Guzman vs. Guzman and Montealto

A Rule 65 petition for certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, especially when the loss was occasioned by one's own negligence or error in the choice of remedy. Where the RTC renders a decision in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the proper remedy is a Rule 42 petition for review, and a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading that does not toll the reglementary period for appeal.

The petitioner, Isabel N. Guzman, is the mother of respondents Aniano N. Guzman and Primitiva G. Montealto. The dispute concerned a 1,446-square meter parcel of land, Lot No. 2419-B, in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-74707, which the petitioner co-owned with Arnold N. Guzman. The respondents occupied the property as the petitioner's children, and the petitioner alleged they occupied by mere tolerance. The case involved an ejectment proceeding, which is a summary special civil action intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property, where title is not involved.

On June 15, 2000, Isabel N. Guzman filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 4, a complaint for ejectment against her children, Aniano N. Guzman and Primitiva G. Montealto. The petitioner alleged that she and Arnold N. Guzman owned the 6/7th and 1/7th portions, respectively, of a 1,446-square meter parcel of land, known as Lot No. 2419-B, in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-74707. She claimed the respondents occupied the land by tolerance, did not comply with her January 17, 2000 written demand to vacate, and that subsequent barangay conciliation proceedings failed to settle their differences.

In their answer, the respondents countered that the petitioner transferred, in a December 28, 1996 document, all her property rights in the disputed property, except her usufructuary right, in favor of her children. They also claimed the petitioner engaged in forum shopping since she already raised the issue of ownership in a petition for cancellation of adverse claim against them, pending with Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.

In a November 27, 2002 decision, the MTC found the petitioner to be the lawful owner of the land with a right to its possession, holding that the respondents had no vested right to the land since they were merely the petitioner's children to whom no ownership or possessory rights have passed. The MTC directed the respondents to vacate the land and surrender possession to the petitioner, and to pay ₱5,000.00 as monthly rental from January 2000 until possession is surrendered, plus ₱15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.

The respondents appealed to the RTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 1, arguing that the MTC had no jurisdiction, the petitioner had no cause of action, she engaged in forum shopping, and the MTC erred in deciding the case in her favor. In its May 19, 2005 decision, the RTC rejected these arguments but still ruled for the respondents, setting aside the MTC ruling. The RTC took into account the petitioner's transfer of rights in the respondents' favor, which it held could not be unilaterally revoked without a court action, and noted that the petitioner failed to allege and prove that earnest efforts at a compromise had been exerted prior to the filing of the complaint. The RTC ordered the petitioner to pay the respondents ₱25,000.00 as attorney's fees and ₱25,000.00 as litigation expenses.

On June 16, 2005, the petitioner received a copy of the RTC decision. She filed a first motion for reconsideration on June 30, 2005, which the RTC denied on July 6, 2005 for lack of the required notice of hearing. The petitioner then filed a second motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2005, denied on July 15, 2005 for being filed out of time, and a third motion for reconsideration on July 20, 2005, denied on July 22, 2005 with finality. On August 8, 2005, the petitioner filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in deciding the case based on matters not raised as issues on appeal, in finding that the transfer of rights could not be unilaterally revoked, in holding that she failed to prove earnest efforts at compromise, and in denying her motion for reconsideration on a mere technicality.

The CA dismissed the petition, noting that a Rule 42 petition for review, not a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, was the proper remedy to assail an RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The CA found that the petitioner lost her chance to appeal when she filed a second motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. The CA also held that the petitioner cannot validly claim that the respondents occupied the properties through mere tolerance since they were co-owners of the property as compulsory heirs of Alfonso Guzman, the original owner.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Remedy: The petitioner justified the filing of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA by claiming that the RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in passing on issues not raised in the appeal and in not relaxing the rule on the required notice of hearing on motions.
• Lack of Factual and Legal Basis: The petitioner further argued that the CA's finding of co-ownership was bereft of factual and legal basis.

• Proper Remedy: The respondents submitted that the proper remedy for appealing a decision of the RTC, exercising appellate jurisdiction, is a Rule 42 petition for review, and that a Rule 65 petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

• Propriety of Certiorari as Remedy: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioner's petition for certiorari.

• Propriety of Certiorari as Remedy: No. The petitioner availed of the wrong remedy; the proper remedy from an RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is a Rule 42 petition for review, and a Rule 65 petition for certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

• Propriety of Certiorari as Remedy: The petitioner's resort to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to assail the RTC decision and orders was misplaced. When the RTC issued its decision and orders, it did so in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; the proper remedy therefrom is a Rule 42 petition for review. Instead, the petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration and thereby lost her right to appeal, a second motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner's subsequent motions for reconsideration should be considered as mere scraps of paper, not having been filed at all, and unable to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. The RTC decision became final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is "immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land." Certiorari, by its very nature, is proper only when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party; the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. It cannot substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.

Even granting that the petition could be properly filed under Rule 65, it was bound to fail. Certiorari is a limited form of review, restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment. As long as the lower courts act within their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the exercise of their discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by an appeal or a petition for review. The imputed errors pertained to the RTC's appreciation of matters not raised as errors on appeal, specifically, the transfer of rights and subsequent unilateral revocation, and the strictly enforced rule on notice of hearing. These matters involve only the RTC's appreciation of facts and its application of the law; the errors raised do not involve the RTC's jurisdiction, but merely amount to a claim of erroneous exercise of judgment.

The RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the petitioner's transfer of rights, even if it had not been raised as an error. Under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the RTC is mandated to decide the appeal based on the entire record of the MTC proceedings and such pleadings submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. Even without this provision, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, or is closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent. The matter of the petitioner's transfer of rights, which was in the records of the case, was the basis for the RTC's decision.

The RTC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in strictly enforcing the requirement of notice of hearing. The requirement of notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process that seeks to avoid "surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court." A motion unaccompanied by a notice of hearing is considered a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the running of the period to appeal. The petitioner's alleged absence of counsel is not a valid excuse or reason for non-compliance with the rules.

Finally, ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved, hence, it is a special civil action with a special procedure. The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the question of entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. Any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional, made solely for the purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Accordingly, any ruling on the validity of the petitioner's transfer of rights is provisional and should be resolved in a proper proceeding.

• Finality of Judgment — A decision that becomes final and executory is immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the RTC decision, having become final and executory after fifteen days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, could no longer be modified even if allegedly erroneous.

• Certiorari Not a Substitute for Lost Appeal — The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Certiorari is proper only when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party, and it cannot substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the petitioner's resort to Rule 65 after she lost her right to appeal by filing a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.

• Certiorari Limited to Errors of Jurisdiction — Certiorari is a limited form of review restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment. As long as the lower courts act within their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the exercise of their discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by an appeal or a petition for review. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the imputed errors pertained to the RTC's appreciation of facts and application of law, not to its jurisdiction.

• Provisional Nature of Ownership Ruling in Ejectment — In ejectment cases, the only issue to be resolved is the question of entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. Any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional, made solely for the purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. The Court applied this doctrine to clarify that the RTC's ruling on the validity of the petitioner's transfer of rights was provisional and should be resolved in a proper proceeding.

• "It is elementary that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is 'immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.'" — This passage states the doctrine of finality of judgment, which was the basis for holding that the RTC decision could no longer be modified.

• "Certiorari, by its very nature, is proper only when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party; the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. It cannot substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse." — This passage articulates the controlling rule that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, which was the core ground for denying the petition.

• "The requirement of notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process that seeks to avoid 'surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court.'" — This passage explains the purpose of the notice of hearing requirement, which the Court used to justify the RTC's strict enforcement of the rule.

• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Suntay, G.R. No. 188376, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 614 — Cited as authority for the doctrine that a final and executory decision is immutable and unalterable.
• Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185668, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 294 — Cited for the rule that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
• Teh vs. Tan, G.R. No. 181956, November 22, 2010, 635 SCRA 593 — Cited for the rule that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error occasioned such loss.
• Pilipino Telephone Corporation vs. Radiomarine Network, Inc., G.R. No. 152092, August 4, 2010, 626 SCRA 702 — Cited for the rule that certiorari is restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment.
• Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 479 — Cited for the rule that an appellate court has ample authority to review matters not assigned as errors if their consideration is necessary for a just decision.
• Jehan Shipping Corporation vs. National Food Authority, 514 Phil. 166 (2005) — Cited for the purpose of the notice of hearing requirement as an integral component of procedural due process.
• Go, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172 (2001) — Cited for the rule that in ejectment cases, any ruling on ownership is only provisional, made solely for determining who is entitled to possession de facto.

• Section 1, Rule 42, Rules of Court — Provides that a party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the CA within fifteen days from notice of the decision or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration. The Court applied this provision to hold that the petitioner should have filed a Rule 42 petition, not a Rule 65 petition.

• Section 5, Rule 37, Rules of Court — Prohibits a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order. The Court applied this provision to hold that the petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading that did not toll the reglementary period for appeal.

• Section 18, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Mandates the RTC to decide an appeal from an ejectment case based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. The Court applied this provision to hold that the RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the petitioner's transfer of rights even if not raised as an error.

• Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15, Rules of Court — Governs the requirements for notice of hearing on motions. The Court applied these provisions to hold that the RTC properly denied the petitioner's first motion for reconsideration for lack of the required notice of hearing.

• Section 33(2), Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 — The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which the RTC cited as the basis for the MTC's jurisdiction over ejectment cases.

• Article 151, Family Code — Cited by the RTC as the basis for its finding that the petitioner failed to allege and prove that earnest efforts at a compromise had been exerted prior to the filing of the complaint.

Carpio, J. (Chairperson), Del Castillo, J., Villarama, Jr., J., and Perlas-Bernabe, J., concurred in the decision.