Heirs of Serapio Mabborang vs. Hermogenes Mabborang

Evidence not formally offered shall be excluded and cannot be assigned any probative weight or value. Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the trial court shall consider no evidence that has not been formally offered; mere identification and marking of a document as an exhibit during pre-trial or trial does not constitute a formal offer, and a party's failure to formally offer evidence—absent the two requisites for relaxation (duly identified by testimony and incorporated in the records) and a compelling justification—is fatal to reliance on that evidence.

Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung, spouses, died intestate in 1938 and 1963, respectively, leaving six parcels of land. Their daughter Sofronia Mabborang had an illegitimate son, Rufino Mabborang, who predeceased her. Upon Sofronia's death in 1978, Rufino's two sons—respondents Hermogenes and Benjamin Mabborang—claimed entitlement to Sofronia's share in the grandparents' estate by right of representation. The other children and grandchildren of Severino and Maria (petitioners) resisted, asserting that Rufino was not a child of the spouses but a grandson, and that Sofronia had already received her hereditary share and sold it to some petitioners and third parties.

• Nature: The case originated as an action for judicial partition of six parcels of land comprising the intestate estate of the late spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung.

• The Parties' Relationship: The spouses had eight children: Serapio, Victoriano, Vicente, Sofronia, Isabel, Susana, Regino, and Segunda. Sofronia had an illegitimate son, Rufino, who was registered in his birth certificate as a son of the spouses, a fact the RTC attributed to a superstitious practice to save the child from death. Rufino predeceased Sofronia in 1962. Respondents Hermogenes and Benjamin are Rufino's sons and thus Sofronia's grandsons.

• Petitioners' Defense of Prior Partition and Sale: Petitioners alleged that Sofronia had already received her share of the estate and sold portions of it to some petitioners and third parties. As proof, they cited purported Deeds of Absolute Sale, an Extrajudicial Settlement/Partition with Sale, and an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Rufino Mabborang with Adjudication and Sale. These documents were mentioned only on January 28, 1998, nearly two years after the CA's decision became final and almost nine years after the complaint was filed, through a Report and Motion submitted by the Public Attorney's Office. Only machine copies were attached; the originals were not presented. The documents were never identified by any witness, marked as exhibits, or formally offered during the trial.

• Proceedings on Remand: On remand, the RTC initially granted respondents' motions for subdivision. Subsequently, the trial court set aside those orders, reopened pre-trial, and directed petitioners to present the subject documents. Respondents insisted the documents were spurious. In an Order dated August 31, 2001, the RTC directed respondents to have the thumbprints on the documents examined by an expert. Respondents failed to do so, and by Order dated May 30, 2003, the RTC declared that respondents were deemed to have waived the presentation of evidence to prove the alleged transfers were forgeries. Despite this, the RTC ultimately found that the existence of the documents themselves was never proven, as they were not formally offered.

• The CA's 1996 Finding: The CA had previously observed that no deed of partition, no certificates of title in the names of individual heirs, and no deeds of sale or instruments of conveyance were presented. The sketches submitted were offered only after the RTC rendered its initial decision.

• Waiver of Evidence: Petitioners maintained that because respondents failed to subject the documents to expert examination as ordered, respondents were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence and thereby admitted the documents' genuineness and due execution. Consequently, the case should have been dismissed.

• Right to Present Evidence: Petitioners argued that since respondents were deemed to have waived their evidence, the trial court should have ordered petitioners to present theirs, and that the appellate court erred in affirming a decision rendered without affording them that opportunity.

• Non-Existence of Prior Partition: Respondents argued that Sofronia Mabborang had never received her share of the estate and that no valid sale or transfer of her share had ever been proven.

• Documents Spurious and Not Formally Offered: Respondents consistently maintained that the documents petitioners sought to rely upon were spurious. They further argued that these documents were never properly identified, marked, or formally offered in evidence, and thus could not be considered.

• Formal Offer of Evidence: Whether the courts below erred in refusing to give probative value to the deeds of sale and extrajudicial settlements purportedly proving that Sofronia had already received and disposed of her share, despite respondents' failure to prove the documents were forgeries.

• Waiver and Right to Present Evidence: Whether respondents' failure to subject the documents to expert examination amounted to an admission of their genuineness that should have led to dismissal, and whether petitioners were erroneously denied the opportunity to present their evidence.

• Formal Offer of Evidence: The documents were correctly excluded. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court mandates that courts shall consider no evidence that has not been formally offered. Mere identification and marking as an exhibit during pre-trial or trial is insufficient; a formal offer is indispensable to allow the opposing party to examine and object to admissibility, and to ensure judicial findings rest strictly on properly offered evidence. While the rule may be relaxed where the evidence was (1) duly identified by testimony duly recorded and (2) incorporated in the records, neither condition was met here. The documents were not identified by any witness; no originals were presented; the mere photocopies attached to the Public Attorney's Office's Report and Motion were not equivalent to a formal offer; and the documents were not even marked during the initial presentation of evidence. The formal offer that petitioners did make referenced only diagrams showing division of properties, not the subject deeds and settlements.

• Waiver and Right to Present Evidence: Respondents' failure to have the documents examined by an expert did not relieve petitioners of their burden to prove the existence and authenticity of those documents. The trial court correctly observed that the existence of the documents was never proven in the first place, as they were not formally offered. Petitioners were not denied the right to present evidence; they had years to do so and offered no explanation for the delay. The undue delay—attempting to present the documents only in 1998, after the CA's 1996 decision became final—further cast doubt on their authenticity and reliability.

• Formal Offer of Evidence (Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court): Evidence not formally offered shall not be considered by the court and cannot be assigned any evidentiary weight or value. A formal offer serves a dual purpose: to apprise the trial judge of the purpose for which the evidence is presented and to allow opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Identification and marking of a document as an exhibit during pre-trial or trial is distinct from, and does not substitute for, a formal offer made when a party rests its case.

• Exception to the Formal Offer Rule (Two Requisites): A trial court may relax the rule and consider evidence not formally offered only when: (1) the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded, and (2) the evidence was incorporated in the records of the case. Both requisites must concur.

• Burden of Proof on Affirmative Allegations: A party who asserts an affirmative fact—here, petitioners' claim that Sofronia had already received and sold her share—bears the burden of proving it. Unless the party asserting the affirmative sustains that burden by the required degree of proof, the claim must fail. The failure of the opposing party to disprove a document does not shift the burden of proving its existence and authenticity.

• "It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence."

• "It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected."

• "Unless substantial justice dictates that procedural rules be relaxed to arrive at a just disposition of a case, there shall be no liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules."

• Heirs of Pasag v. Spouses Lorenzo, 550 Phil. 571 (2007) — Cited to explain the purpose of the formal offer rule: to enable the trial judge to know the purpose of the evidence, allow opposing parties to object, and ensure that findings rest strictly on offered evidence.

• Heirs of Romana Saves v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, 646 Phil. 536 (2010) — Cited for the two requisites that must concur before a court may relax the formal offer rule: the evidence must have been duly identified by recorded testimony and incorporated in the records.

• Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427 — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the successional rights of illegitimate children and the principle that descendants of an illegitimate child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent that child in inheritance.

• Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 — Cited by the trial court for the limited probative value of birth certificates regarding statements of filiation.

• Article 776, Civil Code — The inheritance includes all property, rights, and obligations of a person not extinguished by death.

• Articles 774 and 777, Civil Code — Succession is a mode of acquiring the property, rights, and obligations of a decedent; rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death.

• Articles 902 and 990, Civil Code — The successional rights of illegitimate children are transmitted to their descendants upon death; determining factor for representation is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented.

• Article 968, Civil Code — Accretion in intestate succession: if a sibling dies without issue, the share accrues to the surviving brothers and sisters.

• Article 980, Civil Code — In intestate succession, children inherit in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

• Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court — The court shall consider no evidence that has not been formally offered; the purpose of the rule is to enable the court and opposing parties to know the purpose for which evidence is presented.

Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson); Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (Acting Member); Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes; and Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, concurred.