Gutierrez vs. Carpio

A stipulated period of "one month" is computed by the civil or calendar month, excluding the date from which the period is reckoned and including the date of performance, and a tender of payment by check — though not per se equivalent to payment — becomes legally effective when the creditor has consented to that mode of payment, estopping him from subsequently refusing it.

The plaintiffs and the defendant were parties to a civil case that they compromised on July 13, 1928, under an agreement that the plaintiffs could repurchase certain land within one month from that date; if they failed to do so, ownership would vest in the defendant. The dispute turned on whether the plaintiffs validly exercised their right to repurchase within the agreed period and in the proper form of payment. The governing legal framework included section 13 of the Administrative Code, which defines "month" as the civil or calendar month and prescribes the rule for computing fixed periods, as well as provisions of the Civil Code and the Negotiable Instruments Law on the effect of payment by check.

The plaintiffs and the defendant were litigants in a civil case that they compromised on July 13, 1928. Under the compromise agreement, the plaintiffs were granted one month from that date to repurchase certain land from the defendant; if they failed to do so within that period, ownership of the land would vest in the defendant.

On August 12, 1928, the day before the period was to expire, Felipe Gutierrez, one of the plaintiffs, went to the defendant to tender the repurchase. According to Felipe Gutierrez's testimony, the defendant told him on that day that he would accept the repurchase by check. The defendant denied having so consented. The following day, August 13, 1928, the plaintiffs formally tendered the repurchase amount by check, but the defendant refused to accept it, contending that the stipulated period had already elapsed, that tender by check was legally insufficient, and that the trial court's valuation of the land at ₱27,000 was groundless.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the tender was made within the stipulated period and in proper form. The defendant appealed, raising three assignments of error: the timeliness of the tender, the sufficiency of payment by check, and the valuation of the land.

• Computation of Period: Whether the plaintiffs' tender to repurchase the land on August 13, 1928, was made within the stipulated one-month period counted from July 13, 1928.
• Sufficiency of Payment by Check: Whether the tender of the repurchase amount by check was legally sufficient to compel the defendant to accept it.
• Valuation of the Land: Whether the trial court's holding that the land is valued at ₱27,000 is groundless and warrants reversal.

• Computation of Period: Yes. The stipulated month began on July 14 and ended on August 13, the date from which the period is reckoned being excluded and the date of performance included, pursuant to section 13 of the Administrative Code.
• Sufficiency of Payment by Check: Yes. Although payment by check does not per se constitute payment, the defendant had consented to that mode of payment on August 12, estopping him from refusing it the following day.
• Valuation of the Land: No. The assignment of error touching the value of the land has no bearing on the decision and does not affect the result, thus providing no ground for reversal.

• Computation of Period: The determination of when the stipulated month terminated depends on the kind of month agreed upon and the day from which it is counted. Under section 13 of the Administrative Code, which modified article 7 of the Civil Code, "month" means the civil or calendar month — not a regular thirty-day month. A calendar month is a month as designated in the calendar, ending on the day in the succeeding month corresponding to the day in the preceding month from which computation began. Section 13 further provides that in computing a fixed period, the day from which the time is reckoned is excluded and the date of performance is included, unless otherwise provided. The agreement stated "one month from this date," referring to July 13, 1928, which is the date to be excluded. The civil month of thirty-one days therefore began on July 14 and ended with the close of August 13. Since the plaintiffs offered to repurchase on August 13, the offer was made within the stipulated period. This ruling followed Guzman vs. Lichauco (42 Phil. 291) and Villegas vs. Capistrano (9 Phil. 416).

• Sufficiency of Payment by Check: Payment by check does not per se have the effect of payment, as provided in section 189 of Act No. 2031 (Negotiable Instruments Law), article 1170 of the Civil Code, and settled jurisprudence. However, Felipe Gutierrez testified that the defendant told him on August 12 that he would accept the repurchase by check. While the testimony was not very explicit, the Court deemed it established by a preponderance of evidence, considering all the circumstances. The defendant, having consented to repurchase by check and having signified that the plaintiffs could return to their home on that basis, was estopped from refusing such payment the following day, because he induced the plaintiffs to act upon the belief that he had consented to that manner of payment. The check was neither alleged nor proved to be defective. The tender was therefore legally effective and sufficient to compel the defendant to accept it.

• Valuation of the Land: The last assignment of error regarding the value of the land could not be a cause for reversal because, under the circumstances of the case, it had no bearing on the decision and did not affect the result.

• Computation of Fixed Periods (Section 13, Administrative Code) — In computing any fixed period of time for the performance of an act required by law or contract, the day from which the time is reckoned is excluded and the date of performance is included, unless otherwise provided. The Court applied this rule to the phrase "one month from this date" in the compromise agreement, holding that July 13 was excluded and August 13 included, making the tender timely.

• Civil or Calendar Month — Under section 13 of the Administrative Code, which modified article 7 of the Civil Code, "month" means the civil or calendar month, not a regular thirty-day month. A calendar month ends on the day in the succeeding month corresponding to the day in the preceding month from which computation began; if the last month has not so many days, then on the last day of that month.

• Estoppel by Consent to Mode of Payment — Although payment by check does not per se constitute payment, a creditor who consents to that mode of payment and induces the debtor to act upon that belief is estopped from subsequently refusing to accept payment by check. The Court applied this doctrine where the defendant told the plaintiff on August 12 that he would accept repurchase by check, then refused the check the following day.

• "In computing any fixed period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done at a certain time or within a certain limit of time, the day of date, or day from which the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided." — This is the Court's quotation of section 13 of the Administrative Code, the controlling rule for computing the stipulated repurchase period and the ratio decidendi for the timeliness of the tender.

• "The defendant having thus consented to the repurchase by check and having signified that by reason of such repurchase the plaintiffs could return to their home, said defendant was in estoppel, and could not, on the following day, refuse to accept such payment by check, because he induced the plaintiffs to act upon the belief that he had consented to said manner of payment." — This passage articulates the estoppel doctrine applied to make the check tender legally effective, the second pillar of the Court's ruling.

• Guzman vs. Lichauco, 42 Phil. 291 — Followed. Established that article 7 of the Civil Code was modified by section 13 of the Administrative Code, such that "month" means the civil or calendar month rather than a regular thirty-day month.
• Villegas vs. Capistrano, 9 Phil. 416 — Followed. Held that a period of three months counted from February 13 did not expire on May 12, illustrating the rule that the date from which the period is reckoned is excluded.
• Bryan, Landon Co. vs. American Bank, 7 Phil. 255 — Cited for the proposition that payment by check does not per se have the effect of payment.
• Tan Sunco vs. Santos, 9 Phil. 44 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the insufficiency of check payment per se.

• Section 13, Administrative Code — Defines "month" as the civil or calendar month and prescribes the rule for computing fixed periods: the day from which time is reckoned is excluded and the date of performance is included. Applied to determine that the one-month repurchase period from July 13 ended on August 13.
• Article 7, Civil Code (old) — Originally defined "month" as a regular thirty-day period; modified by section 13 of the Administrative Code to mean the civil or calendar month.
• Article 1130, Civil Code (old) — Contains a similar provision to section 13 of the Administrative Code on the exclusion of the starting date in computing periods.
• Section 4, Code of Civil Procedure — Contains a similar provision on the computation of periods.
• Section 189, Act No. 2031 (Negotiable Instruments Law) — Provides that payment by check does not per se have the effect of payment unless and until the check is cashed.
• Article 1170, Civil Code (old) — Cited in connection with the rule that payment by check does not per se constitute payment.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concurred.