Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections

The question of whether a resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution is justiciable and subject to judicial review, the power to propose amendments being derived from the Constitution rather than from the people's inherent sovereignty, such that Congress does not have the final say on whether its acts are within constitutional limits. The petitions were nonetheless dismissed because fewer than eight justices voted to declare Republic Act No. 4913 and R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional.

Ramon A. Gonzales, a Filipino citizen, taxpayer, and voter, filed the petition in L-28196 as a class suit on behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated, seeking to restrain the Commission on Elections, the Director of Printing, and the Auditor General from implementing Republic Act No. 4913. The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA), a civic, non-profit, and non-partisan corporation organized to uphold the rule of law and defend the Constitution, filed a separate petition before the Commission on Elections and, upon its dismissal, elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via L-28224. Senator Arturo M. Tolentino appeared before both tribunals to oppose the PHILCONSA petition. The cases arose under the 1935 Constitution, whose Article XV, Section 1, governed the amendment process and required that proposed amendments be "submitted to the people for their ratification" at "an election."

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three resolutions. Resolution of Both Houses (R.B.H.) No. 1 proposed amending Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution to increase the maximum membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180, with apportionment among the provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, each province having at least one member. R.B.H. No. 2 called a constitutional convention to propose amendments, composed of two elective delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections on the second Tuesday of November 1971. R.B.H. No. 3 proposed amending Section 16, Article VI to authorize senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the constitutional convention without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which, upon approval by the President on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments proposed in R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 be submitted for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. The Act appropriated funds for the election and prescribed the manner of disseminating information about the proposed amendments, including publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election, posting of printed copies in conspicuous places in every municipality, city, and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967, keeping at least five copies in each polling place for examination by qualified electors on election day, and printing the full text of the contested resolutions on the back of the ballots.

Gonzales filed the petition in L-28196 on October 21, 1967, praying that the Commission on Elections be restrained from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, the Director of Printing from printing ballots pursuant to the Act and the resolutions, and the Auditor General from passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation made in the Act, and that the Act be declared unconstitutional and void. At the hearing on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of the respondents and expressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits. Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for PHILCONSA were allowed to argue as amici curiae; Dr. Salvador Araneta, counsel for PHILCONSA, prayed that the decision be deferred until the related case before the Commission on Elections had been finally determined.

On October 30, 1967, the Commission on Elections dismissed the PHILCONSA petition, and on October 31, 1967, PHILCONSA filed L-28224 with the Supreme Court seeking review by certiorari of that dismissal. The two cases were submitted for decision on November 8, 1967. The Solicitor General maintained in his answer in L-28224 that the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the same being "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito. Senator Tolentino objected to the petition on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of Representatives, that granting the petition would render the legislative department inoperational, and that the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law did not render illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter or its acts null and void.

• De Facto Congress: Petitioners argued that because no valid apportionment was made within three years after the 1960 census, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and its members became de facto officers, rendering the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 null and void.
• Special Election Requirement: Petitioners maintained that the term "election" in Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution should be construed as meaning a special election, not a general election in which officers of the national and local governments are chosen.
• Spirit of the Constitution: Petitioners urged that the spirit of the Constitution demands that the election in which proposals for amendment are submitted for ratification must be held under conditions giving the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of the amendments, conditions which allegedly did not exist.
• Three-Fourths Vote for RA 4913: Petitioner Gonzales contended that Republic Act No. 4913 was deficient for not having been passed by Congress in joint session by a three-fourths vote, as required by Section 1, Article XV for proposing amendments.
• Due Process: Petitioner Gonzales argued that Republic Act No. 4913 violated the due process clause by not requiring that the substance of the proposed amendments be stated on the face of the ballot or otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed amendments, instead printing only the proposed amendments at the back of the ballot.
• Mutually Exclusive Alternatives: Amicus curiae Atty. Juan T. David maintained that Congress may either propose amendments or call a convention for that purpose, but may not do both at the same time, based on the disjunctive "or" connecting the two alternatives in the Constitution.

• Political Question: The Solicitor General maintained that the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of L-28224, the same being "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.
• No Effect of Reapportionment Failure: Senator Tolentino argued that the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law did not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void.
• Legislative Inoperability: Senator Tolentino objected that the petition, if granted, would render the legislative department inoperational.
• No Jurisdiction Over House Composition: Senator Tolentino contended that the Court had no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of Representatives.

• Justiciability: Whether the question of whether Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violated the Constitution is a political question beyond judicial review.
• Legal Status of Congress: Whether the members of Congress are de facto officers due to the failure to make a valid apportionment within three years after the 1960 census, such that the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void.
• Dual Authority of Congress: Whether Congress may both propose amendments to the Constitution and call a constitutional convention at the same time.
• Type of Election for Ratification: Whether constitutional amendments may be submitted for ratification at a general election rather than a special election.
• Adequacy of Submission: Whether the measures prescribed by Republic Act No. 4913 constitute a proper submission of the proposed amendments to the people for ratification within the meaning and intendment of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.

• Justiciability: Yes. The issue is essentially justiciable, not political, and subject to judicial review, the Members of the Court being unanimous on this point.
• Legal Status of Congress: No. The objection is untenable; the members of Congress are de jure officers, the Court being unanimous in rejecting the de facto theory.
• Dual Authority of Congress: Yes. Congress may both propose amendments and call a convention, there being no disagreement among the members of the Court on this question.
• Type of Election for Ratification: Dismissed. The Chief Justice's opinion held that the Constitution does not require a special election, but six justices disagreed; the petitions were dismissed because fewer than eight votes existed to declare the Act unconstitutional.
• Adequacy of Submission: Dismissed. Four justices found the measures in Republic Act No. 4913 sufficient; six justices found them insufficient; the petitions were dismissed because fewer than eight votes existed to declare the Act unconstitutional.

• Justiciability: The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress under Section 1, Article VI; it is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state. Congress may propose amendments only because the Constitution explicitly grants such power under Section 1, Article XV. When exercising that power, senators and representatives act not as members of Congress but as component elements of a constituent assembly, deriving their authority from the Constitution. It follows necessarily that they do not have the final say on whether their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits; otherwise, they could brush aside constitutional constraints, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of the Constitution. The rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of the treaty-making power. The force of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, which characterized a similar issue as political, has been weakened by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, Avelino vs. Cuenco, Tañada vs. Cuenco, and Macias vs. Commission on Elections, in all of which the Court rejected the political question theory and proceeded to review the acts of Congress or its organs. To the extent the view in Mabanag is inconsistent, it should be deemed modified.

• Legal Status of Congress: Congress did in fact pass a bill making an apportionment, which became Republic Act No. 3040, but it was declared unconstitutional in Macias vs. Commission on Elections for not apportioning according to the number of inhabitants. The constitutional provision stating that "until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly" does not support the view that upon expiration of the period to make the apportionment, Congress becomes dissolved or illegal. On the contrary, it implies that Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of the period. The three-year period after the 1960 census did not expire until 1963, after the 1961 presidential elections, so the Senate and House organized on December 30, 1961 were de jure bodies. Neither political law nor the law on public officers supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty automatically results in forfeiture of office in the absence of a statute to that effect. The Constitution's impeachment provision further indicates that title to office remains unimpaired despite violation of a mandatory duty, until dismissal pursuant to a judgment of conviction. Even assuming the members were merely de facto officers, the de facto doctrine provides that acts of persons holding office under color of title are valid insofar as the public is concerned, and the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally, as held in Tayko vs. Capistrano.

• Dual Authority of Congress: The theory that Congress may either propose amendments or call a convention but not both rests on the disjunctive "or" connecting the two alternatives in Section 1, Article XV. This basis is weak, as the term "or" has often been held to mean "and" when the spirit or context of the law warrants it. Moreover, R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provisions on Congress, to be submitted for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R.B.H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971 to consider amendments to the Constitution in general; the subject matter is different, and the amendments under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the convention. Although the three resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately. Nothing in the Constitution or its history negates the authority of the same Congress to pass such resolutions in different sessions or on different days. The argument that the whole matter should be left to the convention impugns the wisdom, not the authority, of Congress's action.

• Type of Election for Ratification: Section 1, Article XV contains nothing to indicate that the "election" referred to is a special rather than a general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments were submitted in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best under the circumstances then obtaining; it does not negate the authority to submit proposed amendments in general elections. The term "election" normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote, and the word used in Article V concerning women's suffrage was "plebiscite," not "election," indicating that the framers distinguished the two terms. Considerations about whether a plebiscite simultaneous with general elections is wise address the wisdom, not the authority, of Congress's choice. The majority view, as set forth in Justice Sanchez's separate opinion, was otherwise, but the votes in favor thereof were insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional.

• Adequacy of Submission: The contested resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, giving the citizenry approximately eight months to be informed. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provided for publication in the Official Gazette, posting in public buildings and polling places, keeping copies in polling places for examination, and printing the full text of the resolutions on the back of the ballots. These were substantially the same means used to inform the people in connection with all prior amendments, from the original Constitution through the Parity Amendment. The sufficiency of submission depends on whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 fairly apprise the people of the gist or substance of the proposals — under R.B.H. No. 1, the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House from 120 to 180, and under R.B.H. No. 3, the authority given to members of Congress to serve as convention delegates without forfeiting their seats. The minority — those who concur in the Chief Justice's opinion — believed Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies this requirement. Six members of the Court, however, believed the Act and R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution. Since there were fewer than eight votes in favor of declaring the Act unconstitutional, the petitions were dismissed.

• Justiciability of the Constitutional Amendment Process — The question of whether Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violated the Constitution is justiciable and subject to judicial review. The power to propose amendments is derived from the Constitution, not from the people's inherent sovereignty, so Congress does not have the final say on whether its acts are within constitutional limits. This modifies the contrary stance in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, which had characterized a similar issue as a political question. The Court applied this doctrine by unanimously assuming jurisdiction over the petitions and proceeding to review the constitutionality of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 and Republic Act No. 4913.

• Constituent Assembly vs. Legislative Capacity — When proposing amendments to the Constitution, senators and representatives act not as members of Congress exercising legislative power, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. Their authority derives from the Constitution, unlike the people, who are the very source of all governmental power. The Court relied on this distinction to establish that Congress's acts in proposing amendments are constrained by constitutional limits and are reviewable by the judiciary.

• De Facto Officer Doctrine — Acts of persons holding office under color of title are valid insofar as the public is concerned; the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally and may be contested only directly through quo warranto proceedings. The Court applied this doctrine as an alternative ground: even if the members of Congress were merely de facto officers, their acts in proposing amendments and enacting Republic Act No. 4913 would remain valid, and their title could not be collaterally attacked in the petitions.

• Continuing Validity of Congress Despite Reapportionment Failure — The constitutional provision that "until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly" implies that Congress continues to function with existing representative districts upon expiration of the reapportionment period. Failure to discharge the mandatory duty of reapportionment does not automatically render Congress illegal or its members de facto officers. The Court applied this principle to reject the argument that the contested resolutions were null and void for having been approved by a de facto Congress.

• "the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress – acting as a constituent assembly – violates the Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified accordingly." — This passage states the unanimous holding on justiciability, establishing the Court's power to review the constitutional amendment process and expressly modifying Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.

• "the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people – as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours – to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law." — This passage articulates the theoretical foundation for the justiciability doctrine, distinguishing Congress's constituent capacity from its legislative function and locating the ultimate amending power in the people.

• "Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismissed, and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs." — This is the dispositive portion, revealing the unusual procedural outcome: six justices voted to strike down the measures but fell short of the eight votes required, resulting in dismissal.

• Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 — Foundational case establishing that the judiciary is the only constitutional organ that can determine the proper allocation of power among the several departments. Cited as the starting point for the Court's jurisdiction over constitutional questions involving coordinate branches.

• Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 — Previously held that the question of whether a given number of votes cast in Congress satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement for constitutional amendments was a political question. Expressly modified by the present decision, the Court holding that such issues are justiciable.

• Macias vs. Commission on Elections, L-18684 — Declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion representative districts for not apportioning according to the number of inhabitants. Cited as one of four cases weakening the political question doctrine of Mabanag and as the basis for the invalidation of Republic Act No. 3040.

• Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil. 866 — Held that a judge who had reached retirement age was at least a de facto judge whose title could not be assailed collaterally, even by a party to the suit before him. Cited to reject the argument that the de facto doctrine does not apply when the acts in question have not been completed or when the challenger is not a third party.

• Avelino vs. Cuenco, L-2851 — The Court proceeded to determine the number of senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate. Cited as one of four cases that rejected the political question theory and weakened Mabanag.

• Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520 — Nullified the election by senators of the majority party of two senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal for the minority party. Cited as one of four cases rejecting the political question doctrine.

• Section 1, Article XV, 1935 Constitution — The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose; such amendments shall be valid when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. The Court construed the term "election" as not requiring a special election, and held that the three-fourths vote requirement applies to the act of proposing amendments, not to the subsequent legislative act of providing for the mechanics of submission.

• Section 5, Article VI, 1935 Constitution — Provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 120 members, apportioned among the provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, with each province having at least one member; Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise; until such apportionment shall have been made, the House shall have the same number of members as fixed by law for the National Assembly. The Court held that the failure to make a valid apportionment did not render Congress illegal, the Constitution itself providing for continuance of existing districts.

• Section 1, Article VI, 1935 Constitution — Grants legislative power to Congress. The Court noted that the power to propose amendments is not included in this general grant, being instead conferred separately by Article XV.

• Section 1, Article II, 1935 Constitution — Provides that sovereignty resides in the people. Cited to establish that the power to make and amend the Constitution is an inherent power of the people.

• Section 2(1), Article VIII, 1935 Constitution — Confers upon the Supreme Court the power to declare treaties unconstitutional. Cited to stress the rigidity of the Constitution and the Court's review authority even over eminently political matters.

• Section 1, Article IX, 1935 Constitution — Authorizes impeachment of the President, Vice-President, Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution. Cited to illustrate that title to office remains unimpaired despite violation of a mandatory duty, until dismissal pursuant to a judgment of conviction.

• Section 18, Article VI, 1935 Constitution — Provides that all appropriation bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. Justice Bengzon cited this in his concurring opinion to reinforce that Republic Act No. 4913, being an appropriation measure, could not have been validly adopted in a joint session and therefore did not require the three-fourths vote under Article XV.

• Makalintal, J. — Concurred with the Chief Justice, adding that the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law may not be made to depend on factors not inherent in its provisions, such as the zeal with which they are carried out; the defect, if any, lay in implementation, not in the law itself. He also rejected the argument that ratification must necessarily be in a special election.

• Bengzon, J.P., J. — Concurred fully with the Chief Justice, adding that the three-fourths vote requirement under Section 1, Article XV applies only to the act of proposing amendments (determining their substance), not to the subsequent act of providing for the mechanics of submission, which may be done through an ordinary statute. He also argued that Republic Act No. 4913, being an appropriation measure, could not have been validly adopted in a joint session, reinforcing that Article XV does not apply to it.

• Fernando, J. — Concurred fully with the Chief Justice, adding observations on jurisdiction. He noted that while Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito followed the U.S. Supreme Court's Coleman vs. Miller in treating the amending process as political in its entirety, to rely automatically on the political question theory to avoid passing on compliance with Article XV might under certain circumstances be considered judicial abdication. He acknowledged that the view in Mabanag was a product of its times, influenced by the grave economic situation then confronting the country and the uncritical acceptance of American constitutional views.

• Sanchez, J. (separate opinion, concurred in by Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar, and Castro, JJ.) — Held that Republic Act No. 4913 must be stricken down as unconstitutional for failure to properly submit the proposed amendments to the people for ratification within the meaning and intendment of Section 1, Article XV. Justice Sanchez argued that the word "submitted" requires that the government strain every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, the proposed amendments, and their meaning, nature, and effects. He dissected the dissemination mechanics in Section 2 of the Act and found them inadequate: the Official Gazette does not reach the barrios; posted copies are in English and may not be noticed; copies in polling places are unavailable before election day and voting time is not study time; copies in native languages are merely discretionary ("when practicable"); and the Commission on Elections is merely a passive agency that may not distribute copies at all. He further noted that during the general election campaign, the constitutional amendments were crowded out by the election of candidates, and the fortunes of many elective officials were inextricably intertwined with the results of the plebiscite vote. He observed that in all three prior instances of constitutional amendment (1939, 1940, and 1947), the vote was never held simultaneously with the election of officials. Six justices concurred in this view, but the number was insufficient to declare the Act unconstitutional.

• Reyes, J.B.L., J. — Concurred in the result with Justice Sanchez's opinion, arguing that the framers of the Constitution, having required the highest majority (three-fourths) even to approve a mere proposal to amend, could not have intended that such amendments be ratified at an election where the people's attention is diverted by extraneous issues such as the choice of local and national officials. He found corroboration in the uniform past practice of submitting all prior amendments in special elections exclusively devoted to the issue of ratification.