Heirs of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano vs. Heirs of Irene B. Bien

A judicial admission in a party’s pleading conclusively binds that party and may be contradicted only by showing palpable mistake or that no admission was made; a party’s in-court testimony subject to cross-examination is not “self-serving evidence” merely because it favors his cause. Consequently, heirs substituting a deceased defendant are bound by the defendant’s admission of possession and cannot escape liability for the owner’s share of the harvest on that basis.

The dispute concerns a 20,644-square-meter riceland in Bolo, Tiwi, Albay, covered by Tax Declaration No. 5299, one of three lots involved in consolidated recovery-of-possession and ownership cases. The original parties, Irene Bien, through her attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemeña, and Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano, each traced ownership to sales by the estate of the late Pedro Clemeña y Conde. Both original parties died during the protracted litigation and were substituted by their respective heirs, who are the present petitioners and respondents.

The disputed property is a riceland in Bolo, Tiwi, Albay, with a surface area of more or less 20,644 square meters, declared under Tax Declaration No. 5299 and assessed at P310. It was one of three lots involved in two consolidated cases for recovery of possession and ownership filed in the 1940s by Irene Bien, through her attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemeña, against Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano. Irene alleged that she was the absolute owner, having acquired the land by purchase from Victoriano Napa, who in turn bought it from Francisco Barrameda, who had bought it from the administrator of the estate of Pedro Clemeña y Conde, with that sale duly authorized and approved in Civil Case No. 3410, In re the Estate of Pedro Clemeña y Conde. She further alleged that Pedro, after being removed as administrator in 1939, deliberately continued to occupy and usurp possession of the land, refused to relinquish it despite having no right or color of title, and caused damages beginning with the October 1943 harvest at the rate of 25 cavans of palay per harvest, or 50 cavans yearly.

In his answer, Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano alleged that the land was his and that it was in his exclusive possession. His claim of ownership was similarly based on a sale by the estate of the late Pedro Clemeña y Conde to his predecessor-in-interest. Neither original party lived to see the end of the trial. Irene Bien died in 1953 and was substituted by respondents, while Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano died in 1955 and was substituted by petitioners. The trial lasted decades, and the cases were eventually re-raffled to Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City in November 1994.

On August 10, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners of the land described in TD 5299 and directing respondents to respect petitioners’ possession. On reconsideration, however, the RTC ruled that the contending parties had failed to prove their respective claims of ownership and that the land still belonged to its original owner, the estate of the late Pedro Clemeña y Conde. In its November 13, 1995 order, the RTC declared respondents owners of the parcel covered by TD 5681 and petitioners owners of the parcel covered by TD 5685, but awarded no damages because it was not established that petitioners had entered and occupied a portion of TD 5681 and because no damages had been proved for TD 5685. Respondents appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s resolution as to the other two parcels but reversed the ruling on TD 5299. It found from the recovered exhibits and documents of sale that ownership of TD 5299 belonged to respondents. On damages, Gregorio Clemeña testified that the land was riceland, more or less two hectares, with an average owner’s share of about fifty cavans of palay; that from 1943, Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano, and after his death his children, had been receiving the owner’s share; and that the price of palay was about P15 per sack from 1945 to 1960 and P25 per cavan from 1960 to 1970. The Court of Appeals stated that respondents were entitled to P118,000, computed as P1,500 (50 cavans multiplied by two harvests in a year multiplied by P15) for 27 years from 1943 to 1970, and P2,700 (50 cavans multiplied by two harvests in a year multiplied by P25) for 31 years from 1971 to 2001. It ordered petitioners to vacate the land, turn over possession with all improvements to respondents, and pay P118,000 as actual and compensatory damages with legal interest from finality. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. In this petition, petitioners no longer dispute respondents’ ownership of TD 5299 but insist that they never took possession of the property and that Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony was self-serving and could not support the damages award.

• No Possession: Petitioners maintained that they never took possession of the property declared in TD 5299 and therefore could not be held liable to respondents for the owner’s share of the harvest.
• Self-Serving Evidence: Petitioners argued that the evidence the Court of Appeals relied on to determine the amount of damages, proceeding as it did from one of the plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a proper basis for the award.
• Exceptions to Rule 45: Petitioners invoked exceptions to the rule against raising questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari, claiming that the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were contradictory, that the decision was against the law and in complete disregard of the rules on evidence, that there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts, and that the Court of Appeals failed to notice relevant facts and evidence which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

• Possession and Liability for Damages: Whether petitioners can be held liable for compensatory damages for depriving respondents of the owner’s share of the harvest despite petitioners’ claim that they never took possession of the land covered by TD 5299.
• Judicial Admission: Whether Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano’s allegation in his answer that the land was in his exclusive possession binds petitioners as substituting defendants and forecloses their contrary claim.
• Self-Serving Evidence: Whether Gregorio Clemeña’s in-court testimony was self-serving and therefore an improper basis for the damages awarded to respondents.
• Question of Fact: Whether the issue of whether petitioners ever had possession of the land may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Possession and Liability for Damages: Yes. Petitioners are liable for the damages awarded; their predecessor’s judicial admission of exclusive possession binds them, and the issue of possession is a question of fact not reviewable under Rule 45.
• Judicial Admission: Yes. An admission in a pleading conclusively binds the pleader and may be contradicted only by showing palpable mistake or that no admission was made; petitioners made no such showing.
• Self-Serving Evidence: No. A party’s in-court testimony subject to cross-examination is not “self-serving evidence”; the term refers only to out-of-court acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest.
• Question of Fact: No. Possession is a question of fact, and Rule 45 confines review to pure questions of law; none of the invoked exceptions applied.

• Possession and Liability for Damages: The Court rejected petitioners’ contention that the land was never in their possession. Their predecessor Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano had alleged in his answer that the land declared in TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession. That statement confirmed the allegation in the complaint that petitioners’ predecessor had retained possession of the land and took on the character of a judicial admission under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it, and he cannot thereafter contradict it except in rare instances where the trial court, for strong reasons, relieves him from its consequences. As substituting defendants, petitioners were bound by Pedro’s admission. Without any showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners could not contradict it. The award of damages for deprivation of the owner’s share of the harvest therefore stood.
• Judicial Admission: Section 4, Rule 129 provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case does not require proof and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. The Court traced this rule to older case law. In Irlanda vs. Pitargue, the Court laid down the doctrine that acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake. In Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co., the Court stated that an admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission, and all proof submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored by the court. In Cunanan vs. Amparo, the Court declared that the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader, and a party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with his pleadings. Pedro’s admission was judicial; petitioners, as his substitutes, could not take a contrary position.
• Self-Serving Evidence: The Court clarified that “self-serving evidence” is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent’s interest. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court. Evidence of that sort is excluded on the same ground as hearsay, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party and the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication. In contrast, a party’s testimony in court is sworn and subject to cross-examination by the other party and therefore is not susceptible to an objection that it is self-serving. Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony was given in court, sworn, and subject to cross-examination; it was therefore not self-serving. Petitioners never alleged, much less tried to show, that his testimony was inaccurate or untrue. Their objection was founded solely on the fact that he, being a plaintiff, was a witness interested in the outcome of the case. While a party’s interest may to some extent affect his credibility, interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a party’s testimony. The interest of a witness does not ipso facto deprive his testimony of probative force or require it to be disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness’ testimony as he finds credible and to reject the rest. National Development Company vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission was cited in support. The Court thus held that the appellate court committed no reversible error in relying on Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony, and the award of damages had to stand.
• Question of Fact: The issue of whether petitioners ever had possession of the land is undeniably a question of fact. Questions of this nature cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, as the remedy under Rule 45 is confined to pure questions of law. Petitioners invoked several exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are contradictory; (2) the decision sought to be reviewed is against the law and in complete disregard of the rules on evidence; (3) there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; and (4) the Court of Appeals failed to notice relevant facts and evidence which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. The Court found that the case did not fall within any of these exceptions. Petitioners showed no contradiction between the findings of the Court of Appeals and the RTC on the matter, and the conclusiveness of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano’s admission of the fact of possession made the rest of the grounds invoked undeserving of even passing consideration.

• Judicial Admissions — Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case does not require proof. It may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it, and he cannot thereafter contradict it. The Court applied this doctrine to Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano’s answer, in which he alleged that the land covered by TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession. As substituting defendants, petitioners were bound by that admission and could not claim that they never possessed the land.
• Self-Serving Evidence — The term “self-serving evidence” refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court. It does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court. Out-of-court self-serving evidence is excluded on the same ground as hearsay, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination and the risk of fraud and fabrication. In contrast, a party’s in-court testimony is sworn and subject to cross-examination and therefore is not self-serving. The Court applied this doctrine to Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony, which was given in court and subject to cross-examination, and held that it was not rendered inadmissible merely because he was a party interested in the outcome.
• Interest of a Witness — The interest of a witness does not ipso facto deprive his testimony of probative force or require it to be disregarded. The trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness’ testimony as he finds credible and to reject the rest. Interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a party’s testimony. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting petitioners’ objection to Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony, which was based solely on the fact that he was a plaintiff interested in the case.
• Questions of Fact in Rule 45 — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is confined to pure questions of law. Questions of fact cannot be raised in such a petition, subject only to recognized exceptions. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that whether petitioners ever had possession of the land was a question of fact, and that petitioners failed to show that any of the invoked exceptions applied.

• “An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.” — This is the Court’s quotation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which supplies the controlling rule on judicial admissions and anchors the Court’s rejection of petitioners’ claim that they never possessed the land.
• “A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of his admission.” — This passage states the ratio decidendi on why Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano’s admission of exclusive possession bound petitioners as substituting defendants and could not be contradicted.
• “The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court.” — This is the Court’s canonical definition of “self-serving evidence,” which it used to reject petitioners’ objection to Gregorio Clemeña’s in-court testimony.
• “Moreover, this Court held in National Development Company v. Workmen's Compensation Commission that interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a party's testimony.” — This passage is the Court’s summary of the rule that a witness’s interest does not automatically destroy the probative value of his testimony, which supported the Court’s reliance on Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony.

• Irlanda vs. Pitargue, 22 Phil. 383 (1912) — Cited as the early case laying down the doctrine that acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake.
• Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co., 38 Phil. 634 (1918) — Cited for the rule that an admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission, and all proof submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should simply be ignored by the court.
• Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 (1948) — Cited for the rule that the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader, and a party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with his pleadings.
• National Development Company vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 126 Phil. 226 (1967) — Cited for the rule that interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a party’s testimony, and that a party’s in-court testimony subject to cross-examination is not self-serving.
• Joe’s Radio and Electrical Supply vs. Alto Electronics Corp., 104 Phil. 333 (1958) — Cited as one of the cases reiterating the rule in Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co. on the conclusiveness of admissions in pleadings.
• Santiago vs. De los Santos, 158 Phil. 809 (1974) — Cited as another case reiterating the rule in Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co. on the conclusiveness of admissions in pleadings.

• Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court — Provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. The Court applied this provision to Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano’s answer, holding that his allegation of exclusive possession was a judicial admission that bound petitioners as substituting defendants.
• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. The Court applied this provision in holding that the issue of whether petitioners ever had possession of the land was a question of fact and could not be raised in the petition.

Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, and Garcia concurred.