Gonzalez vs. Ordoñez-Benitez

A notice of lis pendens may properly be annotated on registered property on the basis of the pendency of a guardianship proceeding over the property of the registered owner, since such proceeding may affect title to or possession of the property and the owner's capacity to dispose of it is precisely the matter under inquiry. Whether the person sought to be placed under guardianship is sole owner or co-owner is immaterial, for if shown to be non compos mentis, any disposition made by him under either supposition would be equally defective.

Rodolfo P. Gonzalez contracted two marriages: the first with Carmen Rojas, which produced four children — Salvador, Eduardo, Ramon, and Pacita — and the second with Dr. Luz Dizon, which produced two, Maria Luisa and Isabel. Property acquired during the marriages was held under the conjugal partnership regime, and the two sets of heirs held divergent expectations in the eventual settlement of the spouses' estates. Notices of lis pendens are governed by the Torrens Act (Act No. 496) and the Rules of Court, and prior to this case the Court had sustained the annotation of such notices in guardianship proceedings in Diaz vs. Perez.

Rodolfo P. Gonzalez was formerly married to Carmen Rojas, who bore him four children: Salvador, Eduardo, Ramon, and Pacita. Carmen Rojas died on May 2, 1937. Rodolfo later married Dr. Luz Dizon, and the second marriage produced two children, Maria Luisa and Isabel.

On November 11, 1974, Rodolfo and his second wife executed an "Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and for Establishment of Separation of Property," declared to be for the purpose of avoiding confusion or differences among the two sets of heirs in the settlement of the spouses' estates. They filed a petition with the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Manila for approval of the agreement, docketed as Civil Case No. E-01680, and Rodolfo's children by his first marriage moved for and were granted leave to intervene.

On March 4, 1975, Salvador R. Gonzalez, the eldest of the four children of the first marriage, instituted proceedings in the same court to place under guardianship the property of his father, grounded on the latter's alleged incapacity to manage and direct his financial and ownership status resulting from the deterioration of his mental faculties on account of illness and advanced age. The petition averred that prejudice would be caused to the children of the first marriage in the event that the capital of the husband or the conjugal property of the second marriage would be considered conjugal property of the second marriage, would be disposed of or transferred to the children of the second marriage through fictitious or simulated contracts in fraud of the inchoate hereditary rights of the children of the first marriage, or would be sold to third parties and the proceeds donated to the second wife or children of the second marriage. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-00985.

On May 4, 1975, Rodolfo and his wife drew up a contract for the sale of two parcels of land situated on Jose Batute Street and United Nations Avenue in favor of Helen Grace Silvestre and Rica Marie Silvestre. The lots were covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 6803 and 6802 issued in their names and were the subject of first mortgages held, respectively, by the Philippine Trust Company and the Philippine National Bank. Because the mortgagee banks were not willing to accede to the assumption by the vendees of the spouses' mortgage obligations, the vendor spouses, on July 16, 1975, caused the sales to be annotated as adverse claims on the corresponding certificates of title. Sometime in September 1975, Salvador caused notices of lis pendens to be annotated on the spouses' titles — not only over the two lots but also over property in Rizal Province covered by TCT No. 365539 in the names of the Gonzalez spouses and the Spouses Trinidad de la Peña and Aurea Dizon de la Peña, and over property in Cavite Province covered by TCT Nos. T-1144 and T-1145 in the name of Luz Dizon-Gonzalez, married to Rodolfo P. Gonzalez, and denominated "paraphernal property." His requests for annotation were based on the pendency of the guardianship proceeding involving the property of Rodolfo and on Diaz vs. Perez.

On October 17, 1975, Rodolfo filed a petition for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens. He argued that the guardianship petition did not involve title to or possession of any of his properties since he had no exclusive property of his own and whatever assets he had were held in conjugal partnership with his wife; that the property covered by TCT Nos. 6802 and 6803 had already been sold for value in good faith to purchasers who had earlier registered adverse claims; that the annotations had been made merely to harass and molest the spouses and prevented them from dealing with their properties, causing irreparable injury, especially since Luz was engaged in the buying and selling of real estate as a major means of livelihood; that Diaz vs. Perez involved substantially different facts and could not be invoked as authority, the more analogous situation being that in Garcia vs. Vasquez; and that the spouses, while alive, were entitled to exercise full right of dominion over their conjugal assets. Salvador opposed the petition, conceding that a guardianship proceeding is not expressly included in the enumeration of cases in Act No. 496 and the Rules of Court where a notice of lis pendens may be made, but averring that such a proceeding is not excluded expressly or impliedly and that nothing in those laws suggests that the enumeration is exclusive. Relying on Diaz vs. Perez, he asserted that the annotations were a proper cautionary measure which courts should be slow to disturb unless the petition for guardianship was prima facie unconvincing or was not made in good faith.

After Rodolfo filed a reply and Salvador a rejoinder — the latter accusing Luz of attempting to deprive her husband of his properties through fraud and undue influence — the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court promulgated an Order on November 7, 1975 denying the petition for cancellation, on the ground that it had not been established that the purpose of the notice of lis pendens was merely for molesting the proposed ward or that it was not necessary to protect the rights of the petitioners, considering especially that efforts were being made to dispose of some properties pertaining to the proposed ward. On December 8, 1975, a motion was filed seeking leave for Luz Dizon-Gonzalez to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. C-00985 and reconsideration of the November 7, 1975 Order. Salvador opposed the motion, and on December 23, 1975 the court allowed Luz to intervene but denied reconsideration, nothing meritorious having been found therein. The Gonzalez spouses then came to the Supreme Court, assailing the Orders as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction and praying for the cancellation by the respective Registers of Deeds of the notices of lis pendens.

• Non-Applicability to Guardianship Proceedings: Petitioners argued that the guardianship petition did not involve title to or possession of any of Rodolfo P. Gonzalez's properties, he having no exclusive property of his own and whatever assets he had being held in conjugal partnership with his wife, and that the notices could not be justified under either the Torrens Act or the Rules of Court.
• Prior Sale and Adverse Claims: Petitioners maintained that the property covered by TCT Nos. 6802 and 6803 had already been sold for value in good faith to purchasers who had earlier registered adverse claims thereto.
• Harassment and Irreparable Injury: Petitioners contended that the annotations of the notices of lis pendens had been made merely to harass and molest the Gonzalez spouses, who had thereby been prevented from dealing with their properties, causing them irreparable injury, especially considering that Luz Dizon-Gonzalez was engaged in the buying and selling of real estate as a major means of livelihood.
• Inapplicability of Diaz vs. Perez: Petitioners argued that Diaz vs. Perez involved substantially different facts and could not be invoked as authority to justify the annotations, the more analogous situation being that in Garcia vs. Vasquez, where the pendency of a case involving only the fitness of a special administratrix was held not to involve or affect title to or possession of the properties and thus could not be annotated.
• Right of Dominion: Petitioners asserted that the spouses, while alive, were entitled to exercise full right of dominion over their conjugal assets and should not be deprived or restricted in the exercise of that right, especially at the instance of those who had no present existing right over the properties.
• Settlement of the First Estate: In the proceedings before the Supreme Court, petitioners alleged that the estate of Carmen Roxas had been settled and distributed among her heirs.

• Lis Pendens in Guardianship Cases: Respondent countered that although a guardianship proceeding is not expressly included in the enumeration of cases in Act No. 496 and the Rules of Court where a notice of lis pendens may be made, such a proceeding is not excluded expressly or impliedly, and nothing in those laws suggests that the enumeration is meant to be exclusive.
• Diaz vs. Perez as Authority: Respondent argued that Diaz vs. Perez had sustained the propriety of notices of lis pendens in guardianship cases, in the same manner that they had been held proper in receivership proceedings involving realty and in lunacy proceedings, situations closely akin to guardianship.
• Cautionary Measure: Respondent maintained that the annotations were a proper cautionary measure which the courts should be slow to disturb, unless the petition for guardianship was prima facie unconvincing, or was not made in good faith.
• Non-Liquidation of the First Conjugal Partnership: Respondent denied that Carmen Roxas' estate had been settled, asserting that at the time the second marriage was contracted, the conjugal partnership of the first marriage had not yet been totally liquidated and some of the properties had been brought by Rodolfo P. Gonzalez into the second marriage.

• Propriety of Lis Pendens in Guardianship Proceedings: Whether a notice of lis pendens may properly be annotated on registered property on the basis of the pendency of a guardianship proceeding over the property of the registered owner.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petition for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens and the motion for reconsideration.
• Extension to the Spouse's Property: Whether the notices of lis pendens may extend to property titled in the name of Luz Dizon-Gonzalez, who is not personally involved in the guardianship proceeding.

• Propriety of Lis Pendens in Guardianship Proceedings: Yes. The pendency of a guardianship proceeding over the property of the registered owner is a proper basis for a notice of lis pendens, the question having been settled by Diaz vs. Perez.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The denial of the petition for cancellation was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the evidence having failed to establish that the notices were intended merely to molest the proposed ward or were unnecessary to protect the petitioners' rights.
• Extension to the Spouse's Property: Yes, unavoidably. Since the wife's name appears in the titles together with her husband's, and under the law no disposition of property can be made alone by either of them, the notices necessarily reach her proprietary interests.

• Propriety of Lis Pendens in Guardianship Proceedings: Petitioners no longer asserted their earlier theory that the rule on notices of lis pendens does not apply to guardianship cases, and the question had in any case been settled by Diaz vs. Perez. The attempt to distinguish that case was unpersuasive: whether the person whose property is sought to be placed under guardianship be sole owner or co-owner is immaterial, because if shown to be non compos mentis, any disposition made by him under either supposition would be equally defective. The children of the first marriage indisputably had an interest in the property of the first marriage as well as in the property of the second, and had the right to allege and prove in the appropriate proceeding that their father had brought property acquired by him and his first wife into his second marriage, and that all or certain of the property acquired during the second marriage was conjugal in character. They likewise had the right to challenge their father's capacity to make dispositions of property acquired during either marriage. The issues necessarily involved — the degree of Rodolfo's alleged incapacity, the manner and other circumstances of the acquisition of the properties during the first and second marriages, and the attendance of fraud or undue pressure or influence on any dispositions or attempts at disposition — were factual and could not be resolved without evidence, which the Supreme Court could not receive in the first instance. Until those issues were resolved, there was clearly a need to warn any person interested in property titled in Rodolfo's name of the pendency of proceedings that might eventually result in the invalidation of any transaction he made affecting such property.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Nothing in the record established the petitioners' claim that Carmen Roxas' estate had been settled and distributed among her heirs; the record did not indicate that satisfactory evidence in substantiation of that claim was presented in the court a quo. What was disclosed, as the lower court declared, was that the evidence adduced by the parties failed to establish that Salvador had caused the inscription of the notices merely for molesting the proposed ward, or that the inscription was not necessary to protect the rights of the petitioners, considering especially that efforts were being made to dispose of some properties pertaining to the proposed ward. The facts on record demonstrated the need to give constructive notice to all parties having occasion to deal with property registered in the name of Rodolfo and other persons that his capacity to create any encumbrance or make any disposition of the property was suspect, and was precisely the subject of inquiry in the guardianship proceeding cited in the notices — a need underscored by the attempts to dispose of property of the first and second marriage by the proposed ward and his wife.

• Extension to the Spouse's Property: Petitioners correctly observed that the effect of the notices of lis pendens was not delimited to Rodolfo's properties but extended to the proprietary interests of Luz, who was not personally involved in the guardianship proceedings. This could not be helped, since her name in fact appeared in the titles together with her husband's, and under the law no disposition of property could be made alone by either of them. The argument that Luz was required by law to concur and co-sign, and hence there could be no instance in which Rodolfo might be influenced to execute deeds of transfer to his prejudice, begged the question, since the accusation was that it was precisely the wife who had influenced and might continue to influence him to his prejudice. The argument that Rodolfo needed no protection because he had no separate property and was not incompetent was likewise specious, because the chief issues to be determined by evidence before the court a quo were whether Rodolfo was indeed incompetent, and whether there had been liquidation of the property of the first nuptials and what was the nature and character of the property acquired by either or both of the spouses of the second marriage.

• Lis Pendens in Guardianship Proceedings — A notice of lis pendens may be annotated on registered property on the basis of the pendency of a guardianship proceeding over the property of the registered owner, because the proceeding may affect title to or possession of the property and the owner's capacity to dispose of it is precisely the matter under inquiry. The Court applied the doctrine in sustaining the notices annotated by Salvador R. Gonzalez, holding that the question had been settled by Diaz vs. Perez and that the attempt to distinguish that case was unpersuasive, since whether the person sought to be placed under guardianship is sole owner or co-owner is immaterial — if shown to be non compos mentis, any disposition made by him under either supposition would be equally defective.
• Lis Pendens as a Cautionary Measure — A notice of lis pendens is a proper cautionary measure which courts should be slow to disturb, unless the petition for guardianship is prima facie unconvincing or was not made in good faith. The Court found that the evidence failed to establish that the inscription was made merely to molest the proposed ward or that it was unnecessary to protect the petitioners' rights, and that the record demonstrated the need to warn third persons that Rodolfo's capacity to encumber or dispose of the registered property was suspect.
• Co-Ownership and Conjugal Property — Where registered property stands in the names of both spouses, no disposition of the property can be made alone by either of them; consequently, a notice of lis pendens affecting such property necessarily reaches the proprietary interests of the spouse even if she is not personally a party to the proceeding that is the basis of the notice. The Court held that the extension of the notices to Luz Dizon-Gonzalez's interests could not be helped because her name appeared in the titles together with her husband's.
• Factual Issues Requiring Evidence — Issues concerning the degree of a person's alleged incapacity, the manner and circumstances of the acquisition of properties during successive marriages, and the attendance of fraud or undue pressure on dispositions of property are factual and cannot be resolved by the Supreme Court in the first instance. The Court declined to resolve these issues and instead held that until they are resolved, there is a need to warn any person interested in property titled in the name of the alleged incompetent of the pendency of the proceedings.

• "Whether the person whose property is sought to be placed under guardianship be sole owner, or co-owner of property is immaterial. If shown to be non compos mentis, any disposition made by him under either supposition would be equally defective." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for rejecting the petitioners' attempt to distinguish Diaz vs. Perez and confirms that the guardianship proceeding is a proper basis for a notice of lis pendens regardless of the nature of the registered owner's title.
• "And until these issues are resolved, there is clearly a need to warn any person interested in any property titled in the name of Rodolfo P. Gonzalez, among others, of the pendency of the proceedings which might eventually result in the invalidation of any transaction made by said Rodolfo P. Gonzalez affecting such property." — This passage articulates the rationale for the notice of lis pendens: the pendency of the guardianship proceeding may result in the invalidation of transactions affecting the registered property, warranting constructive notice to third persons.
• "This is true, but it cannot be helped, since the latter's name does in fact appear in the titles together with her husband's, and under the law, no disposition of property can be made alone by either of them." — This passage disposes of the petitioners' objection that the notices extended to the proprietary interests of Luz Dizon-Gonzalez, who was not a party to the guardianship proceeding.
• "the facts on record, in the view of the Court a quo, demonstrated the need to give constructive notice to all parties having occasion to deal with the property registered in the name of Rodolfo P. Gonzalez (and other persons) that his capacity to create any encumbrance or make any disposition of said property was suspect, and was precisely subject of inquiry in the guardianship proceeding cited in the notices of lis pendens, a need underscored by the attempts to dispose of property of the first and second marriage by the proposed ward, Rodolfo P. Gonzalez and his wife." — This passage affirms the lower court's factual finding that the notices served a legitimate protective purpose, negating the claim of grave abuse of discretion.

• Diaz vs. Perez, L-12053, May 30, 1958 (103 Phil. 1023) — Controlling precedent. The Court held that the question of the applicability of the rule on notices of lis pendens to guardianship cases had been settled by this case, which sustained the propriety of notices of lis pendens in guardianship cases; the Court likewise rejected the petitioners' attempt to distinguish it on the ground that whether the person sought to be placed under guardianship is sole owner or co-owner is immaterial.
• Garcia vs. Vasquez, 32 SCRA 489 (1970) — Cited by the petitioners as the more analogous authority, on the ground that the pendency of a case involving only the fitness of a special administratrix does not involve or affect title to or possession of the properties and cannot be annotated. The Court found the attempt to distinguish Diaz vs. Perez unpersuasive.

• Act No. 496 (Torrens Act) and the Rules of Court — These laws govern the annotation of notices of lis pendens. The petitioners argued that the notices could not be justified under either, while the respondent conceded that a guardianship proceeding is not expressly enumerated but contended that it is not excluded expressly or impliedly and that the enumeration is not exclusive. The Court resolved the question by holding that the pendency of the guardianship proceeding was a proper basis for the notices.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.