Guevarra vs. Court of Appeals

A decision that has acquired finality may no longer be modified in any respect, and the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of counsel are among the duties of counsel and not the client; service of court resolutions upon the counsel of record constitutes notice to the client himself. The Court may relax the rule on finality of judgments only in rare cases to prevent a miscarriage of justice, considering the factors enumerated in Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals.

Petitioner Renato Guevarra y Robles was a candidate for councilor of Butuan City during the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections, running under the Action Demokratiko Party. He was charged with violating Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10049, which implements Section 6.6 of Republic Act No. 9006 (the Fair Elections Act) and relates to Section 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code). The provision regulates mass media practitioners who are candidates for elective public office, requiring them to be deemed resigned or to take a leave of absence from their work during the campaign period.

Renato Guevarra y Robles was a candidate for councilor of Butuan City during the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections. In an Information dated January 7, 2019, he was charged with violating Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10049 for allegedly engaging in partisan political activity on April 12 and April 23, 2016, between 4:30 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, during the campaign period. As a candidate under the Action Demokratiko Party, and taking advantage of his profession as a radio commentator, he was accused of uttering and broadcasting on the air during his radio program "Batang Butuan: Oras Na! Raon na" on Radyo Trumpeta FM, attacking the candidacy of incumbent Congressman Laurence Lemuel "Law" A. Fortun, whom he named, among others, as "Lawig Traydor," ignorant, liar, power and wealth hungry, corrupt, drug user, and a traitor. Upon arraignment, Guevarra pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution's evidence sought to establish that at the time of the broadcast, Guevarra was a radio commentator for the program "Batang Butuan: Oras Na! Raon Na" aired on Radyo Trumpeta. On April 12 and 23, 2016, three witnesses who were working for the campaign of another candidate recorded the radio program, where Guevarra was heard promoting his own candidacy and that of his party-mates, and maligning other candidates such as Laurence Lemuel A. Fortun.

For his part, Guevarra denied the charge, arguing that as early as 2012, he had resigned from his position as a radio commentator in Radyo Trumpeta. He presented a copy of the resignation letter he sent to the station's acting manager, Elmer Maboloc, and claimed that he went on to teach at an educational institution after his resignation. He averred that his appearance in the radio program on April 12 and 23, 2016 was only as a guest and not as a commentator. Maboloc testified as to Guevarra's resignation as commentator, and Amihan J. Bayer, another radio commentator and Guevarra's former colleague, testified that she interviewed Guevarra in April 2016, clarifying that he was only a guest in the radio program and not considered a commentator or a block-timer. The prosecution then presented a rebuttal witness who testified that contrary to Bayer's testimony, Guevarra was not merely a guest but was the program's anchorman who did the interviewing of the guests, and identified him as among the block-timers who were consistently against Mayor Ronnie Lagnada.

The RTC listened to the broadcast recordings and concluded that far from being a guest, Guevarra was the program's anchorman and commentator. He directed the flow of the program, introduced the guests consisting of his fellow candidates, and even introduced a certain Vic dela Victoria as his "co-anchor." The RTC noted that Guevarra was alone for most of the program, belying the defense that he was a mere guest. The RTC gave little credence to his defense of resignation, ruling that even if it were true, media practitioners who are not employed by any media entity, such as talents or block-timers, are still prohibited by Section 34 from using their time to favor any candidate or party. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision in toto, rejecting Guevarra's argument that the prosecution failed to prove the actual date of broadcast, affirming the RTC's finding that the broadcast mentioned the date and that Guevarra even thanked people who greeted him on his birthday, April 23.

On March 5, 2024, Guevarra sent a Letter to the Executive Clerk of Court III of the Twenty-Third Division of the CA informing her that he had severed his attorney-client relations with his then-counsel, Atty. Cyril Francis S. Casiño, and requesting that subsequent decisions, resolutions, and orders be sent to his address in Butuan City. In its March 25, 2024 Resolution, the CA noted Guevarra's Letter, even listing his new address in Butuan City; nevertheless, the same Resolution was sent to Guevarra's old address in Cavite. When the CA's Resolution reached Guevarra in Butuan City, the time to file a petition for review on certiorari with the Court had passed, and the CA judgment had been entered on August 16, 2024. This prompted Guevarra to file the present Petition for Certiorari, claiming that the CA gravely abused its discretion in failing to send its Resolution to his proper address, and that the courts a quo erred in finding him guilty.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Service of Resolution: Petitioner argued that the CA gravely abused its discretion in failing to send its March 25, 2024 Resolution to his proper address in Butuan City, despite his Letter informing the CA of his change of address and the severance of his attorney-client relations with Atty. Casiño, which resulted in the lapse of the period to file a petition for review on certiorari.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Resignation: Petitioner claimed that the courts a quo erred in finding him guilty of violating Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10049, arguing that the courts should have considered his evidence of having resigned as a commentator as sufficient.

• Non-Violation of Section 34: Petitioner claimed that his actions during the campaign period did not violate Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10049.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the respondents beyond the prosecution's evidence presented before the trial court.

• Finality of Judgment and Service of Resolution: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming Guevarra's conviction and issuing an Entry of Judgment despite not sending its Resolution to Guevarra's proper address.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction: Whether the courts a quo erred in finding Guevarra guilty of violating Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10049.

• Finality of Judgment and Service of Resolution: No. The CA did not gravely abuse its discretion. Service of the CA Resolution upon Atty. Casiño, Guevarra's counsel of record, constituted proper notice to Guevarra himself, and the lapse of the period to file the proper pleading resulted in the finality of the CA decision.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction: No. Even if the rule on finality of judgments were relaxed, no reversible error was found in the assailed CA Decision and Resolution. The factual findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal, are accorded great respect if not conclusive effect, and the courts a quo correctly found that Guevarra was the program's actual host actively practicing his profession during the campaign period.

• Finality of Judgment and Service of Resolution: Once the time to file an appeal has lapsed with no appeal or other suitable remedy being taken, the rule respecting the immutability of final judgments takes effect, ordaining that a decision that has acquired finality may no longer be modified in any respect. The Court recognized exceptions to this rule, citing Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, which allows relaxation of the rules to serve substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. While the Court found that the CA had been remiss in failing to acknowledge Guevarra's new address, it had not erred in sending its Resolution to Atty. Casiño. Despite Guevarra's Letter, Atty. Casiño remained his counsel of record. The termination of an attorney-client relation is the client's absolute right; however, the duty of informing the court of such termination falls to the counsel and not the client. The appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of counsel are among the duties of counsel and not the client. Without a proper notice from counsel, the CA cannot be faulted for considering Atty. Casiño as Guevarra's counsel. Service of the CA Resolution to Atty. Casiño, therefore, is notice to Guevarra himself, and it was incumbent on Atty. Casiño, upon receipt of the CA Resolution, to immediately inform Guevarra of the CA's issuance.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction: A close reading of Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10049 and Section 6.6 of Republic Act No. 9006 shows that they contemplate two classes of offenders committing several unlawful acts. The first is a mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, or reporter who is (1) a candidate for any elective public office, (2) a party-list nominee, or (3) a campaign volunteer for or employed in any capacity by any candidate or party. This sort of offender shall be deemed resigned if required by their employer or shall take a leave of absence from their work during the campaign period, making it unlawful for this kind of offender to fail to take a leave of absence or be deemed resigned from his profession during the campaign period. The second kind of offender is a media practitioner who is an official of a political party or a member of the campaign staff of a candidate or political party, who, while not deemed resigned or ordered to take a leave of absence, is nevertheless ordered by law not to use their time or space to favor any candidate or political party. Both the RTC and CA found that the offense was committed on two dates, April 12 and April 23, 2016, which were within the campaign period for the 2016 National and Local Elections (March 25, 2016 to May 7, 2016). Despite Guevarra's claim of being resigned, both courts found, after listening to the recordings of the radio program, that Guevarra was the program's actual host. Instead of being interviewed, he was the one doing the interviewing. His active role in the radio program included directing its flow and introducing its guests. Thus, the courts a quo found that far from having resigned or taken a leave of absence, Guevarra was actively practicing his profession, and his claim of merely guesting on the show remained a weak denial in the face of the actual recordings. In criminal cases, the Court respects the factual findings of the trial court, and when these findings are affirmed on appeal, they are accorded even greater respect, if not conclusive effect, because the trial court had the unique opportunity to calibrate the evidence as they were presented and to observe the demeanor of witnesses as they testified.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — A decision that has acquired finality may no longer be modified in any respect. Once the time to file an appeal has lapsed with no appeal or other suitable remedy being taken, the rule takes effect. The Court may relax this rule only in rare cases to prevent a miscarriage of justice, considering the factors enumerated in Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

• Duty of Counsel in Withdrawal — The termination of an attorney-client relation is the client's absolute right; however, the duty of informing the court of such termination falls to the counsel and not the client. The appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of counsel are among the duties of counsel and not the client. Without a proper notice from counsel, the court cannot be faulted for considering the former counsel as the client's counsel of record, and service of court resolutions upon the counsel of record constitutes notice to the client himself.

• Two Classes of Offenders under Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10049 — The provision contemplates two classes of offenders: (1) a mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, or reporter who is a candidate for any elective public office, a party-list nominee, or a campaign volunteer for or employed in any capacity by any candidate or party, who shall be deemed resigned if required by their employer or shall take a leave of absence from their work during the campaign period; and (2) a media practitioner who is an official of a political party or a member of the campaign staff of a candidate or political party, who, while not deemed resigned or ordered to take a leave of absence, is nevertheless ordered by law not to use their time or space to favor any candidate or political party.

• Respect for Trial Court Factual Findings — In criminal cases, the Court respects the factual findings of the trial court. When these findings are affirmed on appeal, they are accorded even greater respect, if not conclusive effect, because the trial court had the unique opportunity to calibrate the evidence as they were presented and to observe the demeanor of witnesses as they testified.

• "Once the time to file an appeal has lapsed with no appeal or other suitable remedy being taken, the rule respecting the immutability of final judgments takes effect. It ordains that a decision that has acquired finality may no longer be modified in any respect." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on finality of judgments, which formed the primary basis for dismissing the petition.

• "True, the termination of an attorney-client relation is the client's absolute right; however, the duty of informing the court of such termination falls to the counsel and not the client. The appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of counsel are among the duties of counsel and not the client." — This passage articulates the rule on the duty of counsel in withdrawal proceedings, which the Court applied to hold that service upon the counsel of record constituted proper notice to the petitioner.

• "A close reading of these provisions shows that they contemplate two classes of offenders committing several unlawful acts." — This passage introduces the Court's interpretation of Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10049 and Section 6.6 of Republic Act No. 9006, distinguishing between candidates who must take a leave of absence and media practitioners who must not use their time or space to favor any candidate.

• Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 800 Phil. 50 (2016) — Cited as the source of the exceptions to the rule on immutability of final judgments, enumerating the factors considered in relaxing the rules of procedure to serve substantial justice.

• Denila vs. Republic, 877 Phil. 380 (2020) — Cited for the doctrine that a decision that has acquired finality may no longer be modified in any respect.

• Francisco vs. Portugal, 519 Phil. 547 (2006) — Cited for the rule that the duty of informing the court of the termination of an attorney-client relation falls to the counsel and not the client.

• People vs. Sota, 821 Phil. 887 (2017) — Cited for the principle that the Court respects the factual findings of the trial court in criminal cases, which are accorded even greater respect when affirmed on appeal.

• Section 34, COMELEC Resolution No. 10049 — The provision under which petitioner was convicted. It requires mass media columnists, commentators, announcers, or reporters who are candidates for any elective public office, party-list nominees, or campaign volunteers for or employed in any capacity by any candidate or party to be deemed resigned or to take a leave of absence from their work during the campaign period, and prohibits media practitioners who are officials of a political party or members of the campaign staff of a candidate or party from using their time or space to favor any candidate or party.

• Section 6.6, Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Elections Act) — The statutory provision implemented by Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10049, containing substantially the same prohibition on mass media personalities who are candidates for any elective public office.

• Section 13, Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Elections Act) — Cited in relation to the charge, providing the statutory framework for the prohibition.

• Section 264, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Cited in relation to the charge, providing for the penal sanction for violations of election laws.

• COMELEC Resolution No. 9981 — Cited to establish that the campaign period for candidates of elective regional, provincial, city, and municipal officials was from March 25, 2016 to May 7, 2016, placing the April 12 and April 23, 2016 broadcasts within the campaign period.

• Lazaro-Javier, J.
• J. Lopez, J.
• Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson) — filed a separate concurring opinion.

N/A — No dissenting opinion was noted in the provided text.