Heirs of Mario Pacres vs. Heirs of Cecilia Ygoña

An alleged oral partition of inherited property is not established by a self-serving affidavit executed years after the fact, absent proof that the co-heirs took actual possession of their allotted shares in accordance with the alleged partition; and a person claiming as a beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui in a written contract of sale cannot prove the alleged oral stipulation by parol evidence, since such a beneficiary bases his claim on the contract and cannot claim to be a stranger to it.

Lot No. 9 is a 1,007-square-meter parcel of land located at Kinasang-an, Pardo, Cebu City, fronting the Cebu provincial highway and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 61114 in the name of the Heirs of Pastor Pacres. Pastor Pacres died intestate in 1962, leaving the lot to his six children — Margarita, Simplicia, Rodrigo, Francisco, Mario, and Veñaranda — who thereby became co-owners pro indiviso thereof. Petitioners are Mario's heirs and Veñaranda, while respondents are the heirs of Cecilia Ygoña and Hilario Ramirez, who acquired portions of the lot and the ancestral house from several of the Pacres siblings. The dispute concerns the location of the portions acquired by respondents and the entitlement to the expropriation payment for the front portion of the lot taken by the government for road widening.

Lot No. 9, a 1,007-square-meter parcel at Kinasang-an, Pardo, Cebu City fronting the Cebu provincial highway, originally belonged to Pastor Pacres, who left it intestate to his heirs Margarita, Simplicia, Rodrigo, Francisco, Mario, and Veñaranda. At the time of Pastor's death in 1962, his heirs were already occupying definite portions of the lot: the front portion along the provincial highway was occupied by the co-owned Pacres ancestral home, beside it stood Rodrigo's hut, and Mario's house stood at the back of the ancestral house. This was how the property stood in 1968, as confirmed by petitioner Valentina's testimony.

In 1968, the heirs leased the ground floor of the ancestral home together with a lot area of 300 square meters, including the area occupied by the house, to respondent Hilario Ramirez, who immediately took possession. Subsequently, in 1974, four of the Pacres siblings — Rodrigo, Francisco, Simplicia, and Margarita — sold their shares in the ancestral home and the lot on which it stood to Ramirez. The deeds of sale described the subjects thereof as part and portion of the 300 square meters actually in possession and enjoyment of the vendee and her spouse by virtue of the lease contract; the deed executed by Rodrigo and Francisco, more detailed, conveyed their shares in a house of mixed materials under a nipa roof constructed inside Lot No. 5506. With that sale, Ramirez's possession as lessee turned into a co-ownership with Mario and Veñaranda, who did not sell their shares in the house and lot.

On various dates in 1971, Rodrigo, Francisco, and Simplicia sold their remaining shares in Lot No. 9 to respondent Cecilia Ygoña, and in 1983 Margarita likewise sold her share to Ygoña, bringing the total area sold to Ygoña to 493 square meters. In 1984, Ygoña filed a petition to survey and segregate the portions she had bought. Mario objected on the ground that he wished to exercise his right as co-owner to redeem his siblings' shares, while vendee Rodrigo opposed on the ground that he wanted to annul the sale for failure of consideration; Margarita and the widow of Francisco, however, manifested their assent. By virtue of those manifestations, the court issued a writ of possession respecting Margarita's and Francisco's shares in favor of Ygoña, and it was by authority of that writ that Ygoña built her house on a portion of Lot No. 9. Considering the objections of the two other siblings, the trial court subsequently dismissed the petition so that the two issues could be threshed out in the proper proceeding; Mario filed the intended action while Rodrigo no longer pursued his objection. That complaint for legal redemption, filed by Mario and Veñaranda, was dismissed on the ground of improper exercise of the right, a dismissal affirmed by the appellate court and which attained finality in the Supreme Court on December 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals having held that the complaint was filed beyond the 30-day period under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code, that it failed to comply with the requirement of consignation, and that Ygoña had built her house on Lot No. 9 in good faith so that requiring its removal would be unjust.

On June 18, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public Works and Highways, expropriated the front portion of Lot No. 9 for the expansion of the Cebu south road, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-14150 in Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. As occupant of the expropriated portion, Ygoña moved to withdraw her corresponding share in the expropriation payment, and petitioners opposed the motion; from all indications, that motion remains unresolved. On July 20, 1993, the Pacres siblings — Margarita and Francisco having by then died and being represented by their heirs — executed a Confirmation of Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate of Pastor Pacres, stating that after their father's death the children had declared themselves extrajudicially as heirs and adjudicated the lot unto themselves and forthwith made an oral partition; that in that oral partition the shares of Mario and Veñaranda would be fronting the national highway while the shares of the rest would be located at the rear; and that the heirs had recently caused the lot to be surveyed to determine their respective locations in accordance with that oral partition, a labeled sketch of the subdivision plan being attached.

On September 30, 1994, Mario filed an ejectment suit against Ramirez's successor-in-interest Vicentuan, claiming sole ownership of the lot occupied by the latter by virtue of the oral partition and arguing that Ramirez/Vicentuan should pay rentals to him for occupying the front lot and should transfer to the rear of Lot No. 9 where the lots of Ramirez's vendors were located. The court dismissed Mario's assertion that his siblings had sold the rear lots to Ramirez, holding that the deeds of sale in favor of Ramirez clearly described the object of the sale as the ancestral house and lot, that Ramirez had a right to continue occupying the property he bought, and that since Mario did not sell his pro-indiviso shares in the house and lot the parties were at the very least co-owners thereof, co-owners being entitled to occupy the co-owned property. On June 3, 1996, Veñaranda and the heirs of Mario filed the present complaint for specific performance against Ygoña and Ramirez. Contrary to Mario's allegations of co-ownership over Lot No. 9 in the legal redemption case, Mario's heirs insisted that the heirs had agreed on a partition prior to the sale, and sought compliance with that agreement from their siblings' vendees Ygoña and Ramirez on the basis that the two were privy to these agreements and hence bound to comply therewith by desisting from claiming any portion of the expropriation payment for the front lots. Their other cause of action, directed solely at Ygoña, alleged that she had contracted additional, unwritten obligations beyond payment of the purchase price — to assume all obligations regarding the payment of past and present estate taxes, to survey Lot No. 9 in accordance with the oral partition, and to obtain separate titles for each portion — which, though not written into the deeds of sale, were allegedly not subject to the Statute of Frauds because they had been partly complied with, as shown by Ygoña's survey of her purchased lots and payment of realty taxes.

Respondents denied privity with the heirs' oral partition and maintained that no such partition took place, that the portions sold to and occupied by them were located in front of Lot No. 9, and that they were therefore the ones entitled to the expropriation payment; they sought damages from the unfounded suit. To discredit the assertion of an oral partition, respondents presented Exhibit No. 1, a sketch which petitioner Valentina herself executed during her testimony demonstrating her recollection of the actual occupation of the Pacres siblings, their heirs, and vendees, and which undermined the allegation that the heirs had partitioned the property and immediately taken possession of their allotted shares. Ygoña also denied ever agreeing to the additional obligations imputed against her. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents, holding that petitioners failed to prove partition in accordance with their version and that the parties' actual occupation of their portions, as evidenced by Valentina's sketch, was the real agreement to which they were bound; it further ordered that a survey of the lot according to the parties' actual occupation be conducted. The Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal for lack of evidence, holding that the oral partition was not valid because the heirs did not ratify it by taking possession of their shares in accordance with their oral agreement, and that Ygoña's sole undertaking under the deeds of sale was payment of the purchase price, the written document standing superior over allegations of an oral agreement since petitioners neither questioned the deeds' validity nor assailed their terms as failing to express the true intent of the parties. The appellate court, however, reversed the trial court's order to survey the lot in accordance with Valentina's sketch, explaining that while it was conclusive that Ygoña and Ramirez had bought portions of the property from some of the Pacres siblings, the issue of the actual area and location of the portions sold to them remained unresolved, and that the question regarding ownership of the front lots and the expropriation payment should be threshed out in the proper proceeding; it found no basis for an award of damages to either party.

• Existence of the Oral Partition: Petitioners insisted that the trial and appellate courts overlooked facts and circumstances of much weight which, if properly considered, would alter the decision, and that the courts failed to appreciate their evidence on the existence of the alleged oral partition, their only piece of evidence being the 1993 joint affidavit entitled "Confirmation of Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate."
• Validity of the Oral Partition: Petitioners maintained that the heirs had agreed on a partition prior to the sale, and that respondents Ygoña and Ramirez, as vendees of the siblings, were privy to these agreements and hence bound to comply therewith by desisting from claiming any portion of the expropriation payment for the front lots.
• Additional Obligations of Ygoña: Petitioners argued that Ygoña bound herself, as additional consideration for the sale although not written in the deeds of sale, to survey Lot No. 9 including the shares of the non-selling siblings, to deliver to petitioners free of cost the titles corresponding to their definite shares, and to pay for all their past and present estate and realty taxes; that these obligations were not subject to the Statute of Frauds since they were partly complied with by Ygoña, as evidenced by her survey of the purchased lots and payment of realty taxes.
• Laches and Unlawful Claim Over the Expropriation Payment: Petitioners characterized respondents' claim over the expropriation payment as unlawful on the ground that the expropriated portion belonged to petitioners under the alleged oral partition, and maintained that Ygoña was barred by laches from claiming the front portion because she waited 13 years from the time of the sale to claim her share via a petition for subdivision and survey.
• Weight of Valentina's Sketch: On appeal, petitioners questioned the factual findings of the trial court and its reliance on Exhibit No. 1, maintaining that Valentina was incompetent and barely literate and that her sketch should not be given weight.

• Absence of Partition and Privity: Respondents denied privity with the heirs' oral partition and maintained that no such partition took place, and that the portions sold to and occupied by them were located in front of Lot No. 9, so that they are the ones entitled to the expropriation payment.
• Denial of Additional Obligations: Ygoña denied ever agreeing to the additional obligations being imputed against her.
• Damages: Respondents sought damages from the unfounded suit leveled against them.
• Forum-Shopping: Respondents charged petitioners with forum-shopping on the ground that the issue of ownership had already been submitted to the expropriation court.

• Proof of the Alleged Oral Agreements: Whether petitioners were able to prove the existence of the alleged oral agreements such as the partition and the additional obligations of surveying and titling.
• Ownership of the Front Portion and the Expropriation Payment: Whether the issue of ownership regarding the front portion of Lot No. 9 and entitlement to the expropriation payment may be resolved in this action.

• Proof of the Alleged Oral Agreements: No. The alleged oral partition and the alleged additional obligations of respondent Ygoña were not established by the quantum of proof required by law, the oral stipulations being barred by the Parol Evidence Rule and petitioners, not being parties to the deeds of sale, being unable to enforce obligations arising therefrom.
• Ownership of the Front Portion and the Expropriation Payment: No. The issue of ownership of the front portion of Lot No. 9 and entitlement to the expropriation payment must be litigated in the expropriation court, which is empowered to entertain conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof in the same expropriation case.

• Proof of the Alleged Oral Agreements: The Court declined to review the evidence, reiterating that it is not a trier of facts and that questions as to whether items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs on one side are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are questions of fact not reviewable in a petition confined to questions of law. No compelling reason existed to disturb the factual finding that no oral partition was proven. Petitioners' only evidence was the 1993 joint affidavit, and they did not adequately explain why it was executed only in 1993, several years after respondents Ygoña and Ramirez had taken possession of the front portions of Lot No. 9; had an oral partition allotting the front portions to petitioners existed since Pastor's death in 1962, they should have immediately objected to respondents' occupation, yet they asserted ownership over the front lots only beginning in 1993, when expropriation became imminent and was later filed in court. The assertion of partition was further belied by their predecessor-in-interest's previous assertion of co-ownership over the same lot in the legal redemption case filed ten years before, where Mario and Veñaranda alleged under oath that Lot No. 9 was co-owned by the Pacres siblings pro indiviso and that Ygoña had bought the undivided shares of Rodrigo, Francisco, Margarita, and Simplicia. Those statements were extrajudicial admissions, undisputed by petitioners, which may be given in evidence against them, and the polarity of the previous admissions and the present theory made the latter highly suspect. Petitioners likewise failed to show that the Pacres siblings took possession of their allotted shares after the supposed oral partition, although actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with the alleged partition would have been strong proof of an oral partition; the evidence pointed to the contrary, since Valentina's own sketch showed that the actual occupants of the front portions were respondents. As to the alleged additional obligations, the Court held that under Article 1311 of the Civil Code contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, so that only a party to the contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under it; petitioners, not being parties to the contracts of sale between Ygoña and their siblings, could not sue for the enforcement of the supposed obligations arising from those contracts. While third parties may seek enforcement of a contract under the second paragraph of Article 1311 through a stipulation pour autrui, the written contracts of sale contained no such stipulation in favor of petitioners, and the alleged oral stipulation could not be proven under the Parol Evidence Rule, which provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement; no exception was pleaded, much less proved. The Rule applies to the parties and their successors in interest and has no application to a stranger to a contract, but a person who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui may be considered a party to that contract, since a third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui becomes a party to that contract, which is why under Article 1311 a beneficiary is required to communicate his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. To preclude the application of the Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown that at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby; a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract and therefore cannot claim to be a stranger to it and resist the application of the Rule. Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed stipulations pour autrui, their claim could not prosper because they were barred from proving them by oral evidence.
• Ownership of the Front Portion and the Expropriation Payment: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the existence of forum-shopping could not be determined, the parties having failed to provide the pleadings filed in the expropriation case, which made it impossible to know the extent of the issues already submitted and thereby assess whether there was forum-shopping. Nonetheless, while no ruling could be made on the existence of forum-shopping for insufficiency of evidence, the issue of ownership should be litigated in the expropriation court, since the court hearing the expropriation case is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof in the same expropriation case, owing to the intimate relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment. Petitioners' objection regarding respondents' claim over the expropriation payment should have been brought up in the expropriation court as an opposition to respondent's motion, and the proper venue for such issue was the expropriation court, not the proceeding where a different cause of action, specific performance, was being litigated. The Court likewise disagreed with the trial court's order to partition the lot in accordance with Exhibit No. 1, the sketch prepared by petitioner Valentina, since to do so would resolve the issue of ownership over portions of Lot No. 9 and effectively preempt the expropriation court based solely on actual occupation, which was the only thing Exhibit No. 1 could have possibly proved; the exhibit was simply a sketch demonstrating the portions actually occupied by the parties and was offered simply to impeach petitioners' assertion of actual occupation in accordance with the terms of the alleged oral partition. The ruling, like those of the trial court and the appellate court, was limited to resolving petitioners' action for specific performance; given the finding that petitioners failed to prove the existence of the alleged oral partition and the alleged additional consideration for the sale, they could not compel respondents to comply with these inexistent obligations. There was thus no basis for petitioners' claim that the Court of Appeals' Decision was incomplete for not definitively ruling on ownership over the front lots, the decision having ruled that petitioners failed to prove the alleged obligations and were therefore not entitled to specific performance thereof.

• Parol Evidence Rule — Under Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. The rule admits of exceptions, but the party invoking an exception must plead and prove it. In this case, the alleged oral undertakings of Ygoña — to survey the lot, deliver titles, and pay estate and realty taxes — were not embodied in the deeds of sale, and petitioners neither pleaded nor proved any exception; the oral stipulations were therefore inadmissible to vary the written contracts.
• Stipulation pour autrui — The second paragraph of Article 1311 of the Civil Code allows a third person to demand the fulfillment of a stipulation in his favor contained in a contract, provided he communicates his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui becomes a party to that contract. Consequently, a person claiming to be a beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui bases his claim on the contract and cannot claim to be a stranger to it so as to resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that even assuming the alleged oral undertakings were stipulations pour autrui, petitioners could not prove them by oral evidence.
• Relativity of Contracts — Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, subject to exceptions not applicable in the case; only a party to the contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under it. Petitioners, not being parties to the deeds of sale between Ygoña and their siblings, could not sue to enforce the supposed obligations arising from those contracts.
• Extrajudicial Admissions — Under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Statements made in a judicial proceeding other than the one under consideration are extrajudicial admissions. The Court treated the allegations of co-ownership sworn to by Mario and Veñaranda in the earlier legal redemption case as extrajudicial admissions, undisputed by petitioners, and held that the polarity of those previous admissions and the present theory of partition made the latter highly suspect.
• Actual Possession as Proof of Oral Partition — Actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with the alleged partition would have been strong proof of an oral partition. The Court found that petitioners failed to present any evidence that they took actual possession of their respective allotted shares according to the supposed partition, and that the evidence of the parties, including petitioner Valentina's own sketch, pointed to the contrary.
• Question of Fact vs. Question of Law — Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are questions of fact. Such questions are not reviewable by the Supreme Court, which as a rule confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law that may be resolved without re-examining the probative value of the evidence presented.
• Jurisdiction of the Expropriation Court Over Ownership — The court hearing the expropriation case is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof in the same expropriation case, owing to the intimate relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment. A party's objection to another's claim over the expropriation payment should be raised in the expropriation court as an opposition to the claimant's motion, and not in a separate action litigating a different cause of action such as specific performance.

• "While contracts are generally obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, it remains imperative for a party that seeks the performance thereof to prove the existence and the terms of the contract by a preponderance of evidence. Bare assertions are not the quantum of proof contemplated by law." — The opening statement of the ponencia articulates the evidentiary threshold governing the entire case: a party suing on a contract, written or oral, must prove its existence and terms by preponderance of evidence, and bare assertions will not suffice.
• "Actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with the alleged partition would have been strong proof of an oral partition." — This passage states the evidentiary standard for establishing an oral partition of inherited property and explains why petitioners' claim failed: no proof was presented that the co-heirs took possession of their allotted shares in accordance with the alleged agreement.
• "A beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a stranger to the contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule." — This is the canonical formulation of the interplay between the Parol Evidence Rule and the stipulation pour autrui, holding that a third-party beneficiary is deemed a party to the contract for purposes of the Rule and is thereby barred from proving an alleged oral stipulation.
• "The court hearing the expropriation case is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case." — This passage defines the proper forum for resolving conflicting claims of ownership over expropriated property and entitlement to the expropriation payment, holding that such issues belong to the expropriation court rather than to an action for specific performance.

• Paterno vs. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630, 636 — Cited as the authority defining a question of fact: whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs on one side are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue. The Court relied on it to decline review of the factual findings below.
• Pagsibigan vs. People, G.R. No. 163868, June 4, 2009; Gaje vs. Vda. De Dalisay, G.R. No. 158762, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 272, 283 — Cited for the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable by the Supreme Court, whose review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals is confined to questions of law resolvable without re-examining the probative value of the evidence.
• Quimpo, Sr. vs. Vda. De Beltran, G.R. No. 160956, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 174, 182–184; Arrogante vs. Deliarte, G.R. No. 152132, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 63, 71; Avila vs. Barabat, G.R. No. 141993, March 17, 2006, 485 SCRA 8, 17; Vda. De Ape vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133638, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 193, 208–210; Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 431–433 (2000); Crucillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 375 Phil. 777, 793–794 (1999); Tan vs. Lim, 357 Phil. 452, 470–472 (1998); Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, 203 (1947) — Cited collectively as authority for the principle that actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with the alleged partition would have been strong proof of an oral partition.
• Young vs. Court of Appeals, 251 Phil. 189, 193–195 (1989) — Cited for the rule under Article 1311 of the Civil Code that only a party to the contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under it, which the Court applied in holding that petitioners, as non-parties to the deeds of sale, could not sue on the alleged obligations.
• MOF Company, Inc. vs. Shin Yang Brokerage Corporation, G.R. No. 172822, December 18, 2009; Mendoza vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 90 Phil. 836, 846–847 (1952) — Cited for the holding that a third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract becomes a party to that contract, which the Court used to bar petitioners from resisting the application of the Parol Evidence Rule.
• Lechugas vs. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 310, 319 (1986) — Cited for the test precluding application of the Parol Evidence Rule: it must be shown that at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.
• Republic vs. Court of First Instance, 144 Phil. 643, 648–650 (1970) — Cited as the controlling authority that the court hearing the expropriation case is empowered to entertain conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof in the same expropriation case.

• Article 1311, New Civil Code — Provides that contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, subject to exceptions not applicable here, and that if a contract contains a stipulation in favor of a third person, the latter may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. Applied to hold that petitioners, not being parties to the deeds of sale, could not enforce the alleged obligations arising therefrom, and that no stipulation pour autrui existed in their favor in the written contracts.
• Article 1623, New Civil Code — Prescribes the 30-day period for the exercise of the right of legal redemption by a co-owner. Referred to in the narration of the prior legal redemption case, where the Court of Appeals held that the complaint filed by Mario and Veñaranda was filed beyond the 30-day period and failed to comply with the requirement of consignation.
• Rule 130, Section 9, Rules of Court — The Parol Evidence Rule: when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. Applied to bar proof of the alleged oral undertakings of Ygoña not embodied in the deeds of sale, no exception having been pleaded or proved.
• Rule 130, Section 26, Rules of Court — Provides that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Applied to the allegations of co-ownership sworn to by Mario and Veñaranda in the earlier legal redemption case, which the Court treated as extrajudicial admissions usable against petitioners.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Requires the certification that the conclusions of the Court had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division, as attested by the Division Chairperson and certified by the Chief Justice.

• Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice, Chairperson)
• Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice)
• Roberto A. Abad (Associate Justice)
• Jose Portugal Perez (Associate Justice)