Heirs of Nepomuceno vs. Castillo

An order of forfeiture of bail is conditional and interlocutory, merely requiring production of the accused and showing cause, while a judgment on the bond finally determines the bondspersons' joint and several liability for the bail amount and alone supports execution upon finality. The November 25, 1994 Order, which forfeited the property bond without fixing liability and was followed by a 60-day period to produce the accused before judgment would issue, was only the former.

Basilio Nepomuceno and Remedios Cata-ag were immediate family members of accused Daniel Nepomuceno who stood as his bondspersons by posting real properties as property bond. Under Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, bail guarantees the accused's appearance whenever required and surrender for execution of final judgment, with bondspersons acting in law as the accused's jailers until discharge or cancellation. A.M. No. 05-3-06-SC later supplied guidelines for forfeiture of real property bonds and disposal of forfeited property.

Basilio Nepomuceno and Remedios Cata-ag, immediate members of Daniel Nepomuceno's family, posted bail composed of real properties in Daniel's favor, covered by Tax Declaration No. 3235 with assessed value of P23,720.00 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3791. On June 27, 1990, Branch 12 of the Ormoc City Regional Trial Court adjudged Daniel guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 3435-0. On July 23, 1990, the bondspersons moved for extension to file justification, granted the next day, while Daniel appealed. On June 28, 1993, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modification on civil indemnity, and the conviction attained finality with entry of judgment.

Upon remand of the records, the trial court on June 27, 1994 ordered the bondspersons to bring Daniel to court within five days from notice. On July 13, 1994, they sought extension and were given another 10 days, followed by an alias warrant against Daniel and opposition by the private complainant to replacement of the property bond with cash. On August 19, 1994, the trial court granted a further 30-day extension. On November 14, 1994, the bondspersons submitted written justification for failure to bring Daniel to court and alternatively moved to replace the property bond with a cash bond equivalent to the bail amount.

On November 25, 1994, the trial court noted the explanation but, because the body of the accused could not be produced within the period given, rendered judgment forfeiting the property bond in favor of the Republic. Reconsideration and leave to substitute with cash bail were denied December 23, 1994. A second motion for reconsideration reiterating substitution was denied January 27, 1995, with the trial court emphasizing that the government wanted production of the convicted accused for service of sentence, not the P50,000.00 bond, and giving 60 days from receipt to produce him, upon expiration of which judgment on the same bond would be rendered. Years passed without Daniel being detained.

On May 8, 2008, the bondspersons moved to be allowed to pay the bond amount in lieu of the property bond pursuant to A.M. No. 05-3-06-SC, which the prosecutor left to the court's discretion. On June 24, 2008, Acting Presiding Judge Lauro A.P. Castillo denied the motion on the ground that the January 27, 1995 Order had become final after more than ten years and directed execution of the judgment on the bond. Reconsideration was denied August 5, 2008. The heirs then filed certiorari, which the Court of Appeals dismissed. The trial court had factually noted reliable information that Daniel remained at large in Isabel, Leyte despite a warrant and directive to the PNP Station Commander there, that the bondspersons as immediate family exerted no actual efforts to produce him, and that substitution would amount to buying his freedom for P50,000.00.

• Nature of November 25, 1994 Order: Petitioners argued that the November 25, 1994 Order is merely an order of forfeiture, not a judgment on the bond, as shown by the January 27, 1995 Order giving 60 days to bring Daniel to court before judgment would issue afterward.
• Absence of Judgment and Due Process: Petitioners maintained that no judgment on the bond determining the extent and amount of liability followed, and that treating the forfeiture order as a judgment violated procedural due process because a forfeiture order is interlocutory and cannot attain finality, rendering the June 24, 2008 execution order an absolute nullity, citing Mendoza vs. Alarma.
• Payment in Lieu of Property Bond: Petitioners argued that under A.M. No. 05-3-06-SC and Mendoza, public auction follows only upon failure to pay within 60 days from judgment, and since no judgment existed and they were willing to pay the bail amount, the motion to pay cash to release the property bond should have been granted as speedier and less costly than auction.

• Forfeiture and Judgment Already Rendered: Respondent countered that the trial court correctly forfeited the property bond and rendered judgment against the bondspersons when they failed to surrender Daniel within the period prescribed, with judgment already rendered as early as November 25, 1994 and reinforced after more than ten years of noncompliance without plausible explanation.
• Due Process Observed: Respondent argued that the bondspersons were not denied due process, having been given all chances to explain and having filed numerous pleadings including motions for reconsideration, and were merely negligent in bringing Daniel to court.
• Denial of Substitution Proper: Respondent maintained that denial of substitution was correct because the bondspersons could neither present Daniel nor explain the failure, and despite awareness that the property should be confiscated, insisted on not giving up their property.

• Forfeiture vs. Judgment on the Bond: Whether the November 25, 1994 Order is a judgment on the bond.
• Substitution by Cash Payment: Whether bondspersons Basilio Nepomuceno and Remedios Cata-ag may, in lieu of the property bond, pay the amount of bail in cash.

• Forfeiture vs. Judgment on the Bond: Yes, in the sense corrected on review: the November 25, 1994 Order is only an interlocutory order of forfeiture, not a judgment on the bond, as it merely forfeited the bond without fixing liability and was followed by a further 60-day period before judgment.
• Substitution by Cash Payment: No. Substitution was properly denied, the bondspersons having breached their guaranty by failing to surrender the convicted accused, making release of the property bond impermissible under the rules on cancellation.

• Forfeiture vs. Judgment on the Bond: Non-appearance first causes summary declaration of forfeiture, after which bondspersons are given 30 days to produce the principal and show cause why judgment should not be rendered; only thereafter may judgment on the bond issue. The November 25, 1994 Order explicitly forfeited the property bond but neither determined liability nor fixed the accountable amount, and the January 27, 1995 Order expressly stated judgment would be rendered only upon expiration of 60 days to produce Daniel. Because an order of forfeiture is preliminary and interlocutory while a judgment on the bond finally disposes of liability and supports execution, execution could not issue on the forfeiture order.
• Substitution by Cash Payment: Although execution on a mere forfeiture order was erroneous, denial of cash substitution was correct. Courts adopt a liberal attitude toward bondspersons because the State seeks enforcement of sentence, not monetary reparation, and confiscation compels enhanced efforts to produce the accused. Here the bondspersons, as immediate family, repeatedly failed to present Daniel, remained more interested in recovering the property, and allowed more than 25 years to pass with Daniel at large, which would amount to buying freedom for P50,000.00. People vs. Cawaling controls: a posted property bond cannot be cancelled, withdrawn, or replaced with cash unless the convict is surrendered or death is proved.

• Bail and duties of bondspersons — Bail is security given by one in custody of the law for release to guarantee appearance as required, furnished as corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. Upon accepting the obligation, bondspersons become in law the jailers of their principal and must ensure close monitoring until cancellation or discharge; failure to produce the accused breaches the bond conditions warranting forfeiture.
• Order of forfeiture distinguished from judgment on the bond — An order of forfeiture is conditional and interlocutory, also called confiscation, merely requiring showing cause and production of the accused within the period given and not conclusively resolving the case. A judgment on the bond is a final order disposing of the whole subject matter by determining the surety's joint and several liability for the bail amount, leaving nothing but enforcement by execution upon finality. Judgment cannot be entered unless preceded by forfeiture and opportunity to produce the accused or adduce satisfactory reason for inability to do so.
• Cancellation and substitution of bail after conviction — Under Rule 114, Section 22, bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of death, and is deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal, dismissal, or execution of judgment of conviction, without prejudice to liability. Where judgment of conviction cannot be executed because the convict fled, a property bond cannot be cancelled, withdrawn, or replaced with cash bond unless the accused is surrendered or adequate proof of death is presented, as applied in People vs. Cawaling to deny substitution.

• "An order of forfeiture is different from a judgment on the bond. It is interlocutory and merely compels the bondsperson to show cause why judgment should not be issued against them for the amount of bond." — States the controlling distinction that determines why execution could not issue on the November 25, 1994 Order.
• "An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, there being something more to be done such as the production of the accused within 30 days. This process is also called confiscation of bond." — Recites the canonical formulation from Mendoza vs. Alarma adopted to classify the forfeiture order.
• "Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so." — Defines the mandatory two-stage procedure under Rule 114 before liability may be adjudged.
• "are given sixty (60) days from receipt within which to produce the body of the convicted accused and upon expiration of which this Court will render judgment against the same bond in favour of the Republic of the Philippines" — Proves from the January 27, 1995 Order itself that judgment on the bond was still forthcoming, not already rendered.

• Mendoza vs. Alarma, 576 Phil. 753 (2008) — Followed as instructive authority distinguishing conditional, interlocutory forfeiture from final judgment on the bond that determines liability and supports execution.
• People vs. Cawaling, 603 Phil. 749 (2009) — Applied to deny withdrawal of property bond and replacement with cash where the convict fled and judgment could not be executed absent surrender or proof of death.
• Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Amante, Jr., 501 Phil. 86 (2005) — Cited for the two situations upon non-appearance and the rule that judgment follows only after the 30-day opportunity to produce the principal and show cause.
• People vs. Sanchez, 154 Phil. 262 (1974) — Cited for the liberal attitude toward bondspersons because the State seeks enforcement of sentence rather than monetary reparation, and confiscation aims to compel production.
• Leviste vs. Court of Appeals, 629 Phil. 587 (2010); Philippine Phoenix Surety vs. Sandiganbayan, 233 Phil. 327 (1987); People vs. Mabini Insurance & Fidelity Co., Inc., 242 Phil. 234 (1988) — Cited on the definition of bail and the bondspersons' role as jailers/custodians with continuing duty to produce the accused.

• Section 2, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — States bail conditions that the undertaking remains in force until final determination, the accused shall appear as required, and shall surrender for execution of final judgment; breached here by failure to present Daniel for service of sentence.
• Section 18 (now Section 21), Rule 114, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that upon failure to appear, bail is declared forfeited with 30 days to produce the principal and show cause, failing which judgment shall be rendered jointly and severally for the bail amount without mitigation except upon surrender or acquittal; the basis for the two-stage analysis.
• Section 22, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Governs cancellation of bail upon surrender or proof of death and automatic cancellation upon acquittal, dismissal, or execution of judgment; relied upon in Cawaling to bar cancellation or substitution while the convict remains at large.
• A.M. No. 05-3-06-SC, Guidelines for the Forfeiture of Real Property Bonds and Disposal of the Forfeited Real Property — Provides 30-day production/show-cause period, rendition of judgment for bail amount, 60 days from receipt of judgment to pay the justified amount, and public auction only upon nonpayment; invoked by petitioners but held not to permit substitution absent judgment and surrender.

Gesmundo, J., Carandang, J., Zalameda, J., and Gaerlan, J., concur.