Heirs of Jumero vs. Lizares

A possessor by virtue of ownership has the legal presumption that he holds possession by reason of a sufficient title and cannot be forced to show it; the claimant seeking recovery must first prove a character of possession distinct from that of owner before the possessor can be compelled to prove his title.

Benedicto Jumero owned a parcel of land of five hectares and sixty ares in Occidental Negros, adjoining the property of Aniceto Lacson on the north, east, and west, and that of Gregoria Vinco on the south. He willed the land to his four children — Luisa, Felix, Florentino, and Pedro — all now deceased. The plaintiffs are fifteen grandchildren and great-grandchildren descending from Felix, Florentino, and Pedro. The sole descendant of Luisa, Gregoria Meruegos, did not join the suit and appears as a defendant together with Jacinto Lizares. At the conclusion of trial, Florentino's children — Anatolio, Hilaria, and Felisa — who had testified as witnesses for the defendant against the complaint, were likewise included as defendants by a court-authorized amendment, so that the descendant of one entire branch (Luisa) and three members of another branch (Florentino) opposed the claim.

The land in question — five hectares and sixty ares in Occidental Negros — belonged to Benedicto Jumero, who willed it to his four children: Luisa, Felix, Florentino, and Pedro, all now deceased. The plaintiffs, fifteen persons comprising the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of Benedicto descending from Felix, Florentino, and Pedro, demanded restitution of the land from Jacinto Lizares, who had been in possession of it for approximately forty years. The sole descendant of Luisa, Gregoria Meruegos, did not join the suit and appeared as a defendant alongside Lizares. At the conclusion of trial, Florentino's children — Anatolio, Hilaria, and Felisa — who had testified as witnesses for the defendant in opposition to the complaint, were likewise included as defendants by a court-authorized amendment.

Three facts were admitted by the parties: first, that all the heirs named Jumero are descendants of Benedicto Jumero; second, that the land passed into Lizares's possession for the sum of ₱50 about forty years prior; and third, that the reason for the transfer was that Nicolas Jumero, a son of Felix, had been drafted for the army, and the ₱50 was needed to secure his release from military service or to pay the attorney negotiating the release.

The central dispute was whether the ₱50 was received as a mortgage loan, as the plaintiffs claimed, or as the price of an outright sale, as maintained by Lizares, Gregoria Meruegos, and later by Anatolio, Hilaria, and Felisa Jumero. The plaintiffs asserted the land was delivered under mortgage so that Lizares might have the usufruct until redemption through repayment of the ₱50. The defendants contended the land was sold outright.

At trial, the plaintiffs presented several witnesses. Dionisio Acodo testified to the delivery of the ₱50 under security of the land. Gregoria Vinco, an adjacent owner to the south, testified that twenty years prior, Lizares had sent for her father-in-law Felix Jumero and proposed adding ₱150 more to convert the mortgage into a sale; she stated she had married her husband Nicolas thirty-eight years before, two or four years after he was chosen as a recruit. Romualda Jumero testified that when her brother was drafted, her father borrowed ₱50 from Lizares and gave the land as security, claiming she had accompanied her father to Lizares's house about forty years before — yet when asked her age at the outset of her testimony, she replied "About forty years, I believe." Cosme Jumero testified that two years prior, Lizares had negotiated with Pedro Jumero for conversion of the mortgage into a sale. Rufino Brasileño recounted that Lizares had said to Gregoria Vinco and another woman, "If you had not sued me, I would have allowed you to redeem the land." Aniceto Lacson testified to his attempt, at Lizares's request, to buy the land for the latter.

The defense presented Gregoria Meruegos, Hilaria Jumero, Anatolio Jumero, Basilio Alferio (husband of Felisa Jumero), Simon Lizares, and Francisco Lizares. The first four and the last averred that the sale was made by the Jumero family — by the four children of Benedicto — because of the need to redeem Nicolas from military service. Gregoria Meruegos, on cross-examination, acknowledged having said on some occasion that the land was pledged to Lizares, but that since it had not been redeemed, it was as though Lizares had acquired it by purchase. Hilaria Jumero testified that Aniceto Lacson had offered to buy the land for ₱700 because it had been acquired very cheaply, and that she had replied that Lizares had also made her an offer. Several defense witnesses were themselves heirs of Benedicto Jumero who testified against their own interest in affirming the sale.

The Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros decided in favor of the defendants and absolved them from the complaint. The trial judge expressed doubt as to the character of the contract by which Lizares possessed the land and, by reason of that doubt, resolved the case in favor of the defendant possessor. The plaintiffs appealed via a bill of exceptions with a right to revision of the evidence.

• Inadmissibility of Parol Evidence: Petitioner argued that because the case involved the purchase of real estate, witness testimony was inadmissible to prove the sale, and that under Law 6, Title 5 of the 5th Partida — the law in force at the time the land was allegedly purchased — it was necessary for the validity of the contract that the sale be made by a public instrument.
• Erroneous Resolution of Doubt: Petitioner contended that the trial judge committed error in entertaining doubt as to the character of the contract and, by reason of that doubt, absolving the defendants rather than declaring a preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs.

• Outright Sale: Respondent maintained from the beginning that the land was sold outright to Lizares for the price of ₱50, not delivered as mortgage security, and that the transfer was effected by the four children of Benedicto Jumero to secure the release of Nicolas Jumero from military service.

• Admissibility of Testimony: Whether witness testimony was admissible to prove the purchase of real estate, given the alleged requirement under Law 6, Title 5 of the 5th Partida that a sale of real estate be made by public instrument.
• Burden of Proof and Presumption in Favor of Possessor: Whether the trial court erred in resolving doubt as to the character of the contract in favor of the defendant possessor rather than declaring a preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs.

• Admissibility of Testimony: No. Under the laws of the Partidas, the contract of purchase and sale is consensual and requires only consent for perfection; a public instrument is necessary only when the parties themselves agreed that the sale should be made by such instrument.
• Burden of Proof and Presumption in Favor of Possessor: No. The possessor under claim of ownership enjoys the legal presumption of sufficient title under Article 448 of the Civil Code and cannot be compelled to produce it; the plaintiffs failed to prove a character of possession distinct from ownership, having adduced no written instrument of mortgage or antichresis.

• Admissibility of Testimony: The law cited by the plaintiffs — Law 6, Title 5 of the 5th Partida — provides two modes of sale: by public instrument and without one. The first mode applies when the vendee says to the vendor, "I wish that a document of sale be made," in which case the sale is not completed until the instrument is executed, because either party may repent before that point. The second mode applies when the parties agree on the price and exchange the thing for the price without mentioning an instrument. The contract of purchase and sale under the Partidas, patterned after Roman law, is eminently consensual and requires only consent for perfection. An instrument is necessary only when the form itself is made the subject of consent. Since there was no evidence that the parties stipulated for a public instrument, the verbal sale was valid and testimony was admissible to prove its existence and terms.

• Burden of Proof and Presumption in Favor of Possessor: Under Article 448 of the Civil Code, a possessor by virtue of ownership has the legal presumption that he holds possession by reason of a sufficient title and cannot be forced to show it. Lizares possessed the land for forty years under a claim of purchase — a title of transfer of ownership — and thus enjoyed this presumption. A verbal sale confers a perfect title which, together with possession, confers ownership until the contrary is proved. It was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove a character of possession distinct from ownership — specifically, a mortgage or antichresis — before they could compel the defendant to prove his title. The plaintiffs failed to do so because no written instrument of mortgage or antichresis was executed, and under the first paragraph of Rule 4 of the transitory provisions of the Civil Code, in connection with Articles 1875, 1279, and 1280, mortgages and antichresis — as restrictions on ownership — must necessarily be recorded in writing. Antichresis, moreover, was virtually unknown in the Philippines before the Civil Code's promulgation, save in exceedingly rare cases of pretorian pledges judicially established. The trial judge's resolution of doubt in favor of the possessor was proper under the second paragraph of Article 6 of the Civil Code, which provides that in the absence of exact law, customs and general principles of law shall apply — including the principle that in case of doubt, the condition of the possessor is the better one. Even examining the testimony critically, the plaintiffs' evidence was contradictory and unreliable: Romualda Jumero, who claimed to have accompanied her father to Lizares's house forty years prior, was herself only about forty years old at trial; her account contradicted Gregoria Vinco's as to who accompanied Felix Jumero. The defense witnesses, though related to or dependent on the defendant, testified against their own interest in affirming the sale, making their testimony credible. Even assuming the land was sold with right of redemption — a custom likely throughout the Islands — the right to repurchase is limited to ten years under paragraph 2 of Article 1508 of the Civil Code, and this period had already elapsed since the Code's promulgation, pursuant to Article 1939.

• Legal Presumption of Sufficient Title in Possessor — Under Article 448 of the Civil Code, a possessor by virtue of ownership has the legal presumption that he holds possession by reason of a sufficient title and cannot be forced to show it. The burden falls on the claimant to prove a character of possession distinct from that of owner before the possessor can be compelled to prove his title. The Court applied this doctrine to Lizares, who possessed the land for forty years under a claim of purchase; the plaintiffs were unable to prove a mortgage or antichresis, and thus could not shift the burden to the defendant.

• Consensual Nature of Sale under the Partidas — Under the legislation of the Partidas, patterned after Roman law, the contract of purchase and sale is eminently consensual and requires only consent for perfection. A public instrument is necessary only when the parties themselves made the form the subject of consent — that is, when the vendee says to the vendor, "I wish that a document of sale be made." The Court applied this doctrine to reject the plaintiffs' contention that a public instrument was required for the validity of the sale.

• In Dubio Pro Possessore — It is a general principle of law that, in case of doubt, the condition of the possessor is the better one. The Court applied this principle pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 6 of the Civil Code, which provides that when no law is exactly applicable, customs and general principles of law shall be observed.

• Prescription of Right of Redemption — Under paragraph 2 of Article 1508 of the Civil Code, even if the right to repurchase was stipulated to last for an indefinite time, it is restricted to ten years. This period is reckoned from the promulgation of the Civil Code under Article 1939, and had already elapsed at the time of suit.

• "The possessor by virtue or ownership has in his favor the legal presumption that he holds possession by reason of a sufficient title and he can not be forced to show it." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on the legal presumption in favor of the possessor under claim of ownership, forming the ratio decidendi of the decision.

• "In accordance with the legislation of the Partidas, patterned after the Roman law, the contract of purchase and sale is eminently consensual and, consequently only requires consent for its perfection." — This articulates the consensual nature of sale under the old Spanish law, resolving the first assignment of error on the admissibility of parol evidence.

• "And it is a general principle of law that, in case of doubt, the condition of he who possesses is the better one." — This states the principle of in dubio pro possessore, applied under Article 6 of the Civil Code to justify the lower court's resolution of doubt in favor of the defendant.

• Article 448, Civil Code — Provides that the possessor by virtue of ownership has the legal presumption that he holds possession by reason of a sufficient title and cannot be forced to show it. Applied to Lizares, who possessed the land for forty years under a claim of purchase, shifting the burden to the plaintiffs to prove a distinct character of possession.

• Article 6, second paragraph, Civil Code — Provides that when there is no law exactly applicable to the point in controversy, customs of the place shall be observed, and in their absence, general principles of law. Applied to justify resolving doubt in favor of the possessor under the principle that the possessor's condition is the better one.

• Law 6, Title 5, 5th Partida — Provides two modes of sale: by public instrument (when the vendee requests a document) and without one (when the parties agree on price and exchange without mentioning an instrument). Applied to determine that a verbal sale was valid and that testimony was admissible to prove it.

• Article 1508, paragraph 2, Civil Code — Limits the right to repurchase to ten years even if stipulated to last indefinitely. Applied to bar any redemption claim, the period having already elapsed since the Civil Code's promulgation.

• Article 1939, Civil Code — Reckons the prescription period from the promulgation of the Civil Code. Applied in connection with Article 1508 to establish that the ten-year repurchase period had expired.

• Articles 1875, 1279, 1280, Civil Code; Rule 4, first paragraph, Transitory Provisions of the Civil Code — Require mortgages and antichresis to be recorded in writing. Applied to defeat the plaintiffs' claim of an unwritten mortgage or antichresis, since no instrument was executed.

Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concurred. Carson, J., concurred in the result.