Hamid vs. Gervasio Security and Investigation Agency, Inc.

A security guard placed on floating status for more than six months is deemed constructively dismissed, and a general return-to-work order that does not specify a particular client assignment does not toll the six-month period. A quitclaim executed in a separate case involving the same parties cannot bar adjudication of a distinct cause of action for illegal dismissal.

Petitioner Samsudin T. Hamid was hired by respondent Gervasio Security and Investigation Agency, Inc., whose president is Susan S. Gervasio, as a security guard on March 8, 2003. Security agencies, as employers of security guards deployed to various clients, possess the management prerogative to place guards on "floating status" or off-detail when a client terminates their post assignment. Jurisprudence limits this prerogative to a maximum of six months, beyond which constructive dismissal is deemed to have occurred. The dispute arose from the intersection of this rule with petitioner's suspension, subsequent relief from his post, and the employer's attempts to recall him through general return-to-work orders.

Samsudin T. Hamid was hired by Gervasio Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. as a security guard on March 8, 2003. Sometime in October 2010, he was assigned at Midas Hotel along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, where he was required to work seven days a week from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. On May 24, 2011, after completing his 12-hour day shift on his rest day, he was asked to work the night shift as well because his co-guard assigned for night duty was absent. Petitioner informed his immediate superior that he was not feeling well, but he was nevertheless made to work and guard Gate 2 of the hotel.

On May 25, 2011, as he was about to go home after his 24-hour duty, petitioner received a memorandum requiring him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him after he was caught sleeping while on duty. He submitted his written response on May 26, 2011, admitting that he took a nap but explaining that he had a cough, could not breathe properly, and was taking Decolgen to alleviate his condition. Despite his explanation and plea for understanding, petitioner was suspended for 30 days without pay, effective upon receipt of the memorandum, with a directive to report to the office in complete uniform after completing his suspension for proper disposition.

During his suspension, petitioner received another memorandum informing him that he would be relieved from his post after his suspension by virtue of the client's request. Before the expiration of his one-month suspension, or on June 13, 2011, petitioner received this memorandum. After serving his suspension, petitioner waited to be assigned to another post, but received no call or order from respondents. He filed a complaint for illegal suspension and separation pay on January 6, 2012, and amended it on March 14, 2012 to include illegal dismissal (constructive dismissal) as a cause of action.

Respondents maintained that they did not dismiss petitioner and claimed to have sent four notices — dated October 10, 2011, November 8, 2011, December 8, 2011, and January 9, 2012 — to his last known address as per personnel files, requiring him to report for duty for immediate posting. Petitioner, however, claimed he never received these notices because they were mailed to his old address. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both found that respondents had mailed the notices to petitioner's given address and that petitioner failed to adequately deny receipt. Separately, the parties were involved in a second case, docketed as NLRC-NCR-06-09002-13, a complaint for money claims (surety bond) filed on June 21, 2013, in which they entered into an amicable settlement: petitioner executed a Quitclaim and Release upon receipt of ₱9,500.00, representing cash bond and coop refund, and the Executive LA dismissed that complaint with prejudice on September 12, 2013.

• Misapplication of Quitclaim: Petitioner insisted that the approved Quitclaim and Release pertained to a different case involving the same parties — specifically, a complaint for money claims (surety bond) docketed as NLRC-NCR-06-09002-13 — and not to the illegal dismissal case docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 01-0034-12; thus, the CA's dismissal of the petition on this ground was misplaced.
• Constructive Dismissal: Petitioner claimed he was constructively dismissed because he was placed in a floating status for more than six months without being assigned to a specific client. He explained that he did not receive the notices to report for immediate posting because they were sent to his old address, which led to his failure to report for work.
• Entitlement to Monetary Claims: Petitioner prayed for separation pay and specifically asked that he no longer be reinstated, in addition to backwages and other monetary claims.

• No Dismissal: Respondents averred that they did not dismiss petitioner on May 25, 2011, or any date thereafter.
• Notices to Report: Respondents claimed that after petitioner's suspension, they sent four notices on October 10, 2011, November 8, 2011, December 8, 2011, and January 9, 2012, requiring him to report for duty for immediate posting, all sent to his last known address as per personnel files.
• Failure to Report: Respondents argued that petitioner failed to report for duty despite the notices and instead opted to file a complaint against them on January 6, 2012.

• Quitclaim and Release: Whether the CA gravely erred when it declared the case deemed closed and terminated despite the fact that the approved Quitclaim and Release pertains to a different case involving the same parties.
• Constructive Dismissal: Whether the CA gravely erred in not ruling that petitioner was constructively dismissed.
• Monetary Claims: Whether the CA gravely erred in not ruling that petitioner is entitled to all his monetary claims.

• Quitclaim and Release: Yes. The CA erred in dismissing the petition based on the Quitclaim and Release, which pertained to a separate money-claims case (NLRC-NCR-06-09002-13) and not to the illegal dismissal case (NLRC-NCR-Case No. 01-0034-12).
• Constructive Dismissal: Yes. Petitioner was constructively dismissed because he was placed on floating status for more than six months without being assigned to a specific client, and the notices sent by respondents were mere general return-to-work orders that did not state a particular client assignment.
• Monetary Claims: Partially granted. Petitioner was awarded full backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and attorney's fees; other monetary claims were dismissed for failure to prove entitlement.

• Quitclaim and Release: The amended complaint for illegal dismissal from which the instant petition arose was docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 01-0034-12, filed on January 6, 2012 and amended on March 14, 2012. The Quitclaim and Release executed by petitioner upon receipt of ₱9,500.00 pertained to a second, separate case — a complaint for money claims (surety bond) docketed as NLRC-NCR-06-09002-13, filed on June 21, 2013. The Minutes of the hearing in that second case dated September 12, 2013 showed that the quitclaim represented the cash bond and coop refund. There were thus two separate and distinct cases involving the same parties, and the amicable settlement in the second case could not bar adjudication of the first. The CA's dismissal of the petition on the basis of this quitclaim was therefore erroneous.

• Constructive Dismissal: Placing security guards on floating status is a valid exercise of management prerogative, but such placement on off-detail must not exceed six months; otherwise, constructive dismissal is deemed to have occurred. Petitioner was suspended for one month starting May 26, 2011, and before the expiration of his suspension, on June 13, 2011, he received a memorandum relieving him from his post. He was thus deemed in a floating status from June 26, 2011. He filed his complaint on January 6, 2012, approximately seven months after being relieved. While respondents sent four notices requiring him to report for "immediate posting," jurisprudence — as clarified in Ibon vs. Genghis Khan Security Services and Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation — requires not only that the employee be recalled to the agency's office, but that the employee be deployed to a specific client before the lapse of six months. A general return-to-work order does not suffice. The notices here merely directed petitioner to "report to the undersigned effective on the receipt of this memorandum for immediate posting," without stating any specific client. These were nothing more than general return-to-work orders and did not toll the running of petitioner's floating status. Furthermore, petitioner's immediate filing of the complaint for constructive dismissal negated any suggestion of abandonment, as settled doctrine holds that filing a complaint for illegal dismissal is proof of one's desire to return to work.

• Monetary Claims: As a consequence of the finding of illegal dismissal, petitioner would ordinarily be entitled to reinstatement under Article 294 (formerly Article 279) of the Labor Code. However, reinstatement was no longer practicable because ten years had passed from the filing of the complaint in 2012 to the resolution of the case, satisfying the "considerable time" standard articulated in Dela Fuente vs. Gimenez. Moreover, petitioner himself specifically prayed for separation pay and asked that he no longer be reinstated. Separation pay was therefore granted in lieu of reinstatement, computed at one month's salary for every year of service until the finality of the Resolution, with a fraction of at least six months counted as one whole year. Full backwages and other benefits were awarded from the date of illegal termination until finality. Attorney's fees of ten percent of the total award were granted. Other monetary claims were dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove entitlement. Interest at six percent per annum was imposed on all monetary awards from finality until full payment, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

• Six-Month Floating Status Rule for Security Guards — Placing security guards on floating status or off-detail is a valid exercise of management prerogative, but such placement must not exceed six months. Beyond six months, constructive dismissal is deemed to have occurred. The Court applied this rule by computing the floating status period from June 26, 2011 (the date petitioner's suspension ended and he was relieved from his post) to January 6, 2012 (the date he filed his complaint), which exceeded six months.

• Specific Client Assignment Requirement — An employer of a security guard must assign the guard to a specific or particular client within six months from the last deployment; a general return-to-work order does not suffice. The Court applied this requirement by examining the text of the four notices, which merely directed petitioner to "report to the undersigned effective on the receipt of this memorandum for immediate posting" without naming any client, and concluded they were general return-to-work orders that did not toll the floating status period.

• Abandonment Inconsistent with Filing of Complaint — A charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, as the filing is proof of one's desire to return to work. Abandonment requires clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. The Court applied this doctrine by noting that petitioner filed his complaint immediately after the lapse of six months from the start of his floating status, thereby negating abandonment.

• Reinstatement No Longer Feasible After Considerable Time — Reinstatement is no longer feasible when the former position no longer exists, the employer's business has closed down, the employer-employee relationship has become too strained, or a "considerable time" — including the lapse of eight years or more — has passed between dismissal and resolution. The Court applied this doctrine by noting that ten years had elapsed from the 2012 filing to the 2022 resolution, rendering reinstatement impracticable, and accordingly awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

• "A general return-to-work order does not suffice." — This formulation, drawn from Ibon vs. Genghis Khan Security Services and Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation, encapsulates the requirement that an employer must deploy a security guard to a specific client within six months to avoid constructive dismissal; it is the controlling standard applied in this case.

• "The filing thereof is proof enough of one's desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment. Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned their work." — This passage states the established doctrine that immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is incompatible with abandonment, applied here to reject the employer's implied abandonment theory.

• "Clearly, the notices merely require petitioner to report to the security agency. The notices were, at best, nothing more than general return-to-work orders, which did not state a specific client to which petitioner would be assigned." — This passage applies the specific-client-assignment requirement to the facts, demonstrating why the employer's notices failed to prevent constructive dismissal.

• Padilla vs. Airborne Security Service, Inc., 821 Phil. 482 (2017) — Cited as authority for the rule that placing security guards on floating status must not exceed six months, beyond which constructive dismissal is deemed to have occurred.
• Ibon vs. Genghis Khan Security Services, 811 Phil. 250 (2017) — Cited for the clarification that a general return-to-work order does not suffice to refute constructive dismissal; the employer must assign the security guard to a specific client within six months.
• Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation — Cited for the holistic two-part test: (1) the employer must assign the security guard to another posting within six months, and (2) the assignment must be to a specific or particular client.
• Seventh Fleet Security Services, Inc. vs. Loque, G.R. No. 230005, January 22, 2020 — Cited in support of the requirement that a security guard be deployed to a specific client before the lapse of six months.
• Dela Fuente vs. Gimenez, G.R. No. 214419, November 17, 2021 — Cited for the doctrine that reinstatement is no longer feasible when a considerable time has lapsed, including eight years or more, supporting the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Cited for the imposition of six percent (6%) per annum interest on monetary awards from finality until full payment.
• JS Unitrade Merchandise, Inc. vs. Samson, Jr., G.R. No. 200405, February 26, 2020 — Cited for the doctrine that filing a complaint for illegal dismissal negates abandonment.

• Article 294 (formerly Article 279), Labor Code — Provides that an employee unjustly dismissed is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and full backwages. The Court applied this provision in awarding backwages and, where reinstatement was no longer practicable, separation pay in lieu thereof.

Caguioa, Inting, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concurred.