Primary Holding
A Free Patent issued over private land is null and void and produces no legal effects whatsoever. Where a complaint alleges that the land was already private property at the time a Free Patent was issued, the action is not a reversion proceeding requiring the Solicitor General to institute it, but may be treated as an action for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible.
Background
The private respondents are heirs of Rufino Mallari and Fermina Jamlig, who allegedly owned a 2,250 square meter portion of a parcel of land known as Cad. 324-D, Lot 3275, situated at Mambangan, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. The petitioners are the heirs of Marciano Nagaño, in whose name the disputed title was issued. The case involves the application of Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by R.A. No. 1942, which allows those in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years to apply for confirmation of title.
History
1992 – 1997-
Private respondents filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 35 (Civil Case No. 836) seeking the declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title No. P-8265 issued in the name of the heirs of Marciano Nagaño.
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Sep 21, 1992
RTC
Granted petitioners' motion to dismiss on the ground that the action to annul the certificate of title should be instituted by the Solicitor General, citing Lopez vs. Padilla, Maximo vs. CFI of Capiz, and Sumali vs. Judge of CFI Cotabato.
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2 yrs 11 mos later
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Sep 20, 1995
Court of Appeals
Set aside the trial court's order and reinstated the complaint, applying Agne vs. Director of Lands, holding that the action was not a review of the decree of title on the ground of fraud but an action for cancellation of a patent and certificate of title issued without jurisdiction.
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3 mos later
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Dec 20, 1995
Court of Appeals
Denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
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1 yr 10 mos later
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Nov 17, 1997
Supreme Court
Denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment, but for different reasons.
Facts
Private respondents filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title No. P-8265 issued in the name of the heirs of Marciano Nagaño, covering Cad. Lot No. 3275. They alleged that the issuance of the title was on account of the fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation committed by defendant Macario Valerio, who unlawfully attested that Lot No. 3275 was not occupied or being claimed by other persons. An information for perjury was filed on November 2, 1983 against Valerio. Private respondents alleged that part of the subject property was owned by their predecessors-in-interest, Rufino Mallari and Fermina Jamlig, and that they had been in possession of the land since 1920. They recently discovered that the entire Lot No. 3275 was registered by Valerio under Free Patent No. (III-2) 001953 and OCT No. P-8265 in the name of the heirs of Marciano Nagaño. They demanded that Valerio execute the necessary documents to segregate the 2,250 square meters owned by them, but the defendants refused.
In their complaint, private respondents specifically alleged that: (a) they are heirs of Rufino Mallari and Fermina Jamlig, part owners of the parcel of land; (b) the portion belonging to them, with an area of 2,250 square meters, was covered by tax declarations in their names, occupied and possessed by their predecessors-in-interest since 1920 and continuously thereafter; (c) their possession has been peaceful, public, continuous, adverse, and in the concept of an owner; (d) on or about 18 February 1974, Valerio committed perjury by causing the entire Lot 3275 to be registered under the Free Patent and OCT; (e) on account of the fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, the grant of the patent and issuance of the title were null and void; (f) upon discovery of the issuance of the title, they demanded segregation of the 2,250 square meter portion, but Valerio refused; and (g) they suffered moral damages and incurred expenses. They prayed that OCT No. P-8265 be declared null and void, or that the 2,250 square meter portion be segregated and a title issued in their names, plus damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; (2) the plaintiffs had no cause of action since a suit for annulment of title, which is actually a reversion proceeding, should be instituted by the Solicitor General; and (3) the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, the lawsuit having been instituted more than one year, or almost fifteen years, after the issuance of the title. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the second ground. Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the dismissal and reinstated the complaint.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Lack of Legal Personality: Petitioners argued that private respondents do not have the legal personality to contest the final award made by the Director of Lands, and civil courts are devoid of jurisdiction and authority to review or control such final judgment.
- Jurisdiction over Award: Petitioners argued that private respondents' principal cause of action is for the award in their favor of the 2,250 square meter portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-8265, and civil courts have no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since it is the Director of Lands, not the civil courts, who is vested with jurisdiction to decide to whom to award disposable lands of the public domain.
- Reversion Proceeding: Petitioners argued that private respondents have no cause of action since a suit for annulment of title, which is actually a reversion proceeding, should be instituted by the Solicitor General.
- Statute of Limitations: Petitioners argued that private respondents' cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, the lawsuit having been instituted more than one year, or in fact almost fifteen years, after the issuance of the title.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Error in Dismissal: Private respondents argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the case and/or all the causes of action in their complaint, contending that their action was not a reversion proceeding but an action to nullify a patent and certificate of title issued without jurisdiction.
Issues
- Jurisdiction of Civil Courts: Whether civil courts have jurisdiction over an action to nullify a Free Patent and certificate of title where the complaint alleges that the land was private property at the time of the patent's issuance.
- Legal Personality to Sue: Whether private respondents have legal personality to contest the award made by the Director of Lands, or whether the action should have been instituted by the Solicitor General as a reversion proceeding.
- Statute of Limitations: Whether private respondents' cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, the action having been filed more than one year after the issuance of the title.
Ruling
- Jurisdiction of Civil Courts: Yes. Merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Dismissal of the complaint was premature, and trial on the merits should have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.
- Legal Personality to Sue: Yes. The action is not clearly for reversion, which would require the Solicitor General to institute it under Section 101 of C.A. No. 141. The complaint alleges ownership and possession of private land, giving private respondents a cause of action for quieting of title.
- Statute of Limitations: No. A Free Patent issued over private land is null and void and produces no legal effects whatsoever. Moreover, private respondents' claim of open, public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent, gave them a cause of action for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible.
Ruling Rationale
- Jurisdiction of Civil Courts: The rule is settled that a motion to dismiss a complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. From the allegations in the complaint, private respondents claim ownership of the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously, and adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942. Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and purposes, segregated from the public domain because the beneficiary is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." Consequently, the lot is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Dismissal was premature, and trial on the merits should have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.
- Legal Personality to Sue: The action would have been entirely different if it were clearly for reversion, in which case it would have to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141. However, the complaint alleges ownership and possession of private land, not a reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain. The complaint may be considered an action for quieting of title, which private respondents have the legal personality to bring.
- Statute of Limitations: Prescription is unavailing against private respondents' action. It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. Moreover, private respondents' claim of open, public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the 2,250 square meter portion since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners and in their original certificate of title, gave private respondents a cause of action for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible.
Doctrines
- Hypothetical Admission of Facts in a Motion to Dismiss — A motion to dismiss a complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. The Court applied this rule to determine that the allegations in the complaint, which claimed ownership and possession of private land, were sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.
- Nullity of Free Patent over Private Land — A Free Patent issued over private land is null and void and produces no legal effects whatsoever, applying the principle quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum (what is null produces no effect). The Court applied this doctrine to hold that prescription cannot run against an action to nullify a void patent.
- Imprescriptibility of Quieting of Title — An action for quieting of title based on a claim of open, public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession is imprescriptible. The Court held that private respondents' claim of possession since 1920 and the illegal inclusion of their property in the Free Patent gave them a cause of action for quieting of title, which is not barred by prescription.
Key Excerpts
- "It is then clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents claim ownership to the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920." — This passage establishes the factual basis for the Court's determination that the complaint alleged ownership of private land, which is central to the ruling that the action was not a reversion proceeding.
- "Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and purposes, segregated from the public domain, because the beneficiary is 'conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.'" — This passage articulates the legal effect of Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, which is the basis for holding that the land was beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands.
- "It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void, and produces no legal affects whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on the nullity of a Free Patent issued over private land, which is the ratio decidendi for rejecting the prescription defense.
- "Moreover, private respondent's claim of open, public, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250 square meter portion since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners and in their original certificate of title, gave private respondents a cause of action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible." — This passage establishes the alternative basis for the ruling, treating the complaint as an action for quieting of title that is not barred by prescription.
Precedents Cited
- Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793 (1990) — Followed. Cited by the Court of Appeals to distinguish the action from a review of the decree of title on the ground of fraud, and relied upon by the Supreme Court for the proposition that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void.
- Vital vs. Anore, 90 Phil. 855 (1952) — Cited as authority for the settled rule that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void.
- Mendoza vs. Navarette, 214 SCRA 337 (1992) — Cited for the propositions that a Free Patent over private land is null and void and that an action for quieting of title is imprescriptible.
- Canagay Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718 (1984) — Cited in Mendoza vs. Navarette for the imprescriptibility of an action for quieting of title.
Provisions
- Section 48(b), C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by R.A. No. 1942 — Provides that those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. The Court applied this provision to hold that the land alleged to be possessed since 1920 was segregated from the public domain and beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands.
- Section 101, C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act) — Provides that all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead. The Court distinguished the present action from a reversion proceeding, holding that the complaint alleged ownership of private land rather than reversion to the Government.
- Section 4, P.D. No. 1073 — Amended Section 48(b) to apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since 12 June 1945. The Court noted this amendment in a footnote.
Notable Concurring Opinions
- Justice Bellosillo
- Justice Vitug
- Justice Kapunan