Gordoland Development Corp. vs. Republic of the Philippines

An applicant for land registration must present incontrovertible evidence that the subject land has been officially classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain; a CENRO certification stating only that a lot is "not covered by any subsisting public land application" is insufficient, and a certification that was never formally offered in evidence cannot be considered on appeal. Absent such proof, there is no reference point for counting adverse possession, and the application must be denied under the Regalian doctrine.

Petitioner Gordoland Development Corporation is a private corporation engaged in real property development. It sought original registration of title over eight parcels of land totaling 86,298 square meters situated in various barangays within the Municipality of Lilo-an, Cebu, claiming to have acquired the properties in 1995 through deeds of sale and assignments of rights from alleged owner-possessors. The application was grounded on Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act), in relation to Republic Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act) and Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree). The State, through the Director of Lands, formally opposed the application, interposing the Regalian doctrine and arguing that a private corporation is disqualified under the Constitution from holding alienable lands of the public domain.

Petitioner Gordoland Development Corporation, a private corporation engaged in real property development, filed an application for original registration of title on November 18, 1996 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City, docketed as LRC Case No. N-547. The application covered eight parcels of land totaling 86,298 square meters located in different barangays within the Municipality of Lilo-an, Cebu. Petitioner averred that it had obtained title over the parcels in 1995 through several deeds of sale and assignments of appurtenant rights from alleged owner-possessors, whom it claimed had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation sufficient to acquire title by acquisitive prescription under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in relation to Republic Act No. 496 and Presidential Decree No. 1529.

To support its application, petitioner presented the testimonies of its predecessors-in-interest and various documentary exhibits, including tax declarations, certifications from the Register of Deeds that there were no subsisting titles over the subject properties, and certifications from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources declaring that there were no subsisting public land applications with respect to the same lots. After submitting its formal offer of exhibits and resting its case, petitioner filed a Manifestation dated November 14, 1997, attaching a photocopy of a Certification dated January 10, 1996 from the Cebu CENRO. That certification stated, based on "projection and ground verification," that a tract of land containing 138.4657 hectares in Barangays Sta. Cruz, San Vicente, and Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu was within the Alienable and Disposable Block-1, land classification project no. 29, per LC Map no. 1391, certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-537 dated July 31, 1940. However, the list of lot numbers referred to in the certification was not included, nor was it attached to the Manifestation, and it was never submitted to the trial court. Petitioner did not move to re-open the proceedings to present the certification in evidence, have it authenticated or subjected to cross-examination, or have it marked and formally offered. The original was never submitted.

The State, through the Director of Lands, entered its formal opposition, asserting that neither petitioner nor its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax declarations did not constitute competent evidence of bona fide acquisition; that the claim of ownership based on Spanish title could no longer be availed of for failure to file within six months from February 16, 1976 under Presidential Decree No. 892; that petitioner, being a private corporation, was disqualified under the Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain; and that the parcels applied for were portions of the public domain not subject to private appropriation.

On January 16, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment granting the application and directing the issuance of decrees of registration for all eight parcels in petitioner's name. The trial court relied on the photocopied CENRO certification in concluding that the lots were "already within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain and therefore susceptible to private appropriation." The State filed its notice of appeal. Meanwhile, on February 23, 1998, the trial court received a Report from the Land Registration Authority stating that it was not in a position to verify whether the subject lands were covered by land patents or within the area classified as alienable and disposable, and recommending that the Land Management Bureau, CENRO, and Forest Management Bureau be ordered to determine the true status of the lands. The trial court directed these agencies to report but did not recall or suspend its judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that petitioner had not proven that the subject parcels were alienable and disposable and had not established the required 30-year possession. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, giving rise to the instant petition.

• Validity of Application: Petitioner contended that its application for registration was not defective for lack of board authorization, because the Rules of Court are not applicable in land registration cases, and the authority of its counsel, Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was subsequently ratified by the board of directors.
• Alienable and Disposable Status: Petitioner argued that the subject parcels of land were alienable and disposable, as could be readily gleaned from the annexes to its application.
• Possession: Petitioner maintained that it presented more than enough documentary and testimonial evidence to show possession of the subject parcels in the nature and duration required by law, even going way back to World War II.

• Defective Application: Respondent countered that the petition for registration was defective because Atty. Paderanga was not authorized by petitioner's board of directors to file the application and sign the certification on non-forum shopping.
• Alienable and Disposable Status: Respondent argued that petitioner failed to prove that the subject lands were alienable and disposable public lands.
• Insufficient Possession: Respondent contended that petitioner failed to present convincing proof that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject lands in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.

• Authority to File Application: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the application for land registration and the certification of non-forum shopping were defective for lack of authority from the corporation's board of directors.
• Alienable and Disposable Classification: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner failed to prove that the subject properties were alienable and disposable public land.
• Possession Requirement: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest failed to comply with the 30-year possession required by law.

• Authority to File Application: No. The verification requirement is formal, not jurisdictional, and non-compliance does not render a pleading fatally defective, especially where counsel's authority was subsequently ratified by the board of directors.
• Alienable and Disposable Classification: No (the Court of Appeals did not err). The CENRO certifications offered in evidence merely stated that the lots were not covered by any subsisting public land application — not that they were alienable and disposable — and the photocopied certification purporting to show such classification was never formally offered in evidence and thus could not be considered.
• Possession Requirement: Rendered moot. Without proof that the lands were classified as alienable and disposable, there is no reference point for counting adverse possession for purposes of an imperfect title.

• Authority to File Application: The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional; it is a condition affecting the form of the pleading, and non-compliance does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations are true and correct and not the product of imagination or speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The certification against forum-shopping serves to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping. Because Atty. Paderanga's authority to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping was subsequently ratified by the board, there was no circumvention of these objectives. The Court of Appeals' finding on this point was thus erroneous, but it did not affect the ultimate disposition.

• Alienable and Disposable Classification: Although the issue involves a question of fact, the Supreme Court reviewed it because the findings of the Court of Appeals were contrary to those of the trial court — a recognized exception to the general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding. A review of the records confirmed that no evidence showed the subject lots had been classified as alienable and disposable. The CENRO certifications offered in evidence (Exhibits "DD," "OO," "ZZ," and "SSS") merely stated that the lots were "not covered by any subsisting public land application," with no mention that they were within alienable and disposable land. The photocopied Certification dated January 10, 1996 attached to petitioner's Manifestation could not be given probative value: it was never formally offered in evidence, the original or a certified true copy was never submitted, the list of lot numbers referenced therein was never produced, and it was never authenticated or subjected to cross-examination. Evidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot be considered on appeal, as doing so would deny the opposing party the right to rebut it. The trial court erred in adopting the statements in that photocopied document without examining its contents or verifying whether it pertained to the lands in question. Incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that land subject of a registration application is alienable and disposable.

• Possession Requirement: Because there was no sufficient evidence showing that the subject lots were classified as alienable and disposable, and when they were so classified, there was no reference point for counting adverse possession for purposes of an imperfect title. The Government must first declare the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted. Consequently, discussion of the length of petitioner's possession was unnecessary.

• Regalian Doctrine — All lands of the public domain belong to the State, and unless alienated in accordance with law, the State retains its basic rights as dominus. In this case, because petitioner failed to prove that the subject lots had been classified as alienable and disposable, they remained part of the public domain and were not registrable in petitioner's name.

• Requirement of Proof of Alienable and Disposable Classification — Incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of a registration application is alienable and disposable. A CENRO certification stating only that a lot is "not covered by any subsisting public land application" does not suffice to prove alienable and disposable status. The Government must first declare the land to be alienable and disposable before the period of adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

• Formal Offer of Evidence Rule — Evidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot be considered on appeal, because to do so would deny the other party the right to object to its admissibility and to rebut it. A photocopied certification that was never marked, formally offered, authenticated, or subjected to cross-examination has no probative value.

• Verification as Formal, Not Jurisdictional, Requirement — The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Non-compliance does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective, particularly where the authority to verify and certify against forum-shopping is subsequently ratified by the board of directors.

• "It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable." — This passage states the evidentiary standard for proving alienable and disposable status in land registration proceedings, serving as the ratio decidendi for the denial of the petition.

• "In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the subject lots were already classified as alienable and disposable lands of the government, and when they were so classified, there is no reference point for counting adverse possession for purposes of an imperfect title. The Government must first declare the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title." — This passage explains the logical sequence required: classification must precede the counting of adverse possession, and without proof of classification, the possession issue becomes moot.

• "Evidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other parties their right to rebut them." — This passage articulates the rationale for the formal offer rule, which was decisive in excluding the photocopied CENRO certification from consideration.

• Benguet Corporation vs. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc., G.R. No. 155343, Sept. 2, 2005 — Cited for the proposition that the verification requirement is formal, not jurisdictional, and non-compliance does not necessarily render a pleading fatally defective.
• Republic vs. Enciso, G.R. No. 160145, Nov. 11, 2005 — Cited for the rule that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that land subject of a registration application is alienable and disposable.
• Del Rosario vs. Republic, G.R. No. 148338, June 6, 2002 — Cited for the principle that the Government must first declare land alienable and disposable before adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-56948, Sept. 30, 1987 — Cited alongside Del Rosario for the same principle regarding the necessity of prior government classification as a reference point for counting possession.
• Ong vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 387 (1997) — Cited by the Court of Appeals, as quoted in the decision, for the rule that evidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot be considered on appeal.
• Ong Chia vs. Republic, 328 SCRA 749 (2000) — Cited for the rationale that the rule prohibiting admission of evidence not formally offered is to afford the other party the chance to object to admissibility.

• Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) — The law under which petitioner claimed its predecessors-in-interest had acquired title through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of alienable and disposable public land. The Court found the claim unavailing for failure to first prove the land's alienable and disposable classification.
• Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — The codification of laws relative to registration of property, under which the application for original registration was filed. Section 39 was referenced in the trial court's order for issuance of decrees of registration.
• Republic Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) — Cited in relation to petitioner's application for original registration of title.
• Presidential Decree No. 892 — Cited by the State in its opposition for the rule discontinuing the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings, requiring filing within six months from February 16, 1976.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governed the petition for review before the Supreme Court; the general rule that the Court does not resolve questions of fact was applied, subject to recognized exceptions, one of which (conflicting findings between the RTC and CA) was found present.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Justice Dante O. Tinga, and Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were written.