Gotis vs. People of the Philippines

An act of the victim that does not constitute unlawful aggression for purposes of self-defense may nonetheless be considered sufficient provocation for purposes of mitigating the crime. The two concepts are distinct: unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, from the victim, while sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity. The rejection of self-defense therefore does not automatically negate the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.

Petitioner Nemrod Gotis and his brother Nahom were charged with the killing of Serafin Gotis, whose wife Carmen, daughter Nilda, and brother Jose figured as witnesses to the events that gave rise to the prosecution in Barangay Bonga, Bulan, Sorsogon. The killing was prosecuted as homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, a charge that placed in issue the justifying circumstance of self-defense under Article 11(1) of the same Code and, upon its rejection, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.

On October 21, 1990, at around six o'clock in the evening, petitioner Nemrod Gotis and his brother Nahom arrived at Eddie Bautista's coconut plantation in Barangay Bonga, Bulan, Sorsogon looking for Serafin Gotis. Serafin's wife Carmen and daughter Nilda were then at the plantation. Both brothers were armed with bolos, and they angrily approached Carmen and Nilda and asked them where Serafin was. Not being able to find Serafin, Nahom pointed his bolo at Nilda and said, "We will kill your father!" The two then left.

After petitioner and Nahom had gone, Carmen and Nilda went to the house of Adolfo Malinao to wait for Serafin. When Serafin arrived, Carmen told him what had happened at the plantation and prevented him from going home, but Serafin disregarded her warning and insisted on going home. On their way home, Serafin and his family had to pass by Nahom's house. Upon reaching the gate, Serafin called for Nahom and asked him to come out. Hearing Serafin's shouts, Nahom immediately called petitioner for help. Petitioner came over and advised Serafin to go home, but the latter refused to leave. Instead, Serafin attempted to hack petitioner and tried to enter the gate of Nahom's house. Nahom then struck Serafin on the head with a bolo.

Petitioner thereupon entered his brother's house to look for a bolo. After being hit, Serafin ran away. Petitioner, however, pursued him and hit him several times on the back and arm. Carmen, who was then following Serafin, saw the incident and cried for help. Serafin's brother Jose responded, but before he could extend any help, petitioner poked a Batangas knife at his neck; Jose was able to parry the blow with his arm. Petitioner then ran away. Serafin was brought to a hospital in Irosin, Sorsogon, but he eventually died during treatment.

On January 16, 1991, an Information was filed before the trial court alleging that the accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, armed with bolos and with intent to kill, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault, and hack Serafin Gotis in the different parts of his body, causing his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

Petitioner admitted having killed Serafin but interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense, claiming that he hit Serafin merely to defend himself against the latter's attack. The trial court found that while Serafin initially attacked petitioner with a bolo, the unlawful aggression had already ceased when petitioner was able to go inside his brother's house and Serafin ran away, and that petitioner's coming out of the house with a bolo was indicative of a determination to kill Serafin rather than merely to defend himself. The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove the elements of self-defense and that no unlawful aggression existed at the time petitioner attacked the victim.

• Self-Defense: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate that he had acted in self-defense and that he should not, therefore, be held liable for Serafin's death; at trial he claimed that he struck Serafin merely to defend himself against the latter's attack.

• Self-Defense: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court disregarding petitioner's plea of self-defense.
• Sufficient Provocation: Whether an act of the victim that does not amount to unlawful aggression for purposes of self-defense may nonetheless be appreciated as sufficient provocation mitigating the crime.

• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression is the primordial element of self-defense, and it had already ceased when petitioner entered his brother's house and the victim fled; without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
• Sufficient Provocation: Yes. An act that cannot be considered unlawful aggression for purposes of self-defense may still be considered sufficient provocation for purposes of mitigating the crime, warranting reinstatement of the penalty imposed by the trial court.

• Self-Defense: Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code requires the concurrence of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is primordial; without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. To be appreciated, the unlawful aggression must be a continuing circumstance or must have been existing at the time the defense is made, and a person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased. Here, while Serafin initially attacked petitioner with a bolo, the unlawful aggression already ceased when petitioner was able to go inside his brother's house and Serafin ran away. At that point there was no longer any danger to petitioner's life, and consequently no necessity to "defend" himself by pursuing and attacking Serafin. The trial and appellate courts correctly so held, and their factual findings — borne out by the records and supported by substantial evidence — were not shown to warrant disregard. The petition, brought under Rule 45, should have raised only questions of law, and questions of fact are generally not reviewable save when the judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence or is premised on a misapprehension of facts.

• Sufficient Provocation: The trial court appreciated sufficient provocation, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the theory that the mitigating circumstance is incompatible with a finding that petitioner did not act in self-defense, effectively likening sufficient provocation to unlawful aggression. That was error. As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim. As a mitigating circumstance, on the other hand, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity. The two are not coextensive: while an act cannot be considered unlawful aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the same act can be considered sufficient provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime. Pepito vs. Court of Appeals, People vs. Ubaldo, and Romero vs. People all treated the victim's violent act as falling short of unlawful aggression while still appreciating it as sufficient provocation. In this case, petitioner was merely pacifying Serafin when the latter suddenly attempted to hack him; although petitioner evaded the attack, Serafin's act was enough provocation to anger petitioner and cause him to strike back. Sufficient provocation therefore attended the crime, and the prison term imposed by the trial court in its October 29, 1997 Decision was reinstated.

• Unlawful aggression as the primordial element of self-defense — Under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, self-defense requires the concurrence of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is primordial; without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. It must be a continuing circumstance or must exist at the time the defense is made, and a person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor once the unlawful aggression has ceased. Applied here, the unlawful aggression ceased when petitioner was able to enter his brother's house and Serafin ran away; petitioner's pursuit and hacking of the fleeing victim was therefore not self-defense.

• Sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance — Sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity. In determining the sufficiency of a provocation, one must look into the act constituting the provocation, the social standing of the person provoked, and the place and time when the provocation is made. Applied here, Serafin's sudden attempt to hack petitioner, made while petitioner was merely pacifying him, was enough provocation to anger petitioner and cause him to strike back.

• Distinction between unlawful aggression and sufficient provocation — The two concepts are not coextensive. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim, whereas sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance requires only unjust or improper conduct adequate to excite the offender to commit a wrong. Hence, an act that cannot be considered unlawful aggression for purposes of self-defense may still be considered sufficient provocation for purposes of mitigating the crime, and a finding that the victim's act did not constitute unlawful aggression does not automatically negate the attendant circumstance of sufficient provocation.

• Review of factual findings under Rule 45 — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 should raise only questions of law, and questions of fact are generally not reviewable, subject only to exceptions such as when the judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence or is premised on a misapprehension of facts. Petitioner failed to show that the Court of Appeals' findings of fact, borne out by the records and supported by substantial evidence, should be disregarded.

• "Notably, while an act cannot be considered an unlawful aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the same act can be considered as sufficient provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime." — This is the ratio decidendi of the decision; it supplies the ground for reinstating the trial court's lighter penalty notwithstanding the rejection of petitioner's plea of self-defense, and it is the formulation for which the case is chiefly cited.
• "In order to determine the sufficiency of a provocation for the purpose of mitigating a crime, one must look into the act constituting the provocation, the social standing of the person provoked, and the place and time when the provocation is made." — States the test for sufficiency of provocation, which the Court applied to Serafin's attempt to hack petitioner.
• "A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased." — States the rule that defeated the plea of self-defense, since petitioner pursued and hacked Serafin after the latter had fled.
• "Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger." — Quoted from Romero vs. People and relied upon to demonstrate that conduct falling short of unlawful aggression may still amount to sufficient provocation.

• Pepito vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119942, July 8, 1999, 310 SCRA 128 — Followed. The victim's act of challenging the accused's family with a bolo and an "indian pana" was not treated as unlawful aggression for purposes of self-defense, but was appreciated as sufficient provocation mitigating the crime, supporting the same treatment of Serafin's attempt to hack petitioner.
• People vs. Ubaldo, G.R. No. 129389, October 17, 2001, 367 SCRA 432 — Followed. The victim's violent act before the shooting incident was disregarded as unlawful aggression but appreciated as a mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.
• Romero vs. People, G.R. No. 151978, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 467 — Followed. The accused's retaliation, although not considered unlawful aggression, was nevertheless deemed sufficiently provoked by the victim's thrusting of a bolo, threats to kill, and hacking of the accused's house walls.
• Baxinela vs. People, G.R. No. 149652, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 331 — Cited for the rule that unlawful aggression is the primordial element of self-defense, without which there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
• People vs. Cajurao, G.R. No. 122767, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 207 — Cited for the rule that a person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor once the unlawful aggression has ceased.
• People vs. Annibong, G.R. No. 139879, May 8, 2003, 403 SCRA 92 — Cited for the requirement that unlawful aggression be a continuing circumstance or be existing at the time the defense is made.
• Gaisano Cagayan, Inc. vs. Insurance Company of North America, G.R. No. 147839, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 286 — Cited among the authorities on the exceptions to the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide. It is the provision under which petitioner was convicted by the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and ultimately held liable by the Supreme Court.
• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the elements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The plea failed because the unlawful aggression had already ceased when petitioner attacked the victim.
• Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — Governs the effect of mitigating circumstances on the penalty. The trial court applied it in crediting petitioner with the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and voluntary surrender, and the resulting penalty was reinstated by the Supreme Court.
• Article 69, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the penalty lower by one or two degrees when the crime is committed with an incomplete justifying or exempting circumstance. It was applied by the trial court to co-accused Nahom Gotis on the basis of incomplete self-defense and defense of relative.
• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Limits a petition for review on certiorari to questions of law. It was cited in holding that petitioner's challenge to the factual findings of the Court of Appeals was generally not reviewable.

Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Carpio Morales, J., took no part due to her participation in the decision of the Court of Appeals.