Heirs of Spouses Binay vs. Banaag

In forcible entry cases, prior physical possession is not confined to material occupation; it may be acquired through juridical acts — such as the registration of a free patent and the consequent issuance of an original certificate of title — which carry the force of acts of possession and enjoy the presumption of regularity.

Petitioners are the heirs of Spouses Anselmo Binay and Sevilla Manalo. Anselmo Binay was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3303 on January 8, 1984, by virtue of Free Patent No. (IV-19)-3005, over a 25,334-square-meter parcel of land in Barangay Balatero, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. Petitioners claimed that the spouses and their predecessors had possessed and cultivated the land since 1945, planting fruit-bearing trees and regularly paying realty taxes. Respondents are members of the Iraya-Mangyan Tribe who asserted ancestral domain over the area, claiming possession since time immemorial and identifying Bienvenido Banaag as a cadastral claimant in 1978. The land was later included in Certificate of Ancestral Domains Title No. R04-PUE-0404-023.

• Petitioners' Claim of Ownership and Possession: Petitioners are the heirs of Spouses Anselmo Binay and Sevilla Manalo. Anselmo Binay was issued OCT No. P-3303 on January 8, 1984, by virtue of Free Patent No. (IV-19)-3005, covering 25,334 square meters in Barangay Balatero, Puerto Galera. Petitioners alleged that the spouses and their predecessors had been in lawful, peaceful, and continuous possession of the land since 1945, had planted coconut, coffee, nangka, banana, and other fruit-bearing trees, and had religiously paid real property taxes.
• The Alleged Forcible Entry: On August 22, 2005, respondents Bienvenido Banaag, Marcelino Banaag, Nemesio Banaag, and Leoncio Banaag, armed with bolos tucked in their waists, prevented Anselmo's son Efren Binay and three helpers from gathering ripe fruits on the property. In October 2005, respondents fenced the subject property, completely depriving petitioners of access.
• Respondents' Defense: Respondents, members of the Iraya-Mangyan Tribe of Puerto Galera, claimed that the property is their ancestral land, possessed by them and their ancestors since time immemorial. They pointed to a 1978 cadastral survey listing Bienvenido Banaag as claimant for Lot 6263 (85,287.62 sq m) in Cad. 533-D, which later became part of ancestral domains covered by CADT No. R04-PUE-0404-023.
• Petitioners' Documentary Evidence Before the MCTC: Apart from OCT No. P-3303 and tax declarations, petitioners presented: (i) the application for free patent; (ii) notice of application; (iii) a Joint Affidavit of witnesses attesting to Anselmo's occupation and possession; (iv) a Report by Lands Examiner Cesar Acero confirming that the land had been in actual occupation, cultivation, and possession by Anselmo since May 1945; (v) the Order of approval of the free patent application dated December 11, 1984; (vi) a letter from the District Land Officer directing the Register of Deeds to issue the certificate of title; and (vii) a sketch plan with technical description.
• Respondents' Evidence: Respondents submitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Gavino B. Sundalo (Bienvenido's nephew), Querinong Binay Anilao (Bienvenido's brother-in-law), and Alepio Tullo, all contesting petitioners' claim of possession since 1945. The affiants did not take the witness stand.

• Prior Physical Possession Proved: Petitioners maintained that they established prior material or physical possession of the subject property by a preponderance of evidence, a factual finding already affirmed by both the MCTC and the RTC.
• Title and Tax Declaration as Proof: Petitioners insisted that their Torrens title and tax declarations were sufficient to establish possession, as possession is an attribute of ownership and the law recognizes acquisition of possession through juridical acts, not merely by physical occupation.
• Weight of Official Documentary Evidence: Petitioners argued that their evidence — consisting of the free patent application, joint affidavit, Lands Examiner's report, approval order, and the certificate of title — were public documents that far outweighed respondents' Sinumpaang Salaysay, which were executed by interested relatives who never testified in court and were thus questionable and self-serving.

(Respondents did not file a Comment before the Supreme Court; arguments are drawn from their Answer and the CA ruling.)

• Ancestral Domain and Prior Possession: Respondents contended that the property is part of their ancestral lands, and that their ancestors had been in open, continuous, and peaceful possession since time immemorial, as reflected in the 1978 cadastral survey and the subsequent CADT.
• Insufficiency of Petitioners' Evidence: Respondents argued that petitioners' title and tax declaration do not prove actual prior physical possession, which is the essential element in a forcible entry suit.

• Prior Physical Possession: Whether petitioners proved by a preponderance of evidence their prior physical possession of the subject property, a requisite for an action for forcible entry.

• Prior Physical Possession: Petitioners established prior physical possession by a preponderance of evidence. The issuance of OCT No. P-3303 from Free Patent No. (IV-19)-3005 evinced ownership from which the right to possess flows, and a Torrens title entitles the holder to possession. Tax declarations, while not conclusive, serve as a good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner. Critically, possession may be acquired not only by material occupation but also through juridical acts — such as the registration of a free patent and the issuance of a certificate of title — which carry the force of acts of possession. The free patent was issued after government officers found that petitioners' predecessors had openly and continuously possessed the land since 1945; this finding was reached after ocular inspection, publication, and investigation, and the official acts enjoy the presumption of regularity. The documentary evidence submitted, including the Lands Examiner's report and the order approving the free patent, strongly proved prior possession. The CA erred in according greater weight to respondents' Sinumpaang Salaysay, which were executed by relatives and thus lacked impartiality, and which paled in comparison to petitioners' muniments of title and public records. The adjudication was expressly limited to possession de facto and was without prejudice to any proper action for ownership.

• Possession through Juridical Acts — In forcible entry cases, prior physical possession is not limited to material occupation; it may be acquired through juridical acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, such as donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles, and the grant of free patents with the consequent issuance of a Torrens title. One need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times to be considered in possession. (Citing Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., Mangaser v. Ugay, and Quizon v. Juan)
• Presumption of Regularity of Official Acts — The issuance of a free patent and the corresponding original certificate of title, having been performed in the course of government officers' official functions, enjoys a presumption of regularity. Absent evidence to the contrary, it may be presumed that all requirements for the patent, including the requisite period of possession, were duly complied with. (Citing Lee v. Dela Paz)
• Probative Value of Tax Declarations in Ejectment — A tax declaration is not conclusive proof of possession, but is a good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would pay taxes for a property not in his actual or constructive possession. (Citing Mangaser v. Ugay)
• Provisional Determination of Ownership in Ejectment — Under Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, when ownership is raised as a defense and possession cannot be resolved without deciding ownership, the court may provisionally resolve ownership solely to determine the right to possession; such determination is not a final adjudication of title and is without prejudice to a separate action.

• "Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. … Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like." (quoting Mangaser v. Ugay) — The central articulation of the doctrine that juridical acts suffice to establish possession for forcible entry purposes.
• "Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that he had prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner, has no leg to stand on." (quoting Mangaser v. Ugay) — Applied to reject respondents' affidavits as insufficient.
• "The grant of the free patents to petitioner, having been performed in the course of the official functions of the DENR officers, enjoys the presumption of regularity. This means that, absent evidence to the contrary, the Court may presume that the DENR officers issued the free patents to petitioner only after a determination that he had duly complied with all the requirements for the same." (quoting Lee v. Dela Paz) — Establishes that a free patent serves as proof of prior possession.

• Mangaser v. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372 (2014) — Followed and extensively relied upon; the leading case holding that prior physical possession in forcible entry may be established through juridical acts, not solely material occupation, and that Torrens titles and tax declarations prevail over bare allegations of possession.
• Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 632 Phil. 143 (2010) — Followed; affirmed the principle that possession can be acquired through juridical acts, including registration of public instruments.
• Lee v. Dela Paz, 619 Phil. 514 (2009) — Applied; held that free patents enjoy a presumption of regularity and reasonably serve as proof that the grantee had complied with the 30-year possession requirement.
• Perez v. Falcatan, et al., 508 Phil. 21 (2005) — Cited as analogous; recognized a superior right of possession in favor of a party presenting an original certificate of title based on an approved homestead patent.

• Section 16, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Provides that when the defendant raises the defense of ownership and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Applied to allow the Court to provisionally consider petitioners' Torrens title and free patent as proof of prior possession.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concurred.