Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole

The Ombudsman’s authority under R.A. No. 6770 to investigate and preventively suspend local elective officials is not repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; the two statutes are harmonized, and remedies against Ombudsman administrative orders lie directly with the SC, not the RTC.

Petitioner is the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas; respondents are the Presiding Judge of Branch XXVIII, RTC Mandaue City, and Mandaue City elective officials Mayor Alfredo M. Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Cañete, and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol. The Ombudsman Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6770, implements the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman, while the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No. 7160, provides for disciplinary actions and preventive suspension of local elective officials. The case requires reconciling these two statutes on administrative investigation and preventive suspension over local elective officials.

On 22 July 1992, Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede filed criminal and administrative complaints with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas against Mandaue City Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Cañete, and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol. The complaints charged the respondent officials with violating R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Articles 170 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and R.A. No. 6713. Dionson and Bercede alleged that the officials, acting in conspiracy, caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. The complaints were docketed as Criminal Case No. OMB-VIS-92-391 and Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.

On 23 July 1992, Mandaue City Council Secretary Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr. executed a sworn statement in support of the accusations. The next day, petitioner ordered respondents, including Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo G. Ouano and Mandaue City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten days from receipt of the order. Councilors Dionson and Bercede then moved for the preventive suspension of respondent officials in the administrative case.

Respondent officials opposed the motion for preventive suspension and, on 5 August 1992, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to try, hear, and decide the administrative case against them. They invoked Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, claiming that the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against local officials, as well as to effect preventive suspension, had been vested in the Office of the President. In their opposition filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code could not have repealed, abrogated, or modified the constitutional provisions granting the Ombudsman power to investigate cases against all public officials, and that the Ombudsman Act remained unaffected.

During the hearing on the motion for preventive suspension, the Deputy Ombudsman directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. Mayor Ouano reiterated in his memorandum that under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991 the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against elective officials of a province, a highly urbanized city, or an independent component city and impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspension, and that the Constitution gave the Ombudsman no superior powers over the President over elective local officials.

In an Order dated 10 September 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. Respondent officials were formally placed under preventive suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order of 21 September 1992. On 25 September 1992, respondent officials filed a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. The RTC issued a restraining order on even date enjoining petitioner from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition, but the RTC denied the motion and, on 15 October 1992, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P50,000 bond; the writ was issued on 21 October 1992.

• Ombudsman’s Investigatory and Disciplinary Authority: Petitioner contended that Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 19, 21, and 24 of R.A. No. 6770 vest the Ombudsman with authority to investigate administrative complaints against all elective and appointive officials, including local government officials, and to impose preventive suspension.
• No Repeal by the Local Government Code: Petitioner maintained that R.A. No. 7160 did not expressly or impliedly repeal the Ombudsman Act; the Ombudsman’s authority over local elective officials remained.
• Validity of Preventive Suspension: Petitioner argued that the preventive suspension was proper because the evidence of guilt was strong, the charges involved dishonesty or gross misconduct warranting removal, and the respondents’ continued stay in office could prejudice the investigation.

• LGC Divested the Ombudsman: Respondent officials argued that under Section 63 of R.A. No. 7160, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against local officials, as well as to effect preventive suspension, had been vested in the Office of the President, leaving the Ombudsman without jurisdiction over the administrative case.
• Office of the President Has Authority: Respondent officials maintained that under Sections 61 and 63 of R.A. No. 7160, the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could take cognizance of administrative complaints against elective officials of a province, a highly urbanized city, or an independent component city and impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspension; the Constitution gave the Ombudsman no superior powers over the President over elective local officials.
• Conflict in Suspension Periods: Respondent officials contended that the six-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 is repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension under Section 63 of R.A. No. 7160.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondent officials claimed that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing.

• Ombudsman Jurisdiction over Local Elective Officials: Whether the Ombudsman under R.A. No. 6770 has been divested of authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials by the enactment of R.A. No. 7160.
• Preventive Suspension Authority: Whether the Ombudsman may impose preventive suspension on local elective officials under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 despite Section 63 of R.A. No. 7160’s 60-day preventive suspension.
• Hearing Requirement for Preventive Suspension: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order without a hearing.
• Propriety of RTC Prohibition: Whether the RTC may entertain a petition for prohibition against the Ombudsman’s findings or order, or whether recourse must be to the SC under Sections 14 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770.

• Ombudsman Jurisdiction over Local Elective Officials: No. R.A. No. 7160 did not expressly or impliedly repeal R.A. No. 6770; the Ombudsman retains authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials.
• Preventive Suspension Authority: Yes. The Ombudsman may impose preventive suspension under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770; the six-month period and the 60-day period govern different situations and are not irreconcilable.
• Hearing Requirement for Preventive Suspension: No. Preventive suspension is not a penalty and may be decreed after charges are brought and before hearing; the records show respondents filed their opposition and memorandum before the order.
• Propriety of RTC Prohibition: No. Under Sections 14 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, no court may hear an appeal or application for remedy against the Ombudsman’s decision or findings except the SC on a pure question of law; administrative disciplinary orders may be appealed to the SC by certiorari within ten days. The RTC should not have entertained the petition.

• Ombudsman Jurisdiction over Local Elective Officials: The SC applied the rule that implied repeal is not favored; the two laws must be absolutely incompatible and a clear finding of incompatibility must surface before an implied repeal may be drawn. It found nothing in R.A. No. 7160 indicating express or implied repeal of the Ombudsman Act. Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution gives the Ombudsman power to investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency; Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 directs the Ombudsman to act on administrative complaints; and Section 21 gives disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, including local government, except impeachable officials, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Sections 61 and 63 of R.A. No. 7160 run parallel with the old Local Government Code of 1983; the authority previously entrusted to the Minister of Local Government became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon enactment of R.A. No. 6770, and R.A. No. 7160 merely substituted the Office of the President for the Secretary (Minister) of Local Government. The SC thus harmonized the statutes and held that the Ombudsman retained authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials.
• Preventive Suspension Authority: The SC held that Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 and Section 63 of R.A. No. 7160 govern different situations. Under Section 24, the Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending investigation if the evidence of guilt is strong and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case. The suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay is due to the respondent. Under Section 63 of R.A. No. 7160, preventive suspension of an elective local official may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined when the evidence of guilt is strong, the gravity of the offense warrants it, and there is great probability that continuance in office could influence witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of records and evidence; a single preventive suspension shall not extend beyond 60 days, and several administrative cases cannot result in more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground. The SC found no repugnancy; the Ombudsman’s six-month suspension applies to all public officials under investigation, while the LGC’s shorter period applies to elective local officials with lesser conditions. Thus the Ombudsman could impose preventive suspension under Section 24.
• Hearing Requirement for Preventive Suspension: The SC held that preventive suspension is not a penalty; it is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation and may be decreed after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. It relied on Nera vs. Garcia, reiterated in later cases, and on Buenaseda vs. Flavier for the requirement that the evidence of guilt be strong. The records showed that petitioner issued the preventive suspension order after respondent officials filed their opposition to the motion for preventive suspension and after Mayor Ouano filed his memorandum in compliance with petitioner’s directive. Petitioner also justified the suspension by finding that the evidence of guilt was strong, that the charge involved dishonesty or gross misconduct warranting removal, and that the respondents’ continued stay in office might prejudice the investigation. The SC therefore found no grave abuse of discretion.
• Propriety of RTC Prohibition: The SC held that the RTC should not have entertained the petition for prohibition. Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770 provides that no writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, and that no court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the SC on a pure question of law. Section 27 of the same law provides that in all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC by filing a petition for certiorari within ten days from receipt of the written notice, in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondent officials’ petition for prohibition was an application for remedy against the findings in the 21 September 1992 order, so the RTC had no authority to act on it.

• Implied Repeal Not Favored — Repeals by implication are not favored; the two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding of incompatibility must surface before an implied repeal may be drawn. Courts must generally assume congruent application and harmonize statutes. The SC applied this by holding that R.A. No. 7160 did not repeal R.A. No. 6770 and that both could be given effect.
• Ombudsman’s Constitutional and Statutory Investigatory Power — Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution empowers the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency; Sections 19 and 21 of R.A. No. 6770 implement this by directing the Ombudsman to act on administrative complaints and granting disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, including local government, except impeachable officials, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. The SC applied this to local elective officials.
• Concurrent Disciplinary Authority — The authority to investigate and impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was originally entrusted to the Minister of Local Government; upon enactment of R.A. No. 6770, it became concurrent with the Ombudsman to the extent of the common grant. R.A. No. 7160 did not change this except to substitute the Office of the President for the Secretary (Minister) of Local Government.
• Preventive Suspension Is Not a Penalty — Preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation and may be decreed after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. The SC applied this to uphold the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order despite the absence of a prior hearing.
• Direct Recourse to the SC for Ombudsman Administrative Orders — Under Sections 14 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, no court may hear an appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the SC on a pure question of law, and administrative disciplinary orders may be appealed to the SC by certiorari within ten days. The SC applied this by dismissing the RTC case.

• “The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other .” — The SC rejects implied repeal and harmonizes the Ombudsman Act with the Local Government Code.
• “The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.” — The SC explains that the LGC did not divest the Ombudsman of authority over local elective officials.
• “The two provisions govern differently.” — The SC holds that Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 and Section 63 of R.A. No. 7160 on preventive suspension are not repugnant.
• “No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.” — The SC cites Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770 to hold that the RTC should not have entertained the prohibition petition.

• Nera vs. Garcia, 108 Phil. 1031 — Controlling precedent, reiterated; held that preventive suspension is not a penalty and may be imposed before hearing.
• Buenaseda vs. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645 — Followed; cited for the requirement that evidence of guilt be strong before preventive suspension.
• Deloso vs. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 — Cited in support of the Ombudsman’s independence and the constitutional purpose behind its creation.
• Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500 — Cited for the rule that implied repeals are not favored.
• Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 — Cited for the rule that a clear finding of incompatibility is required before implied repeal.
• Compania General de Tabacos vs. Collector of Customs, 48 Phil. 8 — Cited for the requirement that the two laws be absolutely incompatible before implied repeal may be inferred.

• Article XI, Section 13(1), 1987 Constitution — Gives the Ombudsman power to investigate on its own or on complaint any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Applied to uphold the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction over local elective officials.
• Section 19, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Directs the Ombudsman to act on all administrative complaints relating to acts or omissions enumerated therein. Applied as the statutory mandate for administrative investigations.
• Section 21, R.A. No. 6770 — Grants the Ombudsman disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including local government, except officials removable only by impeachment, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Applied to local elective officials.
• Section 24, R.A. No. 6770 — Authorizes the Ombudsman or his Deputy to preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending investigation if the evidence of guilt is strong and the conditions therein are present; suspension shall not exceed six months without pay. Applied to uphold the preventive suspension order.
• Section 60, R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Lists the grounds for disciplinary actions against an elective local official. Cited in the statutory framework for local elective officials.
• Section 61, R.A. No. 7160 — Provides for the form and filing of administrative complaints, including complaints against elective officials of a province, highly urbanized city, independent component city, or component city before the Office of the President. Held not to divest the Ombudsman of authority.
• Section 63, R.A. No. 7160 — Provides for preventive suspension of local elective officials, including the 60-day single suspension and 90-day limit within a single year. Held to govern a different situation from Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 and not repugnant to it.
• Section 14, R.A. No. 6770 — Prohibits any court from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an Ombudsman investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter is outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, and bars any court from hearing an appeal or application for remedy against the Ombudsman’s decision or findings except the SC on a pure question of law. Applied to hold that the RTC should not have entertained the petition.
• Section 27, R.A. No. 6770 — Provides that administrative disciplinary orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC by certiorari within ten days from receipt of notice, in accordance with Rule 45. Applied as the proper remedy.