Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections

The procedure for amending the Constitution is a justiciable question subject to judicial review, not a political question; Congress may simultaneously propose specific amendments and call a constitutional convention; and the term "election" in Article XV does not exclusively mean a special election, permitting ratification during general elections.

In 1967, Congress sought to amend the 1935 Constitution through two tracks: (1) specific amendments proposed by Congress itself (Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3), and (2) a constitutional convention to be held in 1971 (R.B.H. No. 2). This dual approach, along with the decision to hold the ratification vote during general elections rather than a special plebiscite, raised fundamental questions about the limits of congressional power under Article XV and the extent of judicial review over the amendment process.

• March 16, 1967: Senate and House of Representatives passed R.B.H. No. 1 (increasing House membership to 180), R.B.H. No. 2 (calling a Constitutional Convention for 1971), and R.B.H. No. 3 (allowing Congress members to be delegates without forfeiting seats).
• June 17, 1967: Republic Act No. 4913 approved, scheduling submission of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 amendments for ratification at the November 14, 1967 general elections.
• October 21, 1967: Gonzales filed petition for prohibition (L-28196) to restrain implementation of RA 4913.
• October 31, 1967: PHILCONSA filed petition for certiorari (L-28224) to review COMELEC resolution dismissing their earlier petition.
• November 8, 1967: Cases deemed submitted for decision.

• Nature of Action: Special civil actions for prohibition and certiorari to prevent the holding of a plebiscite on constitutional amendments and to declare RA 4913 unconstitutional.
• Parties:
  • Gonzales: Filipino citizen, taxpayer, and voter filing as class suit.
  • PHILCONSA: Civic, non-profit, non-partisan corporation dedicated to upholding the Constitution.
  • Respondents: COMELEC, Director of Printing, and Auditor General.
  • Key Constitutional Provisions at Issue: Article XV, Section 1 (amendment process); Article VI, Section 5 (apportionment of House seats).
  • Contested Legislation: RA 4913 provided for publication of amendments in the Official Gazette, posting in public buildings, availability of copies at polling places, and printing full text of amendments on the back of ballots.

• The issue is a political question beyond judicial review (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito precedent).
• Congress cannot simultaneously propose amendments and call a convention; the word "or" in Article XV is exclusive, not permissive.
• The present Congress is de facto because it failed to reapportion House seats within 3 years after the 1960 census as mandated by Article VI, Section 5, rendering the amendments proposed by de facto officers invalid.
• The word "election" in Article XV means a special election, not a general election.
• RA 4913 violates due process and the spirit of the Constitution because:
  • The amendments are printed only on the back of ballots, not the face.
  • The text of the original provisions being amended is not shown.
  • Voters will be distracted by candidate elections and cannot focus on the amendments.
  • Information dissemination methods (Official Gazette publication, postings) are insufficient to reach the masses, especially in barrios.

• The SC has jurisdiction to determine the proper allocation of powers between departments (Angara v. Electoral Commission).
• The amendment process involves procedural requirements fixed by the Constitution, making compliance justiciable.
• Congress may exercise both alternatives (propose amendments and call convention) as they are not mutually exclusive; "or" may mean "and."
• The present Congress is de jure; failure to reapportion does not dissolve Congress or render members de facto, and the Constitution expressly provides for continuation with existing districts until reapportionment is made.
• "Election" in Article XV includes general elections; the Constitution does not specify "special" election.
• RA 4913 provides sufficient notice through publication, postings, and ballot text, satisfying due process.

• Procedural Issues:

  • Whether the SC has jurisdiction to pass upon the procedure for constitutional amendments, or is the issue a political question?
  • Whether petitioners have standing (locus standi) as taxpayers and citizens?

• Substantive Issues:

  • Whether Congress may simultaneously propose amendments and call a constitutional convention under Article XV?
  • Whether the present Congress is de jure or de facto in light of the failure to reapportion within 3 years after the 1960 census?
  • Whether constitutional amendments may be submitted for ratification at a general election or only at a special election?
  • Whether RA 4913 violates the Constitution by failing to provide adequate means for informing the electorate of the nature and implications of the proposed amendments?

• Procedural:

  • The SC has jurisdiction. The procedure for amending the Constitution is justiciable, not a political question. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, which held that amendment procedures are political questions, is modified. The SC is the only constitutional organ that can determine the proper allocation of powers.
  • Petitioners have standing as taxpayers and citizens concerned with constitutional integrity.

• Substantive:

  • Congress may exercise both alternatives. The word "or" in Article XV ("may propose amendments... or call a convention") is not necessarily exclusive; it may mean "and." The Constitution does not prohibit Congress from proposing specific amendments while simultaneously calling a convention for general amendments, especially where the subjects differ and voting was done separately.
  • Congress is de jure. Failure to reapportion within 3 years after census does not render Congress illegal or its members de facto. Article VI, Section 5 provides that "until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members... who shall be elected... from the present Assembly districts." This provision ensures continuity. Loss of office is not automatic; it requires impeachment or other legal process.
  • General election is permissible. Article XV does not specify that the election must be "special." The word "election" without qualification normally refers to the choice of candidates by popular vote. While a special election may be preferable, the Constitution does not mandate it.
  • RA 4913 is not unconstitutional. (6-6 split, insufficient to invalidate): The majority held that the information dissemination scheme (publication in Official Gazette, posting in public places, copies at polling places, full text on ballots) satisfies the constitutional requirement that amendments be "submitted to the people for their ratification." The minority (6 justices) held that holding ratification during general elections without ensuring exclusive focus on amendments violated the spirit of the Constitution, as voters would be distracted by candidate choices and the dissemination methods were inadequate to reach rural populations.

• Justiciability of Constitutional Amendments — The procedure for amending the Constitution is subject to judicial review. While the substance of amendments is a political question left to Congress and the people, the manner or procedure (e.g., 3/4 vote requirement, submission to people) is fixed by the Constitution and is justiciable. This modifies Mabanag v. Lopez Vito.
• De Facto Officer Doctrine — Acts of persons holding office under color of title are valid insofar as the public is concerned. The title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally but only directly through quo warranto proceedings. However, the SC held that members of the present Congress are de jure, not de facto, because the Constitution expressly provides for continuation of the existing districting until valid reapportionment is made.
• Residuary Powers of Congress — Powers not expressly lodged elsewhere under the Constitution reside with the legislative body. Since the Constitution does not specify who shall provide for the details of submitting amendments to the people (date, manner, funding), Congress may enact ordinary legislation (not requiring 3/4 vote) to implement the submission process.
• Strict vs. Liberal Construction — The spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation; courts cannot read into the Constitution what is not written. While the spirit of the Constitution might favor exclusive focus on amendments during ratification, the letter does not require a special election.

• "The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of power between the several departments and among the integral or constitutional constituent units thereof." (C.J. Concepcion, citing Angara v. Electoral Commission)
• "Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits."
• "The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people... Congress may propose amendments... merely because the same explicitly grants such power."
• "The title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer."
• "The system of checks and balances... is not in derogation of the principle of separation of powers... The determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the legislative sphere." (C.J. Concepcion)
• "The word 'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities should strain every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof." (J. Sanchez, dissenting view on adequacy of submission)

• Angara v. Electoral Commission — Cited for the principle that the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional allocation of powers.
• Mabanag v. Lopez Vito — Distinguished and modified; previously held that amendment procedures are political questions, but this doctrine was overturned in favor of justiciability.
• Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate; Avelino v. Cuenco; Tañada v. Cuenco; Macias v. Commission on Elections — Cited to show the trend of SC rejecting the political question theory and asserting judicial review over congressional procedures.
• Tayko v. Capistrano — Applied the de facto doctrine to judges; held that title of de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally even by parties before them.
• Lino Luna v. Rodriguez; Nacionalista Party v. De Vera — Cited for the de facto officer doctrine rationale (public interest demands validity of acts under color of title).

• Article XV, Section 1 (1935 Constitution) — "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."
• Article VI, Section 5 (1935 Constitution) — Apportionment provision requiring Congress to make apportionment within 3 years after census, but providing that until such apportionment is made, the House shall have the same number of members from existing districts.
• Article VI, Section 18 (1935 Constitution) — All appropriation bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives (cited by J.P. Bengzon to show RA 4913 could not have been validly adopted in joint session).
• Article III, Section 1 (1935 Constitution) — Due process clause (cited regarding adequacy of information dissemination).

• J.P. Bengzon, J. — Agreed with the result but emphasized that RA 4913 is an ordinary statute, not a resolution proposing amendments, and therefore did not require a 3/4 vote in joint session. The act of proposing amendments (determining the WHAT) is distinct from submitting them (determining the HOW/WHEN). Also emphasized that the de facto officer argument fails because the Constitution itself provides for the legal status of Congress pending reapportionment.
• Fernando, J. — Concurred on jurisdiction, adding that automatic reliance on the political question theory would constitute judicial abdication. Noted that Mabanag was a product of its times (1947, economic crisis, parity amendment) and American deference, but modern jurisprudence requires judicial inquiry to ensure compliance with constitutional requirements.
• Makalintal, J. — Emphasized that the constitutionality of a law must depend on its intrinsic provisions, not extrinsic factors like the zeal of implementation. Rejected the argument that ratification must be in a special election.
• Reyes, J.B.L., J. — Concurred in the result with Justice Sanchez (thereby voting to declare RA 4913 unconstitutional), arguing that if a 3/4 vote is required to propose amendments, the framers could not have intended ratification to be by mere majority at an election distracted by other issues. Historical practice showed all previous amendments were submitted in special elections.

• Sanchez, J. (Joined by Reyes, Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar, and Castro, JJ.) — Rendered a separate opinion constituting the minority view that RA 4913 is unconstitutional. Held that "submitted to the people for their ratification" requires the government to strain every effort to inform citizens of the amendments' nature and effects, ensuring intelligent consent. Found that:
  • The dissemination scheme (Official Gazette, postings, back of ballot) was insufficient to reach barrio residents.
  • Voting time is not study time; voters need time to deliberate.
  • Holding ratification during general elections violates the spirit of the Constitution because voters' attention is diverted by candidate choices, and the amendments become "but a bootstrap to the electoral ballot."
  • Historical practice (1939, 1940, 1947 amendments) consistently used special elections.
  • The amendments are transcendental (increasing tax burden, affecting representation) and require the people's undivided attention.