Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals

Non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not jurisdictional; it may affect the sufficiency of the cause of action or render the complaint premature, but it does not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication, and the defense is waived if not timely raised and the defendants participate in the proceedings.

Gregorio Gonzales owned an apartment in Caloocan City. Private respondents Mar Evangelista, Luciano and Rosita Sese, and Estrella Bautista leased three doors of the apartment for less than P200.00 a month. Presidential Decree No. 1508 established a barangay conciliation process as a condition precedent to judicial recourse, while Batas Blg. 25 governed ejectment on the ground that the owner needs the premises for his married children. Jurisdiction over ejectment cases was conferred by Batas Blg. 129 and the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by P.D. No. 1508.

Gregorio Gonzales owned an apartment in Caloocan City. Three doors thereof, Nos. 110-D, 110-B, and 110-C, were leased to the private respondents for less than P200.00 a month in rentals. The facts were undisputed.

On October 1, 1979, Gonzales filed three separate complaints for ejectment against the private respondents in the City Court of Caloocan City. According to him, he needed the premises for the use of his married children who allegedly did not have residences of their own, a ground for ejectment under Batas Blg. 25. The private respondents filed their answers, after which the cases were consolidated and heard.

On January 6, 1981, the City Court rendered judgment ejecting the private respondents. They appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXII, now Regional Trial Court, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Reconsideration was denied.

The private respondents then commenced proceedings in the Court of Appeals. Among other allegations, they asserted that the Court of First Instance erred in sustaining the City Court’s jurisdiction notwithstanding the admitted fact that there was no compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508. On October 31, 1981, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision dismissing the ejectment cases for lack of jurisdiction of the City Court because the parties had not undergone a confrontation at the barangay level. The Court of Appeals denied Gonzales’s motion for reconsideration on January 5, 1982. The Supreme Court noted that there was no controversy as to the facts and that the City Court decision, as affirmed by the Court of First Instance, conformed to law and evidence.

• Non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508: Private respondents alleged that the Court of First Instance erred in sustaining the jurisdiction of the City Court notwithstanding the admitted fact that there was no compliance in the cases with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508.

• Nature of P.D. No. 1508 Conciliation: Whether compliance with the barangay conciliation process under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is jurisdictional, such that non-compliance deprives a court of competent jurisdiction of authority to hear and decide the ejectment cases.
• Waiver: Whether private respondents waived the defense of non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508 by failing to allege it in their answers and by participating in the trial, arguing their case, and adducing evidence.

• Nature of P.D. No. 1508 Conciliation: No. The conciliation process under P.D. No. 1508 is not jurisdictional; jurisdiction is conferred by Batas Blg. 129 and the Judiciary Act of 1948, and P.D. No. 1508 does not vest jurisdiction in the lupong tagapayapa.
• Waiver: Yes. Non-compliance may affect the sufficiency of the cause of action or render the complaint premature, but it does not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising adjudication where defendants fail to object in their answer and participate in the proceedings; such conduct amounts to waiver.

• Nature of P.D. No. 1508 Conciliation: The Court framed the issue as one of procedure, not jurisdiction. In Ebol vs. Amin, the conciliation process under P.D. No. 1508 was held not jurisdictional. Jurisdiction is conferred by Batas Blg. 129 and the Judiciary Act of 1948. P.D. No. 1508 does not vest jurisdiction in the lupong tagapayapa because jurisdiction means the power to try and decide a case, and the lupon does not decide cases; it is vested only with conciliation functions and is not a court of law. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the ejectment cases for lack of jurisdiction.
• Waiver: In Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. No. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and make the complaint vulnerable to dismissal for lack of cause of action or prematurity. However, the same case held that this would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication where the defendants failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo. In the cases at bar, there was no allegation in the private respondents’ answers that the petitioner failed to invoke the authority of the lupon tagapayapa before going to court. Moreover, they took part in the trial, argued their case, and adduced their evidence. These amounted to waiver. The City Court decision, as affirmed by the Court of First Instance, conformed to law and evidence.

• Barangay conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 is not jurisdictional — The lupong tagapayapa is vested only with conciliation functions; it does not decide cases and is not a court of law. Jurisdiction is conferred by Batas Blg. 129 and the Judiciary Act of 1948. Non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process therefore does not deprive a court of competent jurisdiction of its power to adjudicate.
• Non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508 affects cause of action, not jurisdiction — It may affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and render the complaint vulnerable to dismissal for lack of cause of action or prematurity, but it does not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it.
• Waiver of the P.D. No. 1508 defense — A defendant who fails to object to non-compliance with the barangay conciliation requirement in the answer and who participates in the trial, argues the case, and adduces evidence is deemed to have waived the defense. The Court applied this to the private respondents, who did not allege non-compliance in their answers and actively litigated the ejectment cases.

• "The issue to be resolved here is not one of jurisdiction, as erroneously supposed by the respondent Court of Appeals and by the parties as well. The question, rather, is simply one of procedure." — The passage frames the Court’s central correction: the Court of Appeals and the parties treated P.D. No. 1508 compliance as jurisdictional, but the Supreme Court characterized it as a procedural matter.
• "In Ebol v. Amin, we held that the conciliation process under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not jurisdictional. Jurisdiction is conferred by Batas Blg. 129 and the Judiciary Act of 1948." — This states the ratio decidendi on the nature of P.D. No. 1508 and identifies the sources of jurisdiction.
• "Presidential Decree No. 1508 does not vest jurisdiction in the lupong tagapayapa. Jurisdiction means the power to try and decide a case. The lupon does not decide cases. It is vested only with conciliation functions. It is not a court of law." — This defines why the lupon’s role is non-jurisdictional and is a commonly cited formulation of the doctrine.
• "There is a similar waiver in the cases at bar. There is no allegation in the private respondents' answers that the petitioner failed to invoke the authority of the lupon tagapayapa before going to court. Moreover, they took part in the trial, argued their case, and adduced their evidence. These amount to a waiver." — This applies the waiver doctrine to the facts and explains why the Court of Appeals’ dismissal could not stand.

• Ebol vs. Amin, No. L-70237, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 438 (1985) — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that the conciliation process under P.D. No. 1508 is not jurisdictional; the Court relied on it to reject the Court of Appeals’ lack-of-jurisdiction ground.
• Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-65072, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 470 (1984) — Followed for the rule that non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508 may affect the sufficiency of the cause of action or make the complaint premature, but does not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising adjudication where the defendants failed to object in their answer and during the proceedings.
• Peregrina vs. Panis, No. L-56011, October 31, 1984, 133 SCRA 72 (1984) — Cited in the footnote accompanying Royales for the same rule on non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508.
• Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245 (1913) — Cited for the definition of jurisdiction as the power to try and decide a case, supporting the conclusion that the lupon does not exercise jurisdiction.

• Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2 — Cited to show that the lupon is vested only with conciliation functions; the Court used this to hold that P.D. No. 1508 does not vest jurisdiction in the lupong tagapayapa.
• Batas Blg. 129 — Cited as a source of jurisdiction, together with the Judiciary Act of 1948, to establish that jurisdiction over the ejectment cases was conferred on the courts and not on the lupon.
• Judiciary Act of 1948 — Cited as a source of jurisdiction, together with Batas Blg. 129, to establish that jurisdiction over the ejectment cases was conferred on the courts and not on the lupon.
• Batas Blg. 25 — Cited as the ground for ejectment invoked by petitioner, namely, his need of the premises for the use of his married children who allegedly did not have residences of their own.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.