Heirs of Saez vs. Comorposa

Admissibility of evidence is distinct from its probative value; an item of evidence may be admissible but still lack the weight to prove a fact in dispute. Furthermore, in an unlawful detainer action predicated on tolerance, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant's possession was merely tolerated.

Marcos Saez was the lawful possessor of a 1.2-hectare lot in Davao del Sur until his death in 1960. In 1965, Francisco Comorposa, after losing his employment and needing to relocate his house, was allowed by Saez's son, Adolfo, to occupy a portion of the property out of pity and humanitarian consideration, without paying rent. Francisco eventually left for Hawaii and was succeeded by the respondents, who also paid no rent. On May 7, 1998, petitioners (the heirs of Saez) demanded that respondents vacate the premises, but respondents refused, claiming to be the true, valid, and lawful possessors and owners of the lot by prescription, a claim allegedly upheld by the DENR Regional Director.

• Possession of the Property: Marcos Saez possessed Lot No. 845 until his death in 1960. In 1965, Adolfo Saez permitted Francisco Comorposa to occupy a portion out of pity. Comorposa did not pay rent.
• Succession of Possession: Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii and was succeeded by the respondents, who continued to occupy the property without paying rent, purportedly through the petitioners' tolerance.
• Demand to Vacate: On May 7, 1998, petitioners formally demanded that respondents vacate the premises. Respondents refused, asserting ownership and possession by prescription, supported by a DENR order.
• Barangay Conciliation: A complaint was filed with the barangay, but the parties failed to settle, resulting in a Certificate to File Action.

• DENR Order: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in relying on the DENR Regional Director's April 2, 1998 Order, as it was not yet final and was held in abeyance by a later order dated August 23, 1999.
• CENR Certification: Petitioners maintained that the CENR Officer's Certification was a sham document bearing a mere facsimile signature and that it was a new matter raised for the first time on appeal.
• Prescription: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in upholding the defense of prescription, contending that respondents' possession was merely tolerated, precluding prescription.
• Affidavits and Admission by Silence: Petitioners asserted that the CA erred in disregarding their witnesses' affidavits and that respondents' failure to file a position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounted to an admission by silence.

• Rightful Possession: Respondents countered that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid, and lawful claimants and possessors since 1960.
• Prescription: Respondents argued that they had acquired just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription.
• DENR Upholding: Respondents asserted that the DENR Regional Director had already upheld their possession over the land in question, entitling them to the issuance of a title.

• DENR Order: Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the DENR Regional Director's Order despite its alleged lack of finality.
• CENR Certification: Whether the CA erred in giving weight to the CENR Officer's Certification despite its facsimile signature and alleged improper raising on appeal.
• Prescription: Whether the CA erred in holding that the land was acquired by prescription despite petitioners' claim of tolerance.
• Affidavits and Probative Value: Whether the CA erred in disregarding petitioners' affidavits and in not treating respondents' failure to file a position paper as an admission.

• DENR Order: The reliance on the DENR Order was not erroneous. While the Public Land Act places the management and disposition of public land under the primary control of the Director of Lands (LMB), this does not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions. Courts retain the power to determine who has actual physical possession or the better right of possession over public land while the DENR application is pending; the DENR's decision prevails only upon the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a title.
• CENR Certification: The Certification was properly given weight. A facsimile signature—a signature produced by mechanical means recognized as valid in banking and business transactions—is distinct from a document transmitted via fax machine, which lacks guaranteed authenticity. Moreover, the CENR officer did not disclaim the Certification, and the DENR regional director used it as a reference. The Certification was also not raised for the first time on appeal, having been marked during the MTC pre-trial. Furthermore, the rule requiring the formal offer of evidence does not strictly apply to cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
• Affidavits and Probative Value: The CA did not err in disregarding the affidavits. Admissibility of evidence is distinct from its probative value; admissible evidence may still lack the weight to prove a fact in dispute. While affidavits are admissible in summary proceedings, the adverse party's failure to reply does not ipso facto prove the facts alleged therein. Petitioners, as plaintiffs asserting affirmative relief, retained the burden of proving their cause of action.
• Prescription: The defense of prescription was correctly upheld. To defeat prescription based on tolerance, tolerance must first be proven. Petitioners' evidence—a technical description and vicinity map from 1936—was discredited by the CENR Certification, which indicated the lot had not been allocated to anyone. Furthermore, the question of whether possession was by tolerance is a factual issue beyond the purview of a Rule 45 Petition.

• Admissibility vs. Probative Value — Admissibility refers to whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. A particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
• Jurisdiction Over Possessory Actions Involving Public Land — The power given to the DENR and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) to alienate and dispose of public land does not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants to protect their respective possessions and occupations. The power to determine who has actual physical possession or the better right of possession over public land remains with the courts, until the DENR grants a homestead patent and issues a title.
• Facsimile Signature — A facsimile signature, produced by mechanical means, is valid and recognized in banking, financial, and business transactions. This is distinct from a facsimile or fax transmission, which is merely an exact copy and inadmissible if authenticity cannot be determined.
• Formal Offer of Evidence in Summary Procedure — The rule requiring the formal offer of evidence is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure where no full-blown trial is held.

• "The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute."
• "While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief."

• Garvida v. Sales Jr., 338 Phil. 484 (1997) — Distinguished. The Court clarified that Garvida dealt with the inadmissibility of documents transmitted via fax machines, which are mere copies, whereas a facsimile signature (a mechanical signature) is valid and recognized in business transactions.
• Omandam v. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 483 (2001) — Followed. The Court reiterated that courts retain jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public land while the DENR application is pending, and the DENR's decision prevails only upon the grant of a patent and issuance of a title.

• Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — Applied to emphasize that a petition for review is generally limited to questions of law; factual issues, such as whether possession was by tolerance, cannot be raised.
• Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court — Discussed in relation to the formal offer of evidence. The provision requiring formal offer was held inapplicable to cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
• Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), Sections 3 and 4 — Cited to establish that the management and disposition of public land is under the primary control of the Director of Lands (LMB), subject to the review of the DENR Secretary.

Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales