GSIS vs. Court of Appeals

An unlisted illness is compensable under P.D. No. 626 despite the absence of proof that the risk of contracting it is increased by working conditions, where the current state of medical science renders it impossible for the claimant to produce such evidence.

Abraham Cate served in the Philippine Navy, the Philippine Constabulary, and later the Philippine National Police (PNP), reaching the rank of Senior Police Officer IV. In 1993, he was diagnosed with Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma, underwent surgery and radiotherapy, and was compulsorily retired from the PNP in 1994. He filed a claim for income benefits with the GSIS, which was denied on the ground that Osteosarcoma is not an occupational disease and no evidence linked it to his working conditions. Cate died in 1995, and his heirs pursued the claim.

• Military and Police Service: Abraham Cate joined the Philippine Navy as a Rifleman in 1974, transferred to the Philippine Constabulary in 1986, and was absorbed into the PNP in 1991 as SPO4.
• Illness and Medical Treatment: In 1993, Cate complained of a mass on his left cheek. A biopsy at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) revealed Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma. He underwent total maxillectomy with orbital exenteration in October 1993. A recurrence was noted in April 1994, prompting a debulking operation and radiotherapy.
• Claim for Benefits: Compulsorily retired on December 1, 1994, Cate filed a claim for income benefits with the GSIS under P.D. No. 626 on December 20, 1994.
• Denial by GSIS and ECC: GSIS denied the claim, stating Osteosarcoma is not an occupational disease and no increased risk from working conditions was shown. The ECC affirmed the denial, noting Cate failed to prove his ailment was traceable to his work, citing medical findings that no definite etiology can be determined for osteogenic sarcoma.
• Court of Appeals Reversal: The CA reversed the ECC, holding that the failure to present evidence of a causal relation was due to the lack of available proof. It applied a liberal construction of the Employees' Compensation Act, resolving the benefit of the doubt in favor of the claimant given the unknown origin of the disease.

• Compensability Requirements: Petitioners averred that under P.D. No. 626 and Tanedo v. ECC, compensation cannot rest on presumption; the disease must be listed by the ECC, or substantial evidence must show that working conditions increased the risk of contracting it.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioners argued that respondents' speculation about Cate's exposure to elements like a virus during his stint as a rifleman does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence, as awards of compensation cannot rest on speculation and presumption.

• Liberal Construction of Social Legislation: Respondents maintained that the Employees' Compensation Act is a social legislation designed to afford relief to working men and must be liberally construed in favor of the applicant.
• Impossibility of Proof: Respondents contended that the failure to present positive evidence of a causal relation was due to the pure and simple lack of available proof, given that medical science has yet to unravel the cause of Osteosarcoma. Denying compensation under such circumstances was argued to be unrealistic, illogical, and unfair.

• Compensability of Unlisted Illness: Whether Osteosarcoma is compensable under P.D. No. 626 despite the absence of substantial evidence proving that the risk of contracting it was increased by the employee's working conditions.

• Compensability of Unlisted Illness: The ailment is compensable. While the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation require proof that the risk of contracting an unlisted disease is increased by working conditions, the condition is deemed not imposed where it is practically undisputed that the required proof is unavailable and impossible to comply with under the present state of science. The obligation to present impossible evidence is void pursuant to Article 1183 of the Civil Code. Consistent with the beneficial purpose of social legislation, the benefit of the doubt must be resolved in favor of the claimant.

• Impossibility of Performance in Evidentiary Requirements — Where the present state of scientific knowledge renders it impossible for a claimant to prove that the risk of contracting an unlisted disease was increased by working conditions, the evidentiary requirement imposed by the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation is deemed not imposed. An obligation to present impossible evidence is considered void.
• Liberal Construction of Employees' Compensation Law — The Employees' Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to working men; thus, it should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, and doubts resolved in favor of compensability.

• "Considering, however, that it is practically undisputed that under the present state of science, the proof referred by the law to be presented by the deceased private respondent claimant was unavailable and impossible to comply with, the condition must be deemed as not imposed."
• "The obligation to present such as an impossible evidence must, therefore, be deemed void."

• Tanedo v. ECC, G.R. No. L-62300, September 25, 1987 — Cited for the rule that compensation awards can no longer rest on presumption but must be supported by substantial evidence that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease. Distinguished: The rule applies, but the impossibility of producing such evidence excuses compliance.
• Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989 — Cited for the dissenting opinions of Justices Sarmiento and Paras, which advocated resolving doubts in favor of the employee when medical science cannot ascertain the cause of the disease. Adopted: The Court adopted the reasoning from these dissents.
• Government Service Insurance System v. Villamayor, G.R. No. 154386, August 22, 2006 — Cited for the definition of substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
• Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144449, March 23, 2006 — Cited for the rule that awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions.

• Article 167(l), Labor Code of the Philippines — Defines sickness as any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Applied to determine the conditions for compensability of an unlisted disease.
• Section 1(b), Rule III, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation — Provides that for sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must result from an occupational disease listed in Annex "A", otherwise proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. Applied as the standard requirement, which was deemed waived due to impossibility.
• Article 1183, New Civil Code — Provides that impossible conditions shall not be deemed imposed. Applied to hold that the obligation to present impossible evidence is void.

Reynato S. Puno (C.J.), Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Renato C. Corona, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro