Heirs of the Late Gerry Ecarma vs. Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals' dismissal of an appeal for failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court is a final order reviewable by a Rule 45 petition, not a Rule 65 petition; and co-heirs cannot compel each other to remain in perpetual co-ownership, as each co-owner may demand partition under Article 494 in relation to Article 1083 of the Civil Code.

Arminda vda. de Ecarma and Natalio Ecarma were spouses who acquired properties under the conjugal partnership of gains and had seven children, including Renato A. Ecarma and Gerry Anthony Ecarma, whose heirs are petitioners. The properties at issue were later held in co-ownership by their heirs, and the settlement of Arminda's estate became the subject of intestate proceedings. The case concerns the partition of those co-owned properties and the procedural requirements for appealing the partition order.

Arminda vda. de Ecarma was married to Natalio Ecarma, who predeceased her on May 9, 1970. During their marriage, they acquired several properties and had seven children: Angelita, Rodolfo, Renato, Maria Arminda, Gerry Anthony Ecarma, Fe Shirley, and Rolando. Gerry Anthony Ecarma was the husband and father of petitioners Avelina Suiza-Ecarma, Dennis Ecarma, Jerry Lyn Ecarma Pena, Antonio Ecarma, and Natalia Ecarma Sangalang. After Natalio's death, his heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate covering four properties designated as Kitanlad, Cuyapo, and Lala, the latter consisting of two separate lots. Half of the properties was specifically noted as pertaining to Arminda's share in the conjugal partnership of gains. In the same Extrajudicial Settlement signed by all the heirs, the properties were partitioned among them: Arminda was assigned an undivided two-ninth's (2/9's) proportion, while all the children received one-ninth (1/9) each. Despite the partition agreement, no physical division of the properties was effected, and Natalio's heirs remained in co-ownership pro indiviso even at the time of Arminda's death on April 17, 1983.

On May 18, 1990, after his petition for the probate of Arminda's will was dismissed by the RTC, Branch 86, Quezon City, Renato filed the subject intestate proceedings before the RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City. On January 30, 1991, Renato was appointed Special Administrator by the RTC, Branch 220. Continuing conflict persisted between Gerry Ecarma and the other heirs of Natalio and Arminda over the actual division of their inherited properties. By March 9, 2005, Renato moved to terminate their co-ownership by filing a Project of Partition of the Kitanlad Property. He alleged that the probate case had remained unresolved for sixteen years because of the incessant opposition of Gerry Ecarma, the only legal heir who stayed in Kitanlad; that efforts to sell the Kitanlad property had been thwarted by Gerry; that the law frowns on indefinite indivision; that the legal heirs, except Gerry and perhaps another oppositor, desired partition; that the fairest way to partition without giving any heir a larger share was to sell the property and divide the net proceeds, but Gerry's objection to the sale price had rendered that option nugatory; and that the next best option was to divide the property longitudinally from the frontage down to the other end in seven equal parts. Renato noted that the improvements were fully depreciated, with the duplex house fifty-seven years old and the apartments forty years old, and that all seven parts would be equal in measurements, length, width, and street frontage, with allocation by lot. On April 7, 2005, Renato filed another motion, the Omnibus Motion: Project of Partition of the Lala and Cuyapo Properties.

Finding the motions impressed with merit, the RTC, Branch 220, on July 28, 2005, issued an Order approving the proposed partition. The Kitanlad property was to be divided longitudinally from the frontage down to the other end in seven equal parts; the shares of Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma were to be contiguous to each other on one side nearest the main entrance, while the shares of the other five legal heirs would comprise the balance. Jerry and Rodolfo were to determine their respective shares between themselves, while the five remaining legal heirs were to determine their shares by draw of lot and submit their choice to the Regular Administrator within fifteen days; if they failed to comply, the Regular Administrator was directed to assign each share. The Cuyapo farm lot was to be partitioned into seven equal parts substantially in accordance with Annex "A" of the Partial Project of Partition of Estate dated June 22, 1992; Lots 1 and 2 were allocated to Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma so that the remaining balance would remain contiguous, and the remaining balance could be donated by the five other legal heirs to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Regular Administrator was directed to cause the partition and titling of the property, with expenses for partition and titling to be for the personal account of each legal heir and deducted from their share of the estate. The Lala property, consisting of two contiguous farm lots, one more than six hectares and the other more than thirteen hectares, was to be partitioned into seven equal parts substantially in accordance with Annex "B" of the same Partial Project of Partition dated June 22, 1992; lots were allocated to Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma, and the remaining balance could likewise be donated by the five other legal heirs to the AFP.

Gerry Ecarma filed a motion for reconsideration on three grounds: (1) the project of partition of the Kitanlad properties was not feasible, impractical, and detrimental to the interests of the heirs of the Spouses Natalio and Arminda Ecarma; (2) the planned partition was not in accordance with the wishes of the decedents, the spouses Natalio and Arminda; and (3) the RTC, Branch 220, as the court settling the intestate estate of Arminda, had no jurisdiction over part of the subject properties which did not form part of Arminda's estate, such undivided share already pertaining to the other heirs as part of their inheritance from their deceased father, Natalio. Rodolfo Ecarma likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 28, 2005 Order of Partition on the main ground, akin to Gerry's third ground, that the RTC, Branch 220, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by ordering the partition of the subject properties, portions of which did not belong to the intestate estate of Arminda. After Renato filed his Comment/Opposition to the two motions for reconsideration, the RTC, finding no cogent reason to reverse or modify its prior order of partition, denied the motions for reconsideration. Gerry then filed both a Notice of Appeal and a Record on Appeal before the RTC, Branch 220, to bring the partition order to the Court of Appeals.

Sometime before May 4, 2009, counsel of Gerry Ecarma filed a Notice of Death of Gerry Ecarma before the appellate court and was subsequently required to submit a certified true copy of Gerry Ecarma's death certificate within a prescribed period. Petitioners, presumably in substitution of the deceased Gerry Ecarma, filed their Appellants' Brief pursuant to the order of the appellate court. Renato forthwith filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellants' Brief, to which the CA required a comment from petitioners. The CA found that petitioners' brief did not contain a subject index, table of cases and authorities, statement of case, statement of facts, and page references to the record, in violation of Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and that non-compliance warranted dismissal of the appeal under Section 1(f), Rule 50. The CA dismissed the appeal. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, attaching a Supplemental Appellants' Brief, but the CA again deemed the Supplemental Appellants' Brief unsatisfactory and non-compliant with the rules. The new brief, like the original, did not contain reference to the relevant portions of the record pertaining to its statement of facts; further, the subject index did not contain a summary of arguments and reference to the specific pages of the brief, and the supporting laws and authorities. The CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. From that denial, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 almost sixty days from receipt of the denial.

• Substantial Compliance with Section 13, Rule 44: Petitioners maintained that their Appellants' Brief substantially complied with the requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, and they attached a sample copy of an Appellant's Brief from Guevarra's Legal Forms which purportedly served as their guideline in revising and submitting their Supplemental Appellants' Brief.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing their appeal for procedural defects.
• Partition Not Feasible and Contrary to Decedents' Wishes: Petitioners argued that the project of partition of the Kitanlad properties was not feasible, impractical, and detrimental to the interests of the heirs, and that the planned partition was not in accordance with the wishes of the decedents, the spouses Natalio and Arminda.
• Lack of Jurisdiction over Properties Not Part of Arminda's Estate: Petitioners argued that the RTC, Branch 220, as the court settling the intestate estate of Arminda, had no jurisdiction over part of the subject properties which did not form part of Arminda's estate, because such undivided share already pertained to the other heirs as part of their inheritance from their deceased father, Natalio.
• Ruling on the Merits: Petitioners prayed for a ruling on the merits of the RTC, Branch 220's Order of Partition.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Petition: Whether the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 despite the availability of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners' appeal for procedural defects.
• Compliance with Section 13, Rule 44: Whether petitioners substantially complied with the required contents of an appellant's brief under Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.
• Partition and Co-ownership: Whether petitioners may compel the other co-heirs to remain in co-ownership and prevent partition of the subject properties.
• Jurisdiction over Properties: Whether the RTC, Branch 220, acting as intestate court for Arminda's estate, had jurisdiction to order partition of properties portions of which allegedly belonged to Natalio's heirs.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Petition: No. The Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal was a final order appealable via Rule 45; Rule 65 is available only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and a mere allegation of grave abuse of discretion does not transform the petition into a special civil action for certiorari.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The dismissal was expressly allowed by Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and no showing existed that the Court of Appeals acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
• Compliance with Section 13, Rule 44: No. The Appellants' Brief and Supplemental Appellants' Brief lacked the required subject index, table of cases and authorities, statement of case, statement of facts, and page references to the record; no substantial compliance was shown.
• Partition and Co-ownership: No. Under Article 494 in relation to Article 1083 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in co-ownership, and each co-owner may demand partition at any time; petitioners' absolute opposition to partition has no basis in law.
• Jurisdiction over Properties: No jurisdictional defect was sustained. The properties were originally conjugal partnership property of Natalio and Arminda; upon Arminda's death, the heirs' rights to succession vested and co-ownership consolidated by operation of law, and the RTC partition order was upheld.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Petition: An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of only if the lower tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court of Appeals' outright dismissal of the appeal was a final order which left nothing more to do to resolve the case. That disposition was final and executory, appealable to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. The dismissal was expressly allowed by Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Absent grave abuse of discretion, petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of discretion; errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari. Even if the Court were to take a liberal stance and consider the petition as one filed under Rule 45, such cannot cure the failure to file an appeal within the reglementary fifteen-day period provided under Section 2, Rule 45.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The dismissal of the appeal before the Court of Appeals was expressly allowed by Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court cannot be charged with grave abuse of discretion because there was no showing that, in the exercise of its judgment, it acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The soundness of the ruling dismissing the appeal was a matter of judgment, and the remedy of the aggrieved party was a Rule 45 petition. The mere allegation of grave abuse of discretion cannot substitute for the correct remedy of a lost appeal.

• Compliance with Section 13, Rule 44: The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners' Appellants' Brief for failure to comply with the content requirement specified under Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. The Court assiduously went through the Supplemental Appellants' Brief and found it wanting, a lame attempt at compliance through superficial changes, devoid of substance. The Supplemental Appellants' Brief could only cite Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court as its sole legal authority in questioning the RTC's Order of Partition. Petitioners were unable to grasp the necessity of supporting and anchoring their arguments with legal basis; they could not simply cite one section of one rule without expounding thereon. In Lui Enterprises, Inc. vs. Zuellig Pharma Corporation, et al., the Court reiterated faithful adherence to the rules on the specific contents of an appellant's brief. Under Rule 50, Section 1(f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal when the appellant's brief lacks the specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f), namely the subject index, page references to the record, and a table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and a table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited; the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal. Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a purely statutory right. The right to appeal must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law and requires strict compliance with the Rules of Court on appeals; otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process of law. In Mendoza vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc., the Court sustained the dismissal of Mendoza's appeal because the appellant's brief lacked a subject index, assignment of errors, and page references to the record. In De Liano vs. Court of Appeals, the Court also sustained the dismissal of De Liano's appeal because the appellant's brief lacked a subject index, a table of cases and authorities, and page references to the record. Exceptions exist, as in Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Corona International, Inc., where the appellant's brief lacked a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the nature of the judgment, and page references to the record, but the Court found substantial compliance because the brief apprised the Court of Appeals of the essential facts and nature of the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary to dispose of the case. In Go vs. Chaves, Go's 17-page appellant's brief lacked a subject index, but Go subsequently filed a subject index; the Court excused the procedural lapse since the brief consisted only of 17 pages which the Court of Appeals could easily peruse. In this case, petitioners did not substantially comply with the rules. The requirements are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals and to minimize the Court of Appeals' labor in examining the record. The subject index serves as the brief's table of contents; page references to the record guarantee that the facts stated in the appellant's brief are supported by the record; and the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited is required so that the Court of Appeals can easily verify the authorities cited for accuracy and aptness. The Court will not disregard rules on appeal in the guise of liberal construction; for the Court to liberally construe the Rules, the party must substantially comply with the Rules and correct its procedural lapses. Petitioners failed to remedy these errors.

• Partition and Co-ownership: There was no quarrel from any of the parties that the subject properties were originally part of the conjugal partnership of gains property regime of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda. The nature of these properties as part of the spouses' conjugal properties was confirmed in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Natalio signed by all his heirs, his spouse Arminda, and their children, including Gerry Ecarma. Pursuant to this Extrajudicial Settlement, Arminda was apportioned a two-ninth's (2/9's) share, while her children were equally ascribed a one-ninth (1/9) portion of the subject properties. Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession covering Arminda's share in the subject properties vested and their co-ownership over the subject properties consolidated by operation of law. Without a valid will of Arminda, and as Arminda's compulsory heirs, the parties, specifically Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and substitution by petitioners, all ipso facto co-owned the subject properties in equal proportion as compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda. There appeared to be no clear objection, therefore, to the RTC's Order of Partition approving the administrator's proposal for equal division of the properties: the Kitanlad property longitudinally from the frontage down to the other end with the shares of Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma contiguous to each other on one side nearest the main entrance; and the Cuyapo and Lala properties partitioned into seven equal parts with Jerry's and Rodolfo's respective shares contiguous to each other, and the remainder to be donated by the other legal heirs to the AFP. Petitioners and Rodolfo Ecarma cannot compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership over the subject properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. The impasse between the parties was due to petitioners' persistent objection to proposals for partition. Gerry Ecarma, Rodolfo Ecarma, and petitioners consistently opposed the proposed partition as ostensibly not feasible, impractical, and detrimental to the use of the Kitanlad property; however, it was apparent that Gerry Ecarma and his heirs completely objected to any kind of partition, contravening even the proposed sale. Petitioners were careful not to proffer that the subject properties were indivisible or that physical division would render them unserviceable, since Article 495 of the Civil Code provides the remedy of termination of co-ownership in accordance with Article 498, i.e., sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds. Ineluctably, petitioners' absolute opposition to the partition of the co-owned subject properties had no basis in law. As mere co-owners, petitioners, representing the share of the deceased Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other owners, likewise compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda, from exercising all incidences of their full ownership.

• Appeal is a purely statutory right; strict compliance with the Rules on appeal is required — Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a purely statutory right that must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. Strict compliance with the Rules of Court on appeals is required; otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process. The Court applied this doctrine in sustaining the CA's dismissal of petitioners' appeal for failure to comply with the appellant's brief requirements, noting that liberal construction is available only where the party substantially complies and corrects its procedural lapses.

• Rule 45 versus Rule 65; grave abuse of discretion versus error of judgment — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to review a final order of the Court of Appeals, while a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is available only when the lower tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. An error of judgment is correctible by appeal, while an error of jurisdiction is reviewable by certiorari. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the CA's dismissal of the appeal was a final order appealable via Rule 45, and that the mere allegation of grave abuse did not justify Rule 65 relief.

• Contents of an appellant's brief under Section 13, Rule 44; dismissal under Section 1(f), Rule 50 — An appellant's brief must contain, among others, a subject index with a digest of arguments and page references, a table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, a statement of the case, a statement of facts with page references to the record, and an argument with page references. Non-compliance warrants dismissal of the appeal under Section 1(f), Rule 50. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioners' original and supplemental briefs lacked these required contents and that no substantial compliance was shown.

• Co-ownership and the right to demand partition; prohibition on perpetual co-ownership — Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. An agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period not exceeding ten years is valid, and a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period not exceeding twenty years; neither shall there be partition when prohibited by law. Article 1083 provides that every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the testator expressly forbade partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that petitioners could not compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership and that the RTC partition order was proper.

• Compulsory heirs and co-ownership of the estate before partition — Under Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. The rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession vested and their co-ownership over the subject properties consolidated by operation of law, and that the parties, as compulsory heirs, co-owned the properties in equal proportion.

• Remedy when property is indivisible or physical division is unserviceable — Under Article 495 of the Civil Code, co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended; the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with Article 498, which provides that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed. The Court applied this doctrine by noting that petitioners did not proffer that the properties were indivisible or that physical division would render them unserviceable, and that their absolute opposition to partition had no basis in law.

• "No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." — This is the Court's quotation of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which supplies the controlling rule on co-ownership and partition and serves as the basis for rejecting petitioners' opposition to the RTC partition order.
• "Ineluctably, therefore, herein petitioners' absolute opposition to the partition of the subject properties which are co-owned has no basis in law." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the merits: because the properties were co-owned and petitioners did not claim indivisibility, their refusal to permit any partition could not be sustained.
• "The appellate court's outright dismissal of therein appellants' appeal was a final order which left it with nothing more to do to resolve the case." — This passage defines the nature of the CA's dismissal as a final order, which is central to the Court's holding that the proper remedy was a Rule 45 petition rather than Rule 65.

• Lui Enterprises, Inc. vs. Zuellig Pharma Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014, 719 SCRA 88 — The Court reiterated faithful adherence to the rules on the specific contents of an appellant's brief; because Lui Enterprises' brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and a table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal.
• Sps. Saguan vs. PBC, 563 Phil. 696 (2007) — Cited to support the rule that a mere allegation of grave abuse of discretion cannot substitute for the correct remedy of a lost appeal.
• Raymundo vs. vda. de Suarez, et al, 593 Phil. 28, 48 (2008) — Cited for the finality of the Court of Appeals' outright dismissal of an appeal, which left nothing more to do and was appealable via Rule 45.
• De Liano vs. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 1033 (2001) — Cited as a precedent sustaining dismissal of an appeal where the appellant's brief lacked a subject index, a table of cases and authorities, and page references to the record.
• Mendoza vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc. — Cited as a precedent sustaining the Court of Appeals' dismissal of an appeal where the appellant's brief lacked a subject index, assignment of errors, and page references to the record.
• Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Corona International, Inc. — Cited as an exception where substantial compliance excused procedural lapses because the appellant's brief apprised the Court of Appeals of the essential facts and nature of the case, the issues raised, and the laws necessary to dispose of the case.
• Go vs. Chaves — Cited as an exception where a 17-page appellant's brief lacked a subject index, but the appellant subsequently filed one; the Court excused the procedural lapse in the interest of justice.

• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. A petition for certiorari may be availed of only when a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Applied to reject the Rule 65 petition because the CA's dismissal of the appeal was a final order reviewable by Rule 45.
• Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The petition shall raise only questions of law and must be filed within fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the motion for new trial or reconsideration. Applied to hold that the proper remedy was a Rule 45 petition and that petitioners failed to file it within the reglementary period.
• Section 13, Rule 44, Rules of Court — Contents of the appellant's brief. The brief shall contain, in the order indicated, a subject index with a digest of arguments and page references, a table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited with references to pages where cited; a statement of the case; a statement of facts with page references to the record; and an argument with page references. Applied to find petitioners' brief and supplemental brief deficient.
• Section 1(f), Rule 50, Rules of Court — Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, for absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of Rule 44. Applied to sustain the CA's dismissal of petitioners' appeal.
• Article 494, Civil Code — No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership; each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. An agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period not exceeding ten years is valid, and a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period not exceeding twenty years; neither shall there be partition when prohibited by law. Applied to hold that petitioners could not compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership.
• Article 1083, Civil Code — Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the testator expressly forbade its partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in Article 494. Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when any of the causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs. Applied in relation to Article 494 to uphold the partition.
• Article 495, Civil Code — Notwithstanding Article 494, co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended; the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with Article 498. Applied by noting that petitioners did not claim the properties were indivisible or that physical division would render them unserviceable.
• Article 498, Civil Code — Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed. Applied as the remedy for indivisible property, which petitioners did not invoke.
• Article 1078, Civil Code — Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Applied to establish that the parties co-owned the subject properties before partition.
• Articles 774 and 777, Civil Code — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property rights and obligations of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by will or by operation of law; the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Applied to hold that upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession vested.
• Articles 778, 886, 887 and 960, Civil Code — Succession may be testamentary, legal or intestate, or mixed; legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs; compulsory heirs include legitimate children and descendants; legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity. Applied to treat the parties as compulsory heirs and to confirm intestate succession.
• Articles 1078, 979, 980, 887 and 888, Civil Code — Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate before partition is owned in common; legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants without distinction as to sex or age; the children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares; the legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. Applied to support equal co-ownership among the compulsory heirs.
• Articles 427 and 428, Civil Code — Ownership may be exercised over things or rights; the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, and has a right of action against the holder and possessor to recover it. Applied to hold that petitioners, as mere co-owners, cannot preclude the other owners from exercising all incidences of full ownership.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson) and Reyes, JJ., concurred. Peralta, J., was on official leave; Jardeleza, J., was on wellness leave.