Hassan vs. COMELEC

A special election is invalid where the notice given to voters is insufficient and the electoral process is so pervaded by violence that it results in the massive disenfranchisement of the electorate. The concurrence of (1) the failure of election due to violence or terrorism and (2) the fact that the uncast votes could affect the election results must be present to justify the annulment of an election and the calling of a new one.

Petitioner Hadji Nor Basher L. Hassan and private respondent Mangondaya P. Hassan Buatan were rival candidates for Vice-Mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur, in the May 8, 1995 local elections. Due to threats of violence and terrorism, elections failed in six precincts: ballot boxes were burned in one precinct, and members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs) failed to report for duty in five others. The COMELEC Monitoring and Supervising Team scheduled special elections for May 27, 1995, but these also failed when BEI members again did not report. The elections were rescheduled for May 29, 1995, at a school 15 kilometers away from the original polling places. On that date, BEI members still failed to report, prompting the COMELEC Team to appoint military personnel as substitutes. Voting commenced but was forcibly suspended in the afternoon due to grenade launcher fire and rapid gunfire from unidentified groups.

• Nature of the Action: The petition sought to annul the COMELEC Resolution that validated the May 29, 1995 special elections and to compel the COMELEC to declare a failure of election and call for new special elections.
• Failure of Initial Elections: In the May 8, 1995 elections, failure of election occurred in six precincts in Madalum due to violence and terrorism. In Precinct 7-A, the ballot box was burned. In Precincts 9, 9-A, 10, 13, and 14, BEI members failed to report due to threats.
• First Special Election Attempt: Special elections scheduled for May 27, 1995, failed again because BEI members did not report.
• Second Special Election (May 29, 1995): The COMELEC Team reset the elections for May 29, 1995, transferring the venue to Liangan Elementary (Arabic) School, 15 km away. Notice was given on the afternoon/night of May 28, 1995. On May 29, BEI members again failed to report, leading the COMELEC Team to appoint military personnel as substitutes.
• Conduct and Suspension of Voting: Voting began late and was forcibly suspended at around 2:00 p.m. due to grenade launcher fire and rapid gunfire from unidentified groups, as recorded in the official Minutes of Voting and corroborated by affidavits.
• Voter Turnout and Disenfranchisement: Only 328 out of 1,546 registered voters in the five affected precincts (approximately 21.2%) were able to vote.
• COMELEC's Reasoning: The COMELEC denied the petition to declare failure of election, arguing that (1) terrorism alone is not a sufficient ground, and (2) the votes not cast (from the five precincts and the burned Precinct 7-A) would not have changed the outcome, as the lead of private respondent (219 votes) was greater than the number of voters in Precinct 7-A (219 voters), making it improbable for petitioner to win even if all those voters had voted for him.

• Invalidity of Special Election: Petitioner argued that the May 29, 1995 special election was void because (a) voting was forcibly ended by violence; (b) the venue was transferred 15 km away; (c) notice of the transfer was insufficient, being given only on the night before; (d) only 21.1% of voters in the affected precincts were able to vote, disenfranchising 78%; and (e) military personnel illegally substituted for regular BEI members.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in not declaring a failure of election despite the clear prevalence of terrorism and the massive disenfranchisement.

• No Valid Ground for Failure of Election: The COMELEC countered that terrorism, as a rule, cannot be invoked to annul an election and disenfranchise the majority of voters due to the acts of a few. The power to annul an election must be exercised with extreme care.
• Substantial Compliance with Notice: The COMELEC argued that petitioner and the voters were sufficiently aware of the special election date, as it directly affected their political interests, citing jurisprudence that candidates and watchers are always alert to such matters.
• Votes Not Cast Would Not Affect Result: The COMELEC posited that even if the uncast votes from the five precincts and Precinct 7-A were considered, the result would not change, as it was highly improbable that all 219 voters in Precinct 7-A would have voted for petitioner.

• Validity of the Special Election: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in validating the May 29, 1995 special elections and refusing to declare a failure of election.
• Sufficiency of Notice: Whether the notice for the rescheduled special election and the transfer of venue was sufficient to apprise the electorate.
• Effect of Violence and Disenfranchisement: Whether the violence that suspended the voting and the resulting low voter turnout (21.2%) constituted a failure of election that warranted the annulment of the special elections.

• Validity of the Special Election: The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The special election was invalid. The pervasive violence, the last-minute transfer of polling places, and the insufficient notice resulted in a process that did not reflect the will of the electorate, as evidenced by the massive disenfranchisement.
• Sufficiency of Notice: The notice was insufficient. Less than a day's notice for a change in both the date and the location of polling places (15 km away) in a violence-marred area was impracticable and failed to give voters a fair opportunity to exercise their franchise. The low voter turnout itself proved the ineffectiveness of the notice.
• Effect of Violence and Disenfranchisement: The violence and disenfranchisement constituted a failure of election. The COMELEC's mathematical reasoning—that the uncast votes could not affect the result—was flawed because it ignored the massive scale of disenfranchisement (78% of voters in five precincts) and the fact that the right to vote itself was fundamentally impaired. The paramount consideration is the prevention of the disenfranchisement of the electorate.

• Requisites for Declaring Failure of Election — For a failure of election to be declared and a special election called, two conditions must concur: (1) no voting has taken place or the election results in a failure to elect due to force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or analogous causes; and (2) the votes not cast therein could affect the results of the election. The Court emphasized that the disenfranchisement of the electorate is the central evil to be prevented.
• Sufficiency of Notice in Special Elections — The validity of an election, especially a special one, depends on the sufficiency of notice to the voters. The notice must be such that voters generally have knowledge of the time, place, and purpose of the election to afford them a full opportunity to attend and express their will. The requirement is stricter for special elections called after a previous failure.

• "The peculiar situation of Madalum can not be overstated. Notwithstanding, the notice given on the afternoon of May 28 resetting the special elections to May 29 and transferring the venue of the elections 15 kilometers away from the farthest barangay/school was too short resulting to the disenfranchisement of voters." — Highlights the Court's focus on the practical impossibility of voter participation given the circumstances.
• "Whether or not another special election would turn the tide in petitioner's favor is of no moment because what is more important is that the electors should not have been deprived of their right to vote which was rather apparent in the case at bar." — Articulates the principle that the sanctity of the right to vote outweighs speculative calculations of electoral outcomes.
• "The re-scheduling of the special elections from May 27 to May 29, was done in uncommon haste and unreasonably too close for all voters to be notified of the changes, not only as to the date but as to the designated polling place." — Condemns the COMELEC's procedural haste as a violation of due process in the electoral context.

• Lucero v. COMELEC, 234 SCRA 280 (1994) — Cited for the rule that in fixing the date of a special election, the COMELEC must ensure it is reasonably close to the original election date and held within 30 days after the cause of failure ceases. The Court found the May 29 scheduling failed the "reasonably close" requirement given the need for adequate notice.
• Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) vs. Comelec, 150 SCRA 665 — Cited by the COMELEC for the proposition that annulment of elections is a stringent remedy to be exercised with extreme care. The Court did not dispute the doctrine but found the COMELEC misapplied it by ignoring the factual extent of violence and disenfranchisement.
• Sabeniano et al. vs. Comelec, 101 SCRA 289 & Quilala vs. Comelec, 188 SCRA 502 — Cited by the COMELEC to argue that candidates are presumed to have knowledge of special elections affecting their political fortunes. The Court rejected this presumption under the extraordinary circumstances of violence and inadequate notice.

• Section 6, Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) — Provides the COMELEC's authority to declare a failure of election and call for special elections when the election has not been held, has been suspended, or has resulted in a failure to elect due to force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or analogous causes, provided the failure affects the election result. The Court applied this provision, finding its requisites met.

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Josue N. Bellosillo, Jose C. Vitug, Vicente V. Mendoza, Justo P. Torres, Jr., Florenz D. Regalado, Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, and Artemio V. Panganiban.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.