Harvey, et al. vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al.

The Court held that the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation has the authority to issue warrants of arrest against aliens in deportation proceedings based on probable cause determined administratively, and such proceedings are summary and administrative in nature, not subject to the same constitutional strictures on arrest and bail as criminal prosecutions.

Petitioners Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, and Adriaan Van Den Elshout, foreign nationals residing in Pagsanjan, Laguna, were apprehended on February 27, 1988, by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) following a three-month surveillance. They were suspected of being "alien pedophiles." During the apprehension, CID agents seized photographs and negatives depicting minors in salacious poses. Deportation proceedings were instituted against them on March 4, 1988, for being "undesirable aliens" under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Warrants for their arrest were issued on March 7, 1988. Petitioners filed this petition for habeas corpus challenging the legality of their detention.

Petitioners, two American nationals and one Dutch citizen, were apprehended on February 27, 1988, from their residences in Pagsanjan, Laguna, by CID agents executing Mission Orders. The apprehension followed a three-month surveillance of suspected alien pedophiles. Seized items included photo negatives, photographs of minors in salacious poses, and promotional posters. Two days after arrest, seventeen of the twenty-two initially arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. Deportation charges were filed against petitioners on March 4, 1988, under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code for being undesirable aliens (pedophiles) inimical to public morals, health, and safety. On March 7, 1988, the CID Commissioner issued Warrants of Arrest for violation of the Immigration Act and the Revised Administrative Code, and the Board of Special Inquiry commenced trial. Petitioners' requests for release on bond or bail were denied by the Commissioner after a CID physician certified them as healthy.

• Petitioner maintained that the CID Commissioner lacked statutory authority under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 or Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code to arrest and detain them pending a probable cause determination for an administrative investigation.
• Petitioner argued that their warrantless arrest violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, as the CID agents did not possess valid warrants.
• Petitioner contended that mere confidential information and suspicion of being pedophiles, without being caught in the act, did not constitute valid legal grounds for arrest. They further alleged that pedophilia is not a crime under Philippine law.

• Respondent countered that the arrest was based on probable cause established after a three-month surveillance, justifying the warrantless arrest and seizure of evidence as incident to a lawful arrest.
• Respondent argued that even assuming the initial arrest was irregular, it was cured by the subsequent filing of formal deportation charges and issuance of arrest warrants, making the restraint legal.
• Respondent asserted that deportation proceedings are administrative and summary in nature, not criminal, and thus not subject to the same constitutional requirements for warrants and bail.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the petition for habeas corpus became moot and academic after the filing of formal deportation charges and issuance of arrest warrants.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the CID Commissioner had the authority to arrest petitioners pending deportation proceedings.
  • Whether the arrest of petitioners violated their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
  • Whether aliens in deportation proceedings have a constitutional right to bail.

• Procedural: The Court found that the restraint against petitioners had become legal following the commencement of formal deportation proceedings and the issuance of arrest warrants. Consequently, the habeas corpus petition was rendered moot, as the writ cannot be sustained when confinement has become legal, even if initially illegal.
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that the arrest was valid because it was based on probable cause determined after a three-month surveillance. The seizure of evidence (photographs, negatives) was lawful as an incident to a lawful arrest.
  • The Court held that Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which empowers the Commissioner to issue arrest warrants in deportation proceedings, is constitutional. Deportation is an administrative, not criminal, proceeding; thus, the constitutional requirement of a judicial determination of probable cause for arrest does not apply. The Commissioner's authority is essential for the State's power to deport undesirable aliens.
  • The Court ruled that the right to bail is not available to aliens in deportation proceedings. Section 37(e) of the Immigration Act uses the permissive "may," making bail a discretionary matter for the Commissioner. Since deportation is not a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail does not apply.

• Nature of Deportation Proceedings — Deportation is an administrative proceeding, summary in nature, and is not a criminal action. An order of deportation is not a punishment but a police measure against undesirable aliens. It need not be conducted with the strict formalities of court proceedings, though it requires a fair hearing with the right to counsel.
• Probable Cause in Deportation — The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a judge does not extend to deportation proceedings. The Commissioner of Immigration may determine probable cause administratively to issue an arrest warrant preliminary to deportation.
• State's Inherent Power to Deport — Every sovereign state has the inherent power to exclude or deport aliens whose presence is deemed injurious to public interest. This power is an act of state exercised for self-preservation and public welfare.

• "Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings." — This passage underscores the fundamental distinction between deportation and criminal prosecution, justifying the different procedural standards.
• "The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings." — This statement directly addresses the core constitutional challenge and defines the scope of the Commissioner's authority.
• "The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power... a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good." — This quote frames deportation within the context of state sovereignty and police power.

• Morano v. Vivo — Cited for the principle that Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act is not constitutionally proscribed and that the requirement of judicial probable cause does not apply to deportation proceedings.
• Lao Tan Bun v. Fabre — Reiterated for the doctrine that deportation proceedings are administrative and summary, and that the sovereign power has the inherent right to exclude aliens.
• Ong Hee Sang v. Commissioner of Immigration — Cited to support the ruling that bail in deportation proceedings is discretionary, not a matter of right, because the proceedings are not criminal.
• Vivo v. Montesa and Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board were distinguished. The Court noted that in those cases, probable cause had not been previously established, whereas in the present case, probable cause existed before the warrants were issued.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court held this applies to aliens but is qualified in the administrative context of deportation.
• Section 37(a), Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 — The statutory provision authorizing the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of aliens pending deportation. The Court upheld its constitutionality.
• Section 37(e), Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 — Provides that an alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding "may be released under bond." The Court interpreted "may" as permissive, making bail discretionary.
• Section 69, Revised Administrative Code — The provision under which petitioners were charged as undesirable aliens. The Court noted it guarantees the right to a hearing, counsel, and cross-examination.
• Article II, Section 13 & Article XV, Section 3(2), 1987 Constitution — Cited to highlight the State's policy to protect the youth from abuse and exploitation, providing context for the deportation charge.