Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr.

The President’s item-veto power under Article VI, Section 27(2) extends to "inappropriate provisions" or "riders" in appropriations bills—provisions that constitute substantive legislation rather than specific appropriations or genuine conditions on particular items—despite the elimination of explicit "provision-veto" language from the 1987 Constitution.

The case arises from a constitutional conflict between the legislative and executive branches regarding the scope of the President’s veto power over appropriations bills. Congress had included provisions in the 1989 and 1990 General Appropriations Acts restricting the use of savings to augment items that Congress had previously reduced or disapproved, effectively curtailing the President’s authority under Article VI, Section 25(5) to augment items from savings.

• February 2, 1989: Senate adopts Resolution No. 381 authorizing the Committee on Finance to file suit contesting the constitutionality of the veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill.
• April 11, 1989: Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus filed with the SC, assailing the veto of Section 55 (FY 1989).
• January 19, 1990: Petitioners file Supplemental Petition questioning the veto of Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill.
• August 14, 1990: Case deemed submitted for deliberation after filing of consolidated memoranda.
• November 19, 1990: SC renders decision upholding the veto.

• December 16, 1988: Congress passes House Bill No. 19186 (General Appropriations Bill for FY 1989), which eliminates or decreases certain items in the President’s proposed budget.
• December 29, 1988: President signs the bill into law as Republic Act No. 6688 but vetoes seven Special Provisions and Section 55, a General Provision prohibiting the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress.
• February 2, 1989: Senate passes Resolution No. 381 declaring the veto of Section 55 unconstitutional and void.
• 1990: Similar provision appears as Section 16 in the General Appropriations Bill for FY 1990 (House Bill No. 26934), which becomes Republic Act No. 6831; President likewise vetoes the restrictive portion.
• Nature of Vetoed Provisions: Both sections provided that no item disapproved or reduced by Congress could be restored or increased by augmentation from savings, and that any item recommended by the President but not provided for in the Act was deemed disapproved.

• The President’s line-veto power is limited to items, not provisions; the veto of Sections 55 and 16 (which are provisions) exceeds constitutional authority.
• If the President objects to a provision, she must veto the entire bill, not selectively veto provisions.
• The item-veto power does not include the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, as this would constitute legislation in violation of separation of powers.
• Congress has the prerogative to impose restrictions on the power of augmentation since Article VI, Section 25(5) requires authorization "by law," and the vetoed provisions merely regulate this delegated power.
• The vetoed provisions are germane to the appropriations bill and are not "riders."

• The issue presents a political question beyond judicial review; Congress’s remedy was to override the veto by two-thirds vote.
• The vetoed sections are riders—extraneous substantive legislation improperly included in an appropriations bill—and thus subject to veto.
• The power of augmentation is already authorized by law (PD No. 1177, as amended by RA No. 6670), and the vetoed provisions would nullify this statutory authority.
• The President may veto "distinct and severable parts" of appropriations bills, including provisions that are inappropriate.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy or is barred by the political question doctrine.
  • Whether petitioners have standing to sue as senators and taxpayers.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the President has constitutional authority to veto provisions (as distinguished from items) in an appropriations bill.
  • Whether Sections 55 (FY 1989) and Section 16 (FY 1990) are "items," "provisions," or "conditions" subject to veto.
  • Whether the vetoed provisions constitute "inappropriate provisions" or "riders" that may be vetoed.
  • Whether the veto violates the separation of powers by nullifying Congress’s attempt to restrict the power of augmentation.

• Procedural:
  • Justiciable controversy exists. The conflict between the Senate and the Executive regarding the scope of veto power presents an actual case requiring judicial determination of constitutional boundaries.
  • Standing is recognized. Senators have standing to raise constitutional issues, and taxpayers may sue when public funds are involved.
  • Political question doctrine inapplicable. The determination of constitutional boundaries between coordinate branches is a judicial function under Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
• Substantive:
  • The President may veto inappropriate provisions. Despite the elimination of explicit "provision-veto" language in the 1987 Constitution, the President retains authority to veto "distinct and severable parts" of bills, including provisions that are inappropriate to appropriations bills.
  • The vetoed sections are inappropriate provisions (riders). They do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation; they apply generally to all disapproved/reduced items and constitute substantive legislation restricting the power of augmentation, properly the subject of separate legislation.
  • The sections are not true conditions. Genuine conditions must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense and logically belong in a schedule of expenditures; the vetoed sections fail this test of appropriateness.
  • The veto does not violate separation of powers. The vetoed provisions would impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other officials to augment items from savings. The power of augmentation is dormant until authorized by law (PD 1177), but once granted, Congress cannot indirectly revoke it through appropriations riders.

• Item-veto power — An "item" is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose; it is a specific appropriation, not a general provision of law. The President may veto any particular item or items in an appropriations bill, and this power extends to distinct and severable parts, including inappropriate provisions.
• Inappropriate provisions/riders — Provisions in general appropriations bills must relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and be limited in operation to that appropriation. Provisions that are substantive legislation, not germane to specific appropriations, or that apply generally to the entire budget are "inappropriate provisions" or "riders" subject to veto.
• Test of appropriateness for conditions — Conditions or limitations in appropriations bills must exhibit such a connexity with money items that they logically belong in a schedule of expenditures. If a provision requires reference to external documents (e.g., original budget submissions) to identify the affected appropriations, it is not a true condition.
• Power of augmentation — Under Article VI, Section 25(5), the President and other specified officials may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law from savings in other items. This power lies dormant until authorized by statute (e.g., PD 1177, Section 44), but once granted, Congress cannot nullify it through provisions in subsequent appropriations acts without express repeal.
• Political question doctrine — Does not bar judicial review when the issue involves the delimitation of constitutional boundaries between coordinate branches; the expanded definition of judicial power in Article VIII, Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution authorizes courts to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• "An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts... of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose."
• "The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein."
• "The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation."
• "The power of augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure."

• Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (62 Phil. 912 [1926]; 299 U.S. 410 [1936]) — Cited for the definition of "item" as a specific appropriation of money, not a general provision; the SC noted the U.S. Supreme Court reversal of the Philippine decision on other grounds (non-appropriations bill involved), but adopted the definition of "item."
• Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (G.R. No. L-20740, June 30, 1964) — Distinguished; held that the President cannot veto a condition attached to an appropriation without vetoing the item itself. The SC ruled this case inapplicable because the vetoed sections in the instant case were not true conditions attached to specific appropriations.
• Demetria v. Alba (G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987) — Cited for the principle that the judiciary must declare void acts of other branches that exceed constitutional powers, and for upholding the validity of augmentation from savings under Section 25(5).
• Henry v. Edwards (346 So. 2d 153 [La. 1977]) — Cited for the principle that inappropriate provisions in general appropriation bills must be treated as "items" for purposes of the veto power to prevent legislative circumvention of executive veto.
• Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 S.E. 2d 120 [Va. 1940]) — Cited for the definition of "item" in budgetary legislation.

• Article VI, Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution — Grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.
• Article VI, Section 25(2) of the 1987 Constitution — Mandates that provisions in general appropriations bills must relate specifically to particular appropriations and be limited in operation to such appropriations.
• Article VI, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution — Prohibits transfer of appropriations but allows the President and other specified officials to augment items from savings, by law.
• Presidential Decree No. 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977), Sections 44 and 45, as amended by Republic Act No. 6670 — Statutory authority granting the President the power to augment appropriations from savings within the Executive Branch.

• Justice Cruz (Dissenting) — Argued that Section 55 is not a rider but a valid exercise of Congress’s power to withdraw delegated authority; contended that PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree) is the real rider for including augmentation authority in a budget form statute rather than in the General Appropriations Act; maintained that Congress can revoke the power of augmentation at will as the delegating authority.
• Justice Gutierrez, Jr. (Dissenting) — Argued that the veto power is strictly limited to "items" and cannot include "provisions," citing constitutional history showing the deliberate elimination of provision-veto power in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; warned that the ruling allows "fund juggling" and effectively creates a lump-sum appropriation for the Executive, undermining congressional power of the purse.
• Justice Padilla (Dissenting) — Contended that the veto has no constitutional basis because Section 27(2) limits the President to vetoing "items," not "provisions"; argued that Sections 55 and 16 are valid conditions on the power of augmentation that Congress has the right to impose, citing Bolinao Electronics for the rule that the President cannot veto conditions without vetoing the items to which they relate.