Guiao vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847 imposes a clear, unqualified, and ministerial duty on PAGCOR to remit 5% of its gross income to the Philippine Sports Commission without deducting franchise tax or government shares, and on PCSO to remit 30% of the charity fund from six sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum, including lotto draws; mandamus lies to compel these remittances.

Republic Act No. 6847, enacted on January 4, 1990, created the Philippine Sports Commission as a corporate body primarily tasked to carry out the national policy of developing and fostering sports and physical education. Section 26 of its charter established the National Sports Development Fund and designated several funding sources, including 5% of PAGCOR’s gross income and 30% of the charity fund from six sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum from PCSO. Petitioner Joseller M. Guiao was an incumbent member of the House of Representatives for Pampanga, Vice Chairperson of the House Committee on Youth and Sports Development, a taxpayer, former athlete, sportsman, and former coach of the Philippine national basketball team. PAGCOR and PCSO are government agencies under the Executive branch and the direct control and supervision of the Office of the President.

Joseller M. Guiao was then a member of the House of Representatives and Vice Chairperson of the House Committee on Youth and Sports Development. On April 26, 2016, he filed a Petition for Mandamus before the Supreme Court against the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the Office of the President, alleging that they failed to comply with the funding requirements in Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847, otherwise known as the Philippine Sports Commission Act. The provision requires that 30% representing the charity fund of the proceeds of six sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum, taxes on horse races during special holidays, 5% of the gross income of PAGCOR, the proceeds from the sale of stamps, and 3% of all taxes collected on imported athletic equipment be automatically remitted directly to the Philippine Sports Commission and constituted as the National Sports Development Fund.

Guiao claimed that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to remit 5% of its gross income to the Philippine Sports Commission. He attached a Memorandum dated November 5, 1993 addressed to then President Fidel V. Ramos, issued by his Executive Secretary, which sought the President’s approval of percentage allocations made by PAGCOR as to its income: BIR Franchise Tax, 5.0% prior and 5.0% proposed; National Government Share, 45.12% prior and 47.5% proposed; NPC Subsidy, none prior and 4.75% proposed; PSC Share, 4.75% prior and 4.51% proposed; and PAGCOR, 45.13% prior and 38.24% proposed. Guiao alleged that the recommendation was approved by the President in a Memorandum dated November 10, 1993. Thereafter, in another Memorandum dated February 20, 1995, PAGCOR again recommended an allocation of its earnings: BIR Franchise Tax, 5.0%; National Government’s Share, 47.5%; NAPOCOR’s Subsidy, 4.75%; PSC’s Share, 4.51% present and 2.1375% proposed; and PAGCOR, 38.24% present and 40.6125% proposed. The Memorandum provided that beginning CY 1995, PAGCOR shall compute the 5% share of the Philippine Sports Commission based on the amount after deducting the 5% Franchise Tax, the 50% share of the National Government, and NAPOCOR’s 10% income share. Guiao alleged that the Memorandum was approved by the President, and claimed that by reducing the PSC share to 2.1375% through a Memorandum approved by the President, PAGCOR failed to correctly remit to the Philippine Sports Commission its share of its earnings.

Guiao similarly claimed that PCSO, contrary to Section 26, had not been remitting to the Philippine Sports Commission the mandated 30% representing the charity fund and the proceeds of six sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum since 2006. The only exception was in the years 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2015, where PCSO remitted amounts to the Philippine Sports Commission in the form of “donation.” Guiao argued that the government agencies involved grossly violated their duty to implement the law, thereby causing lack of funding for sports development projects, which constituted exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify resort to the Court. He invoked that the case was an exception to the rule on hierarchy of courts due to special and important reasons, as deprivation of the Philippine Sports Commission’s funding would deteriorate sports development in the country and undermine the role of sports in nation-building. He added that there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and that the issues were of public interest, constitutional in nature, and of transcendental importance, and that the Petition posed an actual controversy. He prayed that PAGCOR and the Office of the President be ordered to account and remit the full amount equivalent to 5% of PAGCOR’s gross income in favor of the Philippine Sports Commission, without any deductions, beginning October 1, 1993 up to the present; and that PCSO be ordered to fully account and remit in favor of the Philippine Sports Commission the total amount of 30% representing the charity fund and the proceeds of six sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum beginning 2006 up to the present, and until Republic Act No. 6847 has been revoked, superseded, or amended by the Legislative department.

PAGCOR filed a Comment/Opposition, arguing that the Philippine Sports Commission was not entitled to the full 5% gross income of PAGCOR because its share was subject to deductions for the payment of 5% franchise tax and 50% share of the national government, and that the requisites for questioning the validity of a governmental act were not complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion, praying that it be excused from participating because PAGCOR and PCSO were represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, and the Office of the President was a mere nominal party. PCSO filed a Comment, arguing that Guiao had no legal standing to file the Petition, that he failed to follow the doctrines on the hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies, and that the Petition violated the rule on hierarchy of courts and was the wrong remedy. PCSO maintained that under Republic Act No. 6847, the Philippine Sports Commission’s allocations would be sourced from sweepstakes draws, and not from other PCSO lottery games, and that it complied in good faith with its obligations under the law.

Guiao filed a Consolidated Reply, insisting that he had legal standing and that there were compelling reasons for the Court to exercise jurisdiction. He argued that the deplorable condition of Philippine sports was due to the involved government agencies’ failure to provide the required funding as mandated in Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847. He maintained that mandamus was the proper remedy and insisted that PAGCOR’s act of lowering the allocation of funds to the Philippine Sports Commission was illegal, and that PCSO should remit the amounts mandated in Section 26. In its Memorandum, PAGCOR repeated that the Petition must be denied due to Guiao’s lack of legal standing, claiming that it was the Philippine Sports Commission, as the aggrieved party, that had the capacity to sue and question PAGCOR’s remittance. It added that Guiao violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the rule on hierarchy of courts, and insisted that it was correct in first deducting the 5% franchise tax, the 50% share of the national government, and the 10% subsidy to the National Power Corporation before remitting the Philippine Sports Commission’s 5% share. PCSO likewise claimed that Guiao failed to show his legal standing, that the Philippine Sports Commission’s charter specifically granted it the power to sue to enforce its rights, and that even if Guiao had locus standi, mandamus cannot lie against it because his assertion that the Philippine Sports Commission’s allocations should include online lottery draws had no legal basis, and its remittance of funds was not ministerial. In his Memorandum, Guiao reiterated his prayer for mandamus, alleging that the clear intent of the Legislature was for PAGCOR to automatically remit 5% of its gross income without deducting the 5% franchise tax and 50% share of the national government, and that there was no need to harmonize the provisions of Republic Act No. 6487, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7648, and Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. He also insisted that PCSO must be compelled to automatically remit 30% representing the charity fund of the proceeds of six sweepstakes or lottery draws per year, and echoed Department of Justice Opinion No. 95, which opined that the phrase “shall be automatically transmitted to the [Philippine Sports] Commission” leaves no room for interpretation. The parties were subsequently ordered to move in the premises to inform the Court of any developments that could affect the disposition of the Petition, and they filed separate Compliances informing the Court that there were no supervening events involving the matters in the case.

• Legal Standing: Petitioner argued that he had legal standing as an incumbent member of the House of Representatives, an avid sportsman, a concerned citizen, and a taxpayer; the refusal of respondents to comply with Section 26 infringed upon his duties, rights, and prerogatives as a legislator, and he had willingly sacrificed his time, efforts, talents, and resources for Philippine sports.
• Hierarchy of Courts and Exhaustion: Petitioner maintained that the case was an exception to the rules on hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies due to special and important reasons, because deprivation of the Philippine Sports Commission’s funding would deteriorate sports development and undermine the role of sports in nation-building; there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; and the issues were of public interest, constitutional in nature, and of transcendental importance, posing an actual controversy.
• PAGCOR’s Remittance: Petitioner argued that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to remit 5% of its gross income to the Philippine Sports Commission; the 1993 and 1995 Memoranda reduced the Philippine Sports Commission’s share to 2.1375%; the clear intent of the Legislature was automatic remittance without deductions; there was no need to harmonize Republic Act No. 6487, Republic Act No. 7648, and Presidential Decree No. 1869; and Department of Justice Opinion No. 95 stated that “shall be automatically transmitted” leaves no room for interpretation.
• PCSO’s Remittance: Petitioner claimed that PCSO failed to remit the mandated 30% representing the charity fund and the proceeds of six sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum since 2006, except in 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2015 when it remitted amounts as “donation”; PCSO should remit the amounts mandated in Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847.
• Mandamus Propriety: Petitioner maintained that mandamus was the proper remedy because the government agencies grossly violated their duty to implement the law, causing lack of funding for sports development projects, which constituted exceptional and compelling circumstances.

• PAGCOR — Lack of Legal Standing: PAGCOR argued that the Petition for Mandamus must be denied due to Guiao’s lack of legal standing to file it, claiming that it is the Philippine Sports Commission, as the aggrieved party, that has the capacity to sue and question PAGCOR’s remittance.
• PAGCOR — Exhaustion and Hierarchy: PAGCOR maintained that Guiao violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the rule on hierarchy of courts for having filed the Petition immediately before the Supreme Court.
• PAGCOR — Computation of 5% Share: PAGCOR insisted that it was correct in first deducting the 5% franchise tax, the 50% share of the national government, and the 10% subsidy to the National Power Corporation before remitting the Philippine Sports Commission’s 5% share, and that the Philippine Sports Commission is not entitled to the full 5% gross income because its share is subject to deductions.
• PAGCOR — Validity of Governmental Act: PAGCOR claimed that the requisites for questioning the validity of a governmental act were not complied with.
• PCSO — Lack of Legal Standing: PCSO argued that Guiao failed to show his legal standing to file the Petition, and that the Philippine Sports Commission’s charter specifically granted it the power to sue in order to enforce its rights.
• PCSO — Hierarchy and Exhaustion: PCSO alleged that the Petition violated the rule on hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies and was the wrong remedy.
• PCSO — Scope of Section 26: PCSO maintained that under Republic Act No. 6847, the Philippine Sports Commission’s allocations would be sourced from sweepstakes draws, and not from other PCSO lottery games; it complied in good faith with its obligations; and even if Guiao had locus standi, mandamus cannot lie against it because his assertion that the allocations should include online lottery draws has no legal basis, and its remittance of funds was not ministerial.
• PCSO — Donations and Agreements: PCSO stated that due to the declining sales of the regular sweepstakes, it entered into agreements with the Philippine Sports Commission to remit various amounts in favor of the latter, which it claimed was a show of steadfast compliance on its part.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Whether the Petition for Mandamus is proper.
• Locus Standi: Whether petitioner Joseller M. Guiao has locus standi to file the Petition.
• Hierarchy of Courts and Exhaustion: Whether the Petition was filed in violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies.
• PAGCOR’s Compliance with Section 26: Whether respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation violated Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847 in its remittances to the Philippine Sports Commission.
• PCSO’s Compliance with Section 26: Whether respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office violated Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847 in its remittances to the Philippine Sports Commission.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Yes. Mandamus lies because Section 26 creates a clear legal right in the Philippine Sports Commission and a correlative ministerial duty on PAGCOR and PCSO to remit; no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists.
• Locus Standi: Yes. Guiao has legal standing as a legislator because the alleged underfunding infringes the legislature’s power of the purse; in any case, the transcendental importance of the issue warrants relaxation of the standing rules.
• Hierarchy of Courts and Exhaustion: No. The Petition was not filed in violation of the hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies; exceptions apply because the case involves significant legal questions and established facts, and exhaustion would be futile since the Office of the President approved the memoranda.
• PAGCOR’s Compliance with Section 26: Yes. PAGCOR violated Section 26; the 5% share must be based on gross income without deductions, and the 1993 and 1995 Memoranda are void.
• PCSO’s Compliance with Section 26: Yes. PCSO violated Section 26; the 30% charity fund from six sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum includes lotto draws, and PCSO must account and remit for 2006 to present.

• Propriety of Mandamus: A writ of mandamus is an order directed to an inferior court, tribunal, board, corporation, or person for the performance of a particular specified duty resulting from official station or operation of law. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it issues when a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The requisites are: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it is the duty of the defendant to perform the act because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847 imposes an unqualified duty on PAGCOR and PCSO to remit specified percentages to the Philippine Sports Commission; the duty is ministerial, and the Petition presented a clear legal right and correlative duty. Thus, mandamus is proper.

• Locus Standi: Legal standing requires a personal and substantial interest such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. For legislators, standing exists when official action violates the prerogatives of their office; members of Congress may question the validity of official action that infringes on their prerogatives as legislators, including acts amounting to usurpation of legislative power. Guiao was an incumbent member of Congress for Pampanga, a taxpayer, former athlete, sportsman, and former coach of the Philippine national basketball team. The Court found that petitioner had sufficiently established an apparent, long-standing, and systematic refusal on the part of respondents to provide complete funding to the Philippine Sports Commission, tantamount to infringing a valid law and interfering with the legislature’s power of the purse. The promotion of sports programs is part of the Constitution. Thus, Guiao had legal standing as a legislator. In any event, the Court may relax the rules on standing when the issues involved are of transcendental importance or paramount public interest, as demonstrated in Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Hon. Garcia, Jr. and Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. The Philippine Sports Commission itself had the duty and right to file a petition to compel PAGCOR and PCSO to remit the correct amounts, but it turned a blind eye to its own mandate; the Court would not sit idly by while the Commission slept on its rights and duties, because the ultimate losers are Filipino athletes and youth.

• Hierarchy of Courts and Exhaustion: Although the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, the hierarchy of courts requires that the writ be filed in the lower court when competent, unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify direct recourse to the Supreme Court. Here, the controversy involved significant legal questions that deserved direct recourse, and the facts necessary to resolve those legal questions had been established by the parties and need not be threshed out in a trial court. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is likewise not an iron-clad rule; it is flexible and admits exceptions, including when the issue involved is purely a legal question, when the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and when requiring exhaustion would be unreasonable. Both respondents belong to the Executive branch and are under the direct control and supervision of the Office of the President; the memoranda being followed by PAGCOR had been approved by the same office, so requiring petitioner to seek recourse from the Office of the President would be a futile exercise. Moreover, the Philippine Sports Commission had been neglected for decades; without sufficient funding, its entire existence is made futile and its role in sports development and nation-building rendered nugatory. These exceptional circumstances justified relaxation of the procedural rules.

• PAGCOR’s Compliance with Section 26: Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847 provides that “five percent (5%) of the gross income of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation” shall be automatically remitted directly to the Commission and constituted as the National Sports Development Fund. The remittance required by Section 26 is unqualified; it does not state that the computation of the 5% is arrived at after deducting the franchise tax. Presidential Decree No. 1869, Sections 12 and 13, provides for a 5% franchise tax and the 50% share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, but those provisions do not apply when computing for the remittances to the National Sports Development Fund. Republic Act No. 7648, Section 6, expressly states that PAGCOR shall allocate 10% of its annual aggregate gross earnings for the next five years as subsidy to the National Power Corporation, based on gross revenue after deducting the 5% franchise tax and the 50% income share of the National Government; the absence of a similar instruction for the share of the Philippine Sports Commission shows that no deductions are allowed. The February 20, 1995 Memorandum reduced the Philippine Sports Commission’s share to 2.1375% by deducting the 5% franchise tax, the 50% share of the National Government, and the 10% subsidy to the National Power Corporation, which clearly contravened Section 26. Mere memoranda approved by the President cannot find supremacy over a statute. Thus, the 1993 and 1995 Memoranda are void, and PAGCOR must account and remit the full amount of 5% of its gross income per annum from 1993 to present in favor of the Philippine Sports Commission.

• PCSO’s Compliance with Section 26: Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847 provides that PCSO is to allocate “30% representing the charity fund of the proceeds of six (6) sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum” to the Philippine Sports Commission. PCSO argued that this provision pertains to earnings from its sweepstakes and does not cover lotto games, claiming that lotto draws were not yet in existence when the law was enacted. The express terms of the statute must be construed to be applicable to circumstances that come into existence even after the passage of the law, consistent with the general rule that statutes operate prospectively unless the contrary is manifested. The rule ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debumus means that when the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish; a general phrase such as “sweepstakes or lottery draws” should not be reduced into its parts, with one part distinguished from the other, to remove its application from the law. The term “lottery” extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, and various forms of gambling, and has three essential elements: consideration, prize, and chance. Lotto draws conducted by PCSO fall within the definition of “lottery,” because payment for the lotto ticket is the consideration for the chance to win the prize offered in the lotto draw. Thus, the phrase “30% representing the charity fund of the proceeds of six (6) sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum” necessarily includes the lotto games currently being conducted by PCSO and other future games it may introduce which fall under the definitions of “sweepstakes” and “lottery.” Consequently, PCSO has been remiss of its duty; its various agreements with the Philippine Sports Commission do not rectify this, as the latter does not have the authority to approve donations that violate law. PCSO must account and remit to the Philippine Sports Commission the 30% representing the charity fund of the proceeds of six sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum, including its lotto draws, for the years 2006 to present.

• Mandamus; requisites — A writ of mandamus is an order directed to an inferior court, tribunal, board, corporation, or person for the performance of a particular specified duty resulting from official station or operation of law. The requisites are: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it is the duty of the defendant to perform the act because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied these requisites to compel PAGCOR and PCSO to remit under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847.

• Locus standi of legislators — Members of Congress have legal standing to question official action that infringes on their prerogatives as legislators, including acts amounting to usurpation of legislative power. The Court held that Guiao, as an incumbent member of Congress, had standing because the alleged underfunding of the Philippine Sports Commission interfered with the legislature’s power of the purse and infringed a valid law.

• Transcendental importance exception to locus standi — The Court may relax the rules on standing when the issues involved are of transcendental importance or paramount public interest, allowing parties without personal or substantial interest to raise constitutional issues of critical significance. The Court applied this as an alternative basis for Guiao’s standing, given the constitutional significance of funding the Philippine Sports Commission and sports development.

• Hierarchy of courts; exceptions — Although the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction over mandamus, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is improper unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify it, such as when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or when significant legal questions and established facts warrant direct resolution. The Court applied the exception because the case involved significant legal questions and the facts were already established.

• Exhaustion of administrative remedies; exceptions — Recourse through administrative machinery must generally be exhausted before seeking judicial relief, but the doctrine is flexible and admits exceptions, including purely legal questions, patently illegal administrative action, lack of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, urgency of judicial intervention, and futility of exhaustion. The Court applied the exceptions because the Office of the President had approved the memoranda, making recourse to it futile, and because the Philippine Sports Commission had been neglected for decades.

• Mere memoranda cannot prevail over a statute — Administrative memoranda approved by the President cannot override a statute. The Court voided the 1993 and 1995 PAGCOR Memoranda because they contravened Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847 by reducing the Philippine Sports Commission’s share to 2.1375% through deductions not authorized by law.

• When the law does not distinguish; ubi lex non distinguit — When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish; a general phrase should not be reduced into parts to remove its application. The Court applied this to hold that the phrase “sweepstakes or lottery draws” in Section 26 includes lotto draws conducted by PCSO.

• Definition of lottery — Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, and various forms of gambling. It has three essential elements: consideration, prize, and chance. The Court held that PCSO’s lotto draws fall within this definition because payment for the lotto ticket is consideration for the chance to win the prize.

• Statutes operate prospectively — Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. The Court applied this to hold that Section 26’s express terms apply to lotto draws that came into existence after the law’s passage.

• Gross income versus deductions — Section 26’s 5% PAGCOR share is based on gross income without deductions. The Court distinguished Republic Act No. 7648, Section 6, which expressly requires deductions for the National Power Corporation subsidy, and held that the absence of a similar instruction for the Philippine Sports Commission share means no deductions are allowed.

• "For it to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." — This passage states the requisites for a writ of mandamus, which the Court applied in granting the Petition.
• "The applicable provision is Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6847, which clearly and unqualifiedly states that the remittance is 'five percent (5%) of the gross income of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation.'" — This passage is the ratio for holding that PAGCOR’s 5% share must be computed on gross income without deductions.
• "In addition, it is an established rule that when the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debumus." — This passage articulates the statutory construction rule used to hold that the phrase “sweepstakes or lottery draws” includes lotto draws.
• "Surely, mere memoranda approved by the President cannot find supremacy over a statute. Accordingly, the Memoranda should not be sustained." — This passage states the hierarchy-of-laws principle that led to the voiding of the 1993 and 1995 PAGCOR Memoranda.

• Palileo vs. Castro, 85 Phil. 272 (1949) — Held that the legal right of a petitioner in mandamus must be clear and complete, clearly founded in or granted by law; cited to support the requirement of a clear legal right.
• Falcis III vs. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019 — Explained locus standi and direct injury; cited for the rule that even exceptional suits by taxpayers, legislators, or concerned citizens require some injury-in-fact.
• Secretary of Finance Purisima vs. Rep. Lazatin, 801 Phil. 395 (2016) — Reiterated that legislators have legal standing to question official action infringing their prerogatives and acts amounting to usurpation of legislative power; relied on for Guiao’s standing.
• Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374 (2010) — Cited for the transcendental importance exception and legislator standing.
• Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Hon. Garcia, Jr., 309 Phil. 358 (1994) — Recognized that the Court may brush aside procedural infirmities and recognize standing in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised; applied as an alternative basis for standing.
• Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 450 Phil. 744 (2003) — Held that public interest demands a more liberal view of locus standi for legislators, taxpayers, and citizens; also cited for exceptions to the hierarchy of courts.
• Lihaylihay vs. Tan, 836 Phil. 400 (2018) — Explained the hierarchy of courts and that mandamus should be filed in lower courts when competent; also cited for the concurrence of a clear legal right and a correlative duty.
• De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629 (2010) — Enumerated the requisites for mandamus; cited in the Court’s framework.
• Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 709 (2000) — Listed exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; applied to justify direct recourse.
• Uy vs. Palomar, 136 Phil. 492 (1969) — Defined lottery as extending to all schemes for distribution of prizes by chance and enumerated its three essential elements; relied on to include lotto draws.
• Villanueva vs. People, 864 Phil. 855 (2020) — Cited for the rule that when the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
• National Housing Authority vs. Roxas, 772 Phil. 26 (2015) — Cited for the rule that when the law does not indicate exceptions, the Court should not create them.

• Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Defines a petition for mandamus and its requisites; applied to grant the Petition.
• Section 26, Republic Act No. 6847 — Funding provision; requires automatic remittance to the Philippine Sports Commission of 30% charity fund from six sweepstakes or lottery draws per annum, 5% of PAGCOR gross income, and other sources; basis for PAGCOR and PCSO duties.
• Section 12, Presidential Decree No. 1869 — Special condition of PAGCOR franchise; imposes 5% franchise tax and 50% government share; held not applicable to the computation of the Philippine Sports Commission remittance.
• Section 13, Presidential Decree No. 1869 — Exemptions and franchise tax; held not applicable to the Philippine Sports Commission remittance.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 7648 — Electric Power Crisis Act; requires the National Power Corporation subsidy to be based on gross revenue after deducting the 5% franchise tax and 50% income share; contrasted with Section 26 to show no deductions for the Philippine Sports Commission.
• Article XIV, Section 19, 1987 Constitution — Provides for the promotion of physical education and sports; cited to underscore the constitutional significance of Philippine Sports Commission funding.
• Article 4, Civil Code — Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided; applied to hold that Section 26 covers lotto draws after its passage.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6847 — Statutory objectives of the Philippine Sports Commission; cited to describe its mandate.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 6847 — Created the Philippine Sports Commission; cited for its corporate nature and mandate.

Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concurred.