Guerrero vs. St. Clare’s Realty Co., Ltd.

Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court disqualifies only parties, their assignors, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, and does not bar mere witnesses; it also does not apply where the defendants are sued in their individual capacities and the disputed property is not part of the deceased’s estate. Testimonial evidence is offered by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify, and a party may not be deemed to have waived the presentation of evidence where procedural errors deprived it of a full opportunity to be heard.

The dispute concerns a 42,299-square-meter parcel in San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, originally held by the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos, whose children included Andres and Cristina Guerrero. Petitioners are the heirs of Andres Guerrero; respondents include the Guerreros who claimed the land and the corporations involved in the property. The case turns on Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the dead man’s rule invoked to disqualify two witnesses, and on the procedural consequences of the trial court’s exclusion of evidence.

The disputed property is a 42,299-square-meter parcel in San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal. During their lifetime, the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos owned the property and had six children: Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose, and Cristina, all surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his death, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed that the questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, while the other children were assigned other lots. Upon Isidoro Guerrero’s death, Andres Guerrero physically possessed the lot and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador Ramirez, who received a 50% share in the net produce, with Andres Guerrero retaining the other 50% and defraying cultivation expenses and real estate taxes. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister Cristina Guerrero and allowed her to have it cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the harvests for as long as she needed the property. Dominador Ramirez continued his tenancy until shortly before Andres Guerrero’s death. Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and their children, who are the petitioners. Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero.

The original and amended complaints alleged that as early as December 10, 1957, the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as Lot No. 4752, Case No. 4, Cadastre No. 229 of the Parañaque Cadastre. Sometime during the latter part of 1971, certain people who introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the land approached some of the plaintiffs to secure their consent to the sale of the property. Said plaintiffs were informed that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero. Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered that Manuel Guerrero had the lot titled in his name on the basis of a “Deed of Sale of Land” dated April 24, 1948 purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero; that he caused the lot to be surveyed in his name as Lot No. 4752 and was issued Advance Plan No. AP-10008 on February 28, 1962; that the advance plan noted that Lot No. 4752 had been previously surveyed for Andres Guerrero; that in 1963, Manuel Guerrero, assisted by Felicisimo Guerrero, father of the defendants Guerreros, filed an application for registration of land with the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina Guerrero, the court ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that despite oppositors’ appeal to a higher court, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 4591 to the applicant; that on September 14, 1971, a “Deed of Absolute Sale” purportedly executed by Manuel Guerrero in favor of the defendants Guerreros was filed with the Register of Deeds of Rizal; that the Register of Deeds gave due course to the registration of that deed, cancelled OCT No. 4591, and issued Transfer Certificate No. 339629 in its stead; that on the same day the deed of sale was registered, the defendants Guerreros caused to be notarized an “Articles of Partnership” of St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as partners; that on September 28, 1971, the defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a “Deed of Absolute Sale” to St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd.; and that by virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 340842 in the name of said realty company. The complaints alleged that the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero was fraudulent, simulated, and falsified because, among other reasons, Cristina Guerrero was not the owner of the land at the time she purportedly sold it; that Manuel Guerrero obtained OCT No. 4591 in fraud of the plaintiffs; that the Deeds of Sale to the defendants Guerreros and St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. and the transfer certificates of title in their favor were fraudulent and simulated, and ineffective against the plaintiffs because, among other reasons, at the time of execution of the Deeds of Sale, the defendants Guerreros knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero; that long after the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs learned that St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. executed a “Joint Venture Agreement” with United Housing Corporation under which the latter bound itself to develop the property into a residential subdivision; and that the agreement was entered into in gross and evident bad faith. The defendants Guerreros alleged that Cristina Guerrero was the absolute owner of the property and that the action had prescribed and they were guilty of laches. St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. averred that its contract with United Housing Corporation was made in good faith. United Housing Corporation averred that there was no privity of interest between the plaintiffs and this defendant because the plaintiffs were not parties to the Joint Venture Agreement.

At the trial, Frisco Cervantes, grandson of Cristina Guerrero, testified for the plaintiffs that he had previous information that the disputed lot was borrowed from Andres Guerrero and that Cristina Guerrero merely mortgaged it to Manuel Guerrero; that in 1968, at the behest of the plaintiffs, he went to Manuel Guerrero’s house in Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, to inquire about the mortgage; that Manuel Guerrero replied that the land had been sold but it would be changed with another lot of the same area; that in 1970, Sotero Cervantes and Laura Cervantes, children of Cristina Guerrero, and he went to see Manuel Guerrero at the Sta. Rita Church in Parañaque, where Sotero and Laura asked if they could get the land back and Manuel Guerrero answered that it were better to change the disputed lot with another parcel of the same area and value; and that, not satisfied with the answer, Frisco Cervantes went to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasig, Rizal, where he obtained a copy of a Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero, which he delivered to the children of Andres Guerrero. Roman Mataverde, Chief Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands designated as Officer-In-Charge of the Surveys Division, testified that in the Bureau’s Lot Data Computation Book showing the list of claimants for Lot 4752, Case 4, Cadastre 299, Parañaque, Rizal (Exhibit A), which was surveyed on December 10, 1957, Andres Guerrero is listed as claimant; that the records of the Bureau of Lands from 1957 until 1962 show no claimant to the property except Andres Guerrero; that in 1962, the Bureau received a letter with an affidavit from Manuel Guerrero requesting that an advance plan be made; and that Advance Plan No. 10008 was made without Andres Guerrero being notified, but the Bureau listed Andres Guerrero as original claimant so that he would not be prejudiced when a case comes to trial. Dominador Ramirez testified that during the rainy season of 1936, Andres Guerrero asked him to work on his land in Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, with an area of four hectares, more or less; that as tenant, his agreement with Andres Guerrero was that he would till the land in consideration of 50% of the harvests, with Andres Guerrero shouldering the cultivation expenses; that from 1936 to about 1941 or 1942, he worked on the land and gave 50% of the produce to Andres Guerrero, who went personally to the field to get the same; and that in 1941 or 1942, he stopped working on the land because war had broken out.

On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes testified that her mother, Cristina Guerrero, had been sick for a long time before she died at the age of 80 years in 1948; that her mother could walk only inside their house in Parañaque; that the money spent for the illness of her mother came from Manuel Guerrero; and that, through her children, Cristina Guerrero could ask money from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that Andres Guerrero had lent to her. After Laura Cervantes had thus testified, counsel for the defendants Guerreros objected to the line of questioning on the ground that the witness was testifying on matters prohibited under Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court. The trial court ruled that the witness may answer, and defendants’ counsel registered a continuing objection. The court allowed the witness to continue her testimony subject to such objection. Resuming her testimony, Laura Cervantes stated that the land was lent by Andres Guerrero to Cristina Guerrero; that Manuel Guerrero loaned money to Cristina Guerrero for quite some time; that shortly after the death of Cristina Guerrero, Manuel Guerrero went to their house, accompanied by Felicisimo Guerrero, and summed up the loans he had extended to Cristina Guerrero in the total amount of P1,900.00; and that Felicisimo Guerrero asked Laura Cervantes to sign a piece of paper to attest to the fact that a certain amount of money had been borrowed from Manuel Guerrero. On October 24, 1973, the defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules of Court. The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs. On November 16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes, as well as other witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify in the case.

On February 12, 1974, plaintiffs filed a motion for the presiding judge to inhibit himself and/or to transfer the case to another branch. Oppositions were filed. On April 26, 1974, the trial court denied the motion. At the continuation of the trial on June 14, 1974, plaintiffs and their counsel failed to appear despite due notice and repeated previous warnings to their lawyer. Instead of appearing in court, plaintiffs, through counsel, filed an urgent motion to reset the hearing, which was opposed by the defendants. On even date, the court issued an order stating that, in view of the non-appearance of the plaintiffs and their counsel, they were deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally offer their evidence in court, and on motion of defendants’ counsels, the Clerk of Court, Atty. Juan A. Carambas, was authorized and commissioned to receive the evidence for the defendants. After the defendants had closed their case, they were given 10 days within which to file their respective memoranda, and the case was deemed submitted for decision after receipt of the complete transcript of stenographic notes. On June 22, 1974, plaintiffs filed a Manifestation to the effect that they did not waive their rights to present further evidence, to cross-examine defendants’ witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence, and that they were reserving the exercise of those rights upon the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the Presiding Judge of the trial court, which they were then preparing to file. On June 25, 1974, plaintiffs instituted the said special civil action, docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. No. SF-03120. The action sought the disqualification of the trial judge from continuing with the hearing of the case. On June 27, 1974, the Court of Appeals denied the petition outright. Copy of the resolution was received by the plaintiffs on July 2, 1974. They filed a motion for reconsideration on July 17, 1974. On the same date, July 17, 1974, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and amended complaint and ordering the plaintiffs to pay damages and attorney’s fees to the defendants. On July 20, 1974, or three days before plaintiffs received the decision, they filed with the trial court a Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela praying that, should the Court of Appeals render an adverse resolution in CA-G.R. No. SF-03120, the lower court should set aside its order of June 14, 1974 and allow plaintiffs to present other evidence, cross-examine witnesses of the defendants, and present rebuttal evidence. On August 21, 1974, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which they received on July 23, 1974. Early in 1975, Judge Arsenio Alcantara, who rendered the decision, was replaced by Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome. In her order of February 13, 1975, Judge Castro-Bartolome resolved that the Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela, having been passed upon by Judge Alcantara by the rendition of the decision dated July 17, 1974, was deemed clearly denied; that the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were denied; and that the motions were not pro-forma and had suspended the running of the period of appeal. On February 21, 1975, plaintiffs perfected their appeal to the Court of Appeals, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57597-R. On April 20, 1981, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the decision appealed from, with modification in regard to damages. On May 27, 1981, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review by certiorari.

The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of the defendants’ evidence and without regard to the proofs that the plaintiffs had presented on July 17, 1974 before the Court of Appeals could finally resolve plaintiffs’ petition to disqualify the trial judge. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the decision sentenced the plaintiffs to pay damages and attorney’s fees, apart from the costs of suit, in the staggering amount of Two Million One Hundred Eighty Three Thousand and Five Hundred (P2,183,500.00) Pesos, without plaintiffs having been given the chance to complete their evidence, to cross-examine the witnesses of the defense, and to present rebuttal evidence.

• Damages: Petitioners argued that there was no basis for the grant of actual, moral, and exemplary damages in the huge amount of over two million pesos.
• Prescription and Laches: Petitioners maintained that the lower tribunals erred in ruling that the action was barred by prescription and laches.
• Disqualification of Witnesses: Petitioners assailed the ruling that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes, and others similarly situated were disqualified to testify.
• Waiver of Evidence: Petitioners argued that they did not waive their right to present evidence when they failed to appear at a hearing set by the trial judge during the pendency of proceedings to disqualify him due to alleged hostility.
• Denial of Opportunity: Petitioners underscored the procedural errors they attributed to the lower courts which resulted in the deprivation of their full opportunity to ventilate their case and prove the validity of their claim.

• Ownership: Defendants Guerreros alleged that Cristina Guerrero was the absolute owner of the property.
• Prescription and Laches: Defendants Guerreros alleged that the action of the plaintiffs had prescribed and they were guilty of laches.
• Good Faith: St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. averred that its contract with United Housing Corporation was made in good faith.
• No Privity: United Housing Corporation averred that there was no privity of interest between the plaintiffs and this defendant because the plaintiffs were not parties to the Joint Venture Agreement.

• Disqualification of Witnesses: Whether Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying and their testimonies excluded under Section 20(a), Rule 130, Rules of Court.
• Dead Man’s Rule: Whether the dead man’s rule applies where the defendants are sued in their individual capacities and the disputed lot is not part of the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero.
• Waiver of Evidence: Whether the exclusion of plaintiffs’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was correctly sustained by the Court of Appeals.
• Formal Offer of Testimonial Evidence: Whether testimonial evidence must be formally offered or is waived absent such offer.
• Remand: Whether the case should be remanded to allow plaintiffs to complete their evidence, cross-examine the defendants’ witnesses, and present rebuttal evidence.

• Disqualification of Witnesses: No. Laura and Jose Cervantes were not parties, assignors, or persons in whose behalf the case was prosecuted; mere witnesses are not covered by Section 20(a), Rule 130.
• Dead Man’s Rule: No. The case was not a claim against the estate of Manuel Guerrero; defendants Guerreros were sued in their individual capacities, and the lot was not part of Manuel’s estate.
• Waiver of Evidence: No. The exclusion of plaintiffs’ evidence and preclusion from further proof was not correctly sustained; testimonial evidence is offered by calling the witness to testify, and the plaintiffs had not completed their evidence.
• Formal Offer of Testimonial Evidence: No. Testimonial evidence need not be formally offered in the manner held by the lower courts; the offer is effected by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify.
• Remand: Yes. The Court of Appeals decision was set aside and the case remanded to allow plaintiffs to complete evidence, cross-examine defense witnesses, and present rebuttal evidence.

• Disqualification of Witnesses: Section 20(a), Rule 130 provides that parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such became of unsound mind. The lower courts erred because Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, neither are they assignors of the parties nor persons in whose behalf the case is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero, and that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero. The incompetency established in the provision affects only the persons therein mentioned, and no others; mere witnesses who are neither parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition. By excluding the testimonies of the two witnesses and barring them from further testifying upon reasoning that unduly strained the meaning of the Rules of Court, the trial court deprived itself of the opportunity of knowing the truth.
• Dead Man’s Rule: The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the dead man’s rule is inapplicable. Statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word “against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person”; the word “representative” includes only those who, like the executor or administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. The words “against the estate of such deceased persons” convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought; only his rights are to be asserted and defended by the person representing him, not the personal rights of such representative.
• Waiver of Evidence: Prior to the issuance of the court’s order of June 14, 1974, by which the plaintiffs were deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally offer their evidence, the following had testified as witnesses of the plaintiffs: Alfredo Zamora, Roman Mataverde, Moises Javillionar, Dominador Ramirez, Bonifacio Sumulong, Frisco Cervantes, Laura Cervantes, and Jose Cervantes. It was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is effected by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions.
• Formal Offer of Testimonial Evidence: The lower courts’ requirement of a formal offer of testimonial evidence was mistaken. Testimonial evidence is offered by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions. The witnesses had already testified, and the plaintiffs had not completed their evidence. The trial court’s order treating the evidence as waived was therefore erroneous.
• Remand: Notwithstanding rigid cross-examination conducted by the lawyers of the defendants, the witnesses discovered facts: in the 1930s Andres Guerrero physically possessed the disputed lot, paid the real estate taxes for it, had it cultivated through a tenant, defrayed the cultivation expenses, and exclusively enjoyed the owner’s share in the harvests; Andres Guerrero loaned the lot to his sister Cristina Guerrero before he died; Cristina Guerrero became ill prior to 1948 and could walk only inside her house in Parañaque, Rizal; the money spent for her illness was borrowed from Manuel Guerrero; after Cristina Guerrero’s death, Manuel Guerrero and Felicisimo Guerrero came to her house and the money loaned to her was totalled in the amount of P1,900.00; on December 10, 1957, the questioned lot was cadastrally surveyed and denominated as Lot 4752 of the Parañaque Cadastre, with Andres Guerrero as the lone claimant; and until 1962, no other person claimed the lot. These proofs bear materially on the questions of whether Cristina Guerrero or Andres Guerrero owned the lot when the former purportedly sold it to Manuel Guerrero in 1948, whether Cristina Guerrero really sold or merely mortgaged the land to Manuel Guerrero, and whether Manuel Guerrero and, after him, the defendants Guerreros were buyers in good faith. Instead of insulating itself from evidence that could lead it to the truth, the trial court should have addressed itself to the questions why, if Cristina Guerrero was the owner in 1948, the cadastral surveyors listed Andres Guerrero as the sole claimant; why until 1962 no other person except Andres Guerrero claimed the lot; why, notwithstanding the purported deed of sale dated April 24, 1948, it was presented for registration almost ten years later only on February 27, 1958; why the deed of sale to Manuel Guerrero stated that he appeared in Parañaque, Rizal, before Atty. Jose D. Villena, who was a notary public in Makati, Rizal; why the area of the land bought by Manuel Guerrero was 33,090 square meters whereas the area of the land sold by him to the defendants Guerreros was 42,299 square meters; and why the deed of sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero stated that the subject parcel was surrounded by muddikes besides the stone monuments that visibly marked all its boundaries, which indicated a previous survey and raised the question whether the deed might have been made after the cadastral survey in 1957 and not in 1948. The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of the defendants’ evidence and without regard to the proofs that the plaintiffs had presented on July 17, 1974 before the Court of Appeals could finally resolve plaintiffs’ petition to disqualify the trial judge. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the decision sentenced the plaintiffs to pay damages and attorney’s fees, apart from the costs of suit, in the staggering amount of P2,183,500.00, without plaintiffs having been given the chance to complete their evidence, to cross-examine the witnesses of the defense, and to present rebuttal evidence. The way the trial court and the Court of Appeals proceeded made litigation more a game of technicalities than a proceeding to search the truth and mete justice. No other fairer course of action was demanded but to remand the case for further proceedings.

• Dead Man’s Rule (Section 20(a), Rule 130, Rules of Court) — The rule disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, from testifying against an executor, administrator, or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, as to matters occurring before the death or unsoundness. It does not bar mere witnesses who are not parties, assignors, or persons in whose behalf the case is prosecuted. It also does not apply where the defendants are sued in their individual capacities and the property is not part of the deceased’s estate. In this case, Laura and Jose Cervantes were mere witnesses, and the defendants Guerreros were sued in their individual capacities over a lot not part of Manuel Guerrero’s estate; hence the rule was inapplicable.
• Offer of Testimonial Evidence — Testimonial evidence is offered by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions; a separate formal offer is not required in the manner applied by the lower courts. The plaintiffs’ witnesses had testified, and the lower courts erred in treating their evidence as waived for lack of formal offer.
• Remand for Further Proceedings — Where a trial court renders judgment solely on the defendants’ evidence, without regard to the plaintiffs’ proofs and without allowing the plaintiffs to complete their evidence, cross-examine the defense witnesses, and present rebuttal evidence, remand is the proper recourse to search for the truth and mete justice. The Court of Appeals decision was set aside and the case remanded accordingly.
• Procedural Rules Should Not Defeat Substantial Justice — Litigation should not become more a game of technicalities than a proceeding to search the truth and mete justice. The mistaken and capricious application of procedural rules that deprived the plaintiffs of a full opportunity to establish their claim warranted setting aside the lower courts’ dispositions.

• "The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero." — This passage states the core reason the dead man’s rule did not disqualify the two witnesses: they were neither parties nor assignors nor persons in whose behalf the case was prosecuted.
• "The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of dead man’s rule." — This passage explains why the dead man’s rule was inapplicable even if the witnesses had been covered, because the action was not against the estate and the defendants were sued in their individual capacities.
• "It was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is effected by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions." — This passage defines how testimonial evidence is offered and rejects the lower courts’ waiver theory.
• "The way the trial court and the Court of Appeals proceeded in this case, litigation became more a game of technicalities than a proceeding to search the truth and mete justice. No other fairer course of action is demanded but for this Court to remand the case for further proceedings." — This passage articulates the rationale for setting aside the Court of Appeals decision and remanding the case.

• Section 20(a), Rule 130, Rules of Court — The dead man’s rule. It disqualifies parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, from testifying against an executor, administrator, or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death or unsoundness. The provision was held inapplicable to Laura and Jose Cervantes because they were mere witnesses, and inapplicable to the case because the defendants Guerreros were sued in their individual capacities and the disputed lot was not part of Manuel Guerrero’s estate.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concurred. Teehankee (Chairman), J., took no part.