Herico vs. Dar

A tenant will not be heard to dispute his landlord's title, and free patent proceedings obtained by a tenant over land possessed by his landlord are fraudulent. Moreover, one who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public land under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years is conclusively presumed to have performed all conditions essential to a government grant, and the land ceases to be part of the public domain, beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of by free patent.

Petitioner Moises Herico and respondent Cipriano Dar were connected through a landlord-tenant relationship over a parcel of land in Paracale, Camarines Norte. The land was part of the public domain, originally within the forest zone, and was subject to the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141), as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, which allowed those in long-term possession of agricultural public lands to acquire title thereto. The dispute arose from respondent Dar's successful application for a free patent over the land, which petitioner sought to cancel.

The land in question, situated in Paracale, Camarines Norte, was part of the public domain. In 1914, when it was still within the forest zone, it was occupied by Emilio, Gregorio, and Isidoro Andaya, who gradually cleared the entire area by making caingin and planting bananas, abaca, and coconuts. In 1918, the two elder brothers ceded the land to Isidoro, the youngest, who improved it and incurred indebtedness from his aunt, Martina Herico, in the amount of P60.00. To guarantee payment, Isidoro executed on March 12, 1925, a private document purportedly mortgaging the land to Martina Herico.

In 1938, Martina demanded payment of the indebtedness, which by then amounted to P130.00. Instead of paying, Isidoro transferred and assigned his right to the land to plaintiff Moises Herico, Martina's brother, in consideration of P130.00 paid by Moises to Martina. Moises took possession of the land in 1939, planted it with abaca and coconuts, and declared it for taxation purposes in 1940 and 1945. In 1943, he placed Maximino Andaya as tenant, who remained until 1953. In 1949, petitioner placed respondent Dar as tenant on the land with the privilege of gathering all the produce thereof, provided he planted coconut trees for the petitioner.

On December 12, 1955, while still petitioner's tenant, respondent Dar filed a Free Patent application for the land without the knowledge and consent of petitioner. The application was approved on April 7, 1956, and on May 10, 1956, Original Certificate of Title No. P-506 was issued in Dar's favor. The adjoining owners, including petitioner who owned the adjoining land on the South, were not notified of the free patent application.

Respondent Dar, for his part, claimed he took possession of the land in 1922, cultivated it continuously, declared it for taxation, and filed his free patent application after occupying and cultivating the land continuously since 1922. He asserted that notices of the application were posted as required by law and that nobody objected. Junior Public Land Inspector Florencio Rosales submitted a report stating the land was claimed by nobody and that Dar had totally cultivated the area of 8.6973 hectares.

Dar's allegation that he was never a tenant was contradicted by his own signed statement of November 8, 1956, admitting he had been petitioner's tenant since 1945, and by his testimony on the witness stand admitting he had been making copra for petitioner. Petitioner declared the land for taxation in 1940, earlier than Dar, who declared it only in 1952, after he had allegedly been placed as tenant in 1949.

• Fraud in Free Patent Application: Petitioner argued that respondent Dar, being his tenant, committed fraud in filing a free patent application over the land without the knowledge and consent of his landlord, and that the proceedings whereby the free patent was obtained were fraudulent.
• Constructive Trust: Petitioner maintained that the free patent title issued to Dar created a constructive trust in favor of petitioner, as Dar should not be heard to dispute his landlord's title.
• Republic Act No. 1942: Petitioner argued that his proven occupation and cultivation of the land for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, vested title in him by operation of law, segregating the land from the mass of public domain and making it no longer disposable under the Public Land Act by free patent.
• Timeliness of Action: Petitioner contended that the action to annul or cancel the certificate of title was brought within one year from issuance, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding that the title had become absolute and indefeasible.

• Continuous Possession: Respondent argued that he took possession of the land in 1922, cultivated it continuously to the exclusion of all other persons, declared it for taxation purposes, and paid the taxes thereon.
• Regularity of Free Patent Proceedings: Respondent maintained that his free patent application was approved after the requisite official investigation, which enjoys the presumption of regularity, and that notices were posted in various places required by law with nobody objecting or filing a protest.
• Indefeasibility of Title: Respondent contended that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens title, the same could no longer be reopened to be declared null and void, having become absolute and indefeasible.

• Tenant's Estoppel: Whether respondent Dar, having admitted being a tenant of petitioner, could dispute his landlord's title and validly obtain a free patent over the land.
• Effect of Republic Act No. 1942: Whether petitioner's possession and cultivation of the land for more than thirty years had vested title in him by operation of law, removing the land from the disposable public domain.
• Fraud in Free Patent Application: Whether fraud attended respondent Dar's free patent application sufficient to warrant cancellation of the certificate of title.
• Timeliness of the Action: Whether the action to cancel the certificate of title was timely filed.

• Tenant's Estoppel: Yes. A tenant will not be heard to dispute his landlord's title, and the proceedings whereby respondent Dar obtained the free patent were fraudulent. Dar's admission of being petitioner's tenant since 1945 estopped him from claiming title adverse to his landlord.
• Effect of Republic Act No. 1942: Yes. Petitioner's proven occupation and cultivation of the land for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, vested title in him by operation of law, segregating the land from the mass of public domain and making it no longer disposable under the Public Land Act by free patent.
• Fraud in Free Patent Application: Yes. The filing of the free patent application by respondent Dar while he was petitioner's tenant, without the latter's knowledge and consent, constituted fraud.
• Timeliness of the Action: Yes. The action to annul or cancel the certificate of title was brought within one year from issuance, as admitted by respondent in his brief.

• Tenant's Estoppel: The Court found that the Court of Appeals failed to pass on the question of whether Dar was a tenant of Herico, proceeding instead on the assumption that no landlord-tenant relationship existed. This assumption was contradicted by Dar's own signed statement of November 8, 1956, admitting he had been petitioner's tenant since 1945, and by his testimony admitting he had been making copra for petitioner. The Court held it elementary that a tenant will not be heard to dispute his landlord's title, and that the proceedings whereby the defendants obtained free patents were fraudulent. The presumption of regularity of the free patent approval was seriously impaired by Dar's admission of tenancy.

• Effect of Republic Act No. 1942: The Court held that under Republic Act No. 1942, which amended Section 48b of Commonwealth Act No. 141, those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all conditions essential to a Government grant. When these conditions are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land therefore ceases to be of the public domain and is beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.

• Fraud in Free Patent Application: The Court found evidence of fraud in the filing of the free patent application by respondent Dar, who was petitioner's tenant at the time. The Court also noted that the adjoining owners, including petitioner, were not notified of the free patent application.

• Timeliness of the Action: The Court noted that the action to annul or cancel the certificate of title was brought within one year, as admitted by respondent in his brief, and that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens title, the same could no longer be reopened.

• Tenant's Estoppel — A tenant will not be heard to dispute his landlord's title. This doctrine was applied to hold that respondent Dar, having admitted being petitioner's tenant, could not validly obtain a free patent over the land, and the proceedings whereby he obtained the free patent were fraudulent.
• Conclusive Presumption of Government Grant — Under Republic Act No. 1942, those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years are conclusively presumed to have performed all conditions essential to a Government grant. The possessor acquires by operation of law a right to a grant, and the land ceases to be of the public domain, beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of by free patent.
• Constructive Trust — Where a tenant obtains a free patent over land possessed by his landlord, the proceedings are fraudulent, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto is null and void as against the landlord.

• "It is elementary that a tenant will not be heard to dispute his landlord's title, hence, the proceedings whereby the defendants obtained free patents were fraudulent." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the tenant's estoppel doctrine and the fraudulent nature of the free patent proceedings.
• "By virtue of his possession since 1892, established by the preponderance of evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to a certificate of title to the lands described in his petition, under the provisions of section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No 2874, the Public Land Law, and he is conclusively essential to a government grant." — This quotation from Lizada vs. Oman articulates the principle that long-term possession entitles the possessor to a government grant.
• "when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of." — This passage defines the effect of Republic Act No. 1942 and the conclusive presumption of a government grant.

• Lizada vs. Oman, 59 Phil. 547 — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that long-term possession entitles the possessor to a certificate of title under the Public Land Law and that free patent titles issued to others are unauthorized and void as against such possessor.
• Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, G.R. No. 7745, November 18, 1955 — Cited in support of the principle that long-term possessors of public land are entitled to a government grant.
• Bancadren vs. Diones, G.R. No. L-8013, December 20, 1955 — Cited in support of the same principle regarding long-term possession of public land.
• Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 — Cited as interpretative authority for the operation of law effect of compliance with the conditions for a government grant.
• Mesina vs. Pineda Vda. de Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960 — Cited as interpretative authority for the same principle.

• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 — The provision grants a conclusive presumption of a government grant to those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title. The Court applied this provision to hold that petitioner's possession since 1914 vested title in him and removed the land from the disposable public domain.
• Section 45, paragraph (b), Act No. 2874 — Cited in Lizada vs. Oman as the basis for entitlement to a certificate of title by virtue of long-term possession.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Metencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred.