Heirs of Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals

The death of a party-appellant during the pendency of her appeal automatically suspends the proceedings and the running of the period to file brief pending her substitution by her legal representative or heirs under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court; and the dismissal of an appeal for failure to file brief rests on a discretionary power — not a specific and mandatory duty — of the CA, which must be exercised with great circumspection and in accordance with justice and fair play.

A registered landowner spent over a decade trying to evict eleven occupants from her titled parcel in Mandaluyong, Rizal. After losing at trial, she perfected an appeal that the CA twice attempted to terminate — first through a faulty timeliness ruling that the SC corrected in 1975, then through a failure-to-file-brief ruling triggered by her own death mid-appeal. The 1981 decision resolves the second termination and settles how a pending appeal survives the death of a party.

Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer was the duly registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in her name. Alleging that private respondents Federico Martinez, Baldomero Manalo, Faustino Bagalawis, Federico Sta. Teresa, Angelito King, Gregorio del Rosario, Leodovico Torres, Leon Soriano, Santiago Tumang, Luis Pastor and Cristino Libramante had surreptitiously entered the land and built their houses thereon, she filed eleven (11) complaints for recovery of possession in 1964 and 1965 before the CFI of Rizal.

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a consolidated decision dated May 26, 1971 dismissing all the complaints. On her motion, the cases were reopened and retried on grounds of newly discovered evidence, and on September 15, 1972 the lower court issued an order reviving its May 26, 1971 decision. Haberer appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In the CA, the appeal was once erroneously dismissed on the ground that it had allegedly been filed out of time. That issue reached the SC in Cases Nos. L-39366 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al."; on January 29, 1975 the SC rendered judgment setting aside the dismissal and ordering the reinstatement of the appeal for proper disposition on the merits, having found "that contrary to respondent court's erroneous premises and computation, petitioner duly and timely perfected her appeal within the reglementary period and in compliance with the material data rule requiring that the Record on Appeal state such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time." The cases were thereupon remanded to the CA, which required the appellant to file her printed brief within forty-five (45) days from her receipt of notice.

Three days before that period was to expire, or on June 18, 1975, counsel requested an extension of time. In its resolution of June 23, 1975 the CA granted a ninety (90)-day extension, with a warning of no further extension, from receipt on June 27, 1975 or up to September 25, 1975. Private respondents opposed the extension the same day through a "Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Extension of Time to File Brief," upon which the CA required the appellant to comment; counsel complied on July 15, 1975. By then the appellant was already dead — she had died on May 26, 1975. In their motion of June 28, 1975, Attorneys Bausa, Ampil and Suarez gave notice of their client's death and asked for the suspension of the running of the period to file the appellant's brief pending the appointment of an executor of her estate in the probate proceedings before the CFI of Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-2026), where a petition for the probate of the alleged will of the deceased had been filed by another lawyer, Atty. Sergio Amante. Private respondents countered that the deceased's lawyers had "no longer any legal standing" and could no longer act for her because the client-attorney relationship had been automatically terminated or severed, and asked that the appeal be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Because the June 28, 1975 motion remained unacted upon and the extended period was about to lapse, counsel filed on September 18, 1975 a manifestation and/or motion asking either for a sixty (60)-day extension and/or a resolution suspending the running of the period; the CA again remained silent. Not certain whether their services would still be retained by the heirs of the deceased, counsel reiterated their request in a motion dated November 14, 1975, asking either for an extension of time to file the brief or for the suspension of the period pending the appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate. Acting on that motion, the CA denied the request for extension and at the same time dismissed the appeal in its resolution of November 24, 1975, "considering that appellant has already been given a total of one hundred ninety-five (195) days within which to file brief."

Counsel filed an urgent motion for reconsideration on December 8, 1975, explaining that their requests for extension/suspension stemmed from the uncertainty whether the heirs or legal representatives would retain their services, but that they felt obligated to preserve the right of such heirs/successors to continue the appeal pursuant to Rule 3, Section 17 of the Rules of Court pending the settlement of who among them should be executor of the deceased's estate. They presented for admission the printed "brief for the appellant," the printing of which they had deferred "for professional ethical considerations" pending the CA's action on their request for suspension, and submitted copies of two separate orders dated September 3, 1975 and August 26, 1975 issued by the Court of Agrarian Relations and the CFI, both at Guimba, Nueva Ecija — courts where the deceased was party-defendant — granting counsel's prayer to hold further proceedings therein in abeyance pending the appointment of an administrator for the estate. The CA nonetheless denied reconsideration per its Resolution of January 15, 1976, citing the general principle that "litigants have no right to assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter of course," denied admission of the appellant's brief, and ordered all pleadings filed after the appellant's death stricken off the records. A final development: on March 19, 1976, counsel submitted a Manifestation attaching the written authority dated January 20, 1976 individually signed by the instituted heirs and/or legal representatives of the testate estate granting them full authority to file and prosecute the case, which was duly noted in the SC's Resolution of March 26, 1976 and which the SC deemed the formal substitution of the deceased by her heirs, who appear as petitioners in the title of the case.

• The CA Resolutions of November 24, 1975 and January 15, 1976 were issued with grave error of law, if not with grave abuse of discretion.
• Counsel's requests for extension and/or suspension of the period were due to the uncertainty whether the heirs would retain their services, but they felt obligated to preserve the heirs' right to continue the appeal pursuant to Rule 3, Section 17 of the Rules of Court, pending settlement of who among them should be executor of the deceased's estate.
• The motion to suspend the period was well-taken because no administrator or executor of the estate had yet been appointed, the probate proceedings being pending in the CFI of Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-2026).
• Counsel presented for admission the printed "brief for the appellant" and copies of the orders of September 3, 1975 (Court of Agrarian Relations) and August 26, 1975 (CFI), both at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, holding proceedings in abeyance pending appointment of an administrator — showing the propriety of suspension.
• The printed brief disclosed a prima facie meritorious case that should be determined on the merits rather than terminated on a technicality.

• Private respondents opposed the extension through a "Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Extension of Time to File Brief" and contended that counsel of the deceased had "no longer any legal standing" and could no longer act for and in her behalf because the client-attorney relationship had been automatically terminated or severed; they asked that the appeal be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
• The CA, for its part, denied a further extension and dismissed the appeal because the appellant had already been given a total of 195 days within which to file brief; on reconsideration, it invoked the principle that "litigants have no right to assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter of course"; it ruled that upon the appellant's demise the attorney-client relationship "was automatically severed and terminated," making post-death pleadings "mere scraps of paper"; and it held that the supervening death "rendered the continuance of the appeal unnecessary," citing Velasco vs. Rosenberg.

• Effect of the Death of a Party-Appellant: Whether the death of the appellant on May 26, 1975 suspended the proceedings before the CA and the running of the period to file her printed brief pending her substitution by a legal representative or her heirs.
• Post-Death Acts of Counsel: Whether the pleadings filed by counsel after the client's death, absent a retainer from the heirs, were "mere scraps of paper" with no legal effect.
• Dismissal for Failure to File Brief: Whether the CA gravely erred in dismissing the appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief within the extended period, given that the power to dismiss on that ground is discretionary rather than mandatory.
• Supervening Death as Ground for Dismissal: Whether the appellant's death rendered the continuance of the appeal unnecessary such that the appeal had to be dismissed under the Velasco vs. Rosenberg ruling.
• Liberal Application of the Rules: Whether justice and equity required a liberal rather than a strict and rigid application of the rules on the filing of briefs under the circumstances.

• Effect of the Death of a Party-Appellant: Yes — the death suspended the proceedings and the period. Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, upon notice of the death of a party whose claim is not extinguished, it is the court itself that must order the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted within thirty (30) days or such time as it may grant; since no administrator had yet been appointed, counsel's motion for suspension was well-taken, and the CA should have ordered substitution instead of dismissing the appeal of a deceased party yet to be substituted.
• Post-Death Acts of Counsel: No — while the attorney-client relationship is terminated by the client's death, counsel retained the authority and duty to inform the court of the death and to take the necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case; the post-death pleadings were therefore not "mere scraps of paper."
• Dismissal for Failure to File Brief: No — the dismissal rests on a power granted to the CA under Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, not on a specific and mandatory duty imposed by the Rules; the power is not mandatory but merely directory, and failure to file brief within the prescribed time does not automatically dismiss the appeal.
• Supervening Death as Ground for Dismissal: No — the CA's citation of Velasco vs. Rosenberg was totally inapplicable; the appellant's death in no way impedes the continuation and determination of the deceased's appeal to recover the parcel of land registered in her name for the benefit of her estate and heirs.
• Liberal Application of the Rules: Yes — the rules, while necessary for the speedy and orderly administration of justice, should not be applied with the rigidity and inflexibility of the CA's resolutions; a litigant must be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits, and no substantial injury or prejudice would be caused to the adverse parties, who are in actual possession of the disputed land.

• Effect of the Death of a Party-Appellant: Section 17, Rule 3 sets the rule on substitution of parties in case of death: after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days or within such time as may be granted; if the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative within a time to be specified, and the representative shall "immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased." Since no administrator of the estate of the deceased appellant had yet been appointed — the probate proceedings being pending in the CFI of Quezon City — the motion of the deceased's counsel for suspension of the running of the period to file the brief was well-taken. The CA should have set a period for the substitution of the deceased party with her legal representative or heirs, failing which it should have ordered the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative at the cost of the deceased's estate. Instead, it gravely erred in dismissing the appeal of a deceased who yet had to be substituted. Applying Ordoveza vs. Raymundo and Obut vs. Court of Appeals, when a party dies in an action that survives and no order is issued for the appearance of the legal representative or heirs, and no substitution is in fact effected, the trial held and the judgment rendered without them are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or heirs upon whom the trial and judgment would be binding. Accordingly, further proceedings and specifically the running of the original 45-day period for filing the brief should be legally deemed automatically suspended until the proper substitution of the deceased by her executor, administrator or heirs shall have been effected within the time set by the CA pursuant to the Rule.
• Post-Death Acts of Counsel: The relation of attorney and client is terminated by the death of the client — a principle acknowledged by the CA itself as well as by the private respondents. In the absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized representatives, the attorney would thereafter have no further power or authority to appear or take any further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case. That is precisely what counsel did: they properly informed the CA of the death and sought suspension of the proceedings and of the period for filing the brief pending the appointment of the executor in the Quezon City probate proceedings. The CA therefore erred in ruling that the post-death pleadings were "mere scraps of paper."
• Dismissal for Failure to File Brief: The dismissal of an appeal based on the appellant's failure to file brief is based on a power granted to the CA under Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and not on a specific and mandatory duty imposed upon it by the Rules. Since the power or authority is not mandatory but merely directory, its exercise requires a great deal of circumspection, considering all the attendant circumstances (Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Philippine Milling Co., Inc.; Maqui vs. Court of Appeals; Reyes vs. Court of Appeals). The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically (Ordoveza vs. Raymundo). The CA has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case (PNB and DBP vs. Philippine Milling Co.; Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals). Here, the non-filing was directly attributable to the client's death and the pendency of her substitution — circumstances demanding the circumspection the CA failed to observe.
• Supervening Death as Ground for Dismissal: The CA dismissed the appeal on its belief that the supervening death of the appellant "rendered the continuance of the appeal unnecessary," on the basis of a totally inapplicable citation of Velasco vs. Rosenberg, 29 Phil. 212, 214, which holds that "If pending appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant any relief, the appeal will be dismissed." Manifestly, the appellant's death in no way impedes the deceased's appeal to recover the parcel of land registered in her name from being continued and determined for the benefit of her estate and heirs — the claim survives and relief remains entirely possible.
• Liberal Application of the Rules: Justice and equity dictate that the rules, while necessary for the speedy and orderly administration of justice, should not be applied with the rigidity and inflexibility of the CA's resolutions (citing Obut, Cucio vs. Court of Appeals, Limon vs. Candido, Barrido vs. Court of Appeals, and Monticines vs. Court of Appeals). What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities (Pongasi et al. vs. Court of Appeals). A liberal, rather than a strict and inflexible adherence to the Rules, is justified not only because the appellant — in this case, her estate and/or heirs — should be given every opportunity to be heard, but also because no substantial injury or prejudice can well be caused to the adverse parties, principally since they are in actual possession of the disputed land (Sollorano et al. vs. Court of Appeals). The better and more prudent course in every judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide on the merits rather than dispose of a case on technicalities, especially where no substantial prejudice is caused to the adverse party (Obut; Maqui). Paraphrasing the leading case of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, a reading of the appellant's brief discloses that petitioners-appellants have a prima facie meritorious case which should be properly determined on the merits, and "the element of rigidity should not be affixed to procedural concepts and made to cover the matter" (Carillo vs. Allied Workers Association), for to dismiss the appeal would not serve the ends of justice. Finally, the March 19, 1976 Manifestation with the written authority dated January 20, 1976 signed by the instituted heirs and/or legal representatives, noted in the SC's Resolution of March 26, 1976, may be deemed the formal substitution of the deceased by her heirs — who appear as petitioners in the title of the case — so the proper determination of the pending appeal may now proceed.

• Substitution of parties upon death (Section 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court) — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted within thirty (30) days or within such time as may be granted; if the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative within a time to be specified, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased; court charges in procuring the appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs; the heirs of the deceased may be substituted without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator, and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Applied: the duty to order substitution fell on the CA upon notice of the death; its failure to do so — and its dismissal of the appeal instead — was grave error.
• Automatic suspension of proceedings and periods upon death of a party — Where the claim survives, the death of a party legally suspends further proceedings and the running of the period for filing the appellant's brief until the proper substitution of the deceased by her executor, administrator or heirs is effected. Applied: the 45-day period (as extended) was suspended from the appellant's death on May 26, 1975.
• Termination of attorney-client relationship by death of the client; counsel's residual authority — Death of the client terminates the relation, and absent a retainer from the heirs or authorized representatives, counsel has no further power to act, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case. Applied: counsel's notices and motions for suspension were proper exercises of this residual authority, not "scraps of paper."
• Nullity of proceedings had without substitution — When a party dies in an action that survives and no order is issued for the appearance of the legal representative or heirs, and no substitution is effected, the trial and judgment rendered without them are null and void for want of jurisdiction over their persons (Ordoveza vs. Raymundo; Obut vs. Court of Appeals). Applied: the CA erred in disposing of the appeal of a party yet to be substituted.
• Dismissal for failure to file brief is discretionary, not mandatory — Under Section 1, Rule 50, the power to dismiss is directory, not mandatory; it requires a great deal of circumspection; failure to file brief within the prescribed time does not automatically dismiss the appeal; the discretion must be a sound one exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play. Applied: the CA's summary dismissal after the appellant's death was an unsound exercise of that discretion.
• Liberal construction of technical rules — A party litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities; rigidity should not be affixed to procedural concepts; liberal application is justified where no substantial injury or prejudice is caused to the adverse party. Applied: the private respondents were in actual possession of the disputed land, so hearing the appeal on the merits caused them no prejudice.

• "In the absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized representatives of his deceased client, the attorney would thereafter have no further power or authority to appear or take any further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case." — defining counsel's residual authority after the client's death.
• "After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted." — Section 17, Rule 3, the controlling rule the CA failed to follow.
• "a party litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities." — the guiding principle of liberal construction.
• "A liberal, rather than a strict and inflexible adherence to the Rules, is justified not only because appellant (in this case, her estate and/or heirs) should be given every opportunity to be heard but also because no substantial injury or prejudice can well be caused to the adverse parties principally, since they are in actual possession of the disputed land."
• "The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically."
• "the element of rigidity should not be affixed to procedural concepts and made to cover the matter" — borrowed from Carillo and applied via Berkenkotter.
• "If pending appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant any relief, the appeal will be dismissed." — the Velasco vs. Rosenberg rule the SC rejected as totally inapplicable to a party's death.
• "are mere scraps of paper" — the CA's characterization of counsel's post-death pleadings, which the SC repudiated.

• Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275 (1936) — Followed on two points: failure to file brief does not automatically dismiss the appeal, and proceedings had and judgment rendered without substitution of a deceased party are null and void.
• Obut vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 546 (1976) — Followed: the nullity rule upon failure to substitute, and the directive that rules should not be applied with rigidity.
• Velasco vs. Rosenberg, 29 Phil. 212, 214 — Cited by the CA to justify dismissal but rejected by the SC as a totally inapplicable citation; a party's death does not render appellate relief impossible where the claim survives.
• Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 228, 236 — Followed/paraphrased: a prima facie meritorious case should be determined on the merits; dismissal would not serve the ends of justice.
• Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Philippine Milling Co., Inc., 26 SCRA 712 — Followed: the power to dismiss for failure to file brief is directory, not mandatory, and must be a sound discretion exercised in accordance with justice and fair play.
• Pongasi et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 614 (1976) — Followed: source of the "fullest opportunity to establish the merits" principle.
• Carillo vs. Allied Workers Association, 24 SCRA 566 — Followed: source of the formulation that rigidity should not be affixed to procedural concepts.
• Supporting citations on liberal application and discretionary dismissal: Cucio vs. Court of Appeals (57 SCRA 64), Limon vs. Candido (27 SCRA 1166), Barrido vs. Court of Appeals (59 SCRA 168), Monticines et al. vs. Court of Appeals (53 SCRA 14), Sollorano et al. vs. Court of Appeals (62 SCRA 478), Maqui vs. Court of Appeals (69 SCRA 368), Reyes vs. Court of Appeals (80 SCRA 144), and Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals (72 SCRA 120).

• Section 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court (Death of party) — Quoted in full in the decision and applied as the controlling rule: the court itself must order substitution by the legal representative (or heirs, without need of an executor or administrator) upon notice of death where the claim survives; the CA's non-compliance — dismissing the appeal instead of ordering substitution — was the principal error.
• Section 1, Rule 50, Rules of Court — The source of the CA's power to dismiss an appeal for failure to file brief; the SC held this power directory rather than mandatory, so its exercise demands circumspection and sound discretion rather than automatic dismissal.

• Makasiar, J.
• Guerrero, J.
• De Castro, J. — designated to sit with the First Division vice Justice Ramon C. Fernandez, who was on official leave.
• Melencio-Herrera, J.

No separate concurring opinions were noted in the text.

• None.