Heirs of Margarita Prodon vs. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of inquiry; in an action for quieting of title based on the alleged inexistence of a deed, the rule does not apply, and the party asserting the deed is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original to prove its existence and execution. The party asserting the deed nonetheless must establish its due execution and existence by preponderance of evidence; mere registration or notarization is insufficient.

Respondents, heirs of the spouses Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, sought to quiet title over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 84797. An annotation on the title reflected a sale with right to repurchase executed by Maximo Alvarez, Sr. in favor of Margarita Prodon on September 9, 1975 for ₱120,000.00, with a six-month repurchase period. Respondents alleged the deed referred to in the entry did not exist, making the entry a cloud on their title. Prodon claimed the deed was genuine and that non-repurchase vested absolute ownership in her. The original deed could not be located in the files of the Register of Deeds.

• The Annotated Entry: Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84797 bore an inscription (Entry No. 3816/T-84797) recording a sale with right to repurchase executed by Maximo S. Alvarez in favor of Margarita Prodon for ₱120,000.00, with a six‑month repurchase period, dated September 9, 1975, and registered on September 10, 1975. Respondents, as the heirs of the registered owners Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, alleged that the referenced deed never existed and that the entry fraudulently cast a cloud on their title.

• Prodon’s Defense and Evidence: Prodon claimed the deed was authentic and that, due to the failure to repurchase within six months, she became the absolute owner. The original of the deed could not be produced. Prodon testified to the sale. Her witness Jose Camilon narrated that Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife went to Camilon’s house in Meycauayan, Bulacan, on September 5, 1975 to offer the property for sale, and returned on September 9, 1975 to sign the deed before Notary Public Eliseo Razon. Camilon asserted he gave the original to Prodon’s lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but could not retrieve it because Atty. Lacanilao was recovering from a heart ailment. Prodon also presented the notarial register of Notary Public Razon (showing an entry for a deed of sale with right to repurchase) and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds (recording the registration).

• Medical Condition of Maximo Alvarez, Sr.: Hospital records established that Maximo Alvarez, Sr. suffered from severe ailments: arteriosclerotic heart disease, atrial fibrillation, congestive heart failure, and other conditions. He was hospitalized from August 23 to September 3, 1975, and again from September 15 to October 2, 1975, when he died. On September 12, 1975, he was observed to be weak, bedridden, with 90% motor loss in his left extremities. His son testified that his father had been seriously ill and repeatedly hospitalized throughout 1975.

• Post-Sale Conduct: From the alleged sale in 1975 until the filing of the case in 1996, Prodon never took possession of the property, never sought transfer of the certificate of title in her name, and never paid real property taxes on the land. Respondents and their predecessors remained in peaceful possession and continued paying the taxes.

• Admission of Secondary Evidence: Petitioners argued that the requisites for the admission of secondary evidence—existence, execution, and loss of the original deed—had been satisfactorily established through the testimonies of Prodon and Camilon, the notarial register, and the registry records, thereby allowing proof of the deed’s existence.
• Physical Capacity of the Transferor: Petitioners maintained that the medical records did not demonstrate that Maximo Alvarez, Sr. was physically incapable of traveling to Bulacan or executing the deed, asserting that his cataract could be corrected with lenses and that he was not bedridden at the time.
• Laches: Petitioners contended that the respondents’ claim was barred by laches, having waited over twenty years to challenge the validity of the entry, during which time Prodon’s rights had allegedly vested.

• Non-Existence and Improbability of the Deed: Respondents countered that the alleged deed never existed, emphasizing the improbability that Maximo Alvarez, Sr., who was gravely ill and near death, could have negotiated and signed the instrument on September 9, 1975. They relied on the extensive hospital records and the testimony of Maximo Alvarez, Jr. to show the transferor’s incapacity.
• Insufficient Proof of Loss: Respondents argued that Prodon failed to account for all original copies, failed to make a diligent search for the duplicate from the notary public, and did not prove that the original in Atty. Lacanilao’s possession was irretrievably lost, thus secondary evidence should not have been admitted.

• Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule: Whether the Best Evidence Rule applied to an action for quieting of title where the issue was the existence, not the terms, of a deed of sale with right to repurchase.
• Proof of Existence and Execution: Whether Margarita Prodon preponderantly established the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase.
• Laches: Whether Prodon’s claim of ownership was barred by laches.

• Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule: The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable. The terms of the writing were not in issue; the inquiry concerned the existence and due execution of the deed. The rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is triggered only when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document. Because the controversy centered on whether a deed existed at all, not on what its provisions were, Prodon was not required to account for the loss of the original as a condition for presenting other evidence of the deed’s existence. The RTC and the CA both misapplied the rule; however, the error was harmless.
• Proof of Existence and Execution: Prodon did not preponderantly prove the existence and due execution of the deed. Although the Best Evidence Rule did not strictly require proof of loss, Prodon’s evidence was insufficient to carry her burden. The alleged meeting and execution on September 9, 1975 were irreconcilable with the transferor’s documented severe medical conditions, multiple hospitalizations, and bedridden state around that date. The annotation on the certificate of title and the entry in the notarial register established, at most, that a document had been presented for registration and notarization; they did not prove the authenticity or due execution of the underlying instrument, because registration is a ministerial act for notice and does not validate an inexistent deed. Moreover, Prodon’s failure for more than two decades to assert ownership—by taking possession, transferring the title, or paying realty taxes—strongly belied the genuineness of the alleged sale.
• Laches: The issue of laches was not reached because the finding that the deed of sale with right to repurchase did not exist fully resolved the case and warranted the removal of the cloud on respondents’ title.

• Best Evidence Rule — Scope of Application — The Best Evidence Rule embodied in Section 3, Rule 130 applies only when the terms of a writing are the subject of inquiry. Its purpose is to prevent inaccuracy, fraud, and misleading inferences in proving the precise contents of an instrument. When the evidence concerns external facts such as the existence, execution, or delivery of a document, without reference to its terms, the rule does not apply, and secondary evidence may be received even without accounting for the original.
• Proof of Existence and Due Execution of a Document — A party asserting the existence and due execution of a document not produced in court bears the burden of proving those facts by preponderance of evidence. Evidence such as testimonies, notarial register entries, and registry annotations may be considered, but is not conclusive; the court must evaluate all circumstances, including the physical capacity of the alleged signatory and the subsequent conduct of the party asserting rights under the document.
• Effect of Registration and Notarial Acknowledgment — Registration under the Torrens system is a ministerial act that serves purely as notice. It does not confirm the validity, authenticity, or due execution of the registered instrument. Similarly, a notarial register entry proves only that a document was notarized, not its due execution. An annotated entry on a certificate of title is not proof that the underlying deed was actually executed by the registered owner.
• Action for Quieting of Title — Requisites — For an action to quiet title to prosper, the plaintiff must show: (a) a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property; and (b) that the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding casting a cloud on the title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity.

• “The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.”
• “In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document.”
• “The registration alone of the deed was not conclusive proof of its authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner of the property, which was precisely the issue in this case. The explanation for this is that registration, being a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which an instrument is inscribed in the records of the Register of Deeds and annotated on the dorsal side of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the instrument.”

• De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 (1993) — Cited for the general rule that before secondary evidence of a document’s contents is admissible, the proponent must prove existence, execution, and loss, and must account for all duplicate originals. Distinguished because the Best Evidence Rule was inapplicable, but referenced to illustrate that Prodon’s efforts were inadequate even as a matter of trial tactics.
• Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, 411 SCRA 577 (2003) — Followed as restating the requisites for secondary evidence under the Best Evidence Rule.
• Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio, 651 SCRA 327 (2011) — Relied upon for the two essential requisites of an action for quieting of title.
• Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals, 437 SCRA 678 (2004) — Cited to support the principle that registration is a ministerial act and does not validate an otherwise invalid instrument.

• Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court — The Best Evidence Rule. Held inapplicable because the terms of the deed were not in issue; the provision did not bar evidence of the deed’s existence without the original.
• Article 1403, Civil Code (Statute of Frauds) — Mentioned only by way of example as a situation where the Best Evidence Rule would apply in a quieting-of-title suit, but deemed irrelevant as the action was not based on unenforceability under the Statute.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes.