Gutierrez Repide vs. Astuar

A voluntary proceeding for possession under Title XIII, Book 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is converted into a contentious proceeding when any person in actual occupation of the land objects to the delivery of possession or refuses to recognize the petitioner as owner. The phrase “without prejudice to third persons” in article 2016 of the same Code refers to persons other than the occupant from whom possession is taken; the occupant is necessarily prejudiced and may validly oppose, causing the voluntary suit to end.

The Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company claimed ownership of two haciendas — San Isidro Labrador (Naic) and Santa Cruz (Tanza) — situated in the Province of Cavite. On June 26, 1901, through its attorney Baldomero de Hazañas, the company filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Cavite under Title XIII, Book 3 of the then-operative Code of Civil Procedure, praying that it be placed in judicial possession of the estates and that the tenants and occupants be required to recognize it as owner.

• Nature of the Action: The Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, a corporation represented by its general administrator Francisco Gutierrez Repide, instituted voluntary proceedings under Title XIII, Book 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to obtain judicial possession of two estates — Hacienda San Isidro Labrador (Naic) and Hacienda Santa Cruz (Tanza) — together with a demand that tenants and occupants recognize the company as possessor.

• The Initial Order: On June 27, 1901, the Court of First Instance of Cavite granted the petition and directed the justices of the peace of Naic and Santa Cruz to carry out the proceedings prescribed by articles 2017 and 2018 of the Code. The petition did not request that demand for recognition be made upon any tenant other than the military officer and the occupant of the hydraulic mill in Naic.

• Opposition in Santa Cruz: When the justice of the peace of Santa Cruz attempted to execute the order on July 15, 1901, he was met by the local president, the military commander, and approximately 200 inhabitants who protested, refused to recognize the company’s representative, and objected to the proceeding. The justice suspended further action and sought instructions. The court directed him to record the protest, after which Eduardo Imzon y Ison, on behalf of the people of Santa Cruz, filed a formal objection on July 20, 1901. The court suspended proceedings by telegraph that same day.

• Opposition in Naic: The order reached the justice of the peace of Naic only on August 21, 1901. He made written demand upon the military officer occupying the main house and upon the local president who held the hydraulic machinery, requiring them to recognize the petitioner as owner. The local president, following instructions of the municipal council, refused on August 30, 1901. After notices were published, over 200 residents filed a protest before the justice on August 24, 1901, stating they occupied portions of the land, opposed the claimed possession, and prayed that proceedings be suspended and the company be required to assert its rights in an ordinary action. A formal written protest bearing over 200 signatures was presented to the Court of First Instance on August 26, 1901.

• Symbolic Possession and Formal Opposition: Although the court, on August 28, 1901, provisionally suspended proceedings and ordered the justice of the peace to report whether the opposition covered all lands, the justice — before receiving that order — proceeded on August 30, 1901, to give symbolic possession to the company’s representative in the public plaza of Naic while reading the order aloud. Even at that act, many inhabitants opposed and filed a written statement of protest. The trial court found that no effective possession had been conferred.

• Declaration of Contention: On September 12, 1901, the Court of First Instance declared the entire matter contentious. The petitioner appealed, arguing that the voluntary proceeding could not be opposed, that the opposition was irregular, and that the proceeding should not have been declared contentious in its entirety.

• Nature of the Proceeding: Petitioner argued that the proceeding under Title XIII was wholly voluntary and allowed no opposition to alter its character; the acts ordered by the court amounted merely to notification of a change of ownership and not a judicial dispossession that could be resisted.

• Lack of Proper Opposition: Petitioner maintained that even if opposition were permissible, it was not properly made because the court had not demanded individual recognition from each occupant before the protests were lodged, and symbolic possession in Naic had already been given before any formal opposition was presented.

• Scope of the Declaration: Petitioner contended that the opposition, if valid at all, related only to parts of the estates, and that the court therefore erred in declaring the entire matter contentious instead of limiting the contentious aspect to the disputed portions.

• Right to Possession: Respondents, the opposing occupants, argued that as persons in actual occupation of the lands they had a right to be respected in their possession under articles 441 and 446 of the Civil Code, and could not be evicted through a mere voluntary proceeding without being heard in an ordinary action.

• Application of Article 1800: Respondents maintained that their opposition made them interested parties within the meaning of article 1800 of the Code of Civil Procedure, thus requiring the court to declare the matter contentious and to allow them to litigate their rights in a proper suit between parties.

• Sufficiency of Representation: Respondents asserted that the mass protests before the justice of the peace and the formal written protest signed by over 200 actual occupants in the Court of First Instance were sufficient to constitute opposition under the law, and that no particular form of opposition was required.

• Conversion to Contentious Proceeding: Whether voluntary proceedings for possession under Title XIII, Book 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure are subject to article 1800 of the same Code, such that the opposition of an actual occupant converts the suit into a contentious proceeding.

• Sufficiency of Opposition: Whether the protests made by the occupants in Naic, consisting of a mass objection before the justice of the peace and a formal written protest in court, constituted sufficient opposition to warrant a declaration that the entire matter had become contentious.

• Conversion to Contentious Proceeding: The voluntary proceedings under Title XIII are subject to article 1800 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The civil possession sought to be conferred under Title XIII is the same possession defined in the Civil Code — a possession that includes the fact of occupation. Because every occupant has the right to be respected in his possession under article 446 and may refuse to deliver possession under article 441, a mere occupant is an interested party whose opposition necessarily puts an end to the voluntary character of the suit. The proceeding cannot produce its intended effect — the transfer of possession — if the person in actual occupation refuses either to abandon the property or to recognize the petitioner as owner. Article 1800 therefore compels the court to declare the matter contentious when such an interested person objects.

• Sufficiency of Opposition: The opposition made by the more than 200 tenants of Naic was sufficient. The record showed that these persons were actual occupants of the land described in the petition. Because petitioner did not ask that demand for recognition be made upon them individually, they did all they could by presenting a formal written protest, signed by over 200 persons, directly to the Court of First Instance. No particular form of opposition is required; the occupant’s mere refusal suffices. The symbolic act of possession performed by the justice of the peace on August 30, 1901, occurred after the protest had been filed in court and even after the court had ordered suspension; it therefore had no legal effect. Moreover, because the opposition covered at least a part of the lands, and petitioner did not seek to amend the petition by omitting those contested lands, the entire proceeding was properly declared contentious. The failure to limit the contentious declaration rested on the petitioner, not on the court.

• Effect of Opposition by Bare Possessor — A proceeding for possession under Title XIII, Book 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is voluntary only so long as no actual occupant objects. The bare possessor, by virtue of articles 441 and 446 of the Civil Code, has the right to be respected in possession and cannot be evicted without a proper ordinary action. His refusal to deliver possession or to recognize the petitioner as owner makes him an “interested party” under article 1800 and converts the suit into a contentious one, regardless of whether he presents title or proof of any right other than the fact of occupation.

• Meaning of “Without Prejudice to Third Persons” — The phrase found in article 2016 of the old Code of Civil Procedure refers to third persons other than the occupant from whom possession is taken. When a voluntary proceeding results in the delivery of possession by the consent of the occupant, it does not prejudice strangers. The occupant, however, is necessarily prejudiced because possession is taken from him, and he may therefore oppose.

• Sufficiency of Opposition — No particular form of opposition is required to convert the proceeding. It is enough that the occupant manifests his refusal to recognize the petitioner’s possession or to surrender the property. A formal written protest filed in court by numerous individuals claiming to be actual occupants is sufficient.

• Scope of Declaration of Contention — If opposition is made as to only a portion of the lands involved, the entire proceeding becomes contentious unless the petitioner moves to amend the petition by striking out the contested properties. The burden of limiting the dispute falls on the petitioner.

• “The phrase ‘without prejudice to third persons’ must be interpreted in the sense that, if the proceedings in the suit of voluntary jurisdiction are made effective by the consent of the tenant, they do not prejudice persons other than the petitioner and the tenant. By this proceeding the possession is either conferred upon the petitioner or is not conferred. If it is not conferred, the proceeding produces no effect. If the possession is given, by that very act the person who was in possession is evicted, and therefore is necessarily prejudiced by the act. It is impossible to give the possession to the petitioner without taking it from him who was in possession, to the prejudice of the latter.”

• “Under article 446 it is evident that the mere occupant has an interest in the matter, and that, in accordance with article 441, his opposition is sufficient to put an end to the suit of voluntary jurisdiction, and, under article 1800 of the Law of Civil Procedure, sufficient to justify the action of the court in making the suit contentious.”

• “We therefore hold that if, either before or in the act of giving possession in accordance with Title XIII, the bare possessor objects to the proceeding, it must be made contentious. It is not necessary that this opposition should be made in any particular form. It is sufficient, for the purposes of article 441, that the occupant is opposed to the delivery.”

• Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, March 24, 1896 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that article 1800 of the Law of Civil Procedure applies to voluntary possession proceedings under Title XIII, Book 3. The Court followed this Spanish holding.
• Manresa, Commentaries on the Law of Civil Procedure, vol. 6, pp. 117, 481–483 — Invoked as doctrinal support for the same rule.

• Article 1800, Code of Civil Procedure (old) — If opposition is made by anyone who has an interest in the matter, the voluntary suit shall be made contentious. Applied here because the actual occupant, as an interested party, objected to the delivery of possession.
• Articles 441 and 446, Civil Code — Article 441 provides that one who believes he has a right to deprive another of possession must seek the aid of the proper authority if the occupant objects. Article 446 gives every occupant the right to be respected in his possession. These provisions were central to the ruling that a bare possessor cannot be evicted through a non-adversarial proceeding and that his objection terminates the voluntary suit.
• Articles 430, 431, 438, 440, Civil Code — Definitions and principles of possession, including that possession includes occupation and cannot exist without it (art. 430); that possession may be held by another in the owner’s name (art. 431); that possession may be acquired by legal formalities (art. 438); and that direct transmission occurs only by operation of law upon death (art. 440).
• Articles 2016, 2017, 2018, Code of Civil Procedure (old) — Provisions governing the procedure for judicial delivery of possession and the publication of notices.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concurred.