Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Sps. Lorenzo and Florentina Parocha, et al.

Evidence not formally offered within a considerable period is deemed waived and must be excluded, and un-offered documents cannot sustain a claim even if previously identified and marked as exhibits. Applied here, petitioners' almost five-month delay despite extensions justified exclusion of their documentary exhibits, and the remaining testimonial evidence was insufficient to prove fraudulent self-adjudication, warranting dismissal on demurrer to evidence.

Petitioners are the heirs of Pedro, Maria, Juanita, Isidro, Basilio and Fortunata Pasag, six of the eight children of the deceased spouses Benito and Florentina Pasag. Respondents are the successors-in-interest of Severino Pasag, another child of the spouses, who acquired and transferred the disputed lands covered by certificates of title and a free patent.

Petitioners are the heirs of Pedro, Maria, Juanita, Isidro, Basilio and Fortunata Pasag, six of the eight children of spouses Benito and Florentina Pasag, who died intestate leaving properties to their children Pedro, Isidro, Basilio, Severino, Bonifacio, Maria, Juanita and Fortunata. According to petitioners, Severino, predecessor of respondents, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication falsely claiming to be the sole, legal and compulsory heir of Benito and Florentina Pasag, thereby appropriating to himself the properties covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 2983 and 1887. Thereafter, Severino executed a deed of absolute sale over those properties in favor of his daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha, and allegedly used the same affidavit to secure a free patent over agricultural land long possessed by Benito and Florentina Pasag.

Respondents, for their part, denied the material allegations and asserted that the properties left by Benito and Florentina Pasag had already been partitioned among the eight surviving children. They claimed the lands covered by OCT Nos. 2983 and 1887 were Bonifacio's share, later renounced by him in a Quitclaim Deed in favor of his brother Severino, while the land covered by OCT No. P-20607 had been in Severino's possession and occupation since 1940, entitling him to apply for and obtain a free patent that had become indefeasible upon compliance with legal requirements.

Trial commenced on March 19, 1996. On March 9, 1999, petitioners rested their case and were given ten days to submit their formal offer of documentary exhibits. They failed to file within the period, obtained an extension until May 11, 1999, again failed and sought another five-day extension, and still failed to file within the extended period. In its June 17, 1999 Order, the trial court deemed waived petitioners' right to make a formal offer, and in its September 1, 1999 Order denied their July 27, 1999 motion for admission of the offer for consistent failure to submit it. On October 28, 1999, respondents moved for dismissal on demurrer to evidence.

In the proceedings that matter to review, petitioners' witness Eufemio Pasag admitted on cross-examination that the eight children had no will to contend with, that his father Pedro Pasag had titled properties where his house stood as inheritance from the spouses, that Severino likewise acquired properties as inheritance, and that Isidro, Juanito, Fortunata, Basilio, Maria and the other siblings likewise received properties of their own upon the death of their parents.

• Negligence of Counsel and Due Process: Petitioner argued that affirmance despite the gross negligence of their counsel deprived them of due process rights.
• Remand for Full-Blown Trial: Petitioner maintained that the case should have been remanded for further proceedings to clearly establish the parties' respective claims on the subject properties, contending the Complaint should be threshed out in a full-blown trial as the issues were matters of judicial appreciation.

• Prior Partition and Quitclaim: Respondent countered that the estate had already been partitioned among the eight children, and the lands under OCT Nos. 2983 and 1887 were Bonifacio's share renounced to Severino by Quitclaim Deed.
• Lawful Free Patent and Indefeasibility: Respondent argued that Severino had possessed and occupied the land under OCT No. P-20607 since 1940, complied with legal requirements for a free patent, and his title had become indefeasible.

• Waiver of Formal Offer: Whether petitioners' right to offer documentary evidence was properly deemed waived for failure to timely make a formal offer.
• Demurrer to Evidence: Whether dismissal of the Complaint on demurrer to evidence was proper for insufficiency of evidence to prove fraud and entitlement to the properties.

• Waiver of Formal Offer: Yes. Waiver was proper, petitioners having allowed almost five months to lapse despite several extensions, so unoffered documents were correctly excluded and rejected.
• Demurrer to Evidence: Yes. Dismissal was proper, as petitioners failed to carry the burden of proof by preponderance, with no clear and convincing evidence of fraud and testimony admitting partition.

• Waiver of Formal Offer: The rule that only formally offered evidence shall be considered was strictly applied because findings must rest only upon evidence offered at trial, enabling the judge to know its purpose, allowing the opponent to object, and facilitating appellate review. Despite being required to offer documentary and object evidence after testimonial evidence, ideally orally on the day the last witness is presented, petitioners repeatedly defaulted even after extensions totaling almost five months, constituting inexcusable laxity that would encourage delay and derail speedy justice if condoned. Accordingly, mere identification and marking as exhibits during pre-trial or trial, which is distinct from formal offer when a party rests its case, conferred no evidentiary weight, and exclusion was mandated.
• Demurrer to Evidence: A demurrer tests in law whether the adversary's evidence, even if true, makes out a case or sustains the issue, serving expeditious termination of the action. The burden lay on petitioners to prove fraudulent exclusion from the estate, but no concrete and substantial evidence was adduced; their own witness Eufemio admitted each of the eight children, including petitioners' predecessors and Severino, received inherited properties. Since fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and not by conjecture, the bare plea for a full-blown trial could not supply the deficiency, sustaining dismissal.

• Formal offer of evidence; waiver by delay — Only evidence formally offered shall be considered by the court, because judges must rest findings strictly upon offered evidence, the purpose of the offer must be known, the adverse party must have opportunity to object, and appellate review is facilitated. Failure to submit the offer within a considerable period despite court orders and extensions is deemed waiver, and admission after a lapse of months condones inexcusable laxity and needless delay. Here, the nearly five-month default despite two extensions justified deeming the offer waived and rejecting the documents.
• Oral offer on last hearing day; written offer as exception — Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after presentation of testimonial evidence, orally on the very day the last witness is presented, unless the court allows writing. Written offer is tolerated only in extreme cases involving a large number of documents or unusual difficulty, sought by litigated motion with hearing and service. Counsel are expected to prepare the draft offer from the pre-trial order and lay their cards on the table, since evidence not identified and pre-marked is deemed waived except for impeachment, re-direct explanation, rebuttal or sur-rebuttal, or newly unavailable evidence despite diligence.
• Identification and marking distinguished from formal offer — Identification with marking as an exhibit during pre-trial or trial is not a formal offer made when the party rests its case. Documents identified and marked but not formally offered cannot be treated as evidence nor assigned weight and value, and must be excluded and rejected.
• Demurrer to evidence — A demurrer to evidence is an objection that the adversary's evidence is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out the case or sustain the issue and support a verdict. After plaintiff completes presentation, defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon facts and law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, abbreviating proceedings by testing sufficiency without need for rebuttal.
• Burden of proof and proof of fraud — The burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations, who must establish the claim by preponderance of evidence in civil cases. Fraud is never presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, not mere conjectures or speculations. Here, petitioners' fraud allegation failed where their own testimony confirmed distribution of inheritance to all children and no concrete proof of fraudulent self-adjudication was presented.

• "The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it." — States the controlling ratio on waiver, grounding exclusion of petitioners' delayed documentary offer.
• "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." — Recites the foundational evidentiary rule under Rule 132 requiring formal offer as prerequisite to consideration.
• "The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence." — Defines the canonical distinction between marking and offering, denying weight to unoffered exhibits.
• "It must be stressed that fraud is not presumed; and it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations." — Articulates the standard that defeated petitioners' claim of fraudulent self-adjudication.

• Constantino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116018, November 13, 1996, 264 SCRA 59 — Followed as authority that formal offer is deemed waived after failure to submit within a considerable period, and admission after three months would condone inexcusable laxity and delay.
• People of the Philippines vs. Franco, G.R. No. 118607, March 4, 1997, 269 SCRA 211 — Cited for the distinction that identification and marking during pre-trial and trial is separate from formal offer when the party rests its case.
• Ong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117103, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 387 — Cited on the functions of formal offer in enabling the judge to know the purpose and facilitating appellate review of evidence scrutinized below.
• Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., G.R. No. 143338, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 117 — Cited to define demurrer to evidence as an instrument for expeditious termination abbreviating judicial proceedings.

• Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered; applied to exclude petitioners' documentary exhibits for want of timely offer.
• Section 35, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Requires documentary and object evidence to be offered after testimonial evidence, orally unless allowed in writing; applied with pre-trial guidelines to require offer on the day the last witness is presented.
• Section 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court — Allows defendant, after plaintiff completes presentation, to move for dismissal on demurrer on the ground that upon facts and law plaintiff has shown no right to relief; applied to sustain dismissal of the Complaint.
• A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, Pre-trial Guidelines — Requires formal offer on the last hearing day allotted for each party with immediate objection and open-court ruling, and deems waived evidence not identified and pre-marked; applied to enforce strict compliance and speedy disposition.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Chairperson, Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Dante O. Tinga, Associate Justices, concurred. No separate concurring opinion with additional reasoning is recounted in the text.