Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals

A decree of registration may be reopened and reviewed under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 when the applicant commits actual or extrinsic fraud — including the intentional omission of a known adverse claimant's name from the application for registration — that prevents the true owner from receiving notice and participating in the proceedings. The fraud contemplated is not merely intrinsic fraud pertaining to issues litigated in the original action, but extrinsic fraud that deprives a party of the opportunity to be heard.

Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, widow of former President Manuel A. Roxas, inherited the subject parcels of land in Tagaytay City upon her husband's death on April 15, 1946. The Roxas family had been in open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the property for more than thirty years through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez, and had previously filed an application for registration of the same lots (Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072) before the Court of First Instance of Cavite, though no decision had been rendered thereon. Maguesun Management & Development Corporation was a family-connected entity: its president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay, was the petitioner's grandniece and had previously handled the registration and insurance of the petitioner's cars.

On July 2, 1990, Maguesun Management & Development Corporation filed an application for registration of two unregistered parcels of land in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre), with areas of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, docketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-373. In support of its application, the corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by one Zenaida Melliza as vendor for a purchase price of ₱170,000.00. Melliza had purportedly acquired the property from Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas two and a half months earlier for ₱200,000.00, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.

In its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation listed as adjoining owners, occupants, or claimants only Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, and "Provincial Road." Notably, the name "Roxas" did not appear, although a differently worded copy of the application later submitted in the petition for review case contained the name "Roxas" in the same paragraph. The discrepancy was unexplained and appeared intentional: the word "Roxas" seemed to have been erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)" in the original application, typed with a different typewriter and with correction fluid visible. Because the petitioner was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant, or adverse claimant, the Land Registration Authority did not send her a notice of the initial hearing. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and in the Record Newsweekly, which was not a newspaper of general circulation in the ordinary sense but was circulated in several provinces and cities. An order of general default was issued, and on February 13, 1991, the trial court granted the corporation's application for registration. The next day, the court ordered the dismissal of the earlier registration case filed by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon.

It was only when the caretaker of the property was asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of the sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name. On April 21, 1991, she filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183, to set aside the decree of registration on the ground of actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties she inherited from her husband, that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted possession for more than thirty years, and that she had never met Zenaida Melliza. She denied selling the lots and asserted that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged. She further charged that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, noting that the corporation's president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay, was her grandniece who had previously handled the registration and insurance of her cars.

The sole issue as laid down by the trial court after pre-trial was whether the petitioner's signatures on the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged. Petitioner, then ninety-two years old, testified in open court on February 11, 1992 that she had never met Zenaida Melliza, had not sold the subject lots, and that her signatures on the questioned documents were forged. A Philippine National Police document examiner concluded there was no forgery, but upon the petitioner's motion, the signatures were re-examined by an expert from the National Bureau of Investigation, who testified that the questioned and sample signatures were not written by the same person. Despite this conflicting testimony, the trial court dismissed the petition for review on April 15, 1992, placing greater weight on the PNP examiner's findings and noting that the petitioner had not been paying taxes on the property for several years and that her earlier registration application had been "previously dismissed and abandoned." The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal on December 8, 1994, holding that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate actual or extrinsic fraud and that publication in the Official Gazette was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.

• Actual Fraud in Registration Application: Petitioner contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name, or that of the Roxas family, as an occupant, claimant, or adjoining owner in the application for registration, thereby preventing the Land Registration Authority from sending her a notice of the initial hearing and resulting in an order of general default.
• Forgery of Signatures: Petitioner maintained that her signatures on the Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990 were forged, that she had never met Zenaida Melliza, and that she did not sell the subject property.
• Knowledge of Fraud by Respondent Corporation: Petitioner charged Maguesun Corporation with knowledge or authorship of the fraud, given that its president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay, was her grandniece who had previously handled the registration and insurance of her cars and was therefore acquainted with her properties.
• Documentary Irregularities: Petitioner listed a number of irregularities in the documents, including discrepancies in the application for registration, false statements in the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication regarding her residence and status as sole heir, and the implausibility of selling over thirteen thousand square meters of prime Tagaytay property to a stranger for ₱200,000.00.

• No Actual or Extrinsic Fraud: Respondent Court of Appeals held, and Maguesun Corporation implicitly argued, that petitioner failed to demonstrate actual or extrinsic fraud as distinguished from constructive or intrinsic fraud, which is a prerequisite for annulling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration.
• No Concealment of Petitioner's Interest: Respondent argued that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court the existence of the petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration proceedings, the records being replete with references by the corporation itself to the petitioner and the late President.
• Trivial Discrepancies: Respondent contended that the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by the petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters that are too trivial, and are not necessarily indicia of extrinsic fraud or bad faith.
• Jurisdiction by Publication: Respondent maintained that publication of the notice of initial hearing in the Official Gazette was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

• Actual Fraud: Whether Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over the subject parcels of land, warranting the reopening and review of the decree under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
• Forgery: Whether the petitioner's signatures on the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged, and whether forgery was sufficiently established to invalidate the conveyance to Zenaida Melliza and, consequently, to Maguesun Corporation.
• Sufficiency of Publication: Whether publication of the notice of initial hearing in the Official Gazette alone, without publication in a newspaper of general circulation, satisfied the procedural requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

• Actual Fraud: Yes. Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud by intentionally omitting the Roxas family's name as occupants or claimants in the application for registration, thereby preventing the Land Registration Authority from sending notice of the initial hearing to the petitioner and depriving her of her day in court.
• Forgery: Yes. Forgery was established by the more specific and persuasive testimony of the NBI document examiner, the petitioner's own categorical denial of the sale, the glaring irregularities in the questioned documents, and the implausibility of the transaction itself.
• Sufficiency of Publication: While publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement couched in mandatory terms, and the failure to comply is material in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.

• Actual Fraud: The "fraud" contemplated by Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional omission of a fact required by law. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Extrinsic fraud prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, operating upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The Court found that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted the name "Roxas" from the application for registration, replacing it with "Provincial Road" typed on a different typewriter with correction fluid, while submitting a copy containing "Roxas" in the subsequent petition for review case — an unexplained discrepancy that appeared designed to mislead. The corporation likewise declared the land unoccupied when the Roxas family caretaker resided thereon. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires the applicant to state the full names and addresses of all occupants and adjoining owners, a requirement the corporation failed to satisfy. The corporation's president, being the petitioner's grandniece, knew fully well that the petitioner owned the property, and as a buyer she was expected to have inspected the property and ascertained its occupants. This intentional concealment and misrepresentation of the petitioner's interest constituted actual fraud that justified reopening and reviewing the decree of registration. The Court distinguished this from the Court of Appeals' finding that the corporation had not concealed the petitioner's existence: references to the petitioner in the Formal Offer of Exhibits and tax declarations were not sufficient compliance, because disclosure of an adverse interest must be made at the time of the application for registration, otherwise the persons concerned will not receive notices of the initial hearing.

• Forgery: Although there was no direct proof of Maguesun Corporation's participation in the preparation of the forged instruments, sufficient indicia proved that the corporation was not an innocent purchaser for value. The PNP document examiner explained all differences in the questioned and sample signatures as "natural variation," while the NBI expert testified with greater specificity regarding differences in stroke execution, proportional characteristics, linking between letters, and structural patterns. The petitioner herself categorically denied meeting Zenaida Melliza or selling the property, and at over ninety years of age had no motive to testify falsely. The implausibility of the transaction — selling over thirteen thousand square meters of prime Tagaytay property to a stranger for ₱200,000.00 — further undermined its legitimacy. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication contained glaring falsehoods: it stated the petitioner resided in New Manila when she actually lived in North Forbes Park, declared her the sole heir of the late President when there were two children, and stated the President died in 1944 when he died on April 15, 1946. Zenaida Melliza never appeared in court, raising doubts as to her existence. Even visually, the questioned signatures were smooth and rounded, lacking the jagged and shaky character of the petitioner's signatures typical of elderly persons. Because Zenaida Melliza was not the owner of the property, she conveyed no title to Maguesun Corporation, which therefore could not tack its possession to that of the petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. The petitioner, having been in open, uninterrupted, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner for more than thirty years, retained title proper and sufficient for original registration under Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

• Sufficiency of Publication: Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation, with a proviso that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction. While jurisdiction of the court is not affected by the absence of publication in a newspaper of general circulation, such publication remains an indispensable procedural requirement couched in mandatory terms. It is a component of procedural due process aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an adverse interest in the land may be notified. Although jurisdiction was not defeated, the failure to publish in a newspaper of general circulation was material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.

• Actual or Extrinsic Fraud as Ground for Reopening a Decree of Registration — Under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a decree of registration may be reopened and reviewed within one year from entry thereof upon the ground of actual fraud. The fraud contemplated is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of a fact required by law. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Extrinsic fraud prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, operating upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. Intrinsic fraud, which pertains to issues involved in the original action or could have been litigated therein, is not a sufficient ground. In this case, the intentional omission of the petitioner's name as an occupant or claimant in the application for registration constituted extrinsic fraud because it prevented the Land Registration Authority from sending her notice, thereby depriving her of her day in court.

• Intentional Omission of Adverse Claimant's Name as Actual Fraud — Failure and intentional omission of an applicant to disclose the facts of actual physical possession by another person constitutes actual fraud. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. The applicant's disclosure of an adverse claimant's interest must be made at the time of the application for registration, not in subsequent formal offers of exhibits, because the purpose is to ensure that the Land Registration Authority sends notice of the initial hearing to all persons with adverse interests.

• Publication Requirements in Land Registration — Publication of the notice of initial hearing must be made once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation. While publication in the Official Gazette alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement, couched in mandatory terms, and is a component of procedural due process aimed at giving the widest possible publicity to the proceedings.

• Innocent Purchaser for Value — A decree of registration may not be reopened where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein whose rights may be prejudiced. In this case, Maguesun Corporation was held not to be an innocent purchaser for value, given the forged documents, the corporation president's familial relationship with the petitioner, the unexplained discrepancies in the application, and the implausibility of the transaction.

• "The 'fraud' contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact required by law." — This passage defines the controlling standard for reopening a decree of registration under the Property Registration Decree, clarifying that the fraud must be extrinsic and may consist of omission rather than affirmative misrepresentation.

• "Failure and intentional omission of applicants to disclose the facts of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud." — This formulation, adopted from Ramirez vs. CA, articulates the principle that suppressing the existence of an adverse possessor in a land registration application is itself actual fraud warranting review of the decree.

• "While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement." — This passage clarifies the dual publication requirement under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, distinguishing jurisdictional sufficiency from procedural due process compliance.

• "Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims." — This passage establishes the temporal requirement for disclosure of adverse interests in land registration proceedings, rejecting the notion that later references to a claimant in the records cure the failure to identify them in the original application.

• Macabingkil vs. People's Homesite Housing Corporation, 72 SCRA 344 — Followed. Cited for the proposition, drawn from American jurisprudence, that relief from a judgment or decree may be granted where fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief prevented that party from presenting his entire case to the court.

• Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. L-38185, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 292 — Followed. Cited for the ruling that suppression of the fact that applicants possessed property merely as antichretic creditors, and fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation that no other persons had any claim or interest, constitute extrinsic fraud. The Court adopted the principle that intentional omission of facts of actual physical possession by another constitutes actual fraud.

• Nicolas vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-19147-48, December 28, 1963, 9 SCRA 934 — Followed. Cited for the principle that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.

• Director of Lands vs. CFI Rizal, Branch XII, 152 SCRA 487 — Followed. Cited for the requirements that a petition for reopening and review of a decree of registration must be filed within one year from entry of the decree, that the petitioner must have a real and dominical right, and that the property must not have been transferred to an innocent purchaser. Also cited for the principle that fraud justifying review must be extrinsic or collateral.

• Ybañez vs. CA, 253 SCRA 551 — Followed. Cited for the distinction between actual or extrinsic fraud (a ground for annulling a judgment or reopening a decree) and constructive or intrinsic fraud (not a sufficient ground).

• Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, 244 SCRA 537 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that the fraud contemplated by Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is actual and extrinsic, including an intentional omission of fact required by law.

• Treasurer of the Phils. vs. CA, 153 SCRA 359 — Followed. Cited for the principle that a grantor who is not the owner of the property conveys no title, and the grantee cannot tack possession to that of a predecessor-in-interest who lacked title.

• Section 32, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Governs the review of a decree of registration. It provides that the decree shall not be reopened by reason of absence, minority, or other disability, nor by any proceeding for reversing judgments, but recognizes the right of any person deprived of land or any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud to file a petition for reopening and review not later than one year from entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land. Applied as the statutory basis for reopening the decree on the ground of actual fraud.

• Section 15, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known, and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them. Applied to show that Maguesun Corporation failed to comply with this requirement by omitting the Roxas family's name and falsely declaring the land unoccupied.

• Section 23, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Requires the Commissioner of Land Registration to cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation, with a proviso that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Applied to hold that while jurisdiction was conferred by Official Gazette publication, the failure to publish in a newspaper of general circulation remained a violation of an indispensable procedural requirement.

• Section 14, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Provides that persons who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, may file an application for registration of title. Applied to confirm that the petitioner retained title proper and sufficient for original registration over the subject lots.

• Section 39, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Cited in the dispositive portion as the basis for directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title upon finality of the decision.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concurred.