological incapacity refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, including their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. It is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated, even if it becomes manifest only after solemnization. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that petitioner's evidence fell short, as no expert testimony established a personality disorder existing at the inception of the marriage.

• Four Requisites for Proving Psychological Incapacity (Republic vs. Court of Appeals) — The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be psychological, not physical, although its manifestations may be physical. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. The Court found that petitioner failed to satisfy these requisites, as no expert testimony was presented to identify or explain the root cause of the alleged incapacity.

• Presumption of Validity of Marriage — In light of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The Court invoked this presumption to affirm the lower courts' findings that psychological incapacity was not established.

• Distinction Between Article 36 and Article 55 Grounds — Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, repeated physical violence, and abandonment are enumerated as grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. If Article 36 had intended to include these circumstances as constitutive of psychological incapacity, they would not have been separately enumerated. However, these circumstances may, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, serve as indicia of psychological incapacity. The Court applied this distinction by holding that the acts complained of, standing alone, did not constitute psychological incapacity.

• "Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support." — This passage, quoted from Santos vs. Court of Appeals, provides the canonical formulation of psychological incapacity under Article 36 and remains a cornerstone of Philippine jurisprudence on marital nullity.

• "The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision." — This passage, quoted from Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, establishes the four-part test for proving psychological incapacity and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence as the standard for expert evidence in Article 36 cases.

• "However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi of the case, distinguishing acts that are grounds for legal separation from those that constitute psychological incapacity, and requiring proof of a disordered personality rather than mere misconduct.

• "Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage." — This passage states the presumption of validity that governs marriage cases, rooted in the constitutional policy protecting the family, and serves as a guiding principle in all Article 36 litigation.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 22 (1995) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on its definition of psychological incapacity as a mental incapacity rendering a party truly incognitive of basic marital covenants, confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders, and existing at the time of the marriage celebration. The Court also adopted the distinction that drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality, or lesbianism existing at the inception of marriage renders the marriage voidable under Article 46, while the same occurring during the marriage are grounds for legal separation under Article 55, though they may serve as indicia of psychological incapacity depending on degree and severity.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) — Followed. The Court applied the four requisite elements for proving psychological incapacity: the root cause must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision. The Court found that petitioner failed to satisfy these requisites.

• Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169 (1996) — Cited for the proposition that findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and even finality, and may be overturned only where shown to be whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary.

• Article 36, Family Code of the Philippines (as amended by E.O. No. 227) — Provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The Court applied this provision by requiring proof that the incapacity existed at the time of celebration, and by holding that the acts complained of did not constitute psychological incapacity absent expert proof of a disordered personality.

• Article 55, Family Code of the Philippines — Enumerates the grounds for legal separation, including repeated physical violence, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment. The Court cited this provision to distinguish grounds for legal separation from psychological incapacity under Article 36, holding that the circumstances pleaded by petitioner fall under Article 55.

• Articles 45 and 46, Family Code of the Philippines — Govern annulment of marriage on grounds of fraud, including concealment of sexually transmissible disease. The trial court held, and the Supreme Court did not disturb, that the gonorrhea infection occurred five years after the marriage and therefore could not serve as a ground for annulment, which requires the fraud to exist at the time of celebration.

• Article 68, Family Code of the Philippines — Enumerates the mutual obligations of spouses to live together, observe love, respect, and fidelity, and render help and support. The Court cited this provision in defining the essential marital obligations that a psychologically incapacitated party must be shown to be unable to discharge.

• Article II, Section 12 and Article XV, Sections 1-2, 1987 Constitution — Establish the State policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. The Court invoked these provisions to support the presumption of validity of marriage and the requirement that any doubt be resolved in favor of the marriage.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.