Heirs of Kukungan Timbao vs. Oscar D. Enojado

The Court of Appeals commits grave abuse of discretion when it dismisses an appeal for failure to file an appellant's brief without considering that the appellee received the brief and filed an appellee's brief, which sufficiently indicates service and warrants allowance of a belated filing under the discretionary standards governing dismissal of appeals. A free patent issued under Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is not invalid merely because the applicant was a minor or did not reside on the land, since the law requires only natural-born citizenship and continuous occupation and cultivation or payment of real estate tax.

Petitioners are the heirs of Kukungan Timbao, Muslim-Filipinos claiming membership in the National Cultural Communities, who assert a claim to a 5.25-hectare agricultural land in General Santos City against respondent Oscar D. Enojado, the son of Felix and Rosario Enojado. The controversy concerns the legal status of a free patent issued under the Public Land Act, Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 152, Republic Act No. 3872, and Republic Act No. 6940, and the treatment of ancestral land claims under Republic Act No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997.

Petitioners, the Heirs of Kukungan Timbao, all Muslim-Filipinos claiming to be members of the National Cultural Communities of the Philippines, filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, and damages, with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and receivership, against Oscar D. Enojado before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 23, docketed as Civil Case No. 7623. They alleged that their deceased father, Kukungan Timbao, was the owner, possessor, and occupant of a 5.25-hectare agricultural land located at Purok Abtalael, Barangay San Isidro, General Santos City, covered by Plan PSU-179955. During the Ilaga-Blackshirt conflicts in the 1970s, Timbao and his family were forced to vacate the ancestral land. After the evacuation and following Timbao's death, a certain Felix Enojado gained possession of the subject agricultural land. When relative peace was re-established, petitioners wanted to return to the property, but Felix and his wife, Rosario Enojado, informed them that it was already registered in the name of their son, respondent Oscar D. Enojado, under OCT No. P-2887.

Petitioners claimed that the certificate of title was null and void because respondent was still a minor in 1974 when he applied for a free patent; that the parcel of land was ancestral land inherited from their father; that they, as members of a cultural minority, did not convey the contested realty to respondent; and that the title issued to respondent violated paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. 152 and was therefore null and void. Respondent admitted that he was a minor at the time of his application for free patent and that Timbao was the original owner, possessor, and occupant of the subject property. He countered that petitioners' action for recovery had already prescribed because the title issued to him had become indefeasible; that petitioners were estopped from questioning the transfer because their father had validly sold the property to his mother, Rosario; and that after such transfer, Rosario executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the realty in his favor.

In its March 14, 2008 Order, the RTC dismissed the complaint after finding respondent's affirmative defenses duly proved. The RTC ruled that respondent had proven that the subject property was sold by petitioners' parents to Rosario based on a Transfer of Rights and Sale of Improvements, and that Rosario executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights covering the realty in respondent's favor. It also held that the heirs' rights and action to recover ownership and possession had already prescribed since the Torrens title issued on the basis of the free patent had become indefeasible and incontrovertible one year after its issuance and registration. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the CA required the parties to submit their briefs. Petitioners' counsel moved for an extension of 30 days from the initial deadline of September 16, 2010, or until October 16, 2010. On December 29, 2010, the CA received respondent's Appellee's Brief dated December 17, 2010; in paragraph 1 thereof, respondent alleged that the statement of facts and case made by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief was inaccurate and unsupported by the records. On February 1, 2011, the Judicial Records Division submitted a Verification Report stating that no appellant's brief had been filed per docket book entry as of that date. Consequently, on February 9, 2011, the CA denied due course to and dismissed the appeal pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules. Petitioners' counsel received a copy of the resolution on February 22, 2011. Two days later, on February 24, 2011, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that they had duly filed their appellants' brief via registered mail on October 13, 2010, for which the post office issued Registry Receipt No. 1000. They submitted a photocopy of an Affidavit of Proof of Service which appeared to have been attached to their appellants' brief, with a photocopy of Registry Receipt No. 1000 at the bottom. The CA directed respondent to comment. Respondent commented that on October 21, 2010, he received a copy of plaintiffs-appellants' Brief sent by registered mail on October 13, 2010; that he filed his brief on December 17, 2010 by registered mail; that he was not certain whether plaintiffs-appellants had filed their Brief in the Court of Appeals; and that if the record showed they had filed it, the motion for reconsideration should be granted and the case decided on the merits, but if not, petitioners should be required to submit the Registry Return Card of Registry Receipt No. 1000. The CA noted respondent's Comment and thereafter denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that there was no Appellant's Brief actually on file, that petitioners failed to exert effort to ensure their brief was received by the CA, and that they did not even file their brief belatedly or simultaneously with their motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for dismissing their appeal based on a technicality. They likewise assailed the validity of the free patent issued to respondent, contending that it was void because respondent was then a minor and did not reside in the contested realty. Respondent posited that petitioners chose the wrong remedy, having filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review under Rule 45, and that any error of the CA was merely an error of judgment not correctible by certiorari. Respondent also contended that petitioners did not attach a certification from the Office of the Postmaster of Tacurong City to prove that they had deposited a copy of the Appellants' Brief with the post office. In their Reply, petitioners insisted on the correctness of their remedy and maintained that the CA should have been more considerate and should have required them to re-submit their brief, which was allegedly lost by the Post Office of Tacurong City; since the loss was beyond their control, they argued that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal.

The free patent, Free Patent No. 557040, was issued on January 25, 1974, and registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds in General Santos City on April 18, 1974. Petitioners filed their complaint on August 28, 2006. There was no indication that the subject parcel of land had been previously reserved and proclaimed as ancestral land, nor was it shown that an application for an ancestral land claim had been filed over the same.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that the CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing their appeal based on a technicality, despite their claim that they had filed the appellants' brief by registered mail.
• Loss of Pleading Beyond Control: Petitioners maintained that the CA should have been more considerate and should have required them to re-submit their brief, which was allegedly lost by the Post Office of Tacurong City; since the loss was beyond their control, the dismissal of their appeal was improper.
• Correct Remedy: Petitioners insisted on the correctness of their remedy under Rule 65.
• Invalid Free Patent: Petitioners assailed the validity of the free patent issued to respondent, contending that it was void because respondent was then a minor and did not reside in the contested realty.
• Ancestral Land: Petitioners claimed that the subject property was a private ancestral land inherited from their father and therefore not part of public land that could be disposed of by free patent.

• Wrong Remedy: Respondent posited that petitioners chose the wrong remedy, having filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review under Rule 45; assuming the CA erred in dismissing the appeal and denying the motion for reconsideration, it merely committed an error of judgment not correctible by certiorari.
• Proof of Filing: Respondent contended that petitioners did not attach a certification from the Office of the Postmaster of Tacurong City to prove that they had deposited a copy of the Appellants' Brief with the post office.
• Prescription and Indefeasibility: Respondent countered that petitioners' action for recovery had already prescribed because the title issued to him had become indefeasible.
• Estoppel and Transfer: Respondent argued that petitioners were estopped from questioning the transfer of property since their father had validly sold the same to his mother, Rosario, and that after such transfer, Rosario executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the realty in his favor.
• Receipt of Appellants' Brief: In his Comment, respondent admitted receiving a copy of plaintiffs-appellants' Brief on October 21, 2010, sent by registered mail on October 13, 2010; he stated that he was not certain whether petitioners had filed their Brief in the Court of Appeals, and that if the record showed they had filed it, the motion for reconsideration should be granted and the case decided on the merits, but if not, petitioners should be required to submit the Registry Return Card of Registry Receipt No. 1000.

• Dismissal of Appeal / Proof of Filing: Whether the CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to serve and file an appellant's brief, and whether petitioners sufficiently proved filing of the Appellants' Brief with the CA by registered mail under Section 12, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion / Certiorari: Whether certiorari lies against the CA for denying due course to and dismissing petitioners' appeal based on technicality, or whether such dismissal was a mere error of judgment.
• Free Patent — Age and Residence: Whether a free patent issued under Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is void because the applicant was a minor and did not reside on the land.
• Indefeasibility and Prescription: Whether respondent's free patent and Torrens title had become indefeasible and whether petitioners' action for recovery of ownership and reconveyance had prescribed.
• Ancestral Land: Whether petitioners proved that the subject property was reserved and declared ancestral land, thereby precluding its disposition by free patent.
• TRO/WPI: Whether petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

• Dismissal of Appeal / Proof of Filing: Yes. The CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to serve and file an appellant's brief, and petitioners failed to prove filing with the CA under Section 12, Rule 13 because their affidavit proved service on respondent, not filing with the appellate court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion / Certiorari: Yes. Notwithstanding petitioners' failure to comply with Section 12, Rule 13, certiorari lies because the CA gravely abused its discretion in instantly dismissing the appeal without considering circumstances that warranted allowance of a belated filing.
• Free Patent — Age and Residence: No. Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not require the applicant to be of legal age or an actual resident of the land; it requires only natural-born citizenship and continuous occupation and cultivation or payment of real estate tax.
• Indefeasibility and Prescription: Yes. The free patent and Torrens title became indefeasible one year after issuance, and the action for reconveyance prescribed in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens title; the complaint was filed 32 years after the patent's issuance.
• Ancestral Land: No. Petitioners failed to prove that the subject property had been reserved and proclaimed as ancestral land; bare allegations were insufficient, and the property could be covered by a free patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act.
• TRO/WPI: No. Petitioners failed to establish an actual and existing right and the urgency of injunctive relief to prevent grave and irreparable injury; their bare allegations were insufficient.

• Dismissal of Appeal / Proof of Filing: Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules authorizes the CA to dismiss an appeal, motu proprio or upon motion of the appellee, for failure of the appellant to serve and file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor part of due process; it is a statutory privilege that must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with law. Filing and service are distinct acts: filing is the act of presenting the pleading to the clerk of court, while service is the act of providing a party with a copy. Under Section 12, Rule 13, if the pleading is not in the record but is claimed to have been filed by registered mail, the filing must be proved by the registry receipt and by an affidavit of the person who did the mailing containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after 10 days if not delivered. Petitioners submitted Registry Receipt No. 1000, but the affidavit they attached pertained to service of the pleading on respondent, not to its filing with the CA. This was not substantial compliance with Section 12. Thus, the CA had sufficient basis to dismiss the appeal and deny the motion for reconsideration.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion / Certiorari: Rule 65 requires that the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction; it does not correct errors of procedure or mistakes in findings or conclusions. However, the dismissal of an appeal for failure to file an appellant's brief is not mandatory; the CA's power is discretionary and directory. Under The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium vs. Court of Appeals, the general rule is dismissal, but the failure to file a brief does not automatically cause dismissal; the appellate court may allow late filing if the circumstances warrant liberality, strong considerations of equity justify an exception in the interest of substantial justice, the appellee has suffered no material injury by the delay, the appellee's cause has not been prejudiced, and no motion to dismiss was filed. Here, respondent admitted in his Comment that he received a copy of the appellants' brief on October 21, 2010, sent by registered mail on October 13, 2010, which coincided with Registry Receipt No. 1000 and was before the October 16, 2010 extension deadline. More importantly, respondent filed an Appellee's Brief, which under Section 8, Rule 44 is filed within 45 days from receipt of the appellant's brief; this sufficiently indicated that petitioners had served him a copy of the appellants' brief. Filing and service go hand-in-hand, and it would be absurd to presume that petitioners did not file the brief when respondent received it. Respondent suffered no prejudice or material injury and did not file a motion to dismiss. The CA should have required petitioners to submit their appellants' brief instead of instantly dismissing the appeal. Its failure to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion. Although the finding would have warranted remand, the Court resolved the case on the merits to save time and in the interest of justice.

• Free Patent — Age and Residence: Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 originally required only that the applicant be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that, since July 4, 1926, the applicant or his predecessors-in-interest had continuously occupied and cultivated a tract of agricultural public land subject to disposition, or had paid the real estate tax thereon while the same was not occupied by any person. At the time respondent was granted a free patent, Section 44 was amended by Republic Act No. 3872, which added a paragraph allowing members of national cultural minorities who had continuously occupied and cultivated a tract of land since July 4, 1955 to apply, provided that at the time of application they were not owners of any real estate secured or disposable under the provision. The first paragraph was later amended by Republic Act No. 6940, which still did not provide for an age limit. Unlike other provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, Section 44 does not impose age limitations. As to residence, Section 44 requires continuous occupation and cultivation, not residence. Occupation is not the same as residence; residence refers to a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, while occupation and cultivation for the prescribed period grants the right to apply for a free patent. Where the law does not distinguish, the Court should not distinguish. Thus, petitioners' challenge against the free patent based on respondent's minority and non-residence lacked legal support.

• Indefeasibility and Prescription: Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by it ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance. Thereafter, the remaining remedy is an action for reconveyance, which prescribes in 10 years from the time of issuance of the Torrens title over the property. Respondent's Free Patent No. 557040 was issued on January 25, 1974, and registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds in General Santos City on April 18, 1974. The free patent had already become indefeasible after one year from its issuance. When petitioners filed their complaint on August 28, 2006, or 32 years after the issuance of the free patent, the latter was already incontrovertible. Consequently, petitioners' action for recovery of ownership was barred by prescription.

• Ancestral Land: Petitioners consistently relied on Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Presidential Decree No. 152 despite the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, at the time they filed their complaint. The IPRA governs the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and domains. It defines ancestral lands as lands occupied, possessed, and utilized by individuals, families, and clans who are members of indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure, or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings. Any person seeking relief under Commonwealth Act No. 141 admits that the property being applied for is public land. The Public Land Act allows the disposition of public lands through confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, either judicially or through a free patent. The second paragraph of Section 44, as amended by Republic Act No. 3872, expressly provides that indigenous peoples may apply for a free patent over realty they have continuously cultivated and occupied since July 4, 1955. Section 12, Chapter III of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations provide an option to secure a certificate of title under Commonwealth Act No. 141 over individually-owned ancestral lands classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands. Under Section 84 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, lands possessed by indigenous peoples must be declared by the President through a proclamation as reserved for their exclusive use; they may also be granted individually by title or gratuitous patent, not exceeding four hectares. The IPRA also allows formal recognition of ancestral land rights through certificates of ancestral land titles. Proofs of claims include the testimony under oath of elders and authentic documents under Section 52(d) of the IPRA, including tax declarations and proofs of payment of taxes. In Lamsis vs. Dong-e, the Court ruled that an application for a certificate of ancestral land title is akin to a registration proceeding; titling does not vest ownership but only recognizes ownership already vested by possession since time immemorial. Certificates of title are not conclusive evidence of ownership, but they are the best proof of ownership. Here, there was no indication that the subject parcel had been previously reserved and proclaimed as ancestral land, nor was it shown that an application for an ancestral land claim had been filed. Apart from bare allegations, petitioners offered no other proof. Thus, they failed to prove that the property was ancestral land.

• TRO/WPI: Provisional or ancillary remedies serve to protect actual existing rights and maintain the status quo. A TRO and a WPI are temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action; they are ancillary because they are incidents of and dependent upon the result of the main action. They are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests and are not a cause of action in themselves. The grant or denial of a TRO or injunctive writ rests on the sound discretion of the court, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence involves findings of fact. The issuance of such relief is an extraordinary or transcendent remedy and a strong arm of equity; it must be exercised with utmost caution, prudence, and deliberation, and reasonably and sparingly only in exceptional circumstances. In every application, the applicant must establish the actual and existing right sought to be protected and the urgency of the writ's issuance to prevent grave and irreparable injury. Failure to do so warrants denial. Petitioners need not substantiate their claim with complete and conclusive evidence because only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits. However, their bare allegations were insufficient to warrant the issuance of a TRO or WPI. In view of their unsubstantiated claims and the lack of merit of the petition, the prayer for such reliefs was denied.

• Right to appeal as a statutory privilege — The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. One who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply strictly with the requirements of the rules, otherwise it often leads to the loss of such right. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that petitioners' failure to comply with the proof-of-filing requirements under Section 12, Rule 13 initially justified the CA's dismissal of the appeal.
• Filing vs. service; proof of filing by registered mail — Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court, while service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. Although they are distinct acts, filing and service go hand-in-hand and must be considered together in determining whether the pleading was filed within the reglementary period. If the pleading is not in the record but is claimed to have been filed by registered mail, the filing must be proved by the registry receipt and by an affidavit of the person who did the mailing containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after 10 days if not delivered. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioners' affidavit proved service on respondent, not filing with the CA, and thus did not amount to substantial compliance.
• Discretionary dismissal of appeal for failure to file appellant's brief; The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium vs. Court of Appeals principles — The CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to serve and file the appellant's brief, but the power is discretionary and directory, not ministerial or mandatory. Failure to file the brief within the reglementary period does not automatically cause dismissal. In case of late filing, the appellate court may still allow the appeal if: (a) the circumstances warrant liberality; (b) strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice; (c) no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay; (d) there is no contention that the appellee's cause was prejudiced; and (e) no motion to dismiss was filed. In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period. Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered an adequate excuse except where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process, where application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interests of justice so require. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that the CA should have allowed a belated filing because respondent received the appellants' brief, filed an appellee's brief, suffered no prejudice, and did not move to dismiss.
• Certiorari under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion — Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and no error or mistake committed by a court will be corrected by certiorari unless the court acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction. The writ is available only for these purposes and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the judge. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that although the CA initially had authority to dismiss the appeal, its failure to consider the circumstances warranting allowance of a belated filing amounted to grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
• Free patent qualifications under Section 44, Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, does not require the applicant to be of legal age or an actual resident of the land subject of the free patent application. The requirements are natural-born citizenship and continuous occupation and cultivation of the land, either by the applicant or through predecessors-in-interest, or payment of real estate tax thereon while the land was not occupied by any person. Occupation is not the same as residence, and occupation is not synonymous with possession. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that respondent's minority and non-residence did not invalidate the free patent issued to him.
• Indefeasibility of patent and Torrens title; prescription of reconveyance — Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by it ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance. Thereafter, the remaining remedy is an action for reconveyance, which prescribes in 10 years from the time of the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that respondent's free patent had become indefeasible and that petitioners' action, filed 32 years after issuance, was barred by prescription.
• Ancestral land claims under the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and Commonwealth Act No. 141 — The IPRA governs the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and domains. Any person seeking relief under Commonwealth Act No. 141 admits that the property being applied for is public land. The Public Land Act allows the disposition of public lands through confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, either judicially or through a free patent, and Section 44 as amended expressly allows indigenous peoples to apply for a free patent over land they have continuously cultivated and occupied since July 4, 1955. The IPRA and its Implementing Rules provide an option to secure a certificate of title under Commonwealth Act No. 141 over individually-owned ancestral lands classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands. Certificates of ancestral land titles recognize ownership already vested by possession since time immemorial. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that petitioners failed to prove that the subject property was reserved or proclaimed ancestral land, and that bare allegations were insufficient.
• Provisional remedies of TRO and WPI — A TRO and a WPI are temporary, ancillary, and preservative remedies that protect actual existing rights and maintain the status quo during the pendency of the main action. They are not a cause of action in themselves but are adjunct to the main suit. The grant or denial rests on the sound discretion of the court, and the issuance is an extraordinary remedy that must be exercised with utmost caution, prudence, and deliberation, and reasonably and sparingly only in exceptional circumstances. The applicant must establish an actual and existing right sought to be protected and the urgency of the writ's issuance to prevent grave and irreparable injury. Only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required, but bare allegations are insufficient. The Court applied this doctrine in denying petitioners' prayer for a TRO and/or WPI.

• "The CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to serve and file an appellant's brief; Petitioners failed to prove filing of the Appellants' Brief to the CA." — This passage states the first holding: the CA has authority to dismiss for failure to file and serve the appellant's brief, and petitioners failed to prove filing with the CA under the Rules.
• "Notwithstanding the authority granted by Sec. 1(e) of Rule 50, as well as the circumstances which convinced the CA to dismiss petitioners' appeal, the Court holds that it committed grave abuse of discretion in doing so." — This is the ratio decidendi on the procedural issue: despite the CA's authority to dismiss, the circumstances warranted liberal treatment, and the failure to allow a belated filing amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
• "Sec. 44 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141 does not require the applicant to be of legal age and an actual resident of the land subject of the free patent application." — This passage defines the controlling rule on free patent qualifications and rejects petitioners' challenge based on respondent's minority and non-residence.
• "It is settled that once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by it ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent." — This passage states the doctrine on indefeasibility of a patent and Torrens title, which barred petitioners' action for recovery and reconveyance.

• The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium vs. Court of Appeals, 574 Phil. 380 (2008) — Controlling precedent. The Court laid down the principles governing the discretionary dismissal of an appeal for failure to file an appellant's brief and the conditions for allowing a belated filing.
• National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Tarobal, 803 Phil. 694 (2017) — Cited for the rule that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, not errors of procedure or mistakes in findings or conclusions.
• Alquiza vs. Alquiza, 130 Phil. 523 (1968) — Cited for the rule that the appellate court exercises discretion when it decides to dismiss an appeal based on failure to file a brief, and may reinstate the appeal upon a showing of good and sufficient cause.
• Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6 (1960) — Cited for the requirement that the discretion to reinstate a dismissed appeal must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause.
• Philippine Savings Bank vs. Papa, 823 Phil. 725 (2018) — Cited for the rule that filing and service go hand-in-hand and must be considered together in determining whether a pleading was filed within the reglementary period.
• Sibayan vs. Costales, 789 Phil. 1 (2016) — Cited for the rule that failure to file an appellant's brief, although not jurisdictional, results in the abandonment of the appeal and may be a cause for its dismissal.
• Republic vs. Bellate, 716 Phil. 60 (2013) — Cited for the rule that once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens title becomes indefeasible after one year.
• Spouses Aboitiz vs. Spouses Po, 810 Phil. 123 (2017) — Cited for the rule that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens title.
• Lamsis vs. Dong-e, 648 Phil. 372 (2010) — Cited for the rule that an application for a certificate of ancestral land title is akin to a registration proceeding; titling does not vest ownership but only recognizes ownership already vested by possession since time immemorial.
• Republic vs. Spouses Noval, 818 Phil. 298 (2017) — Cited for the rule that any person seeking relief under Commonwealth Act No. 141 admits that the property being applied for is public land.
• Begnaen vs. Spouses Caligtan, 793 Phil. 289 (2016) — Cited for the rule that the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act governs the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and domains.
• Naval vs. Jonsay, 95 Phil. 939 (1954) — Cited for the rule that occupation and cultivation of the realty for the prescribed period grants an individual the right to apply for a free patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141.
• Ombudsman Carpio Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 772 Phil. 672 (2015) — Cited for the rule that a TRO and a WPI are ancillary remedies that protect substantive rights and maintain the status quo.
• Bicol Medical Center vs. Botor, 819 Phil. 447 (2017) — Cited for the rule that only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required to justify a preliminary injunction pending decision on the merits.

• Section 1(e), Rule 50, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Authorizes the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal, motu proprio or upon motion of the appellee, for failure of the appellant to serve and file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period. The Court applied this provision in finding that the CA initially had authority to dismiss the appeal.
• Section 3, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that an ordinary appeal from the RTC shall be taken within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. The Court cited this provision in outlining the procedural framework for appeals.
• Section 7, Rule 44, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires the appellant to file with the court, within 45 days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all evidence is attached to the record, seven copies of the appellant's brief, with proof of service of two copies upon the appellee. The Court cited this provision in discussing petitioners' duty to file the appellants' brief.
• Section 8, Rule 44, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that the appellee's brief shall be filed within 45 days from receipt of the appellant's brief. The Court relied on this provision in reasoning that respondent's filing of an appellee's brief indicated that he had received the appellants' brief.
• Section 2, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines filing as the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court, and service as the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. The Court used this provision to distinguish filing from service.
• Section 12, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides the manner of proving filing: by the existence of the pleading in the record; if filed personally, by the written or stamped acknowledgment of the clerk of court; if filed by registered mail, by the registry receipt and by an affidavit of the person who did the mailing containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after 10 days if not delivered. The Court applied this provision in finding that petitioners failed to prove filing with the CA.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for certiorari may be filed when a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this provision in granting the petition on the procedural issue.
• Section 44, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by Republic Act No. 3872 and Republic Act No. 6940 — Governs applications for free patent. The Court held that it requires only natural-born citizenship and continuous occupation and cultivation or payment of real estate tax, and does not impose age or residence qualifications. Republic Act No. 3872 added a paragraph allowing members of national cultural minorities to apply, while Republic Act No. 6940 amended the first paragraph without introducing an age limit.
• Section 84, Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Provides that lands possessed by indigenous peoples must be declared by the President through a proclamation as reserved for their exclusive use, and may be granted to them individually by title or gratuitous patent, not exceeding four hectares. The Court cited this provision in discussing the formal recognition of ancestral land rights.
• Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997) — Defines ancestral lands as lands occupied, possessed, and utilized by individuals, families, and clans who are members of indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure, or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings. The Court cited this definition in resolving the ancestral land issue.
• Section 12, Chapter III, Republic Act No. 8371 — Provides an option for individual members of cultural communities to secure a certificate of title under Commonwealth Act No. 141 over individually-owned ancestral lands which are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands. The Court cited this provision in holding that ancestral lands may be titled under the Public Land Act.
• Section 52(d), Republic Act No. 8371 — Enumerates authentic documents that may serve as proofs of claims to ancestral lands, including tax declarations and proofs of payment of taxes. The Court cited this provision in discussing the evidence required to prove ancestral land claims.
• Section 53(c), Republic Act No. 8371 — Cited in relation to proofs of claims to ancestral lands, including the testimony under oath of elders and other documents attesting to possession or occupation since time immemorial. The Court referenced this provision in discussing the evidence petitioners failed to present.
• Presidential Decree No. 152 — Amended certain provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioners claimed that the title issued to respondent violated paragraph 1 of this decree, but the Court resolved the ancestral land issue under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act.

Hernando, Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concurred.