Gulang vs. Nadayag

Affirmative defenses not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, except lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction; a co-defendant who neither joined nor adopted an untimely motion to amend the answer cannot benefit from it after the movant abandons it. The trial court's factual finding of encroachment, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and supported by the relocation survey, was not disturbed.

Maria Gulang owned a 40-square-meter parcel in Port Area, Iligan City, covered by Tax Declaration No. 76-281591 and TCT No. T-12999, while the Nadayag co-owners held a 62-square-meter parcel in the same area covered by Tax Declaration No. 76-18851 and TCT No. T-15334. Pedro Lasmarias had purchased from the Nadayags' predecessor-in-interest a 38.5-square-meter parcel adjacent to the Nadayags' lot, and Gulang had rented a 32-square-meter portion and improvements from Lasmarias before acquiring her own lot. The dispute implicated the Rules of Court provisions on amendment of pleadings, waiver of defenses, and pre-trial, particularly Rules 9, 10, 16, and 20.

The Nadayag co-owners held a 62-square-meter parcel in Port Area, Iligan City, covered by Tax Declaration No. 76-18851 and TCT No. T-15334. Maria Gulang owned a 40-square-meter parcel in the same area, covered by Tax Declaration No. 76-281591 and TCT No. T-12999. Before Gulang acquired her lot, she rented a 32-square-meter portion of the same, together with the improvements thereon, from Pedro Lasmarias. Sometime in 1964, Lasmarias purchased from the Nadayags' predecessor-in-interest a 38.5-square-meter parcel adjacent to the Nadayags' 62-square-meter lot. Lasmarias claimed that the 32-square-meter portion was part of the land he had purchased, and Gulang paid rentals for that portion and the house erected thereon to Lasmarias instead of the Nadayags.

On October 24, 1978, Genoveva, Felix, Antipas, Andres, Pedro, and Hilario Nadayag filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte at Iligan City, Branch II, against Maria Gulang and/or Pedro Lasmarias. They alleged that they were co-owners of the 62-square-meter parcel; that Gulang was the registered owner of the 40-square-meter parcel; that Gulang had rented the 32-square-meter portion and improvements from Lasmarias before acquiring her lot; that Lasmarias had purchased the 38.5-square-meter parcel from their predecessor-in-interest in 1964; and that Gulang had been occupying the 32-square-meter portion of their land while paying rentals to Lasmarias, who claimed it was part of his land. They prayed that Gulang be ordered to vacate the 32-square-meter portion and restore possession and/or ownership to them, and that defendants pay back rentals for twelve years from 1966 at P100.00 per month, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs.

The defendants filed a common Answer on November 6, 1978, through Atty. Luis Buendia, denying the claim and alleging as affirmative and special defenses that they were the true, legal, and lawful owners and in actual possession and occupation of the land in question, as evidenced by the original certificate of title in Lasmarias' name and the transfer certificate of title in Gulang's name, describing the property as forty square meters, more or less. They counterclaimed for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

During pre-trial, the parties agreed to have the two lots relocated by surveyors who would jointly conduct the relocation survey. The joint survey was not conducted because the two surveyors failed to make it jointly. Instead, Senior Geodetic Engineer Norberto Carreon of the Bureau of Lands, Land District No. XII-2, Iligan City, conducted a separate survey in September 1979 in the presence of both parties, who indicated to him the extents of their respective occupancies. Carreon's report concluded that Gulang was occupying a portion of Lot No. 6094, Cad. 292, covered by TCT No. T-15314 issued to Genoviva Nadayag, as indicated in the attached sketch plan shaded in black with an area of 30 square meters. Defendants' counsel made an open court manifestation that his clients would not abide by the survey and report.

On February 2, 1981, through a new counsel, Atty. Moises Dalisay, Jr., Lasmarias filed a motion to admit an amended answer, attaching an Amended Answer that introduced the defenses of want of cause of action, prescription, estoppel, laches, and fraud. On February 6, 1981, Gulang filed a similar motion to admit her amended answer, raising the same defenses. The trial court denied these motions in its Order of September 27, 1981, and denied reconsideration on June 1, 1983. After trial, the lower court found that there was undoubtedly an area of 32 square meters in the Nadayags' land encroached upon by Gulang, which should be returned to them. It ordered Gulang to vacate the area and deliver possession to the plaintiffs, and to pay P2,000.00 as attorney's fees; it dismissed all other claims and counterclaims for lack of merit and insufficiency of evidence. The relocation survey had reported 30 square meters, while the trial court found 32 square meters.

• Amendment of Answer: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in denying Pedro Lasmarias' motion to amend his answer as predecessor-in-interest of Maria Gulang.
• Prescription: Petitioner maintained that the lower court erred in not holding that the plaintiffs' action had long prescribed.
• Estoppel: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in not holding that the plaintiffs were estopped from denying the existence of the contract of purchase of the land and house by Pedro Lasmarias, which property was subsequently sold to Maria Gulang, as shown by Exhibits "1" and "2".
• Laches: Petitioner maintained that the lower court erred in not holding that the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed on the ground of laches.
• Encroachment and Fraudulent Title: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in holding that Maria Gulang encroached on 32 square meters of the plaintiffs' land and in ordering her to vacate the same, and in not holding that the plaintiffs' title over the land was acquired through fraudulent means.
• Attorney's Fees: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in ordering Maria Gulang to pay P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

• Amendment of Answer: Whether the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in denying Pedro Lasmarias' motion to admit an amended answer, and whether petitioner Maria Gulang may benefit from that motion as successor-in-interest.
• Waiver of Defenses: Whether the defenses of prescription, estoppel, laches, and fraud were deemed waived for failure to plead them in the original answer or to timely amend.
• Prescription: Whether the action had prescribed.
• Estoppel: Whether private respondents were estopped from denying the existence of the contract of purchase of the land and house by Pedro Lasmarias, later sold to Maria Gulang.
• Laches: Whether the complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of laches.
• Encroachment: Whether Maria Gulang encroached upon 32 square meters of private respondents' land and should vacate the same.
• Fraudulent Title: Whether private respondents' title over the land was acquired through fraudulent means.
• Attorney's Fees: Whether the award of P2,000.00 attorney's fees was proper.

• Amendment of Answer: No. The motion to amend was filed long after pre-trial and after the case was placed on the trial calendar; under Rule 10, Sections 2 and 3, leave was required and was properly refused because the proposed amendment substantially altered the defense. Petitioner also did not join or adopt Lasmarias' motion and cannot benefit from it.
• Waiver of Defenses: Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 9, defenses not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Prescription, estoppel, laches, and fraud were not timely pleaded and were therefore waived.
• Prescription: Not reached on the merits; the defense was deemed waived, subject to the recognized exception that prescription is not waived if the complaint or evidence clearly shows prescription.
• Estoppel: Not reached on the merits; the defense was deemed waived.
• Laches: Not reached on the merits; the defense was deemed waived.
• Encroachment: No reversible error. The trial court's finding, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and supported by the relocation survey, was not disturbed.
• Fraudulent Title: Not reached on the merits; the fraud defense was among those deemed waived.
• Attorney's Fees: No reversible error. The petition was denied for lack of merit, and the award of P2,000.00 attorney's fees was not disturbed.

• Amendment of Answer: Section 2, Rule 10 permits amendment as a matter of right only before a responsive pleading is served, or within ten days after service if no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed on the trial calendar. Lasmarias' motion was filed on February 2, 1981, long after pre-trial was terminated and the case was placed on the trial calendar. Under Section 3, Rule 10, substantial amendments after the case is set for hearing require prior leave, which may be refused if the amendment would delay the action or substantially alter the cause of action or defense. The proposed amended answer introduced want of cause of action, prescription, estoppel, laches, and fraud, substantially altering the defense. The trial court correctly denied the motion. Petitioner did not join or adopt Lasmarias' motion; she was not a party to it, and she cannot benefit from it after Lasmarias abandoned it by failing to appeal. Her status as successor-in-interest did not improve her position because the defenses were waived by Lasmarias' failure to plead them and exercise his rights under Rule 10.
• Waiver of Defenses: Section 5, Rule 16 allows dismissal grounds to be pleaded as affirmative defenses. Section 2, Rule 9 provides that defenses and objections not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Because prescription, estoppel, laches, and fraud were not in the original answer and the motions to amend were properly denied, these defenses were waived. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the second to fifth assigned errors raised these defenses for the first time on appeal.
• Prescription: The Court cited authority that prescription is not deemed waived, even if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, if the plaintiff's allegation in the complaint or the evidence presented clearly shows that the action has prescribed. It cited Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House and related cases. In this case, however, the defense was not timely pleaded and the petition was denied for lack of merit; the waiver ruling was not disturbed.
• Estoppel: No separate merits discussion appears; estoppel was among the defenses introduced only in the untimely amended answer and was deemed waived under Section 2, Rule 9.
• Laches: No separate merits discussion appears; laches was among the defenses introduced only in the untimely amended answer and was deemed waived under Section 2, Rule 9.
• Encroachment: The trial court found that Gulang encroached upon 32 square meters of the Nadayags' land. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court saw no reason to disturb the finding because it was supported by the evidence. The relocation survey conducted by Senior Geodetic Engineer Norberto Carreon, prepared in the presence of both parties who indicated the extents of their respective occupancies, disclosed that Gulang was occupying a portion of Lot No. 6094, Cad. 292, covered by TCT No. T-15314 issued to Genoviva Nadayag, shaded in black with an area of 30 square meters. The Court thus sustained the encroachment finding.
• Fraudulent Title: No separate merits discussion appears; the claim that the Nadayags' title was acquired through fraudulent means was among the defenses introduced only in the untimely amended answer and was deemed waived under Section 2, Rule 9.
• Attorney's Fees: No separate discussion appears. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in toto, including the award of P2,000.00 attorney's fees, and the Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. No reversible error was shown.

• Waiver of Defenses Not Pleaded (Rule 9, Section 2) — Under Section 2, Rule 9, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court applied this to prescription, estoppel, laches, and fraud, which were not in the original answer and could not be added through the untimely amended answer. It also noted exceptions: lack of cause of action may be raised later; jurisdiction may be raised at any stage but can be barred by laches or estoppel; prescription may be raised despite non-pleading if the complaint or evidence clearly shows prescription.
• Amendment of Pleadings (Rule 10, Sections 2 and 3) — A party may amend once as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served, or within ten days if no responsive pleading is permitted and the action is not on the trial calendar. After the case is set for hearing, substantial amendments require prior leave, which may be refused if the amendment would delay the action or substantially alter the cause of action or defense. The Court applied this to deny Lasmarias' and Gulang's motions to amend because they were filed long after pre-trial and after the case was placed on the trial calendar and added new defenses.
• Pre-trial as Opportunity to Amend (Rule 20, Section 1) — One purpose of pre-trial is to consider the necessity or desirability of amendments to pleadings. A defendant who fails to raise additional defenses before pre-trial cannot later amend as a matter of right; the Court held Lasmarias should have raised his other defenses during pre-trial.
• Successor-in-Interest Cannot Benefit from Co-Defendant's Abandoned Motion — A co-defendant who neither joined nor adopted another defendant's motion to amend the answer cannot benefit from that motion, especially after the movant abandons it by failing to appeal. The Court applied this to Maria Gulang, notwithstanding her claim as successor-in-interest of Lasmarias.
• Findings of Fact Supported by Evidence and Affirmed by the Court of Appeals Are Not Disturbed — The Court will not disturb factual findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals when supported by evidence. The relocation survey supported the encroachment finding.

• "In the instant case, the motion to amend was filed long after the pre-trial was terminated and the case placed on the trial calendar." — This passage supports the denial of the motions to amend under Rule 10, because the case was no longer at a stage where amendment was available as a matter of right.
• "Under Section 3 of Rule 10, substantial amendments may be made even after the case has been set for hearing provided prior leave of court is obtained. Such leave may be refused if the motion requesting for the same would delay the action or the cause of action or defense would be substantially altered by the proposed amendment." — This states the controlling rule on substantial amendments after the case has been set for hearing and explains why the trial court's refusal was proper.
• "Petitioner, therefore, cannot benefit from Lasmarias' action, which ultimately failed, or revive the same after the latter unilaterally and voluntarily abandoned it by failing to appeal from the decision." — This is the ratio for rejecting Maria Gulang's attempt to rely on her co-defendant's untimely motion to amend.
• "As to whether or not petitioner had encroached upon the lot of private respondents, We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on this matter which were subsequently affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals; such findings are supported by the evidence." — This passage states the Court's deference to the factual finding of encroachment, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and supported by the relocation survey.

• De Jesus vs. Manglapus, 81 Phil. 114 [1948]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Azur vs. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]; Quiaoit vs. Consolacion, 73 SCRA 208 [1976] — Cited for the rule that lack of cause of action may be raised in a motion to dismiss after the answer, by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at trial on the merits.
• Lagman vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCRA 228 [1972]; People vs. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750 [1990] — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]; Quimpo vs. Dela Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972]; Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 49 SCRA 1 [1973]; People vs. Munar, 53 SCRA 278 [1973]; Capilitan vs. de la Cruz, 55 SCRA 706 [1974]; Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]; Tejones vs. Gironella, 159 SCRA 100 [1988]; Marquez vs. Secretary of Labor, 171 SCRA 337 [1989]; Banaga vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 181 SCRA 599 [1990] — Cited for the rule that a party may be barred from raising jurisdiction on the ground of laches or estoppel.
• Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766 [1969], citing PNB vs. Perez, G.R. No. L-20412, 28 February 1966, and Chua Lamko vs. Dioso, 97 Phil. 821; Garcia vs. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250 [1980]; Aznar III vs. Bernad, 161 SCRA 276 [1988] — Cited for the rule that prescription is not deemed waived if the plaintiff's allegations or evidence clearly show the action has prescribed.

• Section 5, Rule 16, Rules of Court — Provides that any ground for dismissal under Rule 16, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. The Court cited this in connection with the requirement that defenses be timely pleaded.
• Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court — Provides that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court applied this to hold that prescription, estoppel, laches, and fraud were waived.
• Section 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court — Provides that a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served, or within ten days after service if no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed on the trial calendar. The Court used this to show that the motions to amend were not filed as a matter of right.
• Section 3, Rule 10, Rules of Court — Provides that substantial amendments may be made after the case has been set for hearing only upon prior leave of court, which may be refused if the motion would delay the action or substantially alter the cause of action or defense. The Court held the trial court correctly applied this provision in denying the motions to amend.
• Section 1, Rule 20, Rules of Court — Provides that one purpose of pre-trial is to consider the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings. The Court held Lasmarias should have raised his additional defenses during pre-trial.

Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J. (Chairman), was on official leave.