Gontang vs. Alayan

A local government official sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel where the action seeks damages that could result in personal liability; such counsel’s authority continues on appeal and in subsequent proceedings for the execution of judgment.

Petitioner Romeo A. Gontang was the incumbent Mayor of Gainza, Camarines Sur, while respondent Engr. Cecilia Alayan was appointed Municipal Government Department Head (Municipal Assessor) of the same municipality. The dispute implicated the authority of private attorneys to represent a local government official in litigation arising from a mandamus action that included claims for damages, and the Rules of Court provisions governing counsel’s authority on appeal.

Respondent Engr. Cecilia Alayan was appointed in 2000 as Municipal Government Department Head (Municipal Assessor) on temporary status. In May 2001, she applied for change of status from temporary to permanent, which the Civil Service Commission-Camarines Sur Field Office denied for lack of relevant experience. On appeal, the CSC-Regional Office, in its August 13, 2001 Order, approved her application effective May 22, 2001. She then reported for work and sought recognition of her appointment and the grant of the emoluments of the position from petitioner, then incumbent Mayor Romeo A. Gontang. Her requests having been denied, she filed before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City on February 5, 2002 a petition for mandamus, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019, against petitioner in his official capacity as Municipal Mayor of Gainza, Camarines Sur. The RTC dismissed the petition for having been prematurely filed because the Order of the CSC-Regional Office had not attained finality due to the pendency of the appeal before the CSC. Respondent appealed to the CA which, in its June 20, 2003 decision, ruled in her favor, holding that the pendency of an appeal is not a justification to prevent her from assuming office. Said decision attained finality on August 10, 2007 with the denial of petitioner’s petition before the Supreme Court.

However, prior to the CA decision, the CSC set aside the August 13, 2001 Order of the CSC-Regional Office on May 8, 2003 upon a finding that there was no permanent appointment as the concurrence of the local Sanggunian was not obtained. Respondent’s appeal of the CSC decision was denied by the CA, and such denial became final on October 6, 2006.

On March 17, 2008, respondent moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution by the RTC in Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019 for the alleged unsatisfied judgment award in the amount of P837,022.50, representing her unpaid salaries and allowances from May 8, 2003 to October 6, 2006 during the pendency of her appeal of the CSC Resolutions. Petitioner opposed the motion, claiming full satisfaction of the judgment after having already paid respondent the net sum of P391,040.60 covering all benefits for the period from the date the CSC-CSFO approved her request for change of status on August 13, 2001 to May 7, 2003, the day before the CSC denied her application for permanent appointment.

Finding that the May 8, 2003 CSC Resolution became final and executory only on October 6, 2006 after respondent’s appeal was resolved by the CA and with no appeal having been taken therefrom, the RTC ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution in the order dated October 22, 2008. It also subsequently denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Dissatisfied, petitioner, through Attorneys Joselito I. Fandiño and Voltaire V. Saulon, the counsels he had retained since the initial stage of the litigation, filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the two Orders of the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of legal authority on the part of Atty. Saulon, a private attorney, to represent the Municipality of Gainza, Camarines Sur. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the assailed March 22, 2010 Resolution. Hence, the instant petition.

• Full Satisfaction of Judgment: Petitioner opposed respondent’s motion for alias writ of execution, claiming that the judgment had already been fully satisfied by payment of the net sum of P391,040.60 covering all benefits from August 13, 2001 to May 7, 2003.
• Authority of Private Counsel: Petitioner maintained that the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of unauthorized representation by private lawyers, and that Attys. Fandiño and Saulon had authority to represent him because the mandamus case sought damages that could result in personal liability and their authority continued on appeal.

• Unauthorized Representation: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of unauthorized representation of petitioner by private lawyers.
• Continuation of Counsel’s Authority: Whether the authority of Attys. Fandiño and Saulon to represent petitioner continued up to his appeal and the filing of the petition for certiorari with the CA respecting the execution of the RTC judgment.

• Unauthorized Representation: Yes. The CA erred. A local government official sued in his official capacity may engage private counsel where the action seeks damages that could result in personal liability; the mandamus case sought damages against petitioner personally, so private representation was proper.
• Continuation of Counsel’s Authority: Yes. The authority continued. Under Rule 138, Sections 22 and 23, an attorney who appears in the lower court is presumed to continue representing the client on appeal unless he withdraws, and attorneys have authority to take appeals and act in ordinary judicial procedure.

• Unauthorized Representation: The present case stemmed from Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019 for mandamus and damages. The damages sought therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence petitioner cannot be deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. Alinsug vs. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental holds that where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private counsel. The rationale is that a government official ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity may later be held to have exceeded his authority; his defense would then have been underwritten by the people’s money, which ordinarily should have been his personal expense, and personal liability can attach to him without his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. Correa vs. CFI held that municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of their officers, except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law and in conformity with the requirements thereof. In such instance, representation by private counsel has been sanctioned. Where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. Albuera vs. Torres held that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. Consequently, Attys. Fandiño and Saulon had authority to represent petitioner at the initial stages of the litigation.
• Continuation of Counsel’s Authority: The authority of Attys. Fandiño and Saulon continued even up to petitioner’s appeal and the filing of the petition for certiorari with the CA respecting the execution of the RTC judgment. Rule 138, Section 22 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. Rule 138, Section 23 provides that attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. Province of Bulacan vs. CA further states that such questions as what action or pleading to file, where and when to file it, what are its formal requirements, what should be the theory of the case, what defenses to raise, how the claim or defense may be proved, when to rest the case, as well as those affecting the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality or immateriality of certain evidence and the burden of proof are within the authority of the attorney to decide. It was therefore an error for the CA to have dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground of unauthorized representation.

• Private Counsel for Local Government Officials Sued in Official Capacity — A local government official sued in his official capacity may engage private counsel where the action seeks damages that could result in personal liability. The rationale is that an official ostensibly acting in official capacity may later be held to have exceeded authority; if his defense were underwritten by public funds, the expense should ordinarily have been personal, and personal liability may attach without the benefit of counsel of his own choice. The Court applied this because the mandamus petition in Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019 sought to hold petitioner personally liable for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, appearance fees, and costs. The Court also noted that rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials could deprive a party of redress for a valid grievance, and that a provincial governor sued in official capacity may engage private counsel when the complaint contains a prayer for moral damages.
• Continuation of Counsel’s Authority on Appeal — Under Rule 138, Section 22, an attorney who appears de parte in a lower court is presumed to continue representing the client on appeal unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. Under Rule 138, Section 23, attorneys have authority to bind clients in taking appeals and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. The Court applied these provisions to hold that Attys. Fandiño and Saulon’s authority continued up to petitioner’s appeal and the filing of the petition for certiorari with the CA respecting execution of the RTC judgment.

• "It can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten by the people’s money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice." — This passage, quoted from Alinsug, states the rationale for permitting private counsel to represent local government officials where personal liability may attach.
• "In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by private counsel." — This sentence states the rule applied to petitioner’s situation.
• "Consequently Attys. Fandiño and Saulon had the authority to represent petitioner at the initial stages of the litigation and this authority continued even up to his appeal and the filing of the petition for certiorari with the CA respecting the execution of the RTC judgment." — This is the Court’s application of the private-counsel doctrine and the continuation-of-authority rule to the facts.
• "It was therefore an error for the CA to have dismissed the said petition for certiorari on the ground of unauthorized representation." — This is the dispositive reasoning on the sole issue.

• Alinsug vs. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, G.R. No. 108232, August 23, 1993, 225 SCRA 553 — The principal controlling precedent cited by the Court. It established that local government officials sued in their official capacity may engage private counsel where personal liability is sought, and supplied the rationale quoted in the decision.
• Mancenido vs. CA, G.R. No. 118605, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 419, 426 — Cited in support of the proposition that the damages sought in the mandamus case could have resulted in personal liability, so petitioner was not improperly represented by private counsel.
• Province of Bulacan vs. CA, G.R. No. 126232, November 27, 1998, 299 SCRA 442, 453-454 — Cited for the authority of attorneys to decide what action or pleading to file, the theory of the case, defenses, evidence, and related matters within ordinary judicial procedure, supporting the continuation of counsel’s authority.
• Correa vs. CFI — Cited within the Alinsug quotation for the rule that municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of their officers except if and when, and only to the extent that, they acted by authority of law and in conformity with its requirements.
• Albuera vs. Torres — Cited within the Alinsug quotation for the rule that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage private counsel when the complaint contains allegations and a prayer for moral damages that, if due, must be satisfied in a private capacity.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The petition before the Supreme Court was filed under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the CA Resolutions. The Court granted the petition and remanded the case to the CA.
• Rule 138, Section 22, Rules of Court — An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court is presumed to continue representing his client on appeal unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. The Court applied this to hold that Attys. Fandiño and Saulon’s authority continued on appeal.
• Rule 138, Section 23, Rules of Court — Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. The Court cited this to support the continuation of counsel’s authority to file the petition for certiorari.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Mariano C. Del Castillo, Jose Portugal Perez, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (designated additional member per Special Order No. 1408 dated January 15, 2013).