Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme

While the heirs of the offended party may appeal the civil aspect of a criminal judgment, the civil indemnity awarded therein may not be increased if the increase would require an aggravation of the criminal conviction — that is, if the accused would have to be convicted of a more serious offense or sentenced to a higher penalty — because that would place him in double jeopardy. Corollarily, an erroneous judgment is not for that reason void; an error of judgment, as distinguished from an error of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, cannot be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be.

Andrew Costales was prosecuted for the killing of Tito Rillorta, whose heirs appear as petitioners in this proceeding. The controversy turns on the procedural rules governing appeals in criminal cases — Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which fixes the fifteen-day period for perfecting an appeal and bars any appeal by the prosecution that would place the accused in double jeopardy, and Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, which embodies that guarantee. The right of the injured party to take part in the prosecution and to appeal the civil liability of the accused traces to Section 107 of General Orders No. 58.

Andrew Costales was charged with killing Tito Rillorta, and it was the heirs of the deceased who, as petitioners, pursued the civil liability arising from the offense after the trial court rendered judgment against the accused on a lesser charge.

The trial court held Costales guilty only of less serious physical injuries and sentenced him to twenty days of arresto menor, ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500.00. In the court's assessment, the accused could not be held liable for homicide because the wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial. The certified cause of death was pneumonia, which the trial court found was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery needlessly performed upon the victim. The victim had thus succumbed not to the skin-deep wound, which did not affect any vital organ, but as a result of the attending physician's gross incompetence.

The heirs did not agree with this disposition. Through counsel acting under the direct control and supervision of the provincial fiscal, they filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which had been notified to them on January 23, 1980. The motion was sent by registered mail on February 2, 1980. It was heard on February 26 and denied on February 28, 1980, in an order that was communicated to the private prosecutor only on March 18, 1980. Two days later, on March 20, 1980, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the private prosecutor.

After considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, the respondent judge dismissed the appeal on April 14, 1980, for tardiness. Both the fiscal and the private prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration, but these were denied on May 12, 1980. The dismissal of the appeal became the subject of the petition for certiorari.

The findings of the trial court that controlled the Supreme Court's analysis were that the wound inflicted on the victim was superficial and did not affect any vital organ, and that the victim's death was not attributable to that wound but to pneumonia induced by the exploratory surgery performed upon him. The petitioners, for their part, maintained that the accused should have been convicted of homicide rather than of less serious physical injuries, and that their appeal encompassed both the criminal aspect and the civil liabilities in the criminal case.

• Increase of the Civil Award: Petitioners urged that the civil award of only P500.00 be increased because the accused should not have been found guilty of only less serious physical injuries but of homicide, their appeal being expressly directed at "both the criminal aspect and the civil liabilities in the criminal cases."
• Inapplicability of Double Jeopardy: Petitioners argued that double jeopardy would not attach because the judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and was therefore null and void.

• Timeliness of the Appeal: Whether the notice of appeal filed on March 20, 1980 was perfected within the fifteen-day reglementary period prescribed by Rule 122, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
• Appeal of the Civil Aspect by the Heirs: Whether the heirs of the offended party may appeal the civil award in a criminal case through the private prosecutor.
• Increase of the Civil Indemnity: Whether the civil award of P500.00 may be increased on the ground that the accused should have been convicted of homicide rather than of less serious physical injuries.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion as an Exception to Double Jeopardy: Whether double jeopardy attaches notwithstanding the alleged grave abuse of discretion tainting the judgment of conviction.

• Timeliness of the Appeal: Yes. The notice of appeal was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period, only twelve days of which had been consumed, the period having been interrupted by the motion for reconsideration until notice of its denial was served on the private prosecutor on March 18, 1980.
• Appeal of the Civil Aspect by the Heirs: Yes. The private prosecutor may appeal on behalf of the offended party or his successors, and the adequacy of the civil award may be challenged on the ground that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the injuries sustained.
• Increase of the Civil Indemnity: No. The civil indemnity may be increased only if the increase would not require an aggravation of the criminal decision, and the accused may not be convicted of a more serious offense or sentenced to a higher penalty to justify the increase.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion as an Exception to Double Jeopardy: No. Whatever error the lower court committed was merely an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, and did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision; double jeopardy therefore barred the appeal.

• Timeliness of the Appeal: The motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered in open court on January 23, 1980 was filed on February 2, 1980, the date of its posting by registered mail, so that only ten days had elapsed from the earlier date. The running of the period was suspended while the motion was under study and until a copy of the order denying the same was furnished the private prosecutor on March 18, 1980. When two days later, on March 20, the fiscal and the private prosecutor jointly filed a notice of appeal, only twelve days of the period of appeal had been consumed. The appeal was thus perfected on time, conformably to Rule 122, Section 6, of the Rules of Court. The trial court consequently lost jurisdiction over the appealed case on March 20, 1980, and was obligated to elevate the records to the appellate court; having become functus officio, it could no longer issue the challenged orders of April 14, 1980 and May 12, 1980 dismissing the appeal.

• Appeal of the Civil Aspect by the Heirs: The question of whether the civil award in a criminal case may be appealed is not new and had been resolved earlier. It is settled that this can be done by the private prosecutor on behalf of the offended party or his successors, and the adequacy of the award may be challenged on the ground that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the injuries sustained as a result of the offense committed by the accused. The right of injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution and to appeal for purposes of the civil liability of the accused, under Section 107 of General Orders No. 58, necessarily implies that such right is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to his defense; if the accused has fifteen days within which to appeal from a judgment of conviction, the offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be made dependent on that of the accused.

• Increase of the Civil Indemnity: The civil indemnity may be increased only if it will not require an aggravation of the decision in the criminal case on which it is based. The accused may not, on appeal by the adverse party, be convicted of a more serious offense or sentenced to a higher penalty to justify the increase in the civil indemnity. The petitioners were not confining themselves to the civil aspect of the challenged decision but were urging that the accused should have been found guilty of homicide rather than of less serious physical injuries, an appeal that is not permitted under the rule on double jeopardy. Rule 122, Section 2, of the Rules of Court provides that the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy, a provision based on Kepner vs. United States, in which the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal, or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict, would place him in double jeopardy. The rule has been consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction. If the government itself cannot appeal, much less can the offended party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity. The prohibition operates as a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information, and the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which the accused was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. It follows that the appeal should be limited to the civil award corresponding only to the offense found against the accused, namely, less serious physical injuries; the award cannot be related to the victim's death, of which the defendant had been absolved by the trial court. On the question of whether P500.00 was sufficient indemnification for the wound, the Court, rather than remanding the case to the Court of Appeals and further prolonging it, resolved the matter directly on the record in the interest of speedy justice and held that the sum awarded for the less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the victim — and not for his death — is sufficient recompense. The increase sought was accordingly denied. While sympathizing with the petitioners for their tragic loss, the Court was unable to accord them a more satisfactory material settlement because it was limited by the findings of the trial court and the inhibitions of double jeopardy.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion as an Exception to Double Jeopardy: The petitioners' argument that double jeopardy would not attach because the judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore null and void is flawed, because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision, and this is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be. In People vs. City Court of Silay, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss a charge for falsification after the prosecution had rested, holding that the guilt of the accused had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; the Court disagreed, yet held through Justice Munoz-Palma that however erroneous the order of the respondent court was, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error could no longer be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. Similar rulings were made in People vs. Hernando, People vs. Francisco, and People vs. Villarin. The cases cited by the petitioners are not in point because they all involve not errors of judgment but denial of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction; the prosecution in each of those cases was allowed to appeal because it had not been given its day in court. In the present case, a full trial was held and both the prosecution and the defense were accorded the right to be heard before the judgment was reached, and there was no doubt that the trial court had the requisite jurisdiction to pronounce the challenged sentence; even assuming it was incorrect, it was certainly not invalid.

• Double Jeopardy as a Bar to Prosecution Appeals — Rule 122, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardy. The protection extends not only to appeals from judgments of acquittal but also to appeals taken for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict. In this case, because the petitioners sought to have the accused convicted of homicide instead of less serious physical injuries, the appeal would have aggravated the criminal conviction and was barred; the prohibition likewise binds the offended party or his heirs, for if the government itself cannot appeal, much less can they.

• Right of the Offended Party to Appeal the Civil Aspect — The offended party, or the private prosecutor on his behalf or on behalf of his successors, may appeal from the judgment of the trial court with reference to the payment of the indemnity resulting from the commission of the offense, and the adequacy of the award may be challenged on the ground that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the injuries sustained. This right, recognized under Section 107 of General Orders No. 58, is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to his defense; if the accused has fifteen days to appeal from a judgment of conviction, the offended party has the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be made dependent on that of the accused.

• Limitation on the Increase of Civil Indemnity — The civil indemnity may be increased only if the increase will not require an aggravation of the decision in the criminal case on which it is based. The accused may not, on appeal by the adverse party, be convicted of a more serious offense or sentenced to a higher penalty to justify the increase in the civil indemnity. Consequently, the appeal of the offended party is confined to the civil award corresponding only to the offense actually found against the accused, and the award cannot be related to a consequence of the crime of which the accused was absolved.

• Error of Judgment vs. Error of Jurisdiction — An error of judgment does not affect the intrinsic validity of a decision and cannot be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be; only a denial of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction removes the case from the operation of the rule on double jeopardy. A full trial in which both the prosecution and the defense were accorded the right to be heard vests the trial court with the requisite jurisdiction to pronounce the challenged sentence, which, even if incorrect, is not invalid.

• Interruption of the Period to Appeal — Under Rule 122, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, an appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from, and the period for perfecting an appeal is interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney. Once the appeal is perfected on time, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the appealed case, becomes functus officio, and may no longer issue orders dismissing the appeal.

• "May the civil award in a criminal case be appealed by the heirs of the offended party? Of course. May the criminal aspect of the decision be modified as a basis for the increase in the civil award? Certainly not." — This opening formulation frames the two-part holding of the case and states, in compressed form, the distinction between the appealable civil aspect and the non-appealable criminal aspect of a judgment of conviction.
• "However, the civil indemnity may be increased only if it will not require an aggravation of the decision in the criminal case on which it is based. In other words, the accused may not, on appeal by the adverse party, be convicted of a more serious offense or sentenced to a higher penalty to justify the increase in the civil indemnity." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, articulating the limiting principle that confines the offended party's appeal to the civil liability corresponding to the offense actually found.
• "This argument is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be." — This passage disposes of the petitioners' contention that grave abuse of discretion rendered the judgment void and thus removed the case from the coverage of double jeopardy, and it supplies the error-of-judgment versus error-of-jurisdiction distinction.
• "It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less then can the offended party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity." — This statement extends the bar against prosecution appeals to the offended party and his heirs, and is the basis for denying the increase in the civil award.

• Kepner vs. United States, 11 Phil. 669; 195 U.S. 100 — The foundational authority for the rule; the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal, or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict, would place him in double jeopardy. The Court relied on it as the basis of Rule 122, Section 2, and noted that it has been consistently applied in this jurisdiction.
• People vs. City Court of Silay, 74 Phil. 247 — Controlling precedent for the proposition that an erroneous order of dismissal, even one resulting in a miscarriage of justice, can no longer be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. The Court cited the ruling through Justice Munoz-Palma in rejecting the petitioners' grave-abuse-of-discretion argument.
• People vs. Guido, 57 Phil. 52 — Cited for the settled rule that the offended party may appeal from the judgment with reference to the payment of the indemnity resulting from the commission of the offense, and that parties prejudiced by the crime may challenge the award.
• People vs. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252 — Cited for the principle that the right of the offended party to appeal the civil liability is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to his defense, and that the offended party's appeal should not be made dependent on that of the accused.
• People vs. Hernando, 108 SCRA 121; People vs. Francisco, 128 SCRA 110; People vs. Villarin, 11 SCRA 550 — Cited as consistent rulings applying the double jeopardy bar to prosecution appeals notwithstanding errors committed by the trial court.
• People vs. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264; People vs. Surtida, 43 SCRA 29; People vs. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289; People vs. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121 — Distinguished by the Court: these cases involved not errors of judgment but denials of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction, in which the prosecution was allowed to appeal because it had not been given its day in court.

• Rule 122, Section 6, Rules of Court — An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from, and the period for perfecting an appeal is interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney. Applied to the timeline, the motion for reconsideration filed on February 2, 1980 interrupted the period, which resumed only upon service of the denial on the private prosecutor on March 18, 1980, so that the notice of appeal filed on March 20, 1980 was timely and only twelve days of the period had been consumed.
• Rule 122, Section 2, Rules of Court — Provides that the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. This provision barred the petitioners' attempt to have the accused convicted of homicide on appeal as a basis for increasing the civil indemnity.
• Article III, Section 21, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, cited as the basis of the rule barring prosecution appeals that would increase the penalty imposed upon the convict.
• Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court — Defines the scope of the prohibition, which operates as a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The Court applied it in noting that less serious physical injuries is necessarily included in the offense of homicide.
• Section 107, General Orders No. 58 — Recognizes the right of injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution and to appeal for purposes of the civil liability of the accused. The Court relied on it in holding that the offended party's right to appeal the civil aspect is protected in the same manner as the accused's right to his defense.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.