Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong

A local government unit must enact an ordinance, not a resolution, to validly authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain under Section 19 of RA 7160; the requirement applies at the initiation of expropriation proceedings, not merely at the appropriation stage.

The City of Mandaluyong sought to expand the Mandaluyong Medical Center to accommodate increasing patient volume. The Sangguniang Panlungsod issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994 authorizing the Mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings over a private parcel of land (TCT No. 56264) owned by Alberto Suguitan after the owner refused to sell.

• Filed in RTC: March 13, 1995 — City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation (SCA No. 875) with Branch 155 of the RTC of Pasig
• Motion to Dismiss: Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that a resolution is insufficient to authorize eminent domain
• RTC Decision: October 24, 1995 — RTC denied the motion to dismiss; subsequently issued an order allowing immediate possession upon deposit of 15% of fair market value (November 14, 1995) and a writ of possession (December 14, 1995)
• Assailed Order: July 28, 1998 — RTC issued an Order of Condemnation declaring the City had a lawful right to take the property
• Elevated to SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45; Alberto Suguitan died on October 2, 1998 and was substituted by his heirs on November 25, 1998

• Nature: Expropriation proceeding under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
• Parties:
  • Petitioners: Heirs of Alberto Suguitan (substituted for the original owner)
  • Respondent: City of Mandaluyong
  • Property: 414-square-meter parcel of land located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets, Mandaluyong City, covered by TCT No. 56264
  • Authorizing Act: Resolution No. 396, S-1994 dated October 13, 1994 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings
  • Prior Negotiations: Mayor Abalos offered to purchase the property on January 20, 1995; Suguitan refused
  • Possession: The City deposited P621,000 (15% of FMV per tax declaration) and took possession on December 15, 1995 pursuant to a writ issued by the RTC

• Section 19 of RA 7160 requires an ordinance. The statute explicitly states that the local chief executive must act "pursuant to an ordinance" to exercise eminent domain; a resolution is legally insufficient
• Article 36 of the IRR is invalid. The Implementing Rules and Regulations provision allowing a resolution contradicts the clear statutory mandate of Section 19 and cannot override it
• Resolution ≠ Ordinance. A resolution merely grants administrative authority to file suit but does not satisfy the legislative authorization required for the actual exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain

• Resolution is sufficient antecedent. Article 36, Rule VI of the IRR of RA 7160 explicitly provides that an LGU may expropriate "through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings"
• Ordinance only needed for appropriation. An ordinance is required only to appropriate funds for payment of just compensation after the court has determined the amount, not for the initiation of proceedings
• Public purpose exists. The expropriation was for the expansion of a public medical center serving indigent residents

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a resolution (as opposed to an ordinance) is sufficient to authorize a local government unit to exercise the power of eminent domain under Section 19 of RA 7160
  • Whether Article 36 of the IRR of RA 7160 can substitute for the statutory requirement of an ordinance

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • An ordinance is required. Section 19 of RA 7160 unambiguously requires the local chief executive to act "pursuant to an ordinance" to exercise eminent domain. The authorization must come from an ordinance—a legislative act of general and permanent character—not a resolution, which is merely a temporary declaration of sentiment or opinion
  • The IRR cannot override the statute. Article 36 of the IRR is inconsistent with Section 19 of the Code. The clear letter of the law controls and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule. The discrepancy appears to be an oversight in the IRR, especially since Article 32 of the same IRR also requires an ordinance
  • Timing of the ordinance requirement. An ordinance is necessary prior to the filing of the complaint, not merely after the court determines just compensation. The power of eminent domain is exercised upon the filing of the complaint (when the plaintiff gains the right to enter possession upon deposit), making the ordinance prerequisite essential from the inception of the suit
  • Reversal. The RTC's Order of Condemnation dated July 28, 1998 is reversed and set aside. The City may enact the proper ordinance and reinstitute proceedings if it complies with all other legal requirements

• Strict Construction of Delegated Eminent Domain Power — The power of eminent domain, being in derogation of private rights, must be strictly construed when delegated to local government units. No species of property is guarded more sedulously than the right to freehold; the statutory power to take property without consent must be watched with jealous scrutiny and substantial compliance with procedural requirements is mandatory
• Ordinance vs. Resolution —
• Ordinance: A local law of general and permanent character, enacted with three readings, and possessing the force and effect of law
• Resolution: A mere declaration of sentiment or opinion of the legislative body on a specific matter, temporary in nature, and not necessarily requiring three readings
• Two Stages of Expropriation —
• First Stage: Determination of the authority to exercise eminent domain and propriety of its exercise; ends with an order of condemnation or dismissal
• Second Stage: Determination of just compensation with the assistance of commissioners
• Application: The ordinance requirement applies to the first stage; the power is already being exercised upon the filing of the complaint when the plaintiff gains immediate possession rights
• Hierarchy of Laws — Statutes prevail over administrative rules and implementing regulations. The clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation

• "The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed."
• "The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny."
• "An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature."
• "We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the court has determined the amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised."
• "It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation."

• City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila — Established that delegated eminent domain power must be strictly construed and watched with jealous scrutiny; cited for the principle that authority must be strictly construed because it derogates private rights
• Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation — Controlling precedent distinguishing between ordinance and resolution; held that Section 19 of RA 7160 requires an ordinance and that the IRR cannot override the statute
• National Power Corporation v. Jocson — Cited for the two-stage nature of expropriation proceedings under Rule 67
• Moday v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the principle that eminent domain power may be delegated to local government units but must be exercised in strict compliance with the delegating law

• Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Mandates that a local government unit may exercise eminent domain "through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance"; establishes the 15% deposit requirement for immediate possession
• Article III, Section 9, 1987 Constitution — Requires just compensation for private property taken for public use
• Article III, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Due process and equal protection clauses as safeguards against arbitrary exercise of eminent domain
• Rule 67, Rules of Court — Governs expropriation proceedings; defines the two stages of expropriation
• Article 36, Rule VI, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7160 — Discussed but rejected as inconsistent with Section 19; purported to allow a resolution instead of an ordinance