Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. vs. Gonzales

Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as required by Article 151 of the Family Code, is a defect in the statement of a cause of action that is waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; it is not a jurisdictional defect and does not constitute a ground for motu proprio dismissal under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., a physician, was first married to Capitolina Aguilar, with whom he had seven children. Following Capitolina's death in March 1944, Dr. Favis entered into a common-law relationship with Juana Gonzales, siring one child, Mariano G. Favis. In 1974, Dr. Favis and Juana contracted marriage, and Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as his legitimate child. Mariano subsequently married Larcelita D. Favis, with whom he had four children: Ma. Theresa Joana, Ma. Cristina, James Mark, and Ma. Thea. From 1992 until his death in July 1995, Dr. Favis suffered from multiple debilitating illnesses, including Parkinson's disease, hiatal hernia, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia. On October 16, 1994, while aged 92 and residing with Juana and Mariano's family, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation conveying residential land and a commercial building in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, to his grandchildren by Juana's line.

• The Family Structure and Properties: Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. died intestate on July 29, 1995, leaving five parcels of real property in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, including residential lands, a commercial building, and an orchard. He was survived by seven children from his first marriage to Capitolina Aguilar (petitioners' predecessors-in-interest) and by his second wife, Juana Gonzales, and their son Mariano G. Favis, who in turn had four children with Larcelita D. Favis.
• The Alleged Donation: On October 16, 1994, seven months prior to his death and seven months after his daughter Mercedes A. Favis left the family residence, Dr. Favis allegedly executed a Deed of Donation conveying a residential lot and commercial building to his four grandchildren by Mariano and Larcelita. At the time of execution, Dr. Favis was 92 years old and suffering from Parkinson's disease, hiatal hernia, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia, conditions which medical experts testified impaired his mental faculties and oxygenation to the brain.
• The Trial Proceedings: Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the donation, asserting it prejudiced their legitime. Respondents answered without filing a motion to dismiss, claiming the donation was inter vivos and valid. The RTC pre-trial order limited issues to the validity of the deed and the compulsory heir status of Juana and Mariano. After full trial, the RTC found that Dr. Favis lacked the mental capacity to donate due to his advanced age and illnesses, noting that the deed's execution after Mercedes' departure indicated undue influence and bad faith by the donees.
• The Appellate Proceedings: Respondents appealed solely on the merits, arguing that the trial court erred in finding vitiated consent. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the complaint motu proprio based on Article 151 of the Family Code, finding that petitioners failed to allege earnest efforts toward compromise.

• Propriety of Motu Proprio Dismissal: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the complaint motu proprio for failure to allege earnest efforts toward compromise, arguing that such failure is not a ground for dismissal under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Nature of the Defect: Petitioner argued that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is merely a condition precedent for filing that does not affect jurisdiction; hence, the defect is waivable and was deemed waived when respondents filed an answer without raising the objection.
• Substantial Compliance and Estoppel: Petitioner contended that even assuming the requirement applied, they had substantially complied with Article 151, and that respondents were in estoppel for having actively litigated the case on the merits without raising the procedural defect.
• Validity of the Donation: Petitioner asserted that the Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the trial court's finding that the Deed of Donation was void due to vitiated consent, citing Dr. Favis's advanced age and debilitating illnesses.

• Mandatory Requirement: Respondent countered that the dismissal was proper because Article 151 of the Family Code mandates that no suit between family members shall prosper unless the complaint alleges earnest efforts toward compromise, and this requirement is jurisdictional.
• Applicability of Rule 16: Respondent argued that failure to comply with a condition precedent is a ground for dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, justifying the appellate court's motu proprio action.
• Nature of the Action: Respondent maintained that the action did not involve future legitime but actual legitime, as the complaint was filed after Dr. Favis's death, and therefore did not fall under exceptions to the compromise requirement.

• Motu Proprio Dismissal: Whether the Court of Appeals may motu proprio dismiss a complaint for failure to allege earnest efforts toward a compromise under Article 151 of the Family Code.
• Waiver of Defense: Whether the defense based on failure to allege earnest efforts toward compromise is waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or answer.
• Nature of Article 151 Requirement: Whether the requirement to allege earnest efforts toward compromise is a jurisdictional defect or merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
• Validity of Donation: Whether the Deed of Donation executed by Dr. Favis is void for lack of consent due to his medical condition and age.

• Motu Proprio Dismissal: The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure limits motu proprio dismissal to four specific grounds: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action. Failure to allege earnest efforts toward compromise is not among these grounds.
• Waiver of Defense: The defense was deemed waived. Section 1, Rule 9 provides that defenses not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or answer are waived. Because respondents filed an answer without raising the objection under Article 151, and because the defect is not jurisdictional, the defense is unavailable on appeal.
• Nature of Article 151 Requirement: The requirement under Article 151 is a condition precedent for filing, but its absence constitutes a defect in the statement of a cause of action, not a jurisdictional defect. Following Versoza v. Versoza, such defects may be cured by amendment and are waived if not seasonably raised.
• Validity of Donation: The Deed of Donation was properly nullified. Dr. Favis was 92 years old and suffering from Parkinson's disease and hiatal hernia, which medical evidence established impaired his mental faculties and deprived him of full control of his mind. The timing of the execution—after his daughter Mercedes left the residence—indicated bad faith and undue influence by the respondents, rendering the donation void for vitiated consent.

• Article 151 of the Family Code (Condition Precedent): The requirement to allege earnest efforts toward compromise in suits between family members is a condition precedent for filing. However, failure to allege it is a defect in the statement of a cause of action, not a jurisdictional defect. The defect may be waived by failure to make seasonable objection in a motion to dismiss or answer.
• Motu Proprio Dismissal under Rule 9: Courts may dismiss actions motu proprio only on the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription of action. Failure to allege earnest efforts toward compromise is not a ground for motu proprio dismissal.
• Vitiated Consent in Donations: A donation inter vivos requires that the donor have full capacity and freedom of will. Advanced age coupled with debilitating illnesses such as Parkinson's disease and hiatal hernia, which impair cerebral oxygenation and mental faculties, may negate the donor's capacity to execute a valid deed of donation.

• "The motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard."
• "Failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action."
• "The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court."
• "To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the action for annulment, the mental state/condition of the donor Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. at the time of its execution must be taken into account. Factors such as his age, health and environment among others should be considered."

• Gumabon v. Larin, 422 Phil. 222 (2001) — Cited for the rule that motu proprio dismissal is limited to specific enumerated grounds to avoid violation of the right to be heard.
• Katon v. Palanca, Jr., 481 Phil. 168 (2004) — Followed for the enumeration of grounds for motu proprio dismissal under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas, G.R. No. 157852, December 15, 2010 — Cited for the interpretation that Section 1, Rule 9 allows motu proprio dismissal only on the four enumerated grounds.
• Versoza v. Versoza, 135 Phil. 84 (1968) — Controlling precedent establishing that failure to allege earnest efforts toward compromise is a defect in the statement of a cause of action, not jurisdictional, and is therefore waivable.
• Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 119 Phil. 368 (1964) — Cited for the rule that amendments curing defects in the statement of a cause of action do not confer jurisdiction but merely correct procedural imperfections.

• Article 151, Family Code — Mandates that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless the verified complaint alleges earnest efforts toward compromise have failed; excludes cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
• Section 1, Rule 9, Rules of Civil Procedure — Enumerates the four grounds upon which a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action.
• Section 1(j), Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that failure to comply with a condition precedent is a ground for a motion to dismiss, which must be raised within the time for but before filing the answer.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.