Heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr. vs. Alcantara

A civil action for damages based on quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal action and is not barred by the accused's acquittal in the criminal case, where the complaint's allegations show that the cause of action is based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict rather than on the felony charged.

The petitioners are the heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr.; the private respondents are Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan, the driver of the Philippine Rabbit bus. The dispute concerns the heirs' claim for damages against the bus company and its driver. The statutory backdrop is Article 31 of the Civil Code, which governs civil actions based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, and Article 2176, which defines quasi-delict.

On September 2, 1974, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was riding a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Sitio Pag-asa, Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac, on his way home to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac, Tarlac, when a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74, driven by Romeo Villa, bumped and hit him. As a result, Tayag sustained physical injuries which caused his instantaneous death, and the bicycle he was riding was damaged and destroyed.

The heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr. — Crisanta Salazar, Pedro Tayag, Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag, and Rodolfo Tayag — filed with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I, on September 25, 1974, a complaint for damages against Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan, docketed as Civil Case No. 5114. The complaint alleged that the bus was driven at a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable and proper and in a negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regard to injuries to persons and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules and regulations, and that Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Romeo Villa y Cunanan. Private respondents filed their answer, admitting some allegations and denying the others.

Thereafter, private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial dated April 30, 1975, on the ground that the criminal case against Romeo Villa was still pending in said court, and that Section 3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge granted the motion and suspended the hearing of Civil Case No. 5114. On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision in Criminal Case No. 836, acquitting Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Private respondents then filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 5114 on the ground that the petitioners had no cause of action against them because the driver of the bus had been acquitted in the criminal action. Petitioners opposed the motion, alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi-delict. Acting upon the motion and the opposition, the respondent Judge issued an order dated April 13, 1978, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114. Petitioners moved to reconsider, but the respondent Judge denied the motion in his order dated May 30, 1979.

• Quasi-Delict as Basis of Civil Action: Petitioners argued that their cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi-delict, so the acquittal of the driver in the criminal case should not bar Civil Case No. 5114.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners claimed that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114, and that there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the present petition for certiorari.

• No Cause of Action After Acquittal: Private respondents moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 5114 on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action against them because the driver of the bus had been acquitted in the criminal action.
• Suspension Pending Criminal Case: Private respondents moved to suspend the trial on the ground that the criminal case against Romeo Villa was still pending and that Section 3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is terminated.

• Dismissal of Quasi-Delict Action: Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.

• Dismissal of Quasi-Delict Action: Yes. The respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114 because the complaint's cause of action was based on quasi-delict, which may proceed independently of the criminal case under Article 31 of the Civil Code and is not barred by the driver's acquittal.

• Dismissal of Quasi-Delict Action: The SC began with Article 31 of the Civil Code, which allows a civil action based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony to proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. That provision refers to a civil action based not on the act or omission charged as a felony but on an obligation arising from other sources, like quasi-delict. The complaint's allegations showed that the heirs' cause of action was based on quasi-delict: it alleged that Romeo Villa drove the bus at a faster and greater speed than reasonable and proper and in a negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, causing Pedro Tayag, Sr.'s death and damage to his bicycle, and that Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. The SC found all essential averments of a quasi-delictual action present: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or omission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. It relied on Elcano vs. Hill, which held that a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided the offended party is not allowed to recover damages twice; the extinction of civil liability under Rule III refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, while civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. Since the heirs' cause of action was based on quasi-delict, Romeo Villa's acquittal in Criminal Case No. 836 was not a bar to Civil Case No. 5114, and the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing it.

• Independent Civil Action Based on Quasi-Delict — Under Article 31 of the Civil Code, when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. The SC applied this because the heirs' complaint alleged quasi-delict, not civil liability arising from the crime.
• Quasi-Delict (Culpa Aquiliana) — Article 2176 defines quasi-delict as damage caused by an act or omission constituting fault or negligence, with no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. The SC found all essential averments present: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence; (2) damage caused by the said act or omission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
• Acquittal Does Not Extinguish Quasi-Delict Liability — An acquittal in the criminal case does not bar a separate civil action for damages based on quasi-delict for the same act; the extinction of civil liability under Rule III refers to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, not to culpa aquiliana.

• "Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." — The SC quotes Article 31 of the Civil Code to establish that a civil action based on an obligation not arising from the felony may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings.
• "the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused." — The SC adopts Elcano vs. Hill to distinguish civil liability ex delicto from liability based on quasi-delict.
• "The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict." — The SC applies its ruling to the heirs' action and holds that the acquittal is not a bar.
• "In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114." — The SC concludes that the CFI's dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion.

• Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May 26, 1977, 77 SCRA 98 — Controlling precedent; the SC quoted and relied on it for the rule that a separate civil action based on quasi-delict is not barred by acquittal.
• Bemaldez Sr. vs. Bohol Land Transportation, Inc., L-18193, February 27, 1963, 7 SCRA 276 — Cited in support of the rule that a civil action may be based on an obligation arising from other sources, like quasi-delict.
• Mendoza vs. Hon. Abundio Z. Arrieta, etc., et al., L-32599, June 29, 1979 — Cited in support of quasi-delict as an obligation arising from another source and of the rule that acquittal does not bar a quasi-delict action.
• Virata, et al., vs. Ochoa, et al., L-46179, Jan. 31, 1978 — Cited in support of the holding that acquittal is not a bar to a civil action for damages based on quasi-delict.

• Article 31, Civil Code — Quoted and applied; because the heirs' action was based on quasi-delict, it could proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 836 and regardless of its result.
• Article 2176, Civil Code — Defines quasi-delict; the SC used it to characterize the complaint as a quasi-delictual action.
• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Mentioned in Elcano vs. Hill as the source of civil liability whose extinction under Rule III does not affect a quasi-delict action.
• Section 3, Rule III, Revised Rules of Court — Invoked by private respondents to suspend the civil case; the SC, through Elcano vs. Hill, held that the extinction of civil liability under this provision refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Justice Barredo (Concurring) — He concurred and added that the proceeding and trial in Civil Case No. 5114 should not have been suspended at all just because of the filing of the criminal case.
• Justice Aquino (Concurring) — He concurred because the action for damages is based on Article 2177 of the Civil Code, under which acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, should not bar a subsequent civil action for damages due to quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. He also said Article 33 justifies the independent civil action because "physical injuries" embraces death, and that since the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt, petitioners could amend their complaint to base the action also on Article 29; the requirement in Section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law.