Gonzales vs. Gonzales de Carungcong

A will’s attestation clause need not be a separate or single clause; it may form part of the body of the will and be phrased as the testator’s own declaration, provided the instrumental witnesses sign it and the will substantially complies with statutory requirements. An instrument of revocation is void where the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity at its execution and did not publish the will to the attesting witnesses.

The testatrix, Manuela Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales, left an estate estimated at P150,000 and several children, among them Alejandro Gonzales, Leopoldo Gonzales, Manolita Gonzales de Carungcong, and Juan Gonzales. The controversy involved competing testamentary instruments offered for probate by Manuel Gonzales and Manolita Gonzales de Carungcong, and a later instrument of revocation invoked by Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. and Juan Gonzales. The governing law was the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly sections 618 and 623 on the execution and revocation of wills.

The testatrix, Manuela Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales, died on November 27, 1948, at about seventy-eight years of age, leaving an estate estimated at P150,000 and children including Alejandro Gonzales, Leopoldo Gonzales, Manolita Gonzales de Carungcong, and Juan Gonzales. On December 22, 1948, Manuel Gonzales filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition, Special Proceeding No. 837, for probate of an alleged will executed by the testatrix on November 16, 1942 (Exhibit B—Manuel Gonzales), which devised to Manuel Gonzales the greater portion of the estate without impairing the legitimes of the other children. On December 31, 1948, Manolita G. de Carungcong filed in the same court a petition, Special Proceeding No. 838, for probate of another alleged will executed on May 5, 1945 (Exhibit 1—Manolita G. Carungcong), which left to Manolita G. de Carungcong the greater bulk of the estate without impairing the legitimes of the other children. On February 16, 1949, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. filed an opposition seeking disallowance of both wills on the ground that, assuming their validity, they had been revoked by an instrument executed by the testatrix on November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2—Alejandro and Juan Gonzales), so that the estate should be distributed as if she died intestate. With the exception of Leopoldo Gonzales, the children filed mutual oppositions to one or the other instruments.

The May 5, 1945 will was in the form and tenor quoted in the decision. Its penultimate paragraph stated that the will was composed of seven pages numbered consecutively, each bearing the testatrix’s genuine signature and that of all her witnesses. Its final paragraph stated that the testatrix signed it at Imus, Cavite, on May 5, 1945, before three witnesses; that she signed the left margin of every page before all and each witness; and that each witness signed as her witness before her and before each other and also signed the left margin of every page. The will bore the signatures of Manuela Y. Vda. de Gonzales and Manuela Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales, and the witnesses Bienvenido de los Reyes, Tahimik T. Sayoc, and Luis Gaerlan. Appellants contended that the will contained no attestation clause; that, assuming the concluding paragraph was the attestation clause, it was invalid because it was the act of the testatrix and not of the witnesses, and because it did not state the number of sheets or pages.

As to the alleged revocation, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. claimed that the May 5, 1945 will had been revoked by the instrument of November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2—Alejandro and Juan Gonzales). That instrument stated that the testatrix, of sufficient age, residing in Rizal, of sound mind and good memory, revoked all prior wills because they were not her true will, and that because she could not sign, Constancio Padilla was asked to sign for her on November 17, 1948, in Pasay. Manolita G. de Carungcong, joined by Manuel Gonzales as appellee, contended that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity when she allegedly executed the instrument of revocation. The trial court sustained that contention.

The evidence showed that for more than ten years before her death the testatrix had suffered from hypertension. On November 14, 1948, she had aphasia; on November 15, 1948, she was taken to the hospital upon the advice of her family physician, Dr. Jose C. Leveriza. In the letter introducing her to the hospital authorities (Exhibit E—Manuel Gonzales), Dr. Leveriza stated that she was suffering from hypertension and cerebral thrombosis. On November 18, 1948, when the alleged instrument of revocation was executed, the testatrix was in a comatose and unconscious state and could not talk or understand. Dr. Leveriza testified that she was completely unconscious from the day she entered the hospital, could not speak or make herself understood, had right-sided hemiflejia or paralysis, and could not move her right hand or foot. Although the attesting witnesses tended to imply that the testatrix was of sound mind, Dr. Ramon C. Talavera, an attesting witness, testified that he had not examined her, that her case appeared serious, that he had a hunch “they were taking advantage of the last moment of the deceased and they were trying to make me an instrument in the accomplishment of their aims,” and that he thought her condition doubtful because he could only judge from the people going there. Dr. Leveriza’s prescription to let the testatrix sit or turn on her side was explained as a measure to avoid hypostatic pneumonia.

The circumstances surrounding the preparation of the revocation instrument were also considered. According to Jose Padilla, the testatrix had asked him to prepare the necessary document as early as May 1948, reminded him weeks before November 1, 1948, and again several days before that date. He delayed because he was busy and because the children had disputes he tried to settle, and because he had not secured from Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. certain documents of transfer he wanted to examine. Even under Alejandro Gonzales, Jr.’s theory, Constancio Padilla merely asked the testatrix whether she was agreeable to the instrument prepared by Jose Padilla and whether she was agreeable to his signing it for her, to which she allegedly answered “Yes”; the attesting witnesses were not introduced to her and their presence was not mentioned to her. The trial court found that the testatrix was comatose and unconscious on November 18, 1948, and that the May 5, 1945 will was executed in accordance with law.

• Attestation Clause: Appellants contended that the May 5, 1945 will did not contain any attestation clause; assuming the concluding paragraph was the attestation clause, it was invalid because it was the act of the testatrix and not of the witnesses, and because it did not state the number of sheets or pages of the will.
• Revocation by Later Instrument: Appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. maintained that the May 5, 1945 will had been revoked by the instrument executed on November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2).
• Testamentary Capacity and Witness Credibility: Appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. argued that the attesting witnesses’ testimony implying that the testatrix was of sound mind should be given more credence than the opinion of Dr. Leveriza, questioned Dr. Leveriza’s expertise, and argued that if the testatrix was comatose, Dr. Leveriza would not have ordered that she be allowed to sit or turn on her side.
• Earlier Will: Appellant Manuel Gonzales contended that the trial court erred in not admitting to probate the November 16, 1942 will (Exhibit B).

• Lack of Testamentary Capacity: Appellee Manolita G. de Carungcong, joined by Manuel Gonzales as appellee, contended that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity when she allegedly executed the instrument of revocation of November 18, 1948.

• Attestation Clause: Whether the May 5, 1945 will contained a valid attestation clause, considering that the clause appeared in the body of the will and was phrased as the testatrix’s declaration, and whether it sufficiently stated the number of sheets or pages.
• Revocation of Earlier Will: Whether the November 16, 1942 will (Exhibit B) was revoked by the subsequent May 5, 1945 will (Exhibit 1).
• Validity of Revocation Instrument: Whether the November 18, 1948 instrument (Exhibit 2) validly revoked the May 5, 1945 will or was void because the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity and did not publish the will to the attesting witnesses.
• Credibility of Expert and Attesting Witnesses: Whether the testimony of the attesting witnesses should be given more credence than the attending physician’s testimony on the testatrix’s testamentary capacity.

• Attestation Clause: Yes. The attestation clause in the body of the will substantially complied with the law; the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses immediately under the testatrix’s signature showed attestation of due execution, and the number of pages stated in the penultimate paragraph could be considered with the last paragraph because the law does not require a single clause.
• Revocation of Earlier Will: Yes. The November 16, 1942 will (Exhibit B) was revoked by the subsequent valid May 5, 1945 will (Exhibit 1), so the trial court did not err in not admitting Exhibit B to probate.
• Validity of Revocation Instrument: No. The November 18, 1948 instrument (Exhibit 2) was null and void because the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity and did not publish her will to the attesting witnesses.
• Credibility of Expert and Attesting Witnesses: No. The attending physician’s uncontradicted testimony prevailed over the attesting witnesses’ implication of sound mind; the cases relied on by appellants were distinguishable because those doctors had not observed the testators on the dates of execution.

• Attestation Clause: The Court relied on Valentina Cuevas vs. Pilar Achacoso, G.R. No. L-3497 (May 1951), which followed Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil. 378, and held that an attestation clause made by the testator and forming part of the body of the will substantially complies with the law. The apparent anomaly that the clause appeared to be the testator’s attestation rather than the witnesses’ was not serious or substantial because the three instrumental witnesses signed immediately under the testator’s signature. An instrumental witness, as defined in In re will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil. 807, 809, is one who takes part in the execution of an instrument; such a witness attests not only the genuineness of the testator’s signature but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The penultimate paragraph stating the number of sheets or pages was sufficient attestation and could be considered together with the last paragraph; the law does not require the attestation to be contained in a single clause. Unsubstantial departures from usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. Although three Justices in Cuevas concurred in the result on the ground that the will had been prepared in reliance on Aldaba vs. Roque, the case at bar still fell within that view because the will was executed on May 5, 1945.
• Revocation of Earlier Will: Because the May 5, 1945 will (Exhibit 1) was valid and admitted to probate, the earlier November 16, 1942 will (Exhibit B) had to be considered revoked by the subsequent will under section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This disposed of Manuel Gonzales’s contention that the trial court erred in not admitting Exhibit B to probate.
• Validity of Revocation Instrument: The trial court’s finding that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity when she allegedly executed the November 18, 1948 instrument was sustained. The record showed more than ten years of hypertension, aphasia on November 14, 1948, hospitalization on November 15, 1948, and a diagnosis of hypertension and cerebral thrombosis. On November 18, 1948, she was comatose and unconscious and could not talk or understand. Dr. Leveriza, the family physician who attended her during her last illness and saw her on that date, testified that she was completely unconscious, could not speak or make herself understood, and had right-sided hemiflejia or paralysis. His testimony was uncontradicted. The attesting witnesses’ implication of sound mind could not prevail, especially since Dr. Ramon C. Talavera, an attesting witness, admitted he had not examined her, thought her case serious, suspected that advantage was being taken of her last moments, and considered her condition doubtful. The Court also found the delay in preparing the revocation instrument suspicious: Jose Padilla had been asked to prepare it as early as May 1948 and reminded twice before November 1, 1948, yet gave poor excuses for delay. Even under Alejandro Gonzales, Jr.’s theory, the testatrix was merely asked two yes-or-no questions by Constancio Padilla; the attesting witnesses were not introduced to her and their presence was not mentioned. She therefore did not understand the meaning and extent of the ceremony and did not publish her last will to the attesting witnesses, contrary to the recital of the attestation clause. The instrument was thus null and void.
• Credibility of Expert and Attesting Witnesses: The cases cited by appellants—Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil. 400; Bagtas vs. Paguio, 22 Phil. 227; Galvez vs. Galvez, 26 Phil. 243; Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil. 573; Amata vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil. 485; and Neyra vs. Neyra, 42 Off. Gaz. 2790—were distinguishable. In those cases the doctors were not in a position to certify the testamentary capacity of the testators at the time the wills were executed because they had not observed the testators on those dates or had never seen them. Here, the family physician attended the testatrix during her last illness and saw her on the day the alleged instrument of revocation was executed. His uncontradicted testimony therefore prevailed over the attesting witnesses’ implication of sound mind. The prescription to let the testatrix sit or turn on her side was explained as a measure to avoid hypostatic pneumonia and did not undermine his testimony.

• Substantial Compliance with Attestation Clause Requirements — A will’s attestation clause need not be a separate or single clause; it may form part of the body of the will and be phrased as the testator’s own declaration, provided the instrumental witnesses sign it and the will substantially complies with statutory requirements. The Court applied this to uphold the May 5, 1945 will because the three instrumental witnesses signed immediately under the testatrix’s signature and the number of pages was stated in the penultimate paragraph.
• Instrumental Witness — An instrumental witness is one who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing. Such a witness attests not only to the genuineness of the testator’s signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The Court found that the witnesses’ signatures immediately under the testatrix’s signature showed they attested to due execution.
• Revocation by Subsequent Will — Under section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a later valid will revokes an earlier will. The Court applied this to hold that the May 5, 1945 will revoked the November 16, 1942 will.
• Testamentary Capacity — A person must have testamentary capacity at the time of executing a will or instrument of revocation. An instrument of revocation is void where the testatrix was comatose and unconscious and could not talk or understand at the time of execution. The Court sustained the trial court’s finding that the testatrix lacked capacity on November 18, 1948.
• Publication of Will — The testatrix must publish her last will to the attesting witnesses. Mere affirmative answers to two questions, without more, where the attesting witnesses were not introduced to the testatrix and their presence was not mentioned, do not establish publication. The Court held that the testatrix did not publish the instrument of revocation to the attesting witnesses.
• Expert Testimony on Testamentary Capacity — The uncontradicted testimony of an attending physician who observed the testatrix during her last illness and on the date of execution may prevail over the testimony of attesting witnesses implying sound mind. The Court distinguished cases where doctors had not observed the testators on the relevant dates.

• "The clause above quoted is the attestation clause referred to in the law which, in our opinion, substantially complies with its requirements. The only apparent anomaly we find is that it appears to be an attestation made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental witnesses. This apparent anomaly, however, is not in our opinion serious nor substantial as to affect the validity of the will, it appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses." — This passage, quoted from Cuevas vs. Achacoso, states the ratio for upholding an attestation clause made by the testator and forming part of the body of the will.
• "It is significant that the law does not require the attestation to be contained in a single clause. While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially when the authenticity of the will is not assailed, as in this case." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of substantial compliance for attestation clauses.
• "The fact that the three instrumental witnesses have signed the will immediately under the signature of the testator, shows that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of his signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause." — This defines the attestation function of instrumental witnesses and supports the validity of the May 5, 1945 will.
• "In other words, contrary to the recital of the attestation clause, the testatrix cannot rightly be said to have published her last will to the attesting witnesses." — This states the publication requirement and the ground for voiding the November 18, 1948 instrument of revocation.

• Valentina Cuevas vs. Pilar Achacoso, G.R. No. L-3497, 88 Phil. 730 (May 1951) — Controlling recent precedent relied on by the Court; sustained an attestation clause made by the testator and forming part of the body of the will, following Aldaba vs. Roque.
• Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil. 378 — Precedent followed; held that an attestation clause forming part of the body of the will and reciting the testatrix’s declaration, signed by her and the three instrumental witnesses, sufficiently complied with Act No. 2465.
• In re will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil. 807, 809 — Cited for the definition of an instrumental witness as one who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing.
• Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil. 400; Bagtas vs. Paguio, 22 Phil. 227; Galvez vs. Galvez, 26 Phil. 243; Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil. 573; Amata vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil. 485; Neyra vs. Neyra, 42 Off. Gaz. 2790, 76 Phil. 296 — Cited by appellants for the primacy of attesting witnesses over expert testimony but distinguished because the doctors in those cases had not observed the testators on the dates of execution.

• Section 623, Code of Civil Procedure — Governs revocation of wills; applied to hold that the November 16, 1942 will (Exhibit B) was revoked by the subsequent May 5, 1945 will (Exhibit 1).
• Section 618, Code of Civil Procedure — Cited by the trial court in declaring the November 18, 1948 instrument (Exhibit 2) null and void because it was executed without the knowledge and testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
• Act No. 2465 — Cited in Aldaba vs. Roque as the law governing the execution of wills; the Court noted that the attestation clause in that case sufficiently complied with its requirements.

Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concurred.

• Justice Padilla — Filed a separate opinion concurring and dissenting for the same reasons given by Justice Montemayor in Cuevas vs. Achacoso. The provided text does not elaborate further on his points of disagreement.