Hasegawa vs. Giron

In determining probable cause at the preliminary investigation stage, the prosecutor need only rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; demanding trial-level evidence or weighing the respondent's defenses amounts to grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari under Rule 65.

Respondent Leila F. Giron and her officemate Leonarda Marcos worked at the LRTA compound and filed a complaint against their employer Pacific Consultants International, J.F. Cancio & Associates, Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo, and petitioner Masayuki Hasegawa for illegal salary deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions. Giron also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander, and unjust vexation against Hasegawa, which were pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City. These prior complaints formed the backdrop against which the subsequent kidnapping charge and the alleged motive for it were assessed.

Respondent Leila F. Giron and her officemate Leonarda Marcos worked at the LRTA compound. Sometime in December 2005, Giron and Marcos filed a complaint against their employer Pacific Consultants International, J.F. Cancio & Associates, Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo, and petitioner Masayuki Hasegawa for illegal salary deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions. According to Giron, since the filing of that complaint she and Marcos had been subjected to threats and verbal abuse by Hasegawa to pressure them to withdraw it. Giron also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander, and unjust vexation against Hasegawa, which remained pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City.

Giron recounted that on 17 July 2006, she received a call from an alleged messenger of her counsel requesting a meeting at Harrison Plaza Mall in Manila, and she asked Marcos to accompany her. While the two were on their way to the mall, they noticed a black Pajero car parked in front of the Package B Building inside the LRTA compound where they worked. Upon reaching the mall, they went inside the SM Department Store to buy a few things and then noticed two men following them. Giron immediately called a close friend and reported the incident. Thereafter, she and Marcos went out of the department store and stood near the food stalls to make another phone call. Giron suddenly felt a man's gun being pushed against the right side of her body; she panicked and her mind went blank. She and Marcos were taken at gunpoint and pushed inside a black Pajero.

While inside the vehicle, they were blindfolded and gagged, and their abductors taunted and repeatedly threatened them into withdrawing the case against Hasegawa. When her blindfold was loosened, Giron was able to take a good look at her surroundings; she noticed that the car was parked in a warehouse with concrete walls and a high roof, that four vehicles were parked outside, and that three men wearing bonnets over their faces were present — the first seated beside her, the second seated in front, and the third standing near the parked vehicles. Before she and Marcos were released, they were once again threatened by a man who said: "pag tinuloy nyo pa kaso kay Hasegawa, may paglalagyan na kayo, walang magsusumbong sa pulis, pag nalaman namin na lumapit kayo, babalikan namin kayo." They were released at around 11:00 p.m. on 18 July 2006 and dropped off in Susana Heights in Muntinlupa. In a separate Affidavit, Marcos corroborated Giron's account and added that while she was in captivity her blindfold was loosened and she was able to see petitioner inside one of the vehicles parked nearby, talking to one of their abductors, whom she noticed to be wearing bonnets.

Petitioner, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied the accusation and categorically stated that he had nothing to do with the kidnapping; that he was neither the "brains" nor a "participant" in the alleged crimes; that he did not know the alleged kidnappers; and that he was not present inside one of the vehicles talking with one of the abductors at the place alleged by Marcos. He pointed out several supposed inconsistencies and improbabilities in the complaint — among them that he only came to know of the December 2005 complaint on 8 May 2006; that Giron and Marcos did not immediately report the matter to the police in Manila or Muntinlupa; that they did not find it unusual that their lawyer would call for a meeting at Harrison Plaza Mall; that the alleged abductors were able to enter SM Department Store with guns; that the alleged statements of the kidnappers were hearsay; and that Giron and Marcos continued to work after the alleged kidnapping. Petitioner asserted that Giron and Marcos were extorting money from him because the instant case was filed right after negotiations to settle the civil aspect of the three cases they filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the MeTC Pasay failed. His personal driver, Edamar Valentino, corroborated his statement that on 17 and 18 July 2006 he drove petitioner at 7:30 a.m. and brought him home after work as was his usual schedule.

The Investigating Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of prima facie evidence against petitioner, resting on the following observations: (a) no law enforcement agency had investigated the complaint and indorsed it to the prosecution office as is the usual procedure for grave offenses; (b) the other victim, Marcos, did not file a case against petitioner; (c) respondent continued to report to work at the LRTA compound where the supposed mastermind also worked; (d) there was an unexplained absence of a report of the alleged incident to any police or law enforcement agency, which tainted the trustworthiness of respondent's allegations; (e) respondent's theory on the motive for her kidnapping had been shown to be fallacious; (f) respondent's propensity to file a string of cases against petitioner supported the contention that these were part of a corrupt scheme to extort money; and (g) vital witnesses such as the NBI agent assigned to her complaint and her other officemates who could have corroborated her story were not presented.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner insisted that there was no showing that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that no probable cause exists to indict him for the crimes charged, and that the Secretary clearly and sufficiently explained the reasons for that conclusion.
• Improper Factual Review: Petitioner faulted the Court of Appeals for deliberating point by point the issues and arguments raised by the parties, and for overlooking that the kidnapping and serious illegal detention charges were but the fourth in a series of successive cases filed by respondent against petitioner, all of which were dismissed by the BID, NLRC, and MeTC of Pasay City; he argued that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
• Wrong Mode of Appeal and Non-Exhaustion: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright respondent's petition for certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for being the wrong mode of appeal.

• Sufficiency of Evidence at Preliminary Investigation: Respondent countered that in preliminary investigation cases there is, as yet, no occasion for the parties to display their full and exhaustive evidence, and that a mere finding that the kidnapping might have been committed by petitioner is already sufficient.
• Certiorari as the Proper Remedy: Respondent maintained that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the Secretary of Justice that no probable cause exists in the instant case.
• Propriety of Certiorari and Questions of Fact: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting respondent's petition for certiorari despite the alleged raising of questions of fact and the petition being unmeritorious.
• Mode of Appeal and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent's petition for certiorari is the proper mode of appeal from judgments of the Secretary of Justice.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause, the prosecutor having set the parameters of probable cause too high and delved into evidentiary matters reserved for trial.
• Propriety of Certiorari and Questions of Fact: No. Certiorari under Rule 65 lies where the Secretary of Justice patently acted with grave abuse of discretion, and such a ground for judicial review was present here.
• Mode of Appeal and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: No. Resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari was correct, the grant of the petition being a determination that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The decision whether to dismiss a criminal complaint depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations or the determination of sufficient probable cause unless the prosecutor's findings are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted; it does not mean actual or positive cause nor import absolute certainty, and a finding thereof does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It need only rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects, and need not be based on clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found that all the elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit: respondent, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two men, forcibly boarded into a vehicle, and detained for more than twenty-four hours. The Investigating Prosecutor set the parameters of probable cause too high; her findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed, and she delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated under the rules of evidence. By taking into consideration the defenses raised by petitioner, the prosecutor already went into the strict merits of the case, and the perceived inconsistencies were more imaginary than real, delving into minor, ambiguous, and inconsequential matters that could yet be properly addressed in a full-dress court hearing. The prosecutor may not turn a blind eye to evidence showing the acts complained of, and such cavalier disregard of the complainant's documents and attestations may be the "arbitrary, whimsical and capricious" conduct described as grave abuse. The task transcended mere discovery of the likelihood or probability that a crime was committed and ventured into weighing evidence beyond reasonable doubt, such that the Secretary of Justice arrogated upon himself the functions of the judge.
• Propriety of Certiorari and Questions of Fact: The elementary rule is that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Although the prosecutor's findings on the existence of probable cause are generally not subject to review by the courts, judicial review is available where those findings are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion, and the Court found such reason for judicial review present in this case.
• Mode of Appeal and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a determination that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention for lack of probable cause. Resort by respondent to the extraordinary writ of certiorari, and the grant thereof by the Court of Appeals, was correct.

• Probable Cause — Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction — it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. It need only rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects; it need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, nor on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In this case, the Court applied this standard to hold that the Investigating Prosecutor erred in demanding trial-level evidence at the preliminary investigation stage.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion as Ground for Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Findings — The decision whether or not to dismiss a criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch, and cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information where he finds the evidence before him insufficient. However, the prosecutor's findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion. The Court found such grave abuse present where the prosecutor set the parameters of probable cause too high and weighed evidence and defenses reserved for trial.
• Elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code — In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present. The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. The Court held that all these elements were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit.
• Certiorari under Rule 65 to Review DOJ Resolutions — The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The grant of the certiorari petition is a determination that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion.

• "Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." — This states the canonical definition of probable cause applied by the Court in assessing whether the Investigating Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice acted within the bounds of their discretion.
• "A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt." — This articulates the controlling standard of proof at the preliminary investigation stage, which the prosecutor exceeded.
• "The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed." — This is the ratio decidendi: the prosecutor improperly evaluated post-incident conduct and evidentiary matters reserved for trial.
• "the respondent Secretary arrogated upon himself the functions of the judge by demanding more than a sampling, but for pieces of evidence that were understandably not there yet, being suited to a trial proper." — Quoted from the Court of Appeals and adopted by the Court, this passage captures the essence of the grave abuse of discretion found.

• Chong vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 184948, 21 July 2009, 593 SCRA 311 — Cited for the rule that courts will not interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable cause unless patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion.
• Baviera vs. Prosecutor Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107 (2007) — Cited for the definition of probable cause as a reasonable ground of presumption based on facts that would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest or strong suspicion.
• Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 180165, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 631 — Cited for the standard that probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Fenequito vs. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 172829, 18 July 2012, 677 SCRA 113 — Cited for the rule that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
• Sy Tiong Shiou vs. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, 30 March 2009, 582 SCRA 517 — Cited for the requirement that, in order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present.
• Clay & Feather International, Inc. vs. Lichaytoo, G.R. No. 193105, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 516 — Cited for the rule that the nullity of a resolution may be shown not only by what patently appears on its face but also by the documentary and testimonial evidence found in the records.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The Court enumerated its four elements and held that all were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit, satisfying the requirement that the elements of the crime charged be present to arrive at probable cause.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the extraordinary writ of certiorari. The Court held that a petition for certiorari under this Rule is the proper remedy to review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is shown.
• Section 13, Article VIII, Constitution — Cited in the certification accompanying the Decision, confirming that the conclusions were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion.

• Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson)
• Arturo D. Brion
• Mariano C. Del Castillo
• Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe