Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of Carigara, Leyte, et al.

Under Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, a vice-mayor may assume the office of acting municipal mayor only when the mayor's absence is an "effective" absence that temporarily disables him from exercising the powers and prerogatives of his office; mere physical absence on official business does not warrant the vice-mayor's assumption of the mayoralty.

Herculano Grapilon and Jose Aguilar were, respectively, the vice-mayor and mayor of Carigara, Leyte, after the general elections of November 8, 1955. The controversy turns on Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, which governs the vice-mayor's assumption of the office of municipal mayor in case of the mayor's absence, suspension, or other temporary disability. The municipal council, municipal secretary, and chief of police were among the local officials and body named in the dispute.

In the general elections held on November 8, 1955 in Carigara, Leyte, Jose Aguilar and Herculano Grapilon were elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively. Both thereafter qualified for and assumed office in accordance with law.

On March 6, 1957, in compliance with a resolution duly approved by the municipal council, Mayor Aguilar left Carigara for Manila on official business. On that same date, Grapilon inquired from the municipal secretary whether the mayor had left for Manila. The municipal secretary replied in the affirmative and informed him that Mayor Aguilar had left for Manila on official business without designating anybody as acting municipal mayor. After receiving this answer, Grapilon informed the municipal secretary that he was assuming office as acting municipal mayor effective that day and for the duration of the mayor's absence pursuant to Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. He sent a similar notice to the chief of police and to the provincial governor of Leyte. In his telegram to the governor, Grapilon also stated that the municipal secretary had refused to recognize him as acting mayor and asked for advice. On March 7, 1957, the provincial governor replied in an official letter, stating that in the absence of the municipal mayor when such absence is for official purpose, he may not leave the office to the vice-mayor and there shall not be an acting mayor.

On March 11, 1957, alleging that the municipal council, Municipal Secretary Felipe Lianza, and Chief of Police Ulpiano Arpon had refused to recognize him as acting mayor and had excluded him from the use and enjoyment of the office of municipal mayor, Grapilon filed a petition for mandamus with the lower court. He prayed that respondents be required to recognize, submit to, and respect his authority as acting municipal mayor; to open, unlock, and allow his entry into the office of the municipal mayor in the Municipal Hall of Carigara, Leyte; and to perform their duties according to law and cooperate with their legitimate superior, the acting municipal mayor. He also prayed for P10,000.00 as moral damages, P1,500.00 as attorney's fees, and P100.00 as costs of litigation.

• Physical Absence: Petitioner maintained that it was enough for the mayor to be away—not physically present—from Carigara for him to be entitled to step into the mayor's shoes under Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.
• Reliance on Laxamana vs. Baltazar: Petitioner relied on Laxamana vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. L-5955, in arguing that the mayor's absence authorized him to act as municipal mayor.

• Mandamus Impropriety: Respondents argued that petitioner was not entitled to a writ of mandamus because he had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to secure the relief sought.
• Section 2195 Interpretation: Respondents contended that the "absence, suspension or other temporary disability" in Section 2195 refers to a disability that temporarily prevents the municipal mayor from performing the duties of his office; because Mayor Aguilar was in Manila on official business, he was not disabled but actually performing his duties, and allowing the vice-mayor to act would result in the irregular situation of two mayors acting at the same time.
• Damages Counterclaim: Respondents argued that the lower court erred in not awarding the moral damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation claimed in their counterclaim.

• Right to Assume Office: Whether petitioner, as vice-mayor, was entitled under Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code to assume the office of acting municipal mayor during the absence of Mayor Aguilar on official business in Manila without having designated an acting mayor.
• Propriety of Mandamus: Whether mandamus was the proper remedy, or whether petitioner had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Damages: Whether respondents were entitled to moral damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses on their counterclaim.

• Right to Assume Office: No. Under Section 2195, the "absence" that authorizes the vice-mayor to act must be an effective absence that disables the mayor from exercising the powers and prerogatives of his office; Mayor Aguilar's official-business absence did not disable him, so petitioner had no right to assume the mayoralty.
• Propriety of Mandamus: No. The writ of mandamus was improperly granted because petitioner had no right to assume the office; the decision was reversed insofar as it granted the writ.
• Damages: No. Respondents' counterclaim for damages was dismissed because no evidence showed petitioner acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the mandamus suit, and the damages claimed were not sufficiently proved.

• Right to Assume Office: Section 2195 places "absence" on the same level as "suspension" and other forms of temporary disability. A suspended mayor is temporarily disabled and cannot exercise the powers and prerogatives of his office; therefore, the absence that authorizes the vice-mayor to act must be one that disables the mayor from exercising the powers and prerogatives of his office. Mayor Aguilar was in Manila precisely in his capacity as mayor transacting official business; although physically absent from Carigara, he was exercising the powers and prerogatives of his office and was entitled to continue drawing his salary. The Court added that an officer's absence does not warrant placing another temporarily in his place unless the officer is absent on an occasion demanding the immediate exercise of the powers of his office, and no satisfactory evidence showed such an occasion had arisen. The Court also relied on the November 25, 1948 opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, which interpreted "other temporary disability" under the ejusdem generis principle and construed "absence" as not merely physical absence but absence preventing the mayor from the active performance of his duties, or "effective" absence. Although not necessarily controlling, the executive interpretation was accorded considerable weight. Thus, petitioner had no right to assume the office.
• Propriety of Mandamus: Because petitioner had no right to assume the office of acting municipal mayor, the lower court erred in granting the writ of mandamus. The dispositive portion reversed the decision insofar as it granted the writ. The Court did not sustain the writ on the basis of petitioner's claim; the absence of a right to the office was fatal to the petition.
• Damages: The incident occurred four years before the decision, and the principal legal question could be considered moot were it not for respondents' claim for damages. Their right to damages depended principally, if not entirely, on whether petitioner's action was justified and, if not, whether he filed suit in bad faith. Although petitioner had no right to assume the office, there was no evidence that he acted maliciously or in bad faith in bringing the mandamus suit, and there was insufficient evidence to prove the damages claimed. The counterclaim was therefore properly dismissed.

• Effective Absence Doctrine under Section 2195, Revised Administrative Code — The vice-mayor may assume the office of acting municipal mayor only when the mayor's absence is an "effective" absence that temporarily disables him from exercising the powers and prerogatives of his office. Mere physical absence does not suffice, especially where the mayor is outside the municipality on official business, continues to exercise his powers, and remains entitled to his salary. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Grapilon had no right to assume the mayoralty during Mayor Aguilar's official-business trip to Manila.
• Ejusdem Generis in the Construction of Section 2195 — The phrase "other temporary disability" in Section 2195 follows the words "absence" and "suspension" and modifies them under the principle of ejusdem generis. Thus, "absence" is construed in the same disabling sense as suspension and other temporary disabilities. The Court adopted this reasoning from the Secretary of the Interior's opinion.
• Weight of Executive Interpretation — An executive department's interpretation of a legal provision affecting the rights of subordinate officials, while not necessarily controlling upon the courts, must be accorded considerable weight. The Court relied on the November 25, 1948 opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, which it found on all fours with the case.
• Bad Faith as Basis for Damages in Litigation — A claim for damages arising from the filing of a suit requires evidence of malice or bad faith and sufficient proof of the damages claimed. The Court denied respondents' counterclaim because petitioner's action, though legally unfounded, was not shown to have been filed maliciously or in bad faith, and the damages were not proved.

• "The "absence" that would authorize the vice-mayor to act as acting mayor should, therefore, be construed in the same manner; it should be such absence as disables the mayor from exercising the powers and prerogatives of his office." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the "absence" in Section 2195 is not mere physical absence but a disabling absence equivalent to suspension or temporary disability.
• "Although physically absent from Carigara, he was in the exercise of the powers and prerogatives of his office and was naturally entitled to continue drawing his salary." — This passage applies the effective-absence doctrine to Mayor Aguilar, explaining why his official-business trip to Manila did not authorize the vice-mayor to assume the mayoralty.
• "Furthermore, while the ordinary meaning of "absence" is the state of being away or not present, we believe that an officer's absence is not such as to warrant the placing of another person temporarily in his place unless said officer is absent on an occasion demanding the immediate exercise of the powers of his office." — This passage adds a condition for the vice-mayor's assumption of office: the mayor's absence must coincide with an occasion requiring the immediate exercise of mayoral powers.
• "While the above opinion is not necessarily controlling upon the courts, it must be accorded considerable weight giving as it does the interpretation of the Executive Department for a legal provision affecting the rights of subordinate officials." — This passage explains the weight given to the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of Section 2195.

• Laxamana vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. L-5955 — Cited as the case relied upon by appellee; the Court used it to illustrate that a suspended municipal mayor is temporarily disabled and cannot exercise the powers and prerogatives of his office, supporting the construction that "absence" under Section 2195 must likewise be disabling. It did not support appellee's claim.
• Gelina vs. Fugere, (R.O.) 180 A. 346, 351 — Cited in the Secretary of the Interior opinion quoted by the Court; it gave "effective" absence the same interpretation. It is a supporting citation for the effective-absence doctrine.

• Section 2195, Revised Administrative Code — Provides for the vice-mayor to assume the office of municipal mayor in case of the mayor's absence, suspension, or other temporary disability. The Court construed "absence" as effective absence disabling the mayor from exercising the powers and prerogatives of his office, not mere physical absence, and held that it did not authorize petitioner to act where Mayor Aguilar was in Manila on official business.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur. Barrera, J., took no part.