Heirs of Mesina vs. Heirs of Fian

Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action; the proper remedy is for the court to order the plaintiff to implead the absent indispensable parties, with dismissal following only upon the plaintiff's refusal to comply. A verification that states allegations are "true and correct" based on personal knowledge is not defective for omitting the phrase "or based on authentic records," as the rule uses the disjunctive "or," indicating that the two bases are alternatives.

The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina purchased two parcels of land on installment from the late spouses Domingo Fian, Sr. and Maria Fian during their respective lifetimes. After both sets of spouses died, the Fian heirs took possession of the properties, refused to acknowledge the sale, and denied that their parents had sold the lots to the Mesina spouses. The Mesina heirs — Norman, Victor, Maria Divina, and Lorna — sought to recover possession and quiet title to the lots.

The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina bought on installment two parcels of land from the late spouses Domingo Fian, Sr. and Maria Fian. Parcel 1, Cadastral Lot No. 6791-Rem, is situated in Barangay Gungab, Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte, containing 1,632 square meters. Parcel 2, Cadastral Lot No. 6737-Rem, is likewise situated in Barangay Gungab, Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte, containing 3,730 square meters.

Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs — whose names do not appear on the records — claimed ownership of the parcels of land, took possession of them, refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots, and denied that their late parents had sold the property to the spouses Mesina. The spouses Mesina had likewise passed away.

Notwithstanding repeated demands, the heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina, namely Norman S. Mesina, Victor S. Mesina, Maria Divina S. Mesina, and Lorna Mesina-Barte. On August 8, 2005, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings, filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the RTC, Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte, against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray as representative of the Heirs of Fian. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-05-08-20.

On September 5, 2005, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action and that it violates Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because "Heirs of Mesina" and "Heirs of Fian" are not juridical persons or entities authorized by law to be parties in a civil action, and that the individual names of all the heirs were not stated. Petitioners opposed the motion on November 24, 2005. The RTC granted the motion and dismissed the complaint on November 22, 2005, holding that the unnamed heirs do not fall within the category of natural or juridical persons and could not be real parties in interest. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on February 29, 2006.

• Failure to State Cause of Action: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action, contending that the omission of the other heirs of Fian does not constitute failure to state a cause of action.
• Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping: Petitioner maintained that there was substantial compliance with the rule on verification and certification against forum shopping.
• Decisions on the Merits: Petitioner argued that cases should be decided on the merits and not on mere technicalities.

• No Cause of Action / Violation of Rule 3: Respondent argued that the complaint states no cause of action and violates Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because "Heirs of Mesina" and "Heirs of Fian" could not be considered juridical persons or entities authorized by law to file or defend a civil action, and that the individual names of all the heirs were not stated in the complaint.

• Non-Joinder vs. Failure to State Cause of Action: Whether the failure to implead all the heirs of spouses Fian constitutes failure to state a cause of action or non-joinder of indispensable parties, and whether dismissal is the proper remedy.
• Sufficiency of Verification: Whether the verification of the complaint is defective for omitting the phrase "or based on authentic records."

• Non-Joinder vs. Failure to State Cause of Action: No. The infirmity is properly non-joinder of indispensable parties, not failure to state a cause of action. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal; the court should order the plaintiff to implead the missing parties, with dismissal following only upon refusal to comply.
• Sufficiency of Verification: No, the verification is not defective. The rule uses the disjunctive "or," meaning "personal knowledge" and "authentic records" are alternatives that need not concur. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and strict compliance may be waived to serve the ends of justice.

• Non-Joinder vs. Failure to State Cause of Action: Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading itself — whether the complaint avers the three essential elements: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff, (b) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right. The inclusion or exclusion of Theresa's co-heirs does not fall under any of these elements. The actual infirmity is non-joinder — the failure to bring a person who is an indispensable party into the lawsuit. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of the action. Relying on Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. vs. Tinghil, the Court held that non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal. The proper course is for the court to order the plaintiff to implead the absent indispensable parties at any stage of the proceeding, with dismissal following only if the plaintiff refuses to comply with such order. The trial court should have directed petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. within a reasonable time, with a warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal.
• Sufficiency of Verification: Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct "of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records." The verification in question stated that the allegations are "true and correct to the best of our knowledge." The lower courts found this defective for omitting "or based on authentic records." The Court disagreed, noting that the provision uses the disjunctive word "or," which indicates an alternative; thus, "personal knowledge" and "authentic records" need not concur. Moreover, verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, intended to secure assurance that the allegations are made in good faith. When circumstances warrant, the court may order correction of unverified pleadings or waive strict compliance to serve the ends of justice.

• Non-Joinder of Indispensable Parties — The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Applied in this case: the RTC should have ordered petitioner to implead all heirs of Fian rather than dismissing outright.
• Three Essential Elements of a Cause of Action — A complaint states a cause of action if it avers: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff; (b) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right. Applied here: the failure to implead all heirs of Fian does not fall under any of these elements; thus, the dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action was erroneous.
• Verification as a Formal, Not Jurisdictional, Requirement — Verification is intended to secure an assurance that matters alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. The court may order correction of unverified pleadings or waive strict compliance to serve the ends of justice. Applied here: the omission of "or based on authentic records" did not render the verification defective, as the rule uses the disjunctive "or."

• "The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order." — This passage, quoted from Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. vs. Tinghil, states the controlling rule on the proper remedy for non-joinder of indispensable parties and forms the ratio decidendi on the first issue.
• "That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase 'or based on authentic records' does not make the verification defective. Notably, the provision used the disjunctive word 'or.' The word 'or' is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative." — This passage articulates the Court's interpretation of Section 4, Rule 7, establishing that "personal knowledge" and "authentic records" are alternative, not cumulative, bases for verification.

• Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. vs. Tinghil, G.R. No. 159121, Feb. 3, 2005 — Controlling precedent on the proper course of action for non-joinder of indispensable parties; directly quoted and applied as the ratio for reversing the dismissal.
• Turner vs. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 157479, Nov. 24, 2010 — Cited for the definition of the three essential elements of a cause of action.
• Pascual vs. Robles, G.R. No. 182645, Dec. 15, 2010 — Cited for the definition of an indispensable party as a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had.
• Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, Nov. 22, 2011 — Cited for the principle that "or" is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative.
• Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011 — Cited for the principle that verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement and that courts may waive strict compliance to serve the ends of justice.

• Section 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Provides that only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law, may be parties in a civil action. The RTC relied on this provision to dismiss the complaint, but the Supreme Court found the dismissal improper.
• Section 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Defines a real party in interest as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit. Respondent invoked this provision in her Motion to Dismiss.
• Section 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court — Governs verification of pleadings, providing that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations are true and correct "of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records." The Court interpreted the disjunctive "or" to mean the two bases are alternatives.
• Section 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court (implied by the doctrine on non-joinder) — Governing the remedy when a party fails to join an indispensable party: the court may order impleading rather than outright dismissal.

Justices Diosdado M. Peralta, Roberto A. Abad, Jose Catral Mendoza, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen concurred.