Grey vs. Carandang

The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction where the main case has already been fully litigated and decided, and its decision has become final and executory, because there remains no final decision on the merits that the Court of Appeals could review by appeal or writ of error.

Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey, deceased, bequeathed the naked ownership of a parcel of land on Ongpin St., Manila, and the building and improvements thereon to petitioners Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar and Jose M. Grey, while granting respondent Josefa Fabie de Carandang a life usufruct over the same property. The improvements were destroyed during the battle for the liberation of Manila, and the Philippine War Damage Commission paid petitioners war damage indemnification. The dispute centers on the respective rights and obligations of the naked owners and the usufructuary regarding war damage payments, real estate taxes, and the execution of prior judgments.

Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey, in her will, bequeathed the naked ownership of a parcel of land situated on Ongpin St., Manila, together with the building and improvements thereon, to petitioners Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar and Jose M. Grey, while granting respondent Josefa Fabie de Carandang a life usufruct over the same property. The improvements on the land were destroyed during the battle for the liberation of the City of Manila. The Philippine War Damage Commission paid petitioners a certain sum as war damage indemnification. Respondent, for her part, paid the real estate taxes due on the land for the years 1945 to 1954.

On October 2, 1952, petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 17674 in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to limit respondent's usufruct to the legal interest on the value of the land. After trial, the court rendered judgment on August 10, 1953, declaring that respondent's life usufruct continued over the property with the exclusive right to collect all rents during her life, that she was entitled to 6% of the P8,574.00 received as war damage indemnification from January 11, 1950, that she was entitled to reimbursement of P1,989.27 paid as real estate taxes, P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs against petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the CFI decision insofar as it held that respondent's usufruct subsisted and that she was entitled to 6% of the war damage payments, but reversed the decision by deferring reimbursement of the P1,989.27 in real estate taxes until the termination of the usufruct and denying attorney's fees. On further appeal to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-13361, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioners should not be made to reimburse the real estate taxes paid by respondent for 1945 to 1954. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court further modified the judgment by eliminating the requirement that petitioners give security for the payment of legal interest on the war damage amount.

After the record was remanded for execution, respondent filed a motion praying that the court order payment of legal interest on the war damage payments for the period January 11, 1950 to January 11, 1960, and P196.32 annually thereafter during the existence of the usufruct. Petitioners opposed the motion, alleging that respondent had failed to pay real estate taxes for the years 1954 to 1959, causing the property to be declared delinquent and sold at public auction to one Mrs. Pilar T. Bautista; that respondent failed to repurchase the property despite her obligation to do so; that on June 8, 1959, petitioners repurchased the property for P715.05 and paid all back taxes up to 1957, bringing their total real estate tax payments to P3,495.00; and that consequently, respondent's usufruct was extinguished and they were entitled to reimbursement. On these grounds they prayed for denial of respondent's motion or suspension of the writ of execution until the question of the termination of respondent's usufruct had been finally settled.

On July 2, 1960, the CFI issued a writ of execution but ordered the sheriff to withhold the sum of P3,495.90, representing real estate taxes paid by petitioners and the amount spent in repurchasing the property, for disposition in a separate incident or independent action. Respondent moved for reconsideration, which was denied on August 25, 1960, the court explaining that it merely desired the judgment be enforced in the correct and proper manner given the parties' divergence of views on the tax liability question. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28196-R), which annulled the CFI orders and directed the judge to issue the writ of execution in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by respondent because the writ sought was not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the main case having been fully decided and its decision having become final and executory.
• Extinguishment of Usufruct and Right to Reimbursement: Petitioners alleged that respondent's failure to pay real estate taxes for 1954 to 1959 caused the property to be sold at public auction, and respondent's failure to repurchase it extinguished her usufruct; petitioners repurchased the property for P715.05 and paid back taxes totaling P3,495.00, entitling them to reimbursement and warranting denial or suspension of the writ of execution.
• Improper Remedy and No Grave Abuse of Discretion: As affirmative defenses in the certiorari proceeding, petitioners argued that appeal in due time was the proper remedy against the orders complained of, and that the respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders.

• Annulment of CFI Orders: Respondent contended that the CFI orders of July 2 and August 25, 1960 were not in conformity with the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. L-13361, as modified by the resolution of February 10, 1960, and sought their annulment through certiorari.
• Unconditional Right to Execution: Respondent argued that the CFI orders imposed a condition on the execution of a judgment that had already become final and executory, thereby modifying the final decision.

• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain respondent's petition for certiorari, given that the main case had already been fully decided and its decision had become final and executory.
• Validity of the CFI Orders: Whether the CFI's orders of July 2 and August 25, 1960, which withheld a disputed sum during execution, constituted a modification of the Supreme Court's final decision or a permissible stay of execution.

• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: No. The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari because the main case had already been fully litigated and decided, and its decision had become executory; there was nothing left for the Court of Appeals to review on appeal or writ of error, its appellate jurisdiction having already been exercised and exhausted.
• Validity of the CFI Orders: No, the orders did not modify the final judgment. The CFI's order withholding the disputed sum constituted a mere stay of execution, authorized by jurisprudence where changed circumstances make execution inequitable.

• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A writ is in aid of appellate jurisdiction if the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the final decision that might be rendered in the principal case by the court against which the writ is sought. In Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., the Court held that the determining factor is whether the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over the final decision on the merits of the principal case. However, Breslin is distinguishable because there, no trial and decision on the merits had yet occurred—the case had been dismissed before trial, so it was still reasonable to say the writ was in aid of appellate jurisdiction. In the present case, the main case had already been fully decided by the CFI, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court; the decision had become executory and the record remanded for execution. There was absolutely nothing left of the substance of the action to be resolved. The Court of Appeals' appellate jurisdiction had already been exercised and exhausted with the rendition of its decision in CA-G.R. No. 11917-R. Any appeal from the orders complained of would involve only a question of law—whether the CFI had jurisdiction to issue them—falling under the Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the certiorari petition. The Court, however, exercised its own original jurisdiction to decide the petition on the merits to save time and avoid unnecessary expense, following the practice adopted in the Breslin case.

• Validity of the CFI Orders: A decision, once executory, is beyond amendment, and the prevailing party is entitled to execution as a matter of right; the writ of execution must conform to the decision. However, a stay of execution may be authorized if necessary to accomplish the aims of justice, as where a change in the situation of the parties makes execution inequitable. Petitioners alleged that respondent failed to pay real estate taxes for 1954 to 1959, causing the property to be sold at public auction; that petitioners repurchased the property and paid back taxes totaling P3,495.00; and that respondent's usufruct may have been extinguished. If proven, these facts would give petitioners at least a prima facie case against respondent. The CFI's order withholding the disputed sum for disposition in a separate proceeding did not modify the final judgment or impose a condition on its enforcement; it was a mere stay of execution authorized by the doctrines in Chua Lee vs. Mapa and Li Kim Tho vs. Sanchez.

• Writs in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals — Under Section 30 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and other auxiliary writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. A writ is "in aid of appellate jurisdiction" if the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final decision that might be rendered in the principal case by the court against which the writ is sought. The determining factor is whether the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over the final decision on the merits of the principal case—not whether the specific interlocutory order complained of is itself appealable to the Court of Appeals. However, where the main case has already been fully decided and the decision has become final and executory, the Court of Appeals' appellate jurisdiction has been exhausted, and it can no longer issue writs in aid of that jurisdiction; any further question of law falls under the Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

• Stay of execution of final judgments — A final and executory judgment is beyond amendment, and the prevailing party is entitled to execution as a matter of right; the writ of execution must conform to the decision. Nevertheless, a stay of execution may be authorized where a change in the situation of the parties makes execution inequitable. An order withholding a disputed sum during execution, pending resolution in a separate proceeding, does not modify the final judgment or impose a condition on its enforcement but constitutes a permissible stay of execution.

• "anyone of the writs aforesaid is in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal within the meaning of the law, if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final decision that might be rendered in the principal case by the court against which the writ is sought." — This passage defines the test for determining whether a writ of certiorari is "in aid of the appellate jurisdiction" of the Court of Appeals under the Judiciary Act.

• "The main case (Civil Case No. 17674 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) had already been finally decided, first by the Court of First Instance of Manila, then by the Court of Appeals and lastly, by Us; our decision had become executory, for which reason the record of the case was remanded below for purposes of execution; there was absolutely nothing left of the substance of the action to be resolved." — This passage explains why the Breslin doctrine does not apply: the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals had already been exercised and exhausted, leaving nothing to review.

• "a stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized if necessary to accomplish the aims of justice, as for instance, where there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable" — This articulates the doctrine permitting stay of execution despite finality, which the Court applied to uphold the CFI's withholding order.

• Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., 47 O.G. 1170 — Distinguished. The Court held in Breslin that a writ of certiorari is in aid of the Court of Appeals' appellate jurisdiction if the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the final decision on the merits. The present case was distinguished because in Breslin, no decision on the merits had yet been rendered, whereas here the case had been fully litigated and decided through all three tiers of the judiciary.

• Buenaventura vs. Garcia, 78 Phil. 759 — Followed for the rule that a decision, once executory, is beyond amendment, and the writ of execution must conform to the decision.

• Chua Lee vs. Mapa, 51 Phil. 624-625 — Followed for the doctrine that a stay of execution may be authorized where changed circumstances make execution inequitable.

• Li Kim Tho vs. Sanchez, 83 Phil. 776, 778 — Followed alongside Chua Lee for the same doctrine on stay of execution due to changed circumstances.

• Section 30, Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) — Grants the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and other auxiliary writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The provision was applied to determine whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over respondent's certiorari petition, the Court concluding it did not because the appellate jurisdiction had already been exhausted.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Makalintal, JJ.