Great Pacific Employees Union and Rodel P. de la Rosa vs. Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, et al.

A worker or union officer who knowingly participates in illegal acts during a strike may be dismissed; affidavits, though generally infirm in regular courts unless the affiants are presented, are acceptable in labor proceedings, and excluding union officers from reinstatement for such acts is a valid exercise of management prerogative, not unfair labor practice.

Great Pacific Life Employees Union and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation were parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement effective 1 July 1990 until 30 June 1993. Rodel P. de la Rosa was the Union’s Vice President. The Labor Code recognizes the right to strike but prohibits violence, coercion, intimidation, and obstruction of free passage to and from the employer’s premises during a strike.

Great Pacific Life Employees Union and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation entered in 1990 into a Collective Bargaining Agreement effective 1 July 1990 until 30 June 1993. Rodel P. de la Rosa was the Union’s Vice President. On 18 May 1993, about a month and a half before the CBA expired, the parties submitted their respective proposals and counter-proposals for renewal. The negotiations resulted in a deadlock, prompting the Union on 23 September 1993 to file a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Despite several conciliatory conferences, the impasse remained unresolved, and on 3 November 1993 the Union, led by its President Isidro Alan B. Domingo and Vice President Rodel P. de la Rosa, went on strike.

On 6 November 1993, GREPALIFE required all striking employees to explain in writing within forty-eight hours why no disciplinary action, including possible dismissal, should be taken against them for committing illegal acts during the strike, particularly on 4 and 5 November. They were warned that failure to submit explanations within the period would be construed as waiver of the right to be heard. The directive was triggered by violent incidents during the strike: strikers reportedly blocked all points of ingress and egress of the company premises in Makati City, preventing GREPALIFE employees from entering their offices, and employees and third persons doing business with the company, including lessees of the GREPALIFE building, were allegedly forced by strikers to submit their cars, vehicles, bags and other belongings to illegal search.

Complying with the order, Domingo and some strikers explained that they did not violate any law because they were merely exercising their constitutional right to strike. De la Rosa and the rest of the strikers ignored the management directive. GREPALIFE found Domingo’s explanation unsatisfactory and considered de la Rosa as having waived his right to be heard. On 16 November 1993, both union officers were notified of the termination of their services, effective immediately, as Senior Benefits Clerk and Senior Data Analyst, respectively. All other strikers whose explanations were found unacceptable or who failed to submit written explanations were likewise dismissed. Notwithstanding their dismissal, Domingo and de la Rosa continued to lead the striking union members in their concerted action against management.

In the meantime, the NCMB resumed conciliatory conferences. On 11 February 1994, GREPALIFE submitted a draft Agreement denominated by the Union as the “last and final offer by Management,” which proposed among others that employees subject of dismissal notices be reinstated under the same terms and conditions prior to dismissal; that reinstatement be conditioned upon the submission by Domingo and de la Rosa of their voluntary resignations upon signing; that the resignations, effective thirty days after submission, would mean they need not report to the company and would be considered on leave with pay for outstanding vacation leave credits; and that they be given separation pay at one month basic pay per year of service based on the new CBA rates. On 14 February 1994, the Union assented, stating that management would make full and immediate implementation of all terms and conditions agreed upon, that the Union would lift the picket lines, and that all employees concerned would terminate the strike and return to work on 16 February 1994. The Union also stated that its acceptance should not be interpreted as acquiescence to any portion contrary to law or public policy and that if any portion were held invalid, the remainder would not be affected.

On 15 February 1994, the Union and GREPALIFE executed a Memorandum of Agreement before the NCMB which ended their dispute. Paragraph 4 of the MOA provided that, except for Domingo and de la Rosa, employees subject of dismissal notices on account of illegal acts committed during the strike would be given amnesty and reinstated under the same terms and conditions prior to their dismissals, and that Domingo and de la Rosa reserved their right to question before the NLRC the validity or legality of their dismissal. Domingo and de la Rosa filed a joint letter of resignation with the company but emphasized that their resignation was submitted only because it was demanded by the company and should not be understood as a waiver of whatever rights they may have under existing contracts and labor and social legislation. The MOA was subsequently incorporated in a new CBA signed on 4 March 1994 but made effective 1 July 1993 until 30 June 1996.

On 2 June 1994, Domingo and de la Rosa sued GREPALIFE for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages. The Labor Arbiter found that the evidence of the company, consisting of affidavits of its employees, was self-serving and inadequate to prove the illegal acts allegedly committed during the strike by Domingo and de la Rosa. The Labor Arbiter considered the demand for resignation in exchange for the reinstatement of all strikers as a scheme to get rid of the complainants and noted the undue haste with which their services were terminated. The NLRC, on the other hand, found that a just cause for dismissal had been sufficiently established but that the company failed to comply strictly with the requirements of due process prior to termination.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner de la Rosa asserted that he was illegally dismissed because his actual participation in the illegal acts during the strike invoked by GREPALIFE as basis for his dismissal was not adequately established.
• Forced Resignation: Petitioner de la Rosa complained that he was later forced to resign by management.
• Unfair Labor Practice and Damages: Petitioner de la Rosa claimed that GREPALIFE unreasonably singled out the top officers of the Union, including himself, as unfit for reinstatement; that this constituted unfair labor practice; and that he was entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

• Illegal Dismissal: Whether de la Rosa was illegally dismissed because his actual participation in illegal acts during the strike was not adequately established.
• Forced Resignation: Whether de la Rosa was forced to resign by management.
• Unfair Labor Practice: Whether GREPALIFE committed unfair labor practice by singling out the top officers of the Union, including de la Rosa, as unfit for reinstatement.
• Damages: Whether de la Rosa is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

• Illegal Dismissal: No. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion; unrebutted affidavits established de la Rosa’s participation in illegal acts during the strike, and the Labor Code allows a worker or union officer who knowingly participates in illegal acts during a strike to be declared to have lost employment status.
• Forced Resignation: No. The final MOA did not carry the condition requiring resignations; the resignation letter was never acted upon, and de la Rosa had already been dismissed, leaving no employment to resign from.
• Unfair Labor Practice: No. Not every unfair act or decision constitutes unfair labor practice; the prohibited acts relate to the workers’ right to self-organization, and no discrimination based on union membership or testimony was proved.
• Damages: No. Because the dismissal was legal and no unfair labor practice was established, moral and exemplary damages are not warranted.

• Illegal Dismissal: The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions. The Labor Code prohibits violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike and prohibits obstruction of free passage to and from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes. Under the provision cited in the text as Article 262, paragraph (a) — with footnote 14 referring to Article 264, paragraph (e) — any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost employment status. GREPALIFE submitted affidavits of its employees, two of whom were security guards who specifically described the incidents on 4 and 5 November 1993: strikers blocked ingress and egress, surrounded vehicles, inspected them, forced drivers to open trunks, placed wooden benches in front of vehicles, prevented employees from entering, frisked persons and inspected bags, and confiscated GREPALIFE business documents. The affidavits named Domingo and de la Rosa as participants. De la Rosa did not refute these affidavits. Although affidavits may be regarded as infirm evidence before regular courts unless the affiants are presented on the stand, such affidavits are acceptable in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter under Section 7, Rule V, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which are not strictly governed by technicalities of law and procedural rules save for the constitutional requirements of due process; Section 3, paragraph 2, of the same Rule allows verified position papers to be accompanied by affidavits of witnesses in lieu of direct testimony. The Labor Arbiter may employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts. Since de la Rosa presented no countervailing evidence, the NLRC correctly appreciated the affidavits as adequately establishing the charges against him and justifying his dismissal. The NLRC’s finding of just cause but non-compliance with due process, with the corresponding one-month salary award, was affirmed.
• Forced Resignation: The draft Agreement submitted by GREPALIFE before the NCMB expressly proposed that reinstatement of dismissed employees be conditioned on the voluntary resignations of Domingo and de la Rosa, and the Union was amenable to this proposition. However, the final MOA did not carry this condition. Paragraph 4(b) merely expressed a reservation by Domingo and de la Rosa of their right to question before the NLRC the legality of their dismissal from employment, referring to their dismissal on 16 November 1993 due to the illegal acts allegedly committed during the strike, not to a voluntary resignation. The joint letter of resignation was never acted upon by GREPALIFE. Because they had already been dismissed on 16 November 1993, they had no more employment to resign from. Under the MOA, their resignations were no longer a condition for the reinstatement of the other strikers. De la Rosa could not therefore complain that he was forced to resign, especially since he acknowledged in his complaint that his cause of action was the illegal termination of his services on 16 November 1993.
• Unfair Labor Practice: While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, not every unfair act or decision constitutes unfair labor practice as defined and enumerated under Article 248 of the Labor Code. The prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-organization. An employer may be held liable under this provision if its conduct affects in whatever manner the right of an employee to self-organize. GREPALIFE’s decision to consider the top officers of the Union as unfit for reinstatement was not essentially discriminatory and did not constitute an unlawful labor practice. Discrimination in the context of the Code involves either encouraging membership in a labor organization or being made on account of the employee’s having given or being about to give testimony under the Labor Code, and these were not proved. There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated. A union officer has larger and heavier responsibilities than a union member and is duty bound to respect the law and to exhort and guide members to do the same, leading by example. By committing prohibited activities during the strike, de la Rosa as Vice President demonstrated a high degree of imprudence and irresponsibility, justifying his dismissal. The dismissal of undesirable labor leaders should be upheld to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace.
• Damages: The employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment according to its own discretion and judgment. Labor laws do not authorize substitution of the judgment of the employer in the conduct of its business, and recall of workers falls within the ambit of management prerogative. The employer can exercise this prerogative without fear of liability so long as it is done in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under special laws or valid agreements, and so long as it is not performed in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite. GREPALIFE’s option to reinstate all strikers except Domingo and de la Rosa was taken in good faith for the just and lawful protection and advancement of its interest. Readmitting the union members to the exclusion of Domingo and de la Rosa was a sound exercise of management prerogative and an act of self-preservation designed to insure the maintenance of peace and order in the company premises. The dismissal of de la Rosa, who had shown a capacity for unmitigated mischief, was intended to avoid a recurrence of the violence that attended the November strike. Because the dismissal was legal and no unfair labor practice was established, moral and exemplary damages are not warranted.

• Affidavits in Labor Proceedings — In proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, affidavits are acceptable as evidence; the proceedings are not strictly governed by the technicalities of law and procedural rules, save for the constitutional requirements of due process. Verified position papers may be accompanied by affidavits of witnesses in lieu of direct testimony, and the Labor Arbiter may employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the unrebutted affidavits of the two security guards adequately established de la Rosa’s participation in illegal acts during the strike.
• Illegal Acts During a Strike — The right to strike is constitutionally recognized but is not without legal constrictions. The Labor Code prohibits violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike and prohibits obstruction of free passage to and from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost employment status. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold de la Rosa’s dismissal based on the security guards’ affidavits describing the blocking of ingress and egress, vehicle inspections, frisking, and confiscation of company documents.
• Management Prerogative — The employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment according to its own discretion and judgment, and labor laws do not authorize substitution of the employer’s judgment in the conduct of its business. Recall of workers falls within management prerogative. The prerogative may be exercised without fear of liability if done in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not to defeat or circumvent employee rights under special laws or valid agreements, and if not performed in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that GREPALIFE’s decision to reinstate all strikers except Domingo and de la Rosa was a sound exercise of management prerogative and self-preservation to maintain peace and order.
• Unfair Labor Practice — Not every unfair act or decision of an employer constitutes unfair labor practice as defined and enumerated under Article 248 of the Labor Code. The prohibited acts in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-organization, and an employer may be held liable if its conduct affects in whatever manner the right of an employee to self-organize. Discrimination in the context of the Code involves encouraging membership in a labor organization or being made on account of the employee’s having given or being about to give testimony under the Labor Code. There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated. The Court applied this doctrine in finding no unfair labor practice in GREPALIFE’s exclusion of the union’s top officers from reinstatement.
• Union Officers’ Responsibilities — A union officer has larger and heavier responsibilities than a union member. Union officers are duty bound to respect the law and to exhort and guide their members to do the same; their position mandates them to lead by example. By committing prohibited activities during the strike, de la Rosa as Vice President demonstrated a high degree of imprudence and irresponsibility, justifying his dismissal. The dismissal of undesirable labor leaders was upheld to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace.
• Forced Resignation — A resignation is not forced where the final MOA did not require it, the resignation letter was never acted upon, and the employees had already been dismissed and therefore had no employment to resign from. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting de la Rosa’s claim that he was forced to resign.
• Due Process in Dismissal — The NLRC found that just cause for dismissal had been sufficiently established but that the company failed to comply strictly with the requirements of due process prior to termination, and it ordered payment of one month salary. The Court affirmed this ruling as not constituting grave abuse of discretion.

• “The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions.” — This states the foundational principle limiting the exercise of the right to strike and introduces the Court’s analysis of the Labor Code prohibitions on violence, coercion, intimidation, and obstruction during a strike.
• “But while it is true that affidavits may be regarded as infirm evidence before the regular courts unless the affiants are presented on the stand, such affidavits by themselves are acceptable in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.” — This defines the evidentiary rule applied to uphold the security guards’ affidavits as sufficient proof of de la Rosa’s participation in illegal acts during the strike.
• “While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not every unfair act or decision constitutes unfair labor practice (ULP) as defined and enumerated under Art. 248 Of the Labor Code.” — This is the Court’s canonical formulation distinguishing unfair acts from unfair labor practice and supports the ruling that GREPALIFE’s exclusion of union officers from reinstatement was not ULP.
• “The employer can exercise this prerogative without fear of liability so long as it is done in good faith for the advancement of his interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or valid agreements.” — This states the standard for valid exercise of management prerogative, which the Court applied to GREPALIFE’s decision to reinstate all strikers except Domingo and de la Rosa.

• People vs. Cañada, G.R. No. 112176, 6 February 1996, 253 SCRA 277 — Cited for the proposition that affidavits may be regarded as infirm evidence before the regular courts unless the affiants are presented on the stand; the Court distinguished labor proceedings, where such affidavits are acceptable.
• Wise and Co. vs. Wise and Co. Employees Union — NATU, G.R. No. 87672, 13 October 1989, 178 SCRA 536 — Cited for the rule that there can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated, supporting the finding of no unfair labor practice.
• Continental Cement Corporation Labor Union (NLU) vs. Continental Cement Corporation, G.R. No. 51544, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 134 — Cited for upholding the dismissal of undesirable labor leaders to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace.
• Manila Electric Company vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 114129, 24 October 1996, 263 SCRA 531 — Cited for the management prerogative of the employer, including recall of workers, and the rule that labor laws do not authorize substitution of the employer’s judgment.
• Pagkakaisang Itinaguyod Ng Mga Mangagawa sa Ang Tibay (PIMA) vs. Ang Tibay Inc., No. L-22273, 16 May 1967, 20 SCRA 45 — Cited in support of the sound exercise of management prerogative in readmitting union members to the exclusion of Domingo and de la Rosa as an act of self-preservation.

• Article 248, Labor Code — Defines unfair labor practices of employers. The Court used it to hold that not every unfair act or decision constitutes unfair labor practice, that the prohibited acts relate to the workers’ right to self-organization, and that discrimination involves encouraging membership in a labor organization or being made on account of testimony under the Labor Code.
• Article 262, paragraph (a), Labor Code — Cited in the text for the sanction that any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost employment status. Footnote 14 refers to Article 264, paragraph (e), on prohibited activities.
• Article 264, paragraph (e), Labor Code — Identified in footnote 14 as the provision on prohibited activities during a strike, cited in relation to the prohibition against violence, coercion, intimidation, and obstruction of free passage to and from the employer’s premises.
• Section 7, Rule V, New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC — Provides that labor proceedings, save for the constitutional requirements of due process, are not strictly governed by the technicalities of law and procedural rules. The Court relied on this to accept the affidavits in the labor proceedings.
• Section 3, paragraph 2, Rule V, New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC — Provides that verified position papers are to be accompanied by all supporting documents, including affidavits of the parties’ respective witnesses in lieu of direct testimony. The Court cited this as a clear mandate allowing the Labor Arbiter to employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts.

Justice Puno, Justice Mendoza, Justice Quisumbing, and Justice Buena concurred.