Heirs of Jose Maligaso, Sr. vs. Spouses Simon D. Encinas and Esperanza E. Encinas

A Torrens titleholder is entitled to possession of the registered land, and the title cannot be collaterally attacked in an unlawful detainer case; laches does not bar the registered owner's right to recover possession, particularly where the occupant's stay was merely tolerated.

Petitioners are the heirs of Jose Maligaso, Sr., namely Antonio, Carmelo, and Jose, Jr. Respondents Spouses Simon D. Encinas and Esperanza E. Encinas are the registered owners of Lot No. 3517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sorsogon under TCT No. T-4773. The lot was originally registered in the name of Maria Maligaso Ramos, petitioners' aunt, under OCT No. 543, and later passed to respondents through sales to Virginia Escurel and then to respondents. The dispute concerns a 980-square-meter portion of Lot No. 3517 that petitioners occupy, claiming it as Jose, Sr.'s share in his parents' estate, and it arises under the Torrens system and the rule against collateral attack on certificates of title.

Respondents Spouses Simon D. Encinas and Esperanza E. Encinas are the registered owners of Lot No. 3517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sorsogon, with an area of 2,867 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4773. The controversy concerns a 980-square-meter portion of that lot occupied by petitioners, the Heirs of Jose Maligaso, Sr., namely Antonio Maligaso, Carmelo Maligaso, and Jose Maligaso, Jr. Lot No. 3517 was previously covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 543, issued in the name of Maria Maligaso Ramos, petitioners' aunt, on February 7, 1929. In May 1965, Maria sold Lot No. 3517 to Virginia Escurel; three years later, on April 5, 1968, Virginia sold the lot to respondents, resulting in the cancellation of OCT No. 543 and the issuance of TCT No. T-4773.

On March 16, 1998 and June 19, 1998, approximately thirty years after they purchased Lot No. 3517, respondents issued two demand letters to petitioners, asking them to vacate the contested area within thirty days from notice. Petitioners refused to leave, claiming that the subject area was the share of their father, Jose Maligaso, Sr., in their grandparents' estate. Respondents then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial Court, alleging that petitioners' occupation was by mere tolerance and had become illegal after their refusal to vacate despite the two demands.

In their defense, petitioners denied that their possession was by mere tolerance and claimed title based on their father's successional rights. They asserted that their occupation had remained undisturbed for more than thirty years and that respondents' failure to detail and specify the allegedly tolerated possession showed that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest were aware of petitioners' claim over the subject area. Petitioners also attacked the validity of OCT No. 543 and TCT No. T-4773, alleging that Maria committed fraud in registering Lot No. 3517, including the disputed area, under her name. They moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the allegations indicated an action for reconveyance and that laches had set in because respondents had failed to assail their possession for more than thirty years.

The MTC gave more weight to petitioners' possession than to respondents' title, finding that petitioners' possession was founded on Jose, Sr.'s successional rights and that the registration of Lot No. 3517 in Maria's name created a trust in Jose, Sr.'s favor insofar as the disputed portion was concerned. The RTC found respondents' allegations relative to petitioners' merely tolerated possession to be wanting and concluded, albeit implicitly, that petitioners' possession was a necessary consequence of their title as evidenced by their occupation in the concept of an owner for a significant period of time.

• Successional Rights/Ownership: Petitioners maintained that the disputed 980-square-meter portion was the share of their father, Jose Maligaso, Sr., in their grandparents' estate, and that they succeeded to his rights; Maria Maligaso Ramos never acquired any right to that portion.
• Nullity of Respondents' Title/Fraud: Petitioners argued that TCT No. T-4773 is null and void insofar as it includes the contested area, because Maria fraudulently registered Lot No. 3517 in her name, including the portion their father allegedly inherited, despite her promise to register that portion in his name; thus respondents' purchase did not include the occupied portion.
• Possession Not by Tolerance: Petitioners denied that their possession was by mere tolerance, pointing to their undisturbed occupation for more than thirty years and respondents' failure to detail and specify the allegedly tolerated possession.
• Laches/Reconveyance: Petitioners moved to dismiss, claiming the allegations showed an action for reconveyance and that laches had set in due to respondents' failure to assail their possession for more than thirty years.

• Ownership and Right to Possession: Respondents countered that they are registered owners of Lot No. 3517 under TCT No. T-4773, including the portion occupied by petitioners, and as such are entitled to possession.
• Mere Tolerance: Respondents claimed they merely tolerated petitioners' occupation, which became illegal after petitioners refused to vacate despite two demands.
• Laches Not a Bar: Respondents maintained that their right to recover possession can never be barred by laches.
• No Collateral Attack: Respondents argued that petitioners cannot collaterally attack their Torrens title.

• Right to Possession/Eviction: Whether respondents, as registered owners under TCT No. T-4773, have the right to evict petitioners from the disputed portion of Lot No. 3517.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: Whether petitioners may assail the validity of respondents' Torrens title and OCT No. 543 in an unlawful detainer case.
• Laches/Prescription: Whether laches or the lapse of more than thirty years bars respondents from recovering possession of the disputed portion.

• Right to Possession/Eviction: Yes. Respondents, as registered owners under TCT No. T-4773, are entitled to possession; a Torrens titleholder's right to possession prevails over an unsubstantiated claim of successional rights.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: No. A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked; its validity may be assailed only in a direct proceeding, and an unlawful detainer case is not an exception.
• Laches/Prescription: No. Laches does not bar a registered owner from recovering possession, especially where the occupant's stay was merely tolerated; registered land cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

• Right to Possession/Eviction: The point of inquiry is whether respondents have the right to evict petitioners. Between petitioners' unsubstantiated, self-serving claim that their father inherited the contested portion and respondents' Torrens title, the latter must prevail. A certificate of title is evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title in favor of the person named, and a person with a Torrens title over land is entitled to possession. Respondents' title and that of their predecessors-in-interest give rise to the reasonable presumption that petitioners have no right over the subject area and that their stay was merely tolerated. Petitioners failed to overcome this presumption: no evidence showed the property was adjudicated to their father; Lot No. 3517 was already registered in Maria's name when Jose, Sr. built the house; his inaction despite Maria's alleged failure to register the portion in his name was specious; and the alleged unwritten agreement between Maria and Virginia that petitioners' possession would remain undisturbed was never proven. Their possession, uncoupled with affirmative action to question the titles of Maria and respondents, showed that respondents merely tolerated their stay.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession. Their summary nature limits the issues that can be determined and fully ventilated; the proceedings are concentrated on possession. Thus, whether petitioners have a better right to the contested area and whether fraud attended the issuance of Maria's title are outside the jurisdiction and competence of the trial court in unlawful detainer and forcible entry. This is in addition to the long-standing rule that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which ejectment is not an exception. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding. Soriente vs. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion held that possession since time immemorial cannot prevail over a Torrens title, whose validity is presumed and immune to collateral attack. Salandanan vs. Mendez reiterated the prohibition.
• Laches/Prescription: The lapse of time does not legitimize petitioners' refusal to vacate or bar respondents from gaining possession. Under Spouses Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., laches does not operate to deprive the registered owner of land of the right to recover possession. Lands covered by a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession; a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 (now Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529). If the claimant's possession is merely tolerated by the lawful owner, the latter's right to recover possession is never barred by laches. Registered owners have an imprescriptible right to eject any person illegally occupying their property; even if aware of the occupation and regardless of its length, they may demand return at any time as long as possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated. Here, petitioners themselves were guilty of laches: they claimed Maria fraudulently registered the subject area inherited by their father but did not question OCT No. 543 issued in 1929; they waited a substantial period and asserted their father's successional rights only after respondents demanded that they vacate. Their inaction was contrary to that of a reasonably diligent person, and knowledge of Maria's registration in 1929 and respondents' acquisition on April 5, 1968 is imputed to them by registration.

• Torrens Title as Evidence of Ownership and Right to Possession — A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title in favor of the person named, and a person with a Torrens title over land is entitled to possession. In this case, respondents' TCT No. T-4773 prevailed over petitioners' unsubstantiated claim of successional rights.
• Prohibition Against Collateral Attack on Torrens Title — A Torrens certificate of title cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding for that purpose; it cannot be collaterally attacked in an unlawful detainer or forcible entry case. The Court applied this to reject petitioners' attack on OCT No. 543 and TCT No. T-4773.
• Summary Nature of Ejectment Proceedings — Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings limited to the issue of possession; questions of ownership, better right, or fraud in the issuance of a Torrens title are outside the trial court's jurisdiction and competence. The Court held that petitioners' claims of fraud and successional ownership could not be resolved in the unlawful detainer case.
• Laches Does Not Bar Recovery of Possession by Registered Owner — Laches does not deprive a registered owner of the right to recover possession of registered land. Registered land cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Where the occupant's possession is merely tolerated, the lawful owner's right to recover possession is imprescriptible and never barred by laches. The Court found respondents' action not barred and, instead, petitioners guilty of laches for failing to question the title for decades.
• Presumption from Torrens Title — A Torrens title and that of predecessors-in-interest give rise to the reasonable presumption that the occupant has no right over the property and that the occupant's stay was merely tolerated. Petitioners failed to overcome this presumption.

• "That a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein and that a person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession thereof are fundamental principles observed in this jurisdiction." — This passage states the core property principle on which the Court rested respondents' right to possession.
• "This is in addition to the long-standing rule that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which an ejectment proceeding, is not an exception." — This passage articulates the Court's ruling that the validity of a Torrens title cannot be litigated in an unlawful detainer case.
• "In this connection, Bishop vs. Court of Appeals teaches that if the claimant’s possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latter’s right to recover possession is never barred by laches." — This passage defines the laches exception for tolerated possession, which the Court applied against petitioners.
• "In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." — This passage states the rule that registered land is not subject to prescription or adverse possession, supporting the rejection of petitioners' lapse-of-time argument.

• Spouses Apostol vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Emmanuel — Cited in the CA ruling quoted by the Supreme Court for the rule that the validity of a Torrens title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose, not in an unlawful detainer suit.
• Esmaquel vs. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 429, 438, citing Caña vs. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157573, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 225, 238-239 — Cited for the fundamental principles that a certificate of title is evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title and that a Torrens titleholder is entitled to possession.
• Soriente vs. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 315 — Held that possession since time immemorial cannot prevail over a Torrens title, whose validity is presumed and immune to collateral attack; the registered owner is preferred to possess, and Section 48 of PD 1529 bars collateral attack.
• Salandanan vs. Mendez, G.R. No. 160280, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 195, citing Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. vs. Booc, G.R. No. 143331, October 5, 2007, 535 SCRA 28, 43-44 — Reiterated the prohibition against collateral attack on a Torrens title and the summary nature of ejectment proceedings.
• Spouses Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., 503 Phil. 751 (2005) — Held that laches does not deprive a registered owner of the right to recover possession; registered land cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession; and if possession is merely tolerated, the owner's right to recover is never barred by laches.
• Bishop vs. Court of Appeals — Cited within Spouses Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc. for the rule that if the claimant's possession is merely tolerated by the lawful owner, the latter's right to recover possession is never barred by laches.
• Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al. — Cited within Spouses Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc. for the rule that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is registered, because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 (now Section 47 of PD 1529).

• Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack; it cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding for that purpose. The Court applied this to bar petitioners' attack on respondents' Torrens title in the unlawful detainer case.
• Article 1126, Civil Code, in relation to Act 496 (now Section 47, Presidential Decree No. 1529) — Cited in Spouses Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc. for the rule that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is registered. The Court used this to reject petitioners' claim that lapse of time or laches barred respondents' recovery.
• Section 47, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — The current provision referred to in lieu of Act 496, relating to registered land not being subject to prescription or adverse possession. The Court relied on this in holding that laches did not bar respondents' right to recover possession.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The petition for review was filed under this Rule. The Supreme Court denied it and affirmed the CA Decision and Resolution.
• Rule 42, Rules of Court — Respondents filed their petition for review with the CA under this Rule. The CA gave it due course and reversed the RTC.

Antonio T. Carpio, Arturo D. Brion, Jose Portugal Perez, and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno concurred. No separate concurring opinions are summarized in the text.