Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. vs. Querubin

A land registration court retains authority under Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 to correct certificates of title containing patent errors or reflecting interests that have already been conveyed to another, even after the decrees of registration have been improvidently issued, where the controversy is a continuation of the original registration proceedings and not a collateral attack on the judgment. The ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession ceases where the actual possessor claims ownership, requiring the registered owner to resort to judicial process for physical recovery.

The dispute centers on two parcels of land in Barrio Mambugan, Antipolo, Rizal (Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-177091), subject of a land registration application filed in 1960 by Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The CFI adjudicated the properties in favor of the applicants in a Decision dated May 31, 1966, but the decrees of registration remained unissued for decades. During that interval, on September 23, 1970, the applicants sold the subject properties to Eugenio Lopez under a Deed of Absolute Sale in which the vendors warranted they would file the necessary motion or manifestation so that the certificates of title would issue in Lopez's name. That obligation was never fulfilled by the vendors' counsel, and the decrees and OCTs were eventually issued in 1998 in the names of the original applicants, precipitating parallel proceedings by the Lopez heirs to annul the titles and by the Sandoval heirs to obtain a writ of possession.

On April 6, 1960, Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. filed an Application for Registration of Title over two parcels of land designated as Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-177091, situated in Barrio Mambugan, Antipolo, Rizal. The application was docketed as LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. The Director of Lands initially opposed but later withdrew the opposition. On May 31, 1966, the CFI rendered a Decision declaring the spouses Sandoval and the spouses Ozaeta the true and absolute owners in equal pro-indiviso shares of the subject properties and ordering the registration thereof in their names. The decision became final, as no appeal was filed, but the decrees of registration remained unissued for years.

On September 23, 1970, prior to the issuance of the decrees, the spouses Sandoval and the spouses Ozaeta sold the subject properties to Eugenio Lopez. In the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendors warranted that they would file the corresponding motion or manifestation in the land registration case so that the original certificates of title would be issued in the name of Eugenio Lopez, his heirs, administrators, or assigns. Eugenio Lopez then entered into possession of the subject properties. The decrees of registration, however, remained unissued. Eugenio Lopez passed away on July 6, 1975.

Decades later, on May 12, 1993, Atty. Juanito R. Dimaano filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Finality on behalf of applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta, asserting that the 1966 Decision had long become final. The RTC of Pasig City, Branch 152, where the case was then pending, granted the motion for issuance of decrees on August 24, 1993, and ordered the LRA to comply. The LRA initially could not act promptly due to discrepancies in the technical description and area of the subject properties. After the discrepancies were clarified, the RTC issued an Order dated October 20, 1994 instructing the LRA to proceed with the issuance of the decrees.

In January 1997, the Lopez heirs — Oscar M. Lopez, Manuel M. Lopez, and Presentacion L. Psinakis — learned of a separate case, LRC No. 96-1907, filed before the RTC of Antipolo City, Branch 74, seeking cancellation of TCT Nos. 288133 and 288134 (registered in the name of Lopez, Inc. and covering the same properties). On July 16, 1997, the Lopez heirs filed a Motion dated April 28, 1997 in the land registration case, manifesting Eugenio Lopez's death and moving, pursuant to Section 22 of PD 1529, that the Deed of Absolute Sale be considered and that the decrees be issued in their names as successors-in-interest. Attached were the Deed of Absolute Sale and receipts evidencing full payment. They later filed a Motion dated July 21, 1998 to hold in abeyance the issuance of the decrees pending resolution of their earlier motion.

While the Motion dated April 28, 1997 was still pending, Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 were issued in the names of the spouses Sandoval and spouses Ozaeta. The Lopez heirs discovered that the decrees bore the date October 20, 1997, but LRA Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez — who signed them — assumed office only on July 8, 1998. In a letter dated December 1, 1998, Enriquez clarified that the decrees were actually issued between August 8 and 13, 1998, and that the date October 20, 1997 was an oversight. He also stated that the LRA had no copy of the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997 on file, though the Lopez heirs submitted registry return receipts and postal certifications proving the LRA received copies of their motions before the decrees were issued.

On June 24, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City denied the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997 as moot (given the issuance of the decrees) and denied the Motion dated November 25, 1998 (seeking nullity of the decrees and OCTs), ruling that the Lopez heirs were barred by laches. On August 27, 1999, applicant Roman Ozaeta, Jr. filed a Manifestation affirming the due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirming that the purchase price had been paid, stating that their former counsel never filed the required motion, and asserting that he did not engage Atty. Dimaano's services. On March 3, 2000, the RTC denied the Lopez heirs' Motion for Reconsideration.

Meanwhile, on September 28, 1998, Imelda Rivera — claiming to be the attorney-in-fact of the Sandoval heirs under a Special Power of Attorney dated May 14, 1996 — filed a petition for the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession over the subject properties before the RTC of Antipolo City, Branch 74, docketed as LRC No. 98-2225. The RTC granted the petition on October 21, 1998, and issued the writ on November 13, 1998. The Lopez heirs moved for reconsideration, citing the pending motion in the land registration case and the dubious circumstances of the OCTs. The RTC recalled the writ on February 2, 1999, but on March 24, 2000, after the RTC of Pasig City denied the Lopez heirs' motions, Rivera's motion to lift the recall was granted. On April 4, 2000, Evelyn Sandoval — the appointed administratrix of the estate of Alfonso Sandoval — manifested that she did not engage Atty. Dimaano's services nor authorize anyone to file the petition for the writ of possession on her behalf.

The Lopez heirs elevated both matters to the Court of Appeals. In CA-G.R. CV No. 67515, the appellate court denied the appeal, ruling that the Motion dated November 25, 1998 was a collateral attack on the titles but noting the Lopez heirs could file a separate action. In CA-G.R. SP No. 58162, the appellate court dismissed the certiorari petition, sustaining the issuance of the writ of possession and the sufficiency of the SPA. The Lopez heirs then filed the two consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court.

• Standing as Parties-Litigants: The Lopez heirs argued that they were parties-litigants in the land registration proceedings, having stepped into the shoes of applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta as successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, and having complied with Section 22 of PD 1529 by presenting the Deed of Absolute Sale and furnishing all parties with copies of their Motion dated April 28, 1997.
• Propriety of the Motion dated November 25, 1998: The Lopez heirs contended that the Motion dated November 25, 1998 was a direct attack on the decrees and OCTs, not a collateral attack, and that if the remedy were deemed improper, it should be treated as an innocuous error of procedure that should not foreclose their right to relief, as filing a separate action would only lead to multiplicity of suits.
• Bar of Pending Appeal on Writ of Possession: The Lopez heirs argued that the pendency of the appeal from the RTC of Pasig City Orders dated June 24, 1999 and March 3, 2000 barred the issuance of the writ of possession.
• Legal Capacity to Sue: The Lopez heirs asserted that Imelda Rivera had no legal capacity to sue because the SPA merely authorized her to sell the properties described therein and receive payment, not to file a petition for a writ of possession, and that the property descriptions in the SPA did not match those of the subject properties.
• Forum Shopping: The Lopez heirs argued that filing the petition for the writ of possession before the RTC of Antipolo City while the land registration case was pending before the RTC of Pasig City constituted forum shopping.
• Binding Effect of the Deed of Absolute Sale: The Lopez heirs maintained that the Sandoval heirs were bound by the Deed of Absolute Sale and the undertaking contained therein, as heirs of the original vendors.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Lopez heirs alleged that the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Rivera Not an Innocent Purchaser: The Lopez heirs averred that Imelda Rivera could not be considered an innocent purchaser for value as she was fully aware of the pending litigation involving the subject properties, and that Evelyn Sandoval herself manifested she did not authorize the filing of the petition.

• Dubious Nature of the Deed of Absolute Sale: The Sandoval heirs stated in their Comment to the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997 that the Deed of Absolute Sale had a "dubious and questionable nature as to its authenticity" since it was presented only after 27 years from its execution and some of the persons who executed the same were already dead.
• Insufficiency of SPA No Longer Relevant: The Sandoval heirs impliedly admitted the insufficiency of the SPA but argued that the same was no longer relevant because the subject properties were now registered in the name of Rivera, who was an innocent purchaser for value.

• Standing: Whether the Lopez heirs are properly parties-litigants in the land registration proceedings.
• Propriety of the Motion to Impugn Decrees and OCTs: Whether the Motion dated November 25, 1998 is proper for purposes of impugning the questioned decrees and the corresponding original certificates of title.
• Effect of Pending Appeal on Writ of Possession: Whether the pendency of the resolution of the appeal from the orders of the registration court denying the Lopez heirs' motion to declare the decrees and OCTs null and void bars the issuance of the writ of possession.
• Legal Capacity to Sue: Whether the petition for the writ of possession is dismissible on the ground that Imelda Rivera had no legal capacity to sue.
• Forum Shopping: Whether the respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she filed the petition for writ of possession before the RTC of Antipolo City although the land registration case was still pending before the RTC of Pasig City.
• Binding Effect of the Deed of Absolute Sale: Whether the heirs of spouses Alfonso Sandoval and Rosa Ruiz, represented by the private respondent, are bound not only by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by their decedents but also by the undertaking contained therein.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Estoppel or Laches: Whether estoppel or laches has set in.

• Standing: No. The Lopez heirs did not acquire legal standing as parties-litigants in the land registration proceedings, but they undeniably have a stake in the outcome of the pending litigation over the subject properties, as Section 22 of PD 1529 does not require the buyer to become a party to the case.
• Propriety of the Motion to Impugn Decrees and OCTs: The Motion dated November 25, 1998 was not a proper remedy as filed, but the Lopez heirs should be allowed to amend it to conform to the requirements of Section 108 of PD 1529, which authorizes correction of certificates of title where new interests have arisen or errors were made in entering a certificate.
• Effect of Pending Appeal on Writ of Possession: The writ of possession was improperly issued, the Lopez heirs being actual possessors claiming ownership, which defeats the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ and requires the registered owner to resort to judicial process for physical recovery.
• Legal Capacity to Sue: No. The SPA in favor of Rivera was insufficient to clothe her with authority to file the petition for the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession, as the specific wording authorized only the sale of the properties, receipt of payment, witnessing in court, and performance of related matters — not the filing of a court petition — and the property descriptions in the SPA did not match those of the subject properties.
• Forum Shopping: No forum shopping was found by the Court in its disposition, as the writ of possession was nullified on other grounds; the Court did not sustain this argument as a basis for relief.
• Binding Effect of the Deed of Absolute Sale: Yes, in principle. Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest, and if the Deed of Absolute Sale is found authentic and duly executed, the Sandoval heirs cannot escape its effects.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The lower courts committed error in issuing the writ of possession on the strength of defective titles and an insufficient SPA, and in declaring the pending incidents moot rather than resolving them on the merits.
• Estoppel or Laches: No. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that laches was inapplicable against the Lopez heirs, as Eugenio Lopez entered into continuous possession of the subject properties after the sale, and the Lopez heirs should not be faulted for the failure of the vendors' counsel to discharge the obligation warranted in the Deed of Absolute Sale.

• Standing: Section 22 of PD 1529 expressly allows the disposition of lands subject of a registration proceeding before the issuance of the decree and the subsequent registration in the name of the person to whom the land was conveyed. The law requires only that the pertinent instruments be presented to the court by the interested party and that prior notice be given to the parties. As explained in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, the buyer may be a total stranger to the land registration case and need not substitute the original applicant. However, nowhere in Section 22 or in Mendoza can it be inferred that the buyer automatically becomes a party to the case after complying with the requirements. The provision nonetheless authorizes the land registration court to accord certain reliefs in favor of the person to whom the property has been conveyed. The Lopez heirs thus have a stake in the outcome even if they are not formally parties-litigants.

• Propriety of the Motion to Impugn Decrees and OCTs: The Court of Appeals ruled that the Motion dated November 25, 1998 was a collateral attack on the certificates of title, proscribed by Section 48 of PD 1529. The Court found, however, that the Lopez heirs never attacked the Decision dated May 31, 1966 — the judgment pursuant to which the decrees were issued. They actually recognized its validity and derived their own right from it. The decrees were issued in the names of the original applicants due to circumstances outside the land registration proceedings, unjustly depriving the Lopez heirs of the remedy under Section 22. Under the exceptional circumstances, the land registration court did not necessarily lose jurisdiction over the case. Section 108 of PD 1529 authorizes a person having an interest in registered property to apply for amendment or alteration of a certificate of title where "new interests not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created," "an omission or error was made in entering a certificate," or "upon any other reasonable ground." The controversy was a continuation of the original registration proceedings — a mere incident therein — because the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997 was timely filed before the decrees were issued and was being heard when the LRA improvidently issued them. The limited-jurisdiction rule governing land registration courts is subject to recognized exceptions, including where parties acquiesced in submitting controversial issues and were given full opportunity to present evidence, as held in Vda. de Arceo vs. Court of Appeals. The Lopez heirs should be allowed to amend their motion to conform to Section 108 requirements, and the case should be remanded for further proceedings.

• Effect of Pending Appeal on Writ of Possession: A writ of possession in land registration proceedings commands the sheriff to place the successful litigant in possession of the property, and may issue against anyone adversely occupying the land during the proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. However, as held in Mendoza vs. Salinas, the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession ceases with respect to actual possessors claiming ownership, pursuant to Article 433 of the Civil Code, which provides that actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership, requiring the true owner to resort to judicial process for recovery. The Lopez heirs were precisely claiming ownership as successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, who had been in possession even before the Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, even without considering the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Sandoval heirs were not entitled to the writ on the strength of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 since those titles were also registered in the names of the Ozaeta spouses, who affirmed that the properties had been sold to Eugenio Lopez.

• Legal Capacity to Sue: Under Article 1881 of the Civil Code, an agent must act within the scope of his authority, and the scope is determined by the written terms of the power of attorney. The SPA authorized Rivera to sell specific parcels of land described by tax declaration numbers and area measurements, receive payment, witness in court, and perform related matters. The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals that the authority to sell carried with it the concomitant duty to file the petition for the writ of possession. The property descriptions in the SPA (5,863 sq. m. and 2,000 sq. m.) did not match the descriptions in the OCTs (2,479 sq. m. and 6,341 sq. m.). Rivera failed to explain the disparity. As held in Angeles vs. Philippine National Railways, a power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued, granting only those powers specified therein. Furthermore, Evelyn Sandoval — the principal — categorically manifested that she did not authorize any person to file the petition.

• Forum Shopping: The Court did not sustain forum shopping as a basis for nullifying the writ of possession, as the writ was nullified on other grounds (defective titles, actual possession under claim of ownership, and insufficient SPA).

• Binding Effect of the Deed of Absolute Sale: Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns, and heirs. As held in Santos vs. Lumbac, heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. If the Deed of Absolute Sale is found authentic and duly executed, the Sandoval heirs cannot escape its effects. Applicant Roman Ozaeta, Jr. himself affirmed the due execution of the deed and confirmed that the purchase price was paid.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The lower courts erred in declaring the pending incidents moot rather than resolving them on the merits, in accepting the LRA Administrator's letter-explanation without further inquiry into the patent errors on the OCTs, and in issuing the writ of possession on the strength of defective titles and an insufficient SPA. The dates of issuance and entry on the OCTs are material information required by Sections 31 and 40 of PD 1529 and cannot remain uncertain or ambiguous. The OCTs should be recalled and submitted to the land registration court for cancellation or correction.

• Estoppel or Laches: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that laches was inapplicable. After the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, Eugenio Lopez entered into continuous possession of the subject properties. The Lopez heirs should not be faulted for the failure of the vendors' counsel to discharge the obligation warranted in the Deed of Absolute Sale.

• Section 22, PD 1529 — Dealings with Land Pending Original Registration — After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, the land may still be the subject of dealings, and the interested party may present the pertinent instruments to the court, which shall order the land registered subject to the conveyance or order the decree issued in the name of the person to whom the property was conveyed. The buyer need not be a party to the case nor substitute the original applicant; the only requirements are presentation of the instrument and prior notice to the parties. The Court applied this provision to hold that the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997 was a proper and timely invocation of their right to have the decrees issued in their name.

• Section 108, PD 1529 — Amendment and Alteration of Certificates — A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property may apply by petition to the court for amendment or alteration of a certificate of title on grounds including: (1) registered interests have terminated and ceased; (2) new interests not appearing on the certificate have arisen or been created; (3) an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or memorandum; (4) the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (5) the registered owner has married or the marriage has been terminated; (6) a corporation owning registered land has been dissolved and has not conveyed the same within three years; or (7) any other reasonable ground. The proviso bars reopening the judgment or decree of registration and prohibits impairing the title of a purchaser for value in good faith without written consent. The Court held this provision available to the Lopez heirs as a remedy to correct the erroneous issuance of OCTs in the name of the vendor-applicants, and remanded the case for further proceedings subject to compliance with its requisites.

• Collateral Attack on Certificates of Title (Section 48, PD 1529) — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding. A direct attack seeks to annul or set aside the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed; a collateral attack is made as an incident in an action to obtain a different relief. The Court found that the Lopez heirs' motion was not a collateral attack because they never questioned the 1966 Decision — they recognized its validity and derived their rights from it.

• Limited Jurisdiction of Land Registration Courts — Exceptions — The rule that land registration courts have limited jurisdiction is subject to recognized exceptions: (1) where the parties mutually agreed or acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have been given full opportunity to present evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the evidence of record and is convinced it is sufficient. The rule is in reality one of procedure, not jurisdiction, and may be waived. The Court applied these exceptions to hold that the land registration court could continue hearing the pending incidents.

• Writ of Possession — Exception for Actual Possessors Claiming Ownership — The ministerial duty of the land registration court to issue a writ of possession ceases with respect to actual possessors of the property under a claim of ownership, pursuant to Article 433 of the Civil Code. The true owner must resort to judicial process (ejectment or reivindicatory action) for recovery of the property. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the writ of possession was improperly issued against the Lopez heirs, who were in actual possession claiming ownership as successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez.

• Strict Construction of Powers of Attorney — A power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued, granting only those powers specified therein; the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the SPA in favor of Rivera did not authorize her to file the petition for the writ of possession, and that the disparity in property descriptions between the SPA and the subject properties further undermined her authority.

• Heirs Bound by Contracts of Predecessors-in-Interest (Article 1311, Civil Code) — Contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns, and heirs. Heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they inherit the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. The Court applied this principle to hold that if the Deed of Absolute Sale is found authentic, the Sandoval heirs are bound by it and by the undertaking contained therein.

• "Under the highly exceptional circumstances of this case, we hold that the land registration court did not necessarily lose jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the improvident issuance of the decrees of registration by the LRA." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that the land registration court retains jurisdiction to correct errors even after improvident issuance of decrees, forming the basis for the remand under Section 108 of PD 1529.

• "The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the 'buyer' or the 'person to whom the property has been conveyed' for the applicant. Neither does it require that the 'buyer' or the 'person to whom the property has been conveyed' be a party to the case." — This quotation from Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, adopted by the Court, defines the scope of Section 22 of PD 1529 and clarifies that a buyer of land pending registration need not become a party to the proceedings to seek issuance of the decree in his name.

• "[A] power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only those powers which are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney." — This passage from Angeles vs. Philippine National Railways, cited by the Court, states the controlling doctrine on strict construction of powers of attorney, applied to hold that Rivera's SPA did not authorize the filing of the petition for a writ of possession.

• "The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased." — This quotation from Santos vs. Lumbac, adopted by the Court, establishes that heirs are bound by the contracts of their predecessors-in-interest and that death does not extinguish contractual obligations involving property rights.

• Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, 173 Phil. 280 (1978) — Followed. Interpreted Section 29 of Act No. 496 (substantially incorporated in Section 22 of PD 1529) as allowing the buyer of land pending registration to seek issuance of the decree in his name without becoming a party to the case. The Court relied on this ruling to hold that the Lopez heirs had a stake in the proceedings even without formal party status.

• Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 507 Phil. 101 (2005) — Followed. Provided the distinction between a direct and collateral attack on a title. The Court used this framework to conclude that the Lopez heirs' motion was not a collateral attack because they never questioned the 1966 judgment.

• Vda. de Arceo vs. Court of Appeals, 264 Phil. 59 (1990) — Followed. Held that under Section 2 of PD 1529, the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a land registration court is no longer as circumscribed as under Act No. 496, and that the limited-jurisdiction rule is subject to exceptions including party acquiescence and full opportunity to present evidence. The Court applied these exceptions to justify the land registration court's continued jurisdiction.

• Santos vs. Lumbac, 548 Phil. 332 (2007) — Followed. Held that heirs are bound by contracts of their predecessors-in-interest and cannot escape the legal consequences of transactions affecting inherited property. Applied to hold that the Sandoval heirs are bound by the Deed of Absolute Sale if found authentic.

• Dawson vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 356 Phil. 1037 (1998) — Followed. Held that parties may avail of Section 108 of PD 1529 to correct a certificate of title issued in the name of the wrong party, but are not automatically entitled to relief and must satisfy the statutory requirements. Applied to guide the remand.

• Mendoza vs. Salinas, 543 Phil. 380 (2007) — Followed. Held that the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession ceases as to actual possessors claiming ownership, who must be subjected to judicial process for recovery. Applied to nullify the writ of possession.

• Angeles vs. Philippine National Railways, 532 Phil. 147 (2006) — Followed. Held that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued, granting only specified powers. Applied to hold that Rivera's SPA did not authorize the filing of the petition for a writ of possession.

• Factor vs. Martel, Jr., 567 Phil. 521 (2008) — Cited for the definition and function of a writ of possession in land registration proceedings.

• Demorar vs. Ibañez, 97 Phil. 72 (1955) — Cited for the rule that a writ of possession may issue against anyone adversely occupying the land during land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.

• Section 22, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Governs dealings with land pending original registration, allowing the interested party to present instruments of conveyance to the court before the decree is issued, so that the court may order the decree issued in the name of the person to whom the property was conveyed. Applied to hold that the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997 was a proper and timely invocation of their right to have the decrees issued in their name.

• Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Prohibits collateral attack on certificates of title, which cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding. The Court found that the Lopez heirs' motion did not constitute a collateral attack because they never questioned the underlying 1966 judgment.

• Section 108, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Authorizes amendment and alteration of certificates of title by a person having an interest in registered property, on grounds including new interests having arisen, omissions or errors in entering a certificate, or any other reasonable ground. The Court held this provision available to the Lopez heirs as a remedy and remanded the case for further proceedings subject to compliance with its requisites.

• Section 31, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Requires every decree of registration to bear the date, hour, and minute of its entry. The Court noted that the incorrect dates on the OCTs violated this provision, furnishing an independent ground for their recall and correction.

• Section 40, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Requires the original certificate of title to be numbered, dated, signed, and sealed by the Register of Deeds, taking effect upon the date of entry. The Court cited this provision to emphasize that the dates of issuance and entry are material information that cannot remain uncertain.

• Section 39, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Governs the preparation of the decree and certificate of title after the judgment of registration becomes final. Cited as the procedural basis for the LRA's issuance of the decrees.

• Article 433, Civil Code — Provides that actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership, requiring the true owner to resort to judicial process for recovery. Applied to hold that the writ of possession should not have issued against the Lopez heirs, who were actual possessors claiming ownership.

• Article 1311, Civil Code — Provides that contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns, and heirs. Applied to hold that the Sandoval heirs are bound by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by their predecessors-in-interest if found authentic.

• Article 1881, Civil Code — Requires an agent to act within the scope of his authority. Applied to hold that Rivera's SPA did not authorize the filing of the petition for a writ of possession.

Bersamin, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concurred.