Heirs of Pelagio Zara vs. Director of Lands

A prior judgment declaring a parcel of land to be public land does not bar a subsequent application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended, because the proceeding contemplated therein presupposes that the land is public, and the basis of the decree is not that the land is already privately owned but that the claimant's thirty years of possession gives rise to a conclusive presumption of having performed all conditions essential to a government grant.

The applicants-appellants are the heirs of Pelagio Zara, who allegedly acquired the subject land through a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. The land, consisting of approximately 107 hectares, is situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas. The application was filed pursuant to Act 496 (the Land Registration Act), with an alternative prayer for the benefits of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141, as amended, which allows citizens of the Philippines in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of agricultural public lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years to apply for confirmation of their claims. The right to file such an application was extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.

On August 4, 1960, the heirs of Pelagio Zara filed an application for registration of a parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A. They alleged that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, the applicants invoked the benefits of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.

Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry, and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recited that the parcel of land sought to be registered was included in the area applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601, which was decided by the same court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949. The opposition alleged that the parcel was declared public land in said decision, and that the de Villas had been in possession of the land for more than sixty years, openly, continuously, notoriously, and under claim of ownership. The opposition further asserted that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear in the prior case to prove their imperfect and incomplete title barred them from raising the same issue in another case, and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601, which was affirmed in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R, was concerned, there was already res judicata, and the court had no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision having transferred the land to the Director of Lands.

On November 15, 1960, the De Villas filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in their opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case. The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead." In the present appeal from the order of dismissal, neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee.

• Effect of Prior Judgment: Applicants-appellants argued that the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, does not preclude a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended.

• Res Judicata: Private oppositors-appellees argued that the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601, which declared the land public and was affirmed in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R, constituted res judicata, barring the applicants from raising the same issue in another case.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Private oppositors-appellees argued that the court had no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision in the prior case having transferred the land to the Director of Lands.
• Possessory Interest: Private oppositors-appellees claimed an interest over the land because for a period of more than sixty years, the de Villas had been in possession, which possession was open, continuous, notorious, and under claim of ownership, and they had furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.

• Effect of Prior Judgment on Imperfect Title Claim: Whether the 1949 judgment declaring the land to be public land precludes a subsequent application for judicial confirmation of title based on continuous possession for at least thirty years under Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
• Personality of Private Oppositors: Whether the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an opposition to the application.

• Effect of Prior Judgment on Imperfect Title Claim: No. The prior judgment declaring the land public does not bar a subsequent application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended, because the proceeding contemplated therein presupposes that the land is public.
• Personality of Private Oppositors: Yes. The private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an opposition, considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land and have applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.

• Effect of Prior Judgment on Imperfect Title Claim: The Court noted that the appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although they were not actual parties in the previous case, the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so, this is a defense that properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public land. In any case, the appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.

• Personality of Private Oppositors: On the question of whether the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an opposition, the Court found in their favor, considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.

• Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title under Section 48(b) of C.A. 141 — The proceeding for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of confirmation is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years, he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that a prior judgment declaring the land public does not foreclose a subsequent application for confirmation of title based on thirty years of possession.

• Res Judicata in Land Registration Proceedings — A prior judgment in a land registration case, being in rem, may bar a subsequent claim of ownership over the same land where the parties had constructive notice by publication. However, the Court held that this defense properly pertains to the Government, and that the applicants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by the prior declaration that the land was public.

• "It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public land." — This passage establishes that the res judicata defense based on the prior judgment belongs to the Government, not to private oppositors, and does not bar the alternative claim for confirmation of imperfect title.

• "In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public." — This is the core ratio decidendi: the confirmation proceeding under Section 48(b) presupposes the land is public, so a prior declaration of public land does not preclude the application.

• "The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant." — This passage defines the legal basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, which is the claimant's thirty-year possession creating a conclusive presumption of a government grant.

• N/A — The case text does not cite any prior jurisprudence.

• Section 48(b), Chapter VIII, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended — The provision allows citizens of the Philippines occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands, whose titles have not been perfected or completed, to apply to the Court of First Instance for confirmation of their claims. Subsection (b) specifically covers those who, by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Such persons are conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and are entitled to a certificate of title. The Court applied this provision to hold that the applicants' claim for confirmation of imperfect title was not barred by the prior judgment declaring the land public.

• Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) — The statute under which the applicants filed their application for registration of title of ownership. The Court noted that the prior judgment may bar the claim under this alternative, but that defense properly pertains to the Government.

• Republic Act No. 2061 — The statute that extended the right to file an application under Section 48(b) of C.A. 141 to December 31, 1968.

Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concurred. Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., took no part.

N/A — The case text does not indicate any dissenting opinion.